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Full text of "Non-fighting forces of the United Nations : An instrument for the pacific settlement of disputes"

THE NON-FIGHTING FORCES OF THE 

UNITED NATIONS: AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE 

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 






By 
JOAN SACKNITZ CARVER 



A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF 

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 



UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 
December, 1965 



DEDICATION 
To Jay and Jimmy 



^ 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

When one comes bo the end of a graduate program and 
bhe completion of a dissertation, there are many persons to 
whom a debt of gratitude is owed. To all those who guided 
me in my graduate courses and who assisted me with this 
study, 1 express my sincere thanks. 

T am particularly indehted to Dr. Frederick Harbmann. 
Not only did Dr. Hartmann stimulate my interest in bhe field 
of international relations, hut he also directed my attention 
to the subject of peace-keeping groups. His perceptive 
comments and constant encouragement have been invaluable bo 
this study, I am deeply grateful for his generous assistance, 

My thanks go too to Dr. Arnold Heidenheimer for his 
valued instruction and guidance and for his useful sug- 
gestions in connection with, this study. I wish to express 
as well my gratitude to Dr. Manning Dauer for his assistance 
and for his unfailing ability to resolve administrative 
crises with dispatch and kindness. 

I would like to thank bhe University of Florida for 
the financial aid which made possible my graduate studies 
and bhe preparation of this dissertation. I am grateful bo 
the staff of the library of the University of Florida for its 
assistance and to Mrs. Thyra Johnston for typing the manu- 
script. 

iii 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . iii 

LIST OH' TABLES x 

LIST OF FIGURES xi 

Chapter 

I. INTRODUCTION. 1 

1 1 . PEAC B-K E EPI NG TH ROUGH OBSERV ATI ON- A FORMATI VE 
STAGE: THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN 

PALESTINE 17 

Introduction 17 

Conditions lor Creation of the Truce 

Organization 18 

The United Nations involvement 20 

The crisis area: internal conditions ... 21 

The precedents for peace-keeping 22 

Establishment of the United Nations Truce 

Supervision Organization . , 29 

The establishment 29 

The legal foundations 55 

The mandate. • 55 

Characteristics of bhe Truce Organization . . 58 

Leadership ...... 

Support for the Truce Organization .... 4-1 

Hen for the Truce Organization 41 

iv 



Chapter Page 

Money: the financial base 52 

Material! the logistic base 56 

The legal status of the Truce Supervision 

Organization 60 

The Truce Supervision Organization in Action 65 

The role of the Truce Supervision 

Organization 63 

Organization for action 6'+ 

The functioning of the observers 70 

Conclusions 7 A *- 

III. PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION-AN 

ESTABLISHED INSTRUMENT: THE UNITED NATIONS 

OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON 80 

Introduction ... ....... 80 

Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL 83 

The crisis area: internal conditions in 

Lebanon 8J 

The United Nations involvement 86 

The precedents for peace-keeping. ..... 87 

The Establishment of the Observation Group . 88 

The establishment , 88 

The legal foundations ..... 92 

The mandate 9'+ 

Characteristics of UNOGIL 104 

Leadership of UNOGIL lO'l 

Support for UNOGIL. . 110 



v 



V 



Chapter Page 

Men for UNOGIL 110 

Money: the financial base of UNOGIL. . 115 

Material: the logistic base of UNOGIL, 118 

The legal status of UNOGIL 119 

UNOGIL in Action ....,.,,, 122 

The role of the observers .,....,. 122 

The organization of UNOGIL 124 

The functioning of UNOGIL 126 

Phase I . 126 

Phase II 136 

Conclusions, . . . , 141 

IV. BEYOND THE OBSERVERS: THE UNITED NATIONS 

EMERGENCY FORCE 146 

Introduction ,..,..,.,, 146 

Conditions for Creation of UNEF 147 

The crisis area • 147 

The United Nations involvement 148 

The Establishment of UNEF. 155 

The establishment ....... 155 

The legal foundations of UNEF ...... 165 

The mandate 170 

Characteristics of UNEF 177 

Leadership of UNEF. 178 

Support for UNEF 184 

vi 









Chapter Page 

Men for UNEF 184 

Money: the financial base of UNEF. . . 190 

Material: the logistic base of UNEF. . 207 

The legal status of UNEF . 212 

UNEF in Action 216 

The role of bhe Force 216 

The organization of UNEF, 218 

The functioning of UNEF 222 

Phase Is the withdrawal 222 

Phase II: the stabilization of the 

area. 229 

Conclusions. 237 

V. AN EXPANSION OF PEACE-KEEPING: THE UNITED 

NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO-ITS ORIGINS . . . 242 

Introduction 242 

Conditions for Creation of the United 

Nations Force , . , 244 

The crisis area: internal conditions in 

the Congo 244 

The United Nations involvement 249 

The Establishment of the United Nations 

jt! orce ,»,...»........... c-yj. 

The establishment ...... . 251 

The legal foundations of the United 

Nations Force 255 

The mandate of the United Nations Force . 264 

Conclusions 284 

vii 



y 



Chapter Page 

VI. THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO: THE 

OUTER LIMITS OF PEACE-KEEPING? 287 

Characteri sties of the United Nations Force. 287 

Leadership of ONUC 287 

Support for ONUC 293 

Men for the United Nations Porce . . . 293 

Money: the financial basis of the 

Porce . . . 298 

Material: the logistic base of the 

Force 312 

The legal status of the United Nations 

i. Ul Ow# a • • « « 9 « e tt /I y 

ONUC in Action . 323 

The role of ONUC 325 

The organization of the Force 330 

The functioning of the United Nations 

Force 33^ 

Phase I 334 

Phase II 338 

Phase III 3^3 

Phase IV 351 

Conclusions 378 

VII. THE NON-FIGHTING FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 389 

Recent Uses of the Non-Fighting Force. . . . 389 

The Non-Fighting Force: Its 

Institutionalized Side 39^ 

viii 



Chapter Page 

Institutionalization of a philosophy of 

action » . 398 

Institutionalization of a philosophy of 

force composition 4-08 

Institutionalization of a methodology , . 4-12 

Institutionalization of a Force 

bureaucracy 417 

The significance of institutionalization. 4-20 

The Non-Fighting Force: Its N on- 
Institutional iz.ed Side 121 

Conclusions , 4-31 

¥111. THE PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF THE NON- 
FIGHTING force ny\- 

APPENDIXES , W 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 465 

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 502 



IX 



LIST OE TABLES 
Table Page 

1. The Growth of UNOGIL: The Increase in 

Observers Over the Months 114- 

2. The Scope of Observational Activity by 

UNOGIL from June through October, 1958 138 

3. Source of Troops for ONUC 297 

A-l. Record of Critical Votes in the Security 

Council on the Establishment and Support of 
Peace-Keeping Groups. . 4-55 

A-2 V . Selected Critical "Votes in the General 

Assembly on the Establishment and Support of 
Peace-Keeping Groups 4-56 

B-l. The National Composition of UNTSO 4-58 

B-2. The National Composition of UNOGIL 4-59 

B-3. The National Composition of UNEF Over the 

B-4. The National Composition of ONUC at Selected 

Times 461 

B-5. The National Composition of the United 

Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYF) 463 

C-l. A Comparison of Peace-Keeping Expenses and 
Regular United Nations Expenses in Selected 
Years and Selected Periods 4-64 






LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 

1. Organization chart of United Nations Truce 

Supervision Organization 65 



o 

c » 



Organization chart of United Nations 

Observation Group in Lebanon 125 



5. The relationship of the Force's power to its 

responsibilities over time . 326 

l \-» Organisation chart of United Nations 

operation in the Congo 531 



xi 



CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 

The blue berets of the United Nations military men 
who do not fight serve as a symbol of the world's concern 
for peace. In mid-1964 the "blue berets" watched over the 
peace of the world in remote and scattered areas: in the 
hot; deserts of Sinai and the Gaza Strip; in mountainous and 
barren Yemen; in the borderland of Kashmir; in the lovely, 
troubled isle of Cyprus. In the past they have served in 
Greece, Indonesia, Lebanon, the Congo, and West New Guinea. 

In this study it is proposed to examine the develop- 
ment and use by the United Nations of the military presence 
as an instrument of pacific settlement. The non-fighting 
force, 1 as we will term the military presence, is an inter- 
national military contingent which is neither equipped for 
real hostilities nor intended really to fight. Called into 
being not for purposes of collective security, but for those 
of pacific settlement, it is injected into a situation of 
tension, instability, and potential violence to prevent or 



Non-fighting force is used in this study to mean ^ 
both military observer groups and military forces like UNEF. 
Some authors' restrict its application to the military forces. 
The term is used by Lincoln Bloom field in The United Nations 
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960), 
p. 66. 






2 

halt thai; violence through the mere fact of its presence. 
It represents in tangible form the concern of the world 
community that; fighting be prevented. It serves as a human 
truce line, powerful, not in and of itself, but powerful 
"because of what it represents. 

The non-fighting force is one of the most significant 
innovations in the realm of pacific settlement made by the 
United Nations. It is both a reflection of the challenges 
which have confronted that body and a commentary on United 
Nations efforts to meet those challenges. The world with 
which the United Nations has had to cope has been a complex 
and difficult one. Problems are many and hardly made more 
simple by the setting within which they occur: one of a 
world complicated by its division into conflicting power 
blocs; by the recent rise of a number of turbulent, dis- 
contented, newly-independent states; and by the awesome 
destructive power of nuclear weapons. In this difficult and 
uneasy world outbreaks of violence have been frequent, 
particularly in the areas just emerging from, colonial status, 
The solutions to the problems causing the violence are not 
easy to find. In most cases the issues have not been black 
or white — -neither the identity of one "aggressor," who 
might be dealt with handily by sanctions, nor just and 
acceptable solutions have always "been clearly evident. Yet 
for the United Nations to do nothing in a crisis merely 



- 






because a solution was not obvious would not only be an • 
indictment of its effectiveness but dangerous and irrespon- 
sible. The possibility of small conflicts expanding into 
large, of brush-fire wars becoming world wars, is omnipresent, 

The non-fighting force is one of the answers of the 
United Nations to this sort of challenge. The non-fighting 
force is injected into the problem area as a means of 
holding the situation in abeyance, while a peaceful solu- 
tion is sought. The non-fighting force is a "manifestation 
of the view that an organization which is incapable of 
providing collective security may yet contribute signifi- ■ 
cantly to peace and security if it concentrates on helping 

states to avoid drifting too near the brink of war, and not 

2 
on rescuing them from the brink itself." 

We have referred to the non-fighting force as a 
significant innovation of the United Nations. This state- 
ment should be qualified. The non-fighting force as a 
pacific settlement technique is primarily, but not entirely, 
a United Nations product. There are forerunners of the 
non-fighting force in pre-United Nations days — though these 
are few in number and apparently influenced United Nations 



2 Inis Claude, "The United Nations and the Use of 
Force," International Conciliation , No. 532 (March, 1961), 
p. 375. 






efforts little. 5 Under the League of Nations there were two 
cases, Vilna and the Saar, in which an international police 
force was brought into existence. The two main League 
experiments with a force were both connected with ensuring 
that plebiscites conducted by the League would be fair. It 
should be noted that such an international police force 
differs in basic conception from the collective security 
military force. The police force is designed more to keep 
order by its presence than to restore the peace by its 
action. The police force usually operates on the basis of 
consent and has limited powers as well as limited functions. 
The first effort of the League to establish an inter- 
national police force came in connection with the Vilna 
situation. After the Polish-led occupation of Vilna in 
1920 the League set up an international force to ensure a 
fair and impartial vote in a plebiscite to determine Vilna' s 
future. Under a League Council resolution of November, 
1920, a force was authorized which was to consist of 1,500 
to 1,800 men from eight states (Belgium, Britain, Spain, 
France, .Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). Plans 



T 



-''bespite the similarities of the non-fighting forces 
used by the' League and those set up under the United Nations, 
there is little or no evidence that those responsible for 
the United Nations forces took much account of or were very 
much influenced by the League experience. There was no 
mention, for example, in the establishment of UNEF of the 
League experience. See Gabriella Rosner, The Un ited 
Nations Emergency Force (New York: Columbia University 
Press, IVbjTT p.^22~7~ 






for financing the force were laid and its functions defined. 
The nations contributing the men were to supply their con- 
tingents with equipment, pay their regular salaries, and 
advance. funds for their transportation and maintenance. All 
expenses over and above those normal to maintain the troops 
in their home state would be repaid by the League, with re- 
imbursement of the League by Poland and Lithuania. This 
project was abandoned, however, before it could come to 
fruition when it became apparent that it could be executed 
only with great difficulty. There was too much opposition 
and too little real support for the League action. Poland 
and Lithuania accepted in theory the idea of the plebiscite 
guaranteed by an international force, but in practice co- 
operated but little. Opposition by the Soviet Union may 
have delivered the final blow to the plan, for the states 
contributing to the force were not anxious to send their 
troops in when a neighboring great power objected. 

The second effort to establish' an international force, 
again to maintain conditions for a fair plebiscite, was more 
successful. In 193^ the League Council created an inter- 
national force which operated with French and German consent 
to ensure order before, during, and after the Saar plebiscite. 



William Frye, A United Nations Peace Force . (New 
York: Oceana for The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 1957), p. 50. 



The Saar force had a function similar to that of the United 
Nations non-fighting forces — to exercise by its presence a 
restraint on the use of force. 

There are parallels not only in purpose but in struc- 
ture, legal regulation, and control between the Saar force 
and those forces used by the United Nations in Suez, the 
Congo, and Cyprus. The Saar force was composed of 3,300 
men supplied by four nations: Britain, Italy, the Nether- 
lands, and Sweden. It was under the command of a British- 
appointed Commander-in-Chief who directed the staff officers 
of each national unit. The consent of the parties concerned 
was a prerequisite to the formation of the force; while an 
advisory committee composed of three members appointed by 
the Council and assisted by a sub-committee of the states 
contributing to the force had wide latitude in making plans 
for the creation and direction of the force.. Financial 
arrangements were based on the principle that the League 
would bear expenses exceeding those normally made by the 
contributing states to maintain their contingents. Out of 
these administrative and financial arrangements came an 

organization able to execute its functions with ease and 

5 
efficiency and without the use of arms. 



^The use of an international force at Letitia is 
sometimes cited as a precedent for the non-fighting forces 
of the United Nations. See, for example, ibid . , p. 51. 
In this case the force was not really very international 
however. In a conflict between Peru and Colombia over the 






Despite the success of the Saar experiment, there 
was no consideration at the United Nations preparatory 
conferences or at the San Francisco Conference in 19^5 of 
the establishment of a permanent non-fighting force. The 
importance that this sort of force could have in stabilizing 
crisis situations was evidently not foreseen. All efforts 
to create an international military force were concentrated 
on the establishment of a fighting force under Article 4-5 
of the Charter. 

Thus, there were only a few precedents either 
theoretical or actual for the United Nations use of military 
men for peace-keeping purposes. The history of the non- 
fighting force is short; for all practical purposes the 
evolution of the non-fighting' force from tentative begin- 
nings in observer groups to small armies occurs within the 
lifetime of the United Nations. . 

If the uses by the United Nations of the military 
presence were placed on a continuum, running from the least 
to the most ambitious in size and scope, they would fall 
into three broad groups. At one end of the continuum would 
be the small, multi-national observer groups used primarily 



Colombian settlement of Letitia, the League Council resolved 
the issue by placing Letitia under the administration of a 
League Commission for one year. The Commission was assisted 
by an "international force." The international force was, 
in fact, composed only of Colombian soldiers deputized by 
the League of Nations and wearing special arm-bands. 






8 

early in the history of the United. Nations, The larger 
observer groups, such as the one used in Palestine, would 
fall in the middle. At the far end of the range would be 
the small armies established by the United Nations to keep 
the peace. Some characteristics common to all these groups 
can be observed. In each case the situation which brought 
in the United Nations was one in which fighting had occurred 
and was liable to break out again; in which emotions over 
the issues were high and agreement not readily reached. 
Most involved nations which had. gained their independence 
since the Second World War. The purpose of the observers 
was to quiet the situation not through forceful means — for 
they were few in number and unarmed. — but through the moral 
and psychological effect conveyed by their presence. The 
purpose and means of the peace-keeping force were similar 
bo those of the observers though a limited use of arms was 
possible to them. 

The small observer groups might be considered as the 
prototype of the military presence. The small observer 
group technique has been used by the United Nations in three 
situations: in Greece from 19'lB bo 195'+; in Indonesia from 
194-7 to 1951 ; and in Kashmir from 19*9 to the present. In 
Greece obsei'vation was carried out along a 500 mile border 
by between JO and 40 military observers operating in teams 



9 

of six. The personnel, as well as the equipment necessary 

n 
for the mission at the outset,' came from eight states — 

Australia, Brazil, China, France, Mexico, the Netherlands, 

the United Kingdom, and the United States — all of which 

were members of the Special Committee on the Balkans. in 

Indonesia approximately 68 observers served, selected from 

the same countries that were members of the Consular 

Commission: Australia, Belgium, China, France, the United 

Kingdom, and the United States. In Kashmir, observers have 

been on duty since early 19^9 to aid in. maintaining the 

C0aS e™fire between India and Pakistan. The observers have 

numbered about sixty over the years. The initial seconding 

states were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, 

Norway, and Sweden. In all these cases the observer teams 

were under the direction, at least initially, of the special 



b U.N. Doc. A/935, PP. 21-22. 

^Establishment and maintenance of the observers raised 
serious financial questions because the initial appropriation 
for the Special Committee on the Balkans did not include a 
sum large enough to cover observer costs. A request to the 
Secretary-General for additional funds received a negative 
response. Thus, the Special Committee decided to accept 
offers of equipment with the recommendation that the donors 
be reimbursed at the next General Assembly session. Later 
budgets did include an appropriation to cover the observer 
costs, U.N. Doc. A/574, P. 3. 

^Pakistan was also a member of the Special Committee 
on the Balkans, but apparently sent no observers. Seats on 
the Special Committee were open for Poland and the Soviet 
Union but were never taken. Had they taken their seats 
presumably they might also have participated in the observer 
group's activity. This might have been precedent-setting. 
. U.N. Doc. A/57'+, p. 2. 






10 

commissions established by the General Assembly or the Se- 
curity Council to work out a solution to the problems at 
issue. In at least two instances the initiative in the 
use of the military observers came from the field organiza- 
tion. The number of observers used in these situations was 
small, and the scope of the mission was correspondingly 
limited. Their primary function was to patrol and to ob- 
serve. The value of the observer groups has been attested 

to repeatedly, however, both by statement and by the practice 

10 
of using them for long periods of time. 

A second level of United Nations peace-keeping 

activity can be detected in the ambitious observer group, 

as represented by the United Nations Truce Supervision 

Organization in Palestine, the United Nations Observation 

Group in Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, the United Nations 



;, In Greece the observers operated under the United 
Nations Special Committee on the Balkans until the end of 
1951 and under the Balkan Sub-Commission of the Peace 
Observation Commission from 1952 to 195*M in Kashmir under 
the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan; and 
in Indonesia under the Consular Commission and the Good 
Offices Committee. 

1() Por example the Third Interim Report of the India- 
Pakistan Commission had this to say about the observers: 
"Although, a number of minor incidents took place during the 
first six and one-half months before the cease-fire line 
was finally demarcated, observer teams, composed of officers 
from Belgium, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and the United States 
headed by Commission's military adviser, in close cooperation 
with military authorities on both sides, greatly contributed 
to preventing the development of any of those into major 
breaches of the cease-fire." U.N. Doc. 8/4-30, Rev. 1, p. 
. 31. 



11 

Observation Mission in Yemen. These groups have been con- 
siderably larger and more expensive than the prototype 
observer teams. They have ranged in size from 200 to 600 
men and have been supplied with a substantial amount of 
communications and reconnaissance equipment. Their mission 
is correspondingly expanded. It may include investigation 
as well as observation. World opinion may be mobilized to 
supplement the observer presence as a deterrant to aggres- 
sion. Such groups move the United Nations a step closer to 
use of a full-fledged military force. Both the Palestine 
and Lebanon endeavors were ambitious enough to qualify as 
miniature armed forces. Their experience is directly rele- 
vant to the emergence of the technique of the peace-keeping 
force. 

This emergence of the full-fledged military force 
takes place with the creation of the United Nations Emergency 
Force, a force of some 6,000 men, to cope with the Suez 
crisis in 1956. it was followed hj the United Nations Force 
in the Congo, created in I960 and ranging in size from 
15,000 to 20,000 men, and the Force in Cyprus, set up in 
1964 and numbering about 7»000. These forces represent the 
furthest extension of the United Nations development of 
peace-keeping techniques. Not only were they far larger in 
size and more expensive than the observer groups, but they 
also had somewhat broader powers at their disposal. Although 






12 

in theory and in most cases the powers of the peace-keeping 
force are only slightly greater than those of the observer 
group, in practice considerably greater powers have been 
exercised at times, particularly by the Force in the Congo. 

This study will examine comparatively and in depth 
the non-fighting force technique as utilized in four cases: 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in 
Palestine, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, 
the United Nations Emergency Force, and the United Nations 
Force in the Congo, Reference will be made as well to the 
recent uses of this technique in Yemen and Cyprus. 

There are striking differences in the characteristics 
of these four groups: differences first in the size of the 
contingents, which range from the 689 man maximum of the 
Palestine group to the 19,707 man maximum force used in the 
Congo; differences too in the situation which called the 
units into being. In Palestine the organization was there 
primarily to maintain a truce imposed on Jews and Arabs by 
the United Nations. In Lebanon the organization was 
stationed at Lebanese borders to observe and stop infiltra- 
tion from without by spotting it. In Suez the force was to 
stabilize the international relationships of the states in- 
volved by making possible the withdrawal of British, French, 
and Israeli forces from Egypt and ensuring against a re- 
sumption of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. In the 



13 
Congo the United Nations Force was to help establish 
internal order in the newly independent nation, thereby 
bringing about the withdrawal of Belgian forces brought in 
because of post-independence turbulence, preventing the 
intervention of outside powers, and aiding the Congo to 
become a viable state. Bobh the Lebanese and Congo situations 
were complicated by overtones of civil war. 

Despite the admittedly significant differences be- 
tween the groups, they can be considered as a unit because 
of all they share. All are composed of military men; all 
are used in situations of tension, instability, actual or 
potential fighting. All initially have a common purpose, to 
promote peaceful settlement by curbing violence through the 
effect of their organized and disciplined presence as repre- 
sentatives of the United Nations. Although they may be 
armed, they are backed by the prestige and power of the 
organization rather than primarily by the power of weapons. 
At the same time, the discipline of the personnel makes them 
capable of quick and effective response on behalf of the 
organization within a context where the use of force is or 
may become prevalent. 

The study is divided into two main parts. In the 
first section case studies of the four peace-keeping groups 
are presented. In each case an examination is undertaken of 
the origins, characteristics, and operation of the group. 



14 

Political, legal, financial, and. administrative factors are 
taken into account;. An effort has "been made to make each of 
the cases parallel the others as closely as possible in 
order to facilitate generalization. The second part of the 
study is devoted to an analysis of the technique of the 
non-fighting force, based on the material developed in the 
case studies. 

The objectives of this analysis of the non-fighting 
force technique as an instrument of peaceful settlement are 
two-fold. The first aim is to determine the nature of the 
instrument which has been developed. We are particularly 
concerned with the degree to which an institutionalized 
technique, readily available in recognizable form for use 
in crises, has emerged and the degree to which each force 
is unique. Going beyond the question of extent of institu- 
tionalization is that of the reasons and significance of 
the institutionalization which has occurred. The analysis 
of the nature of the non-fighting force as an instrument of 
peaceful settlement leads more or less directly to the 
second, central purpose of the study: the evaluation of the 
performance and potential of the non-fighting force. The 
conditions which determine the effectiveness of the non- 
fighting force as an instrument of peaceful settlement are 
hypothesized on the basis of the experience thus far with 
them. On the framework of the evaluation, first, of the 



15 

instrument as it exists and, second, of the conditions of 
its effective use, some tentative conclusions are put forth 
as to the potential for the future of the non-fighting force. 

The justification for a study such as this one rests 
in the past and potential significance of the non-fighting 
force as a technique for pacific settlement and in the 
dearth of comparative studies on the force itself. 

Almost all the studies of the peace-keeping groups 
done thus far have concentrated on a particular use of the 
force rather than on the force, considered abstractly, as 
an instrument of peaceful settlement. It is hoped that by 
using a comparative case study approach, some conclusions 
can be reached with regard to both the nature of the force 
and to the conditions under which it may be used successfully. 
These conclusions might then serve as the hypotheses of later 
studies, enabling us to refine and elaborate our knowledge 
of peace-keeping endeavors. 

To go beyond what has been done in analyzing the non- 
fighting force as a peace-keeping instrument seems important 
not only for scholarly but also for practical reasons. The 
force is being used more and more often. Proposals for the 
creation of ad hoc forces to meet new crises come with in- 
creasing frequency as do those for a permanent force of some 
sort. As early as 19^8 Trygve Lie, then Secretary-General, 
proposed a guard force of 1,000 to 5,000 men — a proposal 






16 

unenthusiastically received and so emasculated as to be 
transformed into a resolution to establish a small field 
service. Not much was said about non-fighting forces in the 
early 1950' s, perhaps because fighting forces were still too 
much in the forefront. From 1956 forward, however, under 
the impetus of the successes of the United Nations Emergency 
Force, proposals for a permanent force have come forth 
steadily, seriously, and at times with impressive origins. 
In general, these proposals have originated less often with 
members of the United Nations Secretariat than with indi- 
vidual statesmen, United Nations delegations, Governments, 
and non-governmental organizations. One of the most per- 
sistent advocates of some sort of permanent force has been 
Lester Pearson of Canada; among the most influential advocates 
were Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. 

In the face of these efforts to make more and more 
extensive use of the non-fighting force as an arm of the 
United Nations, it seems that it is time to evaluate on the 
basis of past experience the merits and usefulness of the 
non-fighting force. 



CHAPTER II 

PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSEHVATION-A FORMATIVE STAGE: 
THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN PALESTINE 

Int roduction 

In Palestine in May, 19^8, violent fighting erupted 
between Israeli and. Arab. A truce supervision organization, 
created by the United Nations to help still that violence, 
stands as one of the pioneering ventures in the field of 
peace-keeping through theyuse of the military man in a 
non-fighting capacity. 

In the first decade of the United Nations there were 
other uses of military observers— in Greece, in Indonesia, 
in Kashmir, for example. Yet the Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation in Palestine differs from these truce observation 
teams. The difference lies primarily in the extensiveness 
and scope of the operation, but this difference is so great 
as to be almost one of kind, not merely size. 

In Palestine the Truce Supervision Organization 
reached a total size of over 600 men and had at its dispo- 
sal twelve airplanes, 150 jeeps and trucks, and four ships 
with their crews. It had extensive communications equipment 



17 



18 

and its own communications system. It was , in short, almost 

1 
a little army — albeit a little army without guns. 

Many of the rudiments of the military force are found 
in the Palestine group. In the problems faced and solved, 
in the accumulation of precedents and personnel experienced 
in the use of the military, there are links, direct as well 
as indirect, between the Palestine experience and the later 
use of the non-fighting force in more ambitious endeavors. 
The Palestine venture moves the United Nations a step for- 
ward in the employment of the non-fighting force to carry 
through its objectives. 

To fully understand the place of the Unit;ed Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization in the development of the 
non-fighting force as a technique of pacific settlement, it 
is necessary to briefly review the history of the Organiza- 
tion: its origins, characteristics, and functioning. 

Con dition s for Creation of the Truce Organization 

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 



"Comments from, various sources noted the resemblance 
of the Truce Organization to an International force. Dr. 
Ralph Bunche, Acting Mediator, said that the operation by 
the fall of 19^8 had grown into both a diplomatic and a 
military one, involving reconnaissance on land, sea, and 
air. It amounted to an unarmed army of occupation in close 
contact with United Nations Headquarters. General Assembly, 
f f i c i al R e c o r d s , 3rd Session, Fifth Committee, 157th meet- 
Tng~T November 5, 19^-8), p. 64-9* See also The New York 
T imes , June 14, 1948. 



19 

(UNTSO) was designed bo symbolize in concrete fashion the 
United Nations concern that fighting he halted in Palestine, 
while a permanent solution was sought to the problems at 
issue. In other problem areas fighting had occurred with- 
out evoking such a strong United Nations response. What 
were the conditions which led to the use in this case of 
a contingent of military men to represent the United Nations 
presence? 

Several elements contributed to bringing the Truce 
Organisation into existence. First, the United Nations 
had special responsibilities with respect to the Palestine 
problem stemming from its prior involvement in the situation 
coupled with its failure either to find a solution ac- 
ceptable to all parties or to win agreement of the United 
Nations members to the imposition of a solution. Second, 
the fact of open and heavy fighting between Jew and Arab 
in the Holy Land made apparent the urgent need for some 
sort of action. Finally, the variety of solutions and the 
proposals for a United Nations enforced peace put forth in 
early 19^8 as well as the tentative experimentation with a 
truce commission prepared the way, at least in part, for 
establishment of a peace-keeping group to quell the vio- 
lence and to facilitate the search for a permanent solution. 



20 

The United Nations involvement 

United Nations involvement with Palestine dates from 
the spring of 194-7 when the United Kingdom, despairing of 
finding a means to resolve Jewish demands for a national 
state in Palestine with Arab opposition to such demands, 
turned the entire complex, explosive problem over to the 
United Nations. The solution which the United' Nations de- 
vised was for the partition of Palestine into an Arab state 

and a Jewish state with economic union and the inter- 

2 

nationalization of Jerusalem. 

Although reached only after lengthy investigations 
by a Special Committee on Palestine and extensive debate in 
the General Assembly, this solution, which was embodied in 
the resolution of November 29, 194-7, was adopted with little 
enthusiasm. The deficiencies, in the solution were all too 
evident. Most serious of these was the lack of provision 
for implementation by the United Nations in the face of the 
Arab hostility to the plan and the announced unwillingness 
of Britain, the mandatory power, to cooperate in implementing 
a plan unacceptable to either of the principals. 



2 

The plan was based on the majority recommendations 
of the eleven member United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine, set up in the spring of 194-7 by a Special Session 
of the General Assembly to make recommendations on Palestine. 
The majority plan was recommended by Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay. A three- 
nation minority of India, Iran, and Yugoslavia recommended a 
bi-national federation, while the eleventh member, Australia, 
abstained. Por the report of the Committee see U.N. Doc. 
A/364- . 



21 

The problem of implementation was discussed in the 
Assembly and some of the smaller powers went so far as to 
put forward proposals for forceful implementation. These 
remained only proposals. The majority of states, in- 
cluding the major powers, showed a marked reluctance to 
commit themselves to forceful action in Palestine. Thus, 
the United Nations was in the anomalous position of 
recommending a solution which might require force to 
implement it, while being unwilling to apply such means. 

The crisis area; internal conditions 

A second important element in the Palestine situation 
was the fact of fighting. After the passage of the parti- 
tion resolution in November, 194-7* the situation in the Holy 
Land rapidly deteriorated. Fighting increased in scale and 
intensity: the convoy battles and bomb outrages which 
characterized the first months after the passage of the 
resolution became steady skirmishes by March and full-scale 
war by May, 194-8.^ 



x 

-^Guatemala proposed an international police force of 

contingents contributed on a proportional basis by states 

other than the permanent members of the Security Council. 

New Zealand suggested that it be agreed that if violence 

occurred in Palestine, a united effort to suppress it would 

be made by an international force to which each country 

would contribute proportionate to its strength. Larry 

Leonard, "The United Nations and Palestine," International 

Conciliation , No. 4-54- (October, 194-9), p. 64-6. 

4- 
For a description of the various phases of the war 

see Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War (New York: 

Frederick A. Praeger, 1957). 



22 

The preced ent s for peace-keeping 

The United Nations could hardly ignore a situation 
becoming ever more violent with which it was directly in- 
volved. Proposals, plans, and limited measures of United 
Nations peace-keeping tumbled one after another between 
November, 19^7, and May, 19^8. Although these proposals 
set few concrete precedents for the Truce Supervision 
Organization, they probably contributed, to creation of an 
atmosphere conducive to decisive action ultimately by the 
United Nations. 

The General Assembly had made virtually no initial 
provision for implementation of the partition decision 
beyond setting up a five-nation Palestine Commission to 
administer the territory in the interim period between, the 
Mandatory Power's departure and the establishment of the 
Arab and Israeli states. The Security Council was in- 
structed to give all necessary aid and guidance to the 
Commission and to take the necessary measures for implemen- 
tation of the plan. It was soon apparent that the Commis- 
sion would need help to fulfill its mission. Two major 
efforts in the spring of 19'1-S to provide such assistance 
can be delineated: the call for a force for Palestine and 
the establishment of a truce commission. 

In January and February, 19'l-S, both Secretary-General 
Trygve Lie and the Palestine Commission struggled with the 



23 



double problem of executing the partition decision and of 
smothering the violence already aflame in the Holy Land. 
Both put forward, more or less openly, proposals for 
forceful action by the United Nations. The proposals were 
received with little enthusiasm and less action. 

The Secretary -General, who "put the full weight of 
(his) office consistently behind the organization's de- 
cision from the time it was first taken," took two 
approaches. On the one hand, he quietly set in motion 
Secretariat studies of the possibilities of creating an 
international police force and inaugurated exploratory 
conversations with some of the smaller nations on their 
willingness to supply a force to execute the Palestine 
decisions. On the other hand, in public statements he 
tried to impress the Security Council members with their 
responsibility for enforcing the resolution. 

The Palestine Commission was more direct in its 
proposals. The Commission found it impossible to assume 
its responsibilities due to violence in Palestine and a 
lack of cooperation by Britain, the mandatory power. It 
therefore confronted the Security Council with a special 
report in which it contended that an armed force was neces- 
sary to bring an end to fighting in Palestine and to enable 



^Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1^5^77 P» ±5%~- 



24 



it to take the" -steps preparatory to partition. The force 
which the Commission recommended was not an army under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, but an international police 
force to maintain law and order in a territory for which 
international society was responsible. The report of the 
Commission said, in part: 

It is the considered view of the Commission that 
the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which 
at the present time prevent the situation from 
deteriorating completely into open warfare on an 
organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate 
• non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding 
elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities, 
organized under the general direction of the Commis- 
sion, in maintaining order and security in Palestine, 
and thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the 
recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, 
the period immediately following the termination of 
the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, wide- 
spread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including 
the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic 
conclusion to an era of international concern for 
that territory. 7 

The Security Council's response to the Palestine 
Commission's request for troops was negative. The reluc- 
tance to implement forcefully the Palestine decision was 
not due solely to a lack of will. There were real legal 
and practical complications involved in implementing the 
partition resolution. For example, Ambassador Austin, 
representative of the United States, suggested that the 



6 U.N. Doc. A/AC 21/15, p. 23. 

7 U.N. Doc. A/AC 21/9, pp. 18-19. Cited in Larry 
Leonard, op_. cit . , pp. 656-67. 



25 
Security Council authority to use force to cope with 
threats to and. breaches of the peace did not extend to the 
use of such force to implement a recommendation by the 
General Assembly. In the face of doubts on the legal 
soundness of the forceful action and the unwillingness of 
the major powers to alienate either side, the practical 
problem of where to get troops for a force loomed large. 

let, the report of the Palestine Commission was not 
without significance. It triggered reconsideration of the 
entire Palestine issue, first in the Security Council from 
February through April, 19'l8; then in the Second Special 
Session of the General Assembly, meeting from April 16 to 
May 14, 19*4-8. The search for an alternative political 
solution to partition was not fruitful.' Reconsideration 
did lead, however, to a separation of the problems of 
fighting and of the future of Palestine. As it became in- 
creasingly apparent that a political solution would not be 
found quickly or easily and as the fighting intensified, 
efforts were concentrated on halting the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 



■Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 253rd 
meeting (February 24, 1948] , p. 26?T 

q 

'The United States delegation raised the possibility 
of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine and even indicated 
willingness to supply some soldiers for the purpose of estab- 
lishing such a trusteeship. The idea was not accepted by the 
majority of the United Nations members however. The United 
States main purpose in calling for a special General Assembly 
session was to get consideration for the trusteeship proposal. 



26 

The Security Council attempted to quiet the Palestine 
situation through a series of cease-fire calls, running from 
April 1 through the end of May, and by creation of a Truce 
Commission. The cease-fire resolutions called in varying 
terms for a halt in the fighting, and until the May 29 
resolution all were virtually ignored. Yet the Security 
Council activity in the period prior \:o the effective truce 
had an influence on the truce which was finally established 
and on the organization set up to maintain it. 

Establishment of the Truce Commission can be singled 
out as of particular importance to later developments. The 
Commission was created "by a resolution of April 23 to assist 
the Security Council in implementing the cease-fire calls 
and to report to the Council on the situation in Palestine. 
The experience of the Truce Commission revealed the need for 
an expanded truce supervisory organization, thereby stimu- 
lating the creation of such an organization. It also pro- 
vided a formula for determining the national composition 
of the organization, once established. (By suggestion of 
the United States, the Commission was composed of repre- 
sentatives of the members of the Security Council that had 
consular representatives in Jerusalem with the exception of 
Syria. Under this formula the Commission was composed of 
representatives of the United States, Belgium, and Prance.) 



10 

The justification for this method of selection was 



27 

The Truce Commission drew the Security Council's 
attention, to the problem of truce supervision with requests 
for more assistance. First, in connection with a proposal 
to demilitarize Jerusalem, the Commission queried the 
Security Council in early May on the possibility of obtain- 
ing a fifty-man force to provide the guarantees necessary 
to both sides if the truce were to be upheld. Second, in 
a cable of May 21 the Commission indicated its need for a 
small body of competent military observers to assist it in 
carrying through its functions. In the same cable the 
Commission expressed the conviction that the only effective 
means to bring a cessation of hostilities was through 
employment of a neutral force, sufficiently large and 
powerful to impose its will on one or both parties, created 
under Article 41 or Article 42 of the Charter. 11 The 



that use of representatives already in Palestine would be 
a prompt, effective, and simple way of providing the Se- 
curity Council with an arm in Palestine to report to it and 
to help execute its decisions. Significantly, in the light 
of later developments, objections to this method of selec- 
tion were voiced by the delegates of the Soviet Union and of 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, both of whom ab- 
stained on the resolution establishing the Commission. 
Security Council, Official Records, 3rd Year, 287th meeting 
(April 25, 1948), pTT5: ~~ 

11 
X U.N. Doc. S/762, p. 3. 



28 



Security Council was markedly unresponsive to these calls 

TO 

for men. 

The Commission may have further stimulated the 
establishment of a military organization to supervise the 
truce by its own ineffectiveness. Lacking assistance and 
confined closely to quarters, by the fighting in Jerusalem, 
the Commission found it difficult to fulfill the functions 
assigned to it. Complaints about the lack of information 
coming from the Truce Commission were frequent and voci- 
ferous in the Security Council. 

This then was the situation in the spring of 194-8: 
the mandate was drawing to an end, tensions were heighten- 
ing, and fighting increasing. The partition plan, which 
the United Nations had devised as the answer to the 
Palestine question, seemed to have little chance of imple- 
mentation. The United Nations, aware of the critical nature 
of the situation, was unable to settle on an alternative 
solution. 



12" 

Some delegates raised practical objections to send- 
ing officers into Palestine: the Canadian representative 
felt New York was too distant from Palestine to serve as a 
source of control officers; the Argentinian, that Palestine 
was too dangerous. The Soviet delegate contended that 
since no functions of a purely police nature were initially 
assigned to the Truce Commission, the Council could not 
decide that the Commission, created for another purpose, 
should now undertake control, and police functions. Security 
Council, Official Records , 3rd Year, 291st meeting (May 12. 
19*8), ppT 9, 13, 16, and 17. 



29 

Establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision 

Organization 

The establishment 

Actual establishment of the Truce Supervision 
Organization came in direct response to a marked intensifi- 
cation of the Palestine crisis. Full-scale fighting broke 
out in mid-May with the proclamation of the state of Israel, 
the ending of the British mandate, and the invasion of Arab 
armies. Necessity spurred the United Nations to positive 
action. Efforts to halt the fighting intensified. Out of 
these efforts came an effective truce and the organization 
to supervise it. 

There were, to be precise, two truce organizations, 
one created for the first four week truce, in effect from 
June 11 to July 9 S 19*8, and a second more extensive and 
permanent organization to maintain the Second Truce, effec- 
tive from July 18, 19*8. Although the truce was replaced 
in August, 19*9 , by an armistice based on agreements between 
Israel and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria respectively, a 
skeleton truce organization continued in existence to assist 
the parties to maintain the armistice and to ensure obser- 
vance of the cease-fire. 

The Eirst Truce and its organization were based on a 
General Assembly resolution of May 15 and a Security Council 



30 



1? 



resolution of Flay 29. The foundation provided for the 
Truce Supervision Organization by the Assembly and the 
Council was skeletal. Neither the resolutions themselves 
nor the debate accompanying them laid down precise guide- 
lines as to what the Organization was to be. The unwilling- 
ness of the United Nations members to draw definitive lines 
for the truce group suggests a resistance to heavy involve- 
ment and limits to support for the truce. 

The General Assembly resolution called for a truce 
and established a mediator, to be selected by a committee 
of the General Assembly — the committee designated was com- 
posed of the five permanent members of the Security Council. 
The Mediator's principal functions were to arrange a truce 
in Palestine and to promote a peaceful settlement between 
Arabs and Jews. The provision which provided the basis for 

a truce organization merely stated "that the Secretary - 

14- 
General shall provide the Mediator with an adequate staff," 

The Security Council resolution was also vague on 
details of the Truce Organization. Its provisions instruc- 
ted the Mediator, in cooperation with the Truce Commission, 
to supei'vise the truce and decided that a sufficient number 
of military observers should, be provided. That was all. 



" -'The May 15, 194-8, General Assembly resolution was 
resolution. 186 (S-II). The Security Council resolution was 
passed at the 310th meeting of the Council and can be found 
in U.N. Doc. S/801. 

General Assembly resolution 186 (S-II). 



31 

.Debate on. the nature of the Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation was almost non-existent. The General Assembly 
resolution which established the position of Mediator had 
received little discussion, before passage. The resolution 
was proposed by the United States in a sub-commission set up 
originally to consider a provisional regime for Palestine, 
but diverted in the face of fighting (and inability to agree 
on any provisional regime) to the problem of violence in the 
Holy Land. The Mediator proposal was put forth on May 13, 
the next to last day of the Special Session, with the 
statement that despite its late introduction, the provision 
represented, not something new, but merely the consensus of 
views which had been expressed in the sub-committee. The 
discussion of the resolution in the plenary session centered 
on whether the position of Mediator should be established at 
all, not on the proper scope of responsibilities of the 
Mediator. 

Debate in the Security Council did little more to 
clarify the role and nature of the proposed Truce Organiza- 
tion. At the time of passage of the May 29 resolution 
attention was focused not on the role of the Mediator and the 
Truce Organization but on the question of whether mediation 
or coercion should be used to solve the crisis. 

The extent of unwillingness of the Security Council 
to commit itself on the Truce Organization is suggested by 






32 

the failure of any Security Council members to come forth 
with substantive suggestions at a session of the Council 
convened for the express pin-pose of formula bing instructions 
for the Mediator in establishing the Truce Organization. 
The French delegate apparently expressed the view of the 
Council when he suggested that confidence along with wide 
powers to implement the resolution should be given the 
Mediator. 15 

The votes in the General Assembly and Security 
Council on the truce resolutions suggest substantial support 
for the truce and its organization. The vote on the May 14 
General Assembly resolution establishing the truce was 31 in 
favor, 7 against, and 16 abstentions. D The opposition came 
from the Communist bloc nations and Cuba, The expressed 
reason for Soviet disfavor was that the truce operation 

represented a Western maneuver to prevent partition from 

] 7 
becoming effective. " That Soviet opposition was designed 



J 5 

""Security Council, Off icial Records , 3rd Year, 313th 
meeting (June 3, 1948), p. 28. 

16 

"The states which abstained were the Arab members of 

the United Nations, joined by some Latin American states and 

Australia, Siam, and Greece. General Assembly, O ffic ial 

Records, 2nd Special Session, 133th plenary meeting (May 14, 

1948), pp. 44-45. See Appendix. A for a complete listing 

of this vote. 

17 

in fact, the opposition to the Truce Supervision 

Organization fits the pattern of Soviet thinking about the 
United Nations during this period, with its general hos- 
tility to any sort of United Nations police system on the 
basis it infringed national sovereignty and its insistence 



33 



merely to voice disapproval and not to kill all action is 
suggested by the fact; that the Soviet Union and the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic abstained on the criti- 
cal votes in the Security Council. 

T he legal foundations 

The legal foundation for the establishment and 
functioning of the Truce Supervision Organization rested on 
the General Assembly resolution of May 1'+, 19*8, and the 
Security Council resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 19*8. 
The authority under which the position of the Mediator was 
created and an organization to aid him authorized was not 
specified in the resolution. However, there was no chal- 
lenge raised as to the power of the General Assembly to 
create a subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the Charter 
to assist it in performing its functions. 

More question could be raised as to the provisions of 
the Charter under which the Security Council called for an 
end to hostilities. The Security Council calls for a cease- 
fire prior to the May 29 call had been clearly taken under 
Chapter VI of the Charter. Apparently the May 29 and July 
15 cease-fire resolutions were also taken under Chapter VI, 



on the veto and on keeping important decisxons in the Se- 
curity Council where they were subject to the veto, ior 
further discussion of the Soviet position see Alexander 
Dallin, The Sovie t Union at the United Nations (New York: 
Frederic! A. Praeger, 1962). 



34 



but each made reference to Chapter VII and seemed to move 
progressively closer to actual invocation, of enforcement 

measures. 

In the debate in the Security Council on the Way 29 
resolution two schools of thought emerged. One, including 
the Soviet Union and the United States among its proponents, 
called for action under the enforcement provisions of 

Chapter VII, apparently feeling that stronger action than 

1. 8 
had been taken in the past was necessary. " The other 

school of opinion, including among its adherents Belgium 

and Britain, called for action under Chapter VI, viewing 

invocation of Chapter VII as a serious and uncertain step. 

There was feeling that invocation of Chapter VII without 

assurance of effective application of measures of coercion 

and without knowledge of all the potential consequences of 

19 
such ac-oion was a serious step, not to be lightly taken. 

The May 29 resolution did refer to Chapter VII, how- 
ever, and the July 15 resolution made even greater use of 
that section of the Charter. In the July 15 resolution the 
parties were for the first time ordered to comply with the 
measures specified by the Council under Article 40 of the 

r8 For the Soviet statement see Security Council, 
Official Records, 3rd Year, 309th meetxng (May 2 9, W, P. 
27~To~f~tEi-TJnTted States statement see Security Council, 
Offi cial Records , 3rd Year, 308th meeting (May 28, 19*8), pp. 

' 19 Security Council, pffj^l„R^cords, 3rd Year, 309th 
meeting (May 29, 19*8), pp. 10-14. 



35 

Charter. Article '(0 refers to provisional measures and re- 
mains a step away from the enforcement action envisioned 
under Article '42. Nonetheless, the reference to action 
under Chapter VII was potentially significant. In theory 
at least such a resolution opened the way to forceful action 
by the United Nations in the event of failure by the parties 
to comply with the cease-fire order or of truce violations. 
In fact, however, strong action was not taken by the United 
Nations when, truce violations of a serious nature did occur. 
Although some question remains as to the precise provisions 
of the Charter under which the United Nations was acting, 
it would appear that the potential authority embodied in 
the July 15 resolution was greater than the authority 
actually invoked under that resolution. It may be suggested 
that political rather than legal factors explain the limited 
response of the United Nations to some serious breeches of 
the cease-fire. 

The mandate 

The truce supervisors' mandate was based on the May 
29 and July 15 resolutions calling for a truce and on the 
terms of the truce itself. The resolutions and the debate 
accompanying them provided only the most general guidelines 
as to the functions of the observers and the conditions 
under which they were to operate. The resolutions called 



36 

for an end to hostilities, banned the introduction of mili- 
tary men or materials into the belligerent axea, and 
enjoined the protection of Holy Places and shrines. None 
Of the resolutions specified precisely what the role of the 
observers was to be in ensuring that the truce terms would 
be carried through. It was left largely to the Mediator to 
spell out the role of the truce observers—the responsi- 
bilities they should bear and the policies they should 
follow in meeting these responsibilities. 

The mandate of the observers, as defined by the 
Mediator on the basis of the relevant resolutions, limited 
the role the observers could play in the Palestine crisis. 
It is true, however, that the Mediator initially interpre- 
ted the responsibilities of the observers in relatively 
broad fashion. Their primary purpose, in his view, was to 
prevent a renewal of large-scale fighting during the truce 
and to preserve the equitability of the truce. The phrase 
••to prevent" might have opened the door to a widening of 
the authority of the observers. The door which was opened 
was quickly slammed shut. Potential disagreement among the 
.embers on the preventive functions of the observers was 
forestalled by the Secretary-General's firm declaration 
that the Truce Supervision Organization had no preventive 



37 

authority and could not take any preventive measures in 

20 
advance. 

Moreover, the conditions under which the observers 
were to function were narrowly drawn. First, the observer 
was to be "completely objective in his attitude and .judg- 
ment" and to "maintain a thorough neutrality as regards 

21 
political issues in the Palestine situation." Such a 

requirement was probably necessary for success in a delicate 
mission. Second, the power available to the observer to 
meet his responsibilities was quite limited. He had, for 
example, no enforcement power and was denied arms of any 
sort. The decision on arms was made by the Mediator. That 
it corresponded with the desires of a majority of member 
states was indicated by the rejection by the members of later 
efforts of the Mediator to broaden the powers of a few of the 
observers by arming them for especially difficult tasks. 
Although the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter in the 
July 15 cease-fire call might have justified such a broaden- 
ing of the observers' mandate, no effort was made to use 
the resolution for this purpose. 



?0 L.M. Bloomfield, Egypt, Israel gnfl the Gulf of A^aba 
(Toronto: The Carswell Company, Ltd., V^/)j p. fv» 

21 U.N. Doc. S/928, p. 1. 



38 
Characteristics of the Truce Organization 

The creation of a non-fighting military unit to help 
restore and maintain peace represents only the first stage 
of United Nations action in a crisis. The group must not 
only be created; it must also operate effectively in the 
field to achieve its objectives. It may he suggested that 
the ability of the group to carry through its charge will 
depend on the balance of the equation of its responsibili- 
ties and its powers. Intimately related to the power of 
the force are the characteristics of the force itself. 
Three aspects of the force seem particularly relevant to 
the determination of its effectiveness: a) its leadership; 
b) its size and character; and c) its support at head- 
quarters and in the field. Support in turn takes several 
forms. At United Nations headquarters it can be read in 
terms of votes, finances, logistics, and manpower. In the 
field cooperation and non-cooperation are indicative of the 
attitude of those with whom the force deals. 

Leadership 

The Security Council resolution calling for establish- 
ment of a mediator to supervise the truce provided that he 
should be appointed by the permanent members of the Security 
Council. On the advice of Secretary-General Trygve Lie the 
permanent members selected Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden 



39 

as Mediator. Count Bernadotte served as Mediator until his 

assassination by Jewish terrorists in September, 19*8. At 

that time the Secretary-General appointed Bernadotte' s 

22 
principal assistant. Dr. Ralph Bunche, as Acting Mediator. 

The Mediator was vested with both great powers and 
great responsibilities in the creation of a truce super- 
vision organisation. With few precedents to follow and 
little guidance from the Security Council or the Assembly, 
the Mediator made the crucial decisions which gave shape and 
form to the Truce Organization and, incidentally, set a 
pattern for the future. According to the United States 
representative on the Security Council, the Truce Organiza- 
tion was not the product of the Council or the Assembly but 
of the Mediator who had built it from the staff of the Truce 
Commission and the staff assembled by the Secretary-General. 

However, it would be misleading to suggest that the 
Mediator was unfettered in his determinations regarding the 
shape and character of the Truce Organization. In fact, the 
Truce Supervision Organization seems to have evolved from a 
mix of the Mediator's decisions, the situation itself, and 

2"2 It miK ht be noted that although the resolution calls 
for selection of the Mediator by the Permanent members of 
+-hP qpruritv Council, Bunche served as Acting Mediator ioi 
ip^wTveL on the basis of the appointment by the Secre- 
farfienefaiy ?he appointment was ratified by the Security 
Council . 

25 Security Council, Official Record s, 4th Year, 437th 
meeting (August 11, 19*9), p. TT 



40 

the influence of the Secretariat; and of certain of the 
national delegations, particularly the United States. 
The relationship between the Mediator and the 
Secretary-General appears to have been one of close collabo- 
ration. Although the critical decisions seem to have been 
made by the Mediator, there is evidence that the Secretary- 
General's role in the decision-making process went beyond 

24 
merely implementing the requests of the Mediator. " Several 

things suggest an important part for the Secretary-General 

in the Palestine operation: first, the Secretary-General's 

role in selecting the Mediator, for it was Lie who proposed 

Bernadotte as Mediator and who appointed Bunche Acting 

Mediator; second, the close personal friendship between the 

Secretary-General and both Bernadotte and Bunche; and third, 

the fact of direct and evidently much-used communications 

between Lake Success and the Mediator's headquarters at 

Rhodes. 

What was the relationship of the Mediator to the 
Security Council and particularly to those nations which 
were most concerned with the Palestine question because of 



""^According to Stephen Schwehel, the United Nations 
effort in Palestine might be classified as a joint field- 
headquarters endeavor in which the Mediator and * he S^retary- 
General collaborated in. indispensably interdependent fashion. 
Stephen Schwebel, The_Secj^toy^ej^er^l„of the Unit edNationgj. 
His Politica l Powers""and Practice { Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press," 1952), p. H>. " 



41 



membership on the Truce Commission and consequently partici- 
pation in the Truce Supervision Organization? These 
national representatives exerted little day-to-day influence 
on the decisions and actions of the Mediator, hut they did 
hold an ultimate check. If his decisions were not regarded 
favorably, pressures could be exerted to alter them or to 
prevent their implementation. Thus, the Mediator's de- 
cisions on both the composition and the size of the truce 
group were modified under the pressure of the national 
delegations, acting not openly through Security Council re- 
jection of proposals, but through inaction and behind-the- 
scenes pressures. 

It is not without significance that both Trygve Lie 
and Count Bernadotte were activists, desiring strong United 
Nations action to resolve the Palestine issue. While they 
gave vigorous leadership to the Truce Organization, their 
more ambitious objectives were curbed by the caution of the 
Security Council. The scope and limits of the Mediator's 
powers will become clearer with an examination of the de- 
cisions made on such crucial aspects of the truce group as 
its proper composition and size. 

Support for t he Truce Org anization 

Men for the Truce Or ganization. -One of the most 
significant decisions made with respect to the Truce 



4-2 

Organization regarded its composition. Bernadotte 's initial 
thought was that the Truce Organization should be composed 
of representatives of the major powers on the Security 
Council. . Accordingly, on May 30, the Mediator contacted 
the French, British, American, and Soviet military attaches 
in Cairo inquiring as to the units which they could con- 
tribute to a truce control organization. Within days the 
Mediator's basis of selection of members of the Truce 
Organization shifted. On June 5 it was made known that, 
aside from some Swedish officers, only representatives of 
countries on the Truce Commission, that is, the United 
States, Prance, and Belgium, would be used in the Truce 

Organization. 

The reasons for the Mediator's shift remain' obscure. 
Bernadotte suggests at least two. On the one hand, in his 
memoirs he hints that a United States official exercised 

some discreet pressure in suggesting only members of the 

25 
Truce Commission take part in truce supervision. On the 

other hand, in a July 13 statement to the Security Council 

Bernadotte suggested another reason for changing the basis 

of selection of observers. He said: 

25 Ac cording to Bernadotte on June 2 the American charge 
d'affaires, calling to inform him unofficially that the United 
States was willing to contribute twenty-one officers to act 
as observers and the necessary staff and aircraft, also sug- 
gested only members of the Truce Commission participate. 
Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and S t ought on, . 
1951), P. *5. 



4-3 

However, in continuing my negotiations with the 
two parties , I was told by the representative of the 
Provisional Jewish Government that they could not 
accept having British observers. They felt that, 
since the British had been there during the period 
of the Mandate, it would not be a very happy solution 
to have them coming back as observers. 

I then had to change the basis for the selection 
of the observers and, instead of using the five great 
powers as countries to provide me with these observers, 
I had to find another solution. I then thought of the 
Truce Commission in Jerusalem, appointed by the Se- 
curity Council, in which Belgium, France and the 
United States were represented; and I asked that my 2 £ 
observers should be taken from these three countries. 

Whatever the reasons for the change in formula for 
participation, the change did bring the Truce Supervision 
Organization in line with a kind of rough rule-of -thumb 
being followed in staffing observer groups at that time: 
exclusion of the Soviet Union from participation and use of 
the most convenient national representatives (i.e. those 
with some prior involvement with the question or area). 

The formula developed to determine who should parti- 
cipate in the Truce Organization had two limitations. First, 
it restricted participation in the Truce Organization to a 
narrow base. Second, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from 
the unit became' a source of criticism of the supervision 
effort by the Communist bloc. 

The issue of the composition of the Truce Organiza- 
tion recurs throughout all Security Council discussion of 



"^Security Council, Official Records , 3rd Year, 333rd 
meeting (July 13, 19*8), p. 4. 



44 

the Mediator's work in Palestine. The Soviet delegate re- 
peatedly protested the make-up of the Truce Organization 
and found in it the explanation for any and all failures of 
the Organization. 27 The Soviet Union felt Security Council 
membership should he the basis for participation. They 
held that the Truce Organization was an American operation. 
This charge had some foundation. Most of the auxiliary 
personnel, over one-half the observers, and most of the 
guard force were American. A broadening of the basis of 
participation might well have given the group a strengthened 
mandate as well as a more independent position. 

^The Soviet representative had protested vigorously 
from June 7 forward the discretion given the Mediator in de- 
termining the make-up of the Truce Organization. The argu- 
ment of the Soviet delegate spread over several meetings 
ran somewhat as follows. The Soviet representative contended 
that the decision as to which countries should send observers 
and how these observers should be made available was one for 
the Security Council, not the Mediator. The connection be- 
tween the Truce Commission and the observers was rejected on 
the grounds that nothing in the May 29 resolution indicated 
that only Truce Commission members should supply military 
observers. Finally, the Soviet representative expressed in- 
ability to understand why the Soviet Union could not send 
even five observers when the United States was sending twenty- 
one observers as well as ships and planes. The Soviets 
pushed their objection to a vote in a draft resolution with 
two significant features: it would have limited the size of 
the Truce Organization to a maximum of fifty members and it 
would have allowed any member of the Security Council except 
Syria to participate. See Security Council, Official Re^ 
cords, 3rd Year, 314th meeting (June 7, 1948), pp. 3, 6, and 
?~and 317th meeting (June 10, 1948), pp. 41-45- 

28 There was a suggestion in the press that the Mediator 
may have considered including Russian observers in the 
organization for the Second Truce. A member of the Medi- 
ator's staff indicated that only 200 of 300 contemplated 
observer positions would be filled by nations of the Truce 



*5 

let there is no proof that other staffing arrange- 
ments would have been feasible or more desirable. On the 
one hand, the United States contention, apparently sup- 
ported by other states, was that opening the door to 
inclusion of even a few Russian observers would complicate 
the situation and would provide the Russians a toe-hold 
making more likely Russian participation in any military 
force which it might be necessary to send into the Middle 
East. 29 

On the other hand, a limited effort in 19*8 to supple- 
ment the seconded observers with a truly international group 
of fifty United Nations guards proved inauspicious. In mid- 
June the Mediator, finding the sixty-three observers 
initially called for inadequate to the task, requested a 
force of fifty men from the Secretary-General. Within three 
days the fifty men, gathered from the United Nations Guard 
and the Secretariat, left New York for Palestine, outfitted 
and ready for active duty. The Force, composed of men from 
seven nations, was hailed as the prototype of a real inter- 
national police force. The experiment evidently did not 



Commission, thereby leaving room for the inclusion of ob- 
servers from other nations. But if such a suggestion^ 
actually was considered, it was considered only fleetingly, 
for when arrangements were made for the Second Truce Organi- 
zation only the original participants were included. The 
New York Times , July 17, 19*8. 

^^The New York Times , June 6, 19*8. 

^Although the majority of members of the force were 
American there were also two Frenchmen, one Australian, one 



4-6 

meet expectations, however, for only seven of the fifty men 

remained after the First Truce. Moreover, disappointment 

31 
in the group was voiced by Bernadotte and by others. 

Had this experiment in international action been successful, 
it might have advanced substantially the evolution of the 
peace-keeping technique. 

As it was, a change in the pattern of recruitment to 
a broader and, in our opinion, firmer base did not come 
until 1953. At that time the composition of the group was 
broadened with the inclusion of observers from nine states 
(Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden 



Swede, one Norwegian, one Dane, and one Chinese. In the_ 
three days of preparation the men were outfitted in tropical 
uniforms (slate grey shorts, blouse, and pith helmet) _ and 
given such necessities as medical kit, flashlight, whistle, 
and standard police arms. (Ammunition was not supplied for 
the arms, for the final decision as to whether the force was 
to be armed was left to the Mediator.) The New York Times, 
June 18, 19^8, and June 20, 1948. 

51 On the one hand, the venture was termed by The New 
York T imes as the first international police force. The 
New" York ~ Times , June 20, 1948. On the other hand, severe 
crTtlcisms were made by those in charge. Bernadotte said, 
"Originally there had been 50 guards on duty in Palestine. 
But some had declared they wanted to go home to the U.S.A. 
They went — though they can hardly be described as returning 
heroes. In newspaper interviews some complained loudly 
firstly of the dangers they had been exposed to, secondly 
of the bad food they had had. Neither had the regulations 
about an eight-hour working day been adhered to. In their 
own eyes they were poor little boys deserving of all the 
pity the American public could give them. It is true, of 
course, that these guards had been hastily and haphazardly 
recruited in response to our urgent request." Polke Berna- 
dotte, op. cit. , p. 198. See also Paul Mohn, "Problems of 
Truce Supervision," Inter national Conciliation , No. 478 
(February, 1952), pp. 70-71. 



4-7 

as well as the original three — Belgium., France, and the 
United States), The truce by then had been replaced by an 
armistice and the Truce Supervision Organization reduced in 

size and role. 

A second man power question of critical importance 
from the outset to the Organization was that of size. How 
many men should be committed to the Palestine venture? 
This decision did not remain fixed. It was a product of 
the demands of the situation and the willingness of the 
countries involved to contribute. The Mediator's requests 
for more men were frequently ignored or met only slowly and 
reluctantly. The needs of an effective truce organization 
and the desire of participating states to avoid undue in- 
volvement in the situation came into conflict at times. 

A kind of pattern emerges with respect to the size 
of the Truce Supervision Organization, a pattern which falls 
into three major phases—growth, stability, reduction. The 
Organization's period of growth, the most significant of the 
phases, extends from its origins in June through September, 
1948. Within this growth period there is a break between 
the First and Second Truces. 

During the period of the First Truce the Mediator 
expanded his force in three directions from its original 
nucleus of sixty- three observers. To supplement the original 
observers, he requested, first, the fifty guards from the 
Secretariat and, second, thirty more observers, ten from each 



48 

of the participating states. These men did not arrive so 
quickly as had the original contingents; in fact, the last 
ones appeared only three days before the end of the First 
Truce. Third, Bernadotte asked the United States for 
technical help, acquiring approximately seventy persons to 
serve in such capacities as medical personnel, aircraft 
pilots, and maintenance men. Thus, hy the end of the First 
Truce the Organization had roughly 250 persons directly con- 
nected with it. (This figure does not include those persons 
connected more loosely with the operation who operated the 
four vessels at United Nations disposal.) An organization 
of this size was not planned initially; it oust grew— under 
the pressure of its responsibilities. 

A sharp increase in size occurs with the Second 
Truce, which commenced in mid-July. Influenced by the de- 
ficiencies of the Organization in the First Truce and by 
the nature of the July 15 resolution, which ordered a truce 
under Chapter VII and had no time limits attached to it, it 
was determined that a larger and more professional Truce 
Supervision Organization was necessary. The observer staff 
was more than tripled and additional auxiliary personnel 
were brought in. Bernadotte requested that the United 
States, France, and Belgium supply 300 officers to act as 
observers and 300 enlisted soldiers to handle tasks not 



4-9 

suitable for officers. 52 The Swedish contingent which 
served as a command group under Bernadotte, was increased 
from five to ten members. And once again the United States 
was asked to supply approximately 100 auxiliary personnel. 
The Second Truce Organization was not, in fact, as 
large nor as rapidly established as the Mediator desired. 
The maximum size Bernadotte formally called for was 600 
observers (officers and enlisted men) plus the auxiliary 
units. In fact, there were never more than 500 observers; 
the French quota was not filled. Moreover, tbere were 
exploratory requests for additional forces which were simply 
never acted on. It would appear that the Mediator had more 
ambitious plans for the Truce Supervision Organization than 
the Security Council was willing to support. For example, 
in July Bernadotte proposed a 1,000 man force for a demili- 
tarized Jerusalem and received French, Belgian, and American 
commitments to supply one-third of the force each. Yet the 
first steps to bring such a force into being were never 
taken. 33 In August Bernadotte requested a small armed force 
of around forty men to guard the Latrum pumping station. 



3 ^0f the 300 soldiers in each category the United 

States was to supply 125, France 125, and Belgium ,0. 

^considerable confusion surrounded this question. At 

«*rX ?? til reoorted that the Mediator thought the 
one porno it was reported uneio . Truce Coramis- 

Secretariat was recr ui ing the f oice f ^ J ^ the 

sion members, while the national , aei ?^ ±«J United 

impression *e reoruiti^ was be^ng done outsxdet|e e to«ea o 

Tuitions framework. II resuiis aie j_uu.xoc-.uj. ». Q ^- r nQZ ,Q 
one was recruiting. The New York Times, July 18, 19*8. 









50 

The men never arrived and as a consequence the station was 
blown, up by Arab irregulars. In the same month Bernadotte 
and Frank Begley, United Nations Security Chief, considered 
a 6,000 man force, armed, for Jerusalem. This too did not 
get beyond the talking stage. 

Not only were the Mediator's more ambitious requests 
for men ignored, but there was a marked slowness in filling 
some of his more routine requests. There was greater speed 
in getting men out to Palestine during the First than the 
Second Truce. And in neither case were observers present 
in more than symbolic numbers in the important first days 
of the truce. During the Second Truce the Mediator had 
particular difficulty with the United States, which bore a 
large part of the burden of supplying the Organization with 
men. 5 ^ While the United States attributed its delay in 
seconding men to such technical factors as being unsure what 
sort of personnel was desired, 55 the Mediator attributed 
delay to political factors and particularly to the United 
States fear of military involvement in Palestine. Such in- 
volvement might complicate relations with the Soviet Union 
and if anything happened to American soldiers in Palestine, 

^Vne Mediator made his initial request for 300 ob- 
servers on July 16; by August 1 only 120 of the 300 had yet 
arrived, only 30 of whom were from the Unxted States. The 
United States was also slow in meeting a request for enlisted 
men to act as auxiliary personnel. 

^The New York Times, August '-I-, 19'+8. 



.1 



it might have repercussions on the upcoming presidential 

36 

election. 

By the end of September most of the delays and diffi- 
culties had been resolved and the Truce Organisation had 
attained its maximum size— 500 observers and 179 auxiliary 
and Secretariat personnel. The Truce Supervision Organiza- 
tion remained at roughly this size through the first quarter 
of 194-9. At that point scaled reductions began to be 
effected by the Acting Mediator because of the transition 
which was taking place from the truce to the armistice and 
the parallel decline in incidents. By August, 19*9, when 
the truce was replaced by the armistice, the observers 

numbered only 79 • 

The replacement of the truce by the armistice did not 
end the life of the Truce Supervision Organization com- 
pletely. A small organization, ranging in size from 50 to 
40 observers plus auxiliary personnel, was retained to help 
' maintain the armistice and cease-fire. In 1956, under the 
pressure of increasing tensions in the area, the size of the 
observer group was expanded to 57 men. By 1959 the number 

of observers had been stabilized at around 120 with a sup- 

37 
porting staff of approximately 150 persons. 



^Bernadotte, op. cit . , p. 193. 

57 Davi d Brook, T he United Nati ons and the Ar^Israel 
i/dviu uiy Q/in-nrrrTTvrrv^ doctoral 

Armistice Syste m, W^hzl 5™ j ilo 
dissertation, WIT; pp. 117 and 189. 



52 



M oney; the financial base * -The Truce Supervision 
Organization in Palestine was more expensive than any 
previous observer group. The 19'+8 cost of the operation to 
the United Nations was 13,581,600 and the 19^9 charge 
$3,14-7,063. The resolution authorizing a mediator and staff 
•made no provision for financial support. Yet despite the 
high costs and the absence of specific financial arrange- 
ments, financing proved no real problem. The expenses of 
TJNTSO were included in the regular budget, and the Secret ary- 
General was allowed great freedom in spending for the group. 
In providing for the support of the Truce Supervision 
Organization the Secretary-General followed a precedent set 
in the financing of earlier, more limited observer groups. 
He drew on the authority of an annual resolution authorizing 
him to enter into commitments not exceeding two million 
dollars to meet unforeseen and extraordinary expenses re- 
lated to the maintenance of peace and security. Since the 
Truce Organization's commitments exceeded the maximum, it 
was necessary for the Secretary-General to obtain the con- 
currence of the Advisory Committee to raise the ceiling to 
four million dollars. 59 This was accomplished with little 
difficulty. 



~^ 8 The specific resolution the Secretary-General was 
acting under was resolution 166, adopted by the General 
Assembly on November 20, 19*7. General Assembly, Official 
Records , 2nd Session, 121st meeting (November 20, 1^7) , P* 

1213 * 59 U.N. Doc. A/678, p. 2^8. 



55 

The Secretary-General defended successfully his dis- 
cretionary powers in a brief discussion of the financing 
question at the General Assembly meeting establishing the 
position of Mediator. The point was raised by the repre- 
sentative of Yugoslavia that a General Assembly rule of 
procedure required, all resolutions involving expenditure of 
funds to be accompanied by a statement of the budgetary 
implications drawn up by the Secretary-General and approved 
by the Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions 
(the Fifth Committee). The contention was brushed aside as 
inapplicable to the situation. The Secretary-General noted, 
first, that no precise figure could be given since neither 
the contemplated size of the Mediator's staff nor the 
duration of his activities was clearly known and, second, 
that the Secretary-General had authority under resolution 
166 to provide funds for the Mediator without prior reference 

40 

to the Fifth Committee. 

The Secretary-General's view of the situation seems 
realistic in retrospect. The innovating nature of the 
mission made it difficult to set up any over-all plans with 
respect to expenditures or to estimate accurately the total 
costs. In May the Secretary-General ventured a tentative 

41 4- 

cost estimate of $100,000 for the first year; actual costs 



"^General Assembly, Official Records, 2nd Special 
Session, First Committee, 141st meeting (May 14, 1^»;, p. 

260. ,,-, 

41 Ibid. , p. 260. 



5* 



to the United Nations exceeded three million dollars. In a 
situation as fluid as that in Palestine tight monetary con- 
trols would have made establishment of an effective mission 
far more complicated. 

The Secretary-General used his discretion to support 
generously the Truce Supervision Organization. The emphasis 
was on meeting the needs of the Organization, rather than 
on narrow budgetary considerations. The Secretary-General 
reportedly hesitated fco respond negatively to the almost 
daily requests of the Mediator for fear of prejudicing the 
truce efforts.^ 2 (It might be noted that the Secretary- 
General's discretion may, thereby, have been the Mediator's 
in fact.) Commitments were made with little consideration 
of the financial implications. For example, Ralph Bunche 
indicated that as far as he could remember no definite 
arrangements regarding the final apportionment of costs 
with respect to the observers had been worked out fully when 
the request for observers was made. 

Despite the unexpectedly high expenditures and the 
experimental quality of the operation, the General Assembly 
seemed satisfied in the fall of 19*8 with the activities of 



""^General Assembly, C^ici^l_Jeco^ » ?£?n? eSSi °&* 

Fifth Committee, 158th meeting (November 6, 19*8;, p. b^a, 

45 General Assembly, Official Records , 3rd Session, 

Fifth Committee, 157th meeting (November 5, 19*8), pp. 

651-52. 



55 



the Mediator and the Secretary-General. Little effort was 
made to exert tighter controls over the mission. The 
budgetary requests evoked few comments and fewer changes. 
The request for supplementary funds to cover the cost of 
the 194-8 operation was passed with only a little complaining 
about being asked to approve a fait acc ompli. The estimates 
for 1949 were approved as modified by the Advisory Committee 
with oust a few critical comments about the high costs. 
(The Advisory Committee had reduced the Secretary-General's 
estimates from $4, 092, 000 to $3, 330, 000 for the first ten 
months of 194-9.) The Soviet representative, reiterating 
his usual criticism of UNTSO, did express the view that the 
narrow geographic base of the organization was prejudicial 
to the effective control of expenditures. This narrow base, 
in his opinion, contributed to the high level of expendi- 
ture on transport, travel expenses, and subsistence. He 
suggested, therefore, that the nations providing the ob- 
servers should shoulder a part of the cost of travel and 
subsistence. ^ A few such discordant notes notwithstanding, 
when the debate' and voting were concluded, the Palestine 
mission had won a vote of confidence. A precedent had been 
set for the discretion of the Secretary-General. 



^General Assembly, Official Records, 3rd Session, 
Fifth Committee, 158th meeting (.November b, 19^-8), p. 657- 



56 



It should be noted that the financing of UNT30 might 
well have raised more difficulties if the United Nations 
had, in fact, underwritten all the costs of the operation. 
The dollars and cents expenditures for the Truce Supervision 
Organization reflected only a fraction of the total cost. 
A large share of the equipment was received on loan, pri- 
marily from the United States and the United Kingdom, the 
salaries of the observers were paid by the seconding 
states, and miscellaneous services were performed for the 
organization free of charge by member states, particularly 
the United States, Thus, a few states bore a relatively 
large proportion of the costs of the Truce Organization. 

Material; the logis tic base. -The logistics problems 
confronting those responsible for the organization and 
operation of UNTSO were formidable. The United Nations had 
little experience with an operation of such magnitude. 
There were few precedents which could be followed. There 
was little or no equipment on hand. Decisions had to be 
made about almost every aspect of the organization. And 
it was necessary to do more than make decisions: equipment, 
supplies, men had to be acquired and transported to the area. 

The nature of the Truce Supervision Organization's 
assignment, to observe and report, made transportation and 
communications equipment essential. In the initial stages 
of the operation the problem of getting essential equipment 



57 

on the scene rapidly was eased by the expedient of 'borrow- 
ing. Thus, for the First Truce the United States and the 
Uni-ced Kingdom supplied eight airplanes, over sixty motor 
vehicles, and most of the needed communications equipment. 
Moreover, the United States placed three destroyers with 
their crews and the French one corvette with crew at the 
disposal of the Mediator for observation work. The United 
States made additional vessels available for special acti- 
vities such as the withdrawal of observers at the end of 
the First Truce and the movement of equipment. 

Despite these considerable contributions, the Medi- 
ator found the amount and quality of equipment available 
during the First Truce inadequate for an effective Job of 
truce supervision. 

In a report to the Security Council Bernadotte con- 
cluded that all aspects of truce supervision had been 
hampered, first, by a lack of communications and, second, 
by inadequate motor transport and airplanes. Since com- 
mercial telecommunications available for the mission were 
almost non-existent, reliance for communications had to be 
placed almost entirely on used British and American field 
equipment operated by slow speed radio operators. It was 
with difficulty that even limited facilities were maintained 



"""^The New York Times, July 9, W-8, and U.N. Doc 
S/1025, p. 5. 



58 

in the area. The consequent deficiencies in communication 
caused serious delays, often prevented the maintenance of 
security of operation, and hampered exercise of operational 
control of observer groups along fronts. 

The situation with respect to transport facilities 
was little better. Both the quantity and the quality of 
vehicles and planes available left much to be desired. At ' 
the outset of the truce no means of transport were avail- 
able, and it was only slowly that needed items were 
acquired. Even then many were in a bad state of repair; by 
the end of the First Truce some 50 per cent of all vehicles 
were inoperative because of lack of proper maintenance 
facilities and spare parts. Performance of the functions 
of patrolling, air reconnaissance, and rapid transport of 
observers to the scene of incidents suffered correspon- 
dingly. 

Only in the field of naval reconnaissance did the 
Mediator find the facilities adequate to the requirements 
of the task. And here the mission was handled, not by 
seconded personnel with used equipment, but by the regular 
crews of vessels placed at the service of the United 
Nations by the United States and France. 

During the Second Truce an effort was made to remedy 
these deficiencies. More equipment was acquired and a 



46 



U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 11. 



59 

larger proportion of it was chartered or purchased outright. 
Thus, the number of motor vehicles more than doubled, 
reaching over 150. Bight airplanes were chartered for a 
total in service of twelve and important communications 
equipment was purchased. 

An examination of the annual budget of UNTSO pro- 
vides insight into the needs of the observers in the field. 
The 1948 budget reveals that the $3,581,600 outlay went 

primarily for three categories of expenditures: personnel, 

47 

transportation, and communications. 

The costs of personnel were primarily for subsist- 
ence and travel. A fifteen dollar per day subsistence 
allowance was granted all personnel in Palestine. Although 
some of the delegates found this exorbitant, the Acting 
Mediator pointed to the hardships, risks, and wartime con- 
ditions as justification for the outlay. (It might be 
noted that these costs were substantially reduced in later 
peace-keeping operations.) Salaries were paid to Secretariat 
personnel and certain technicians and locally hired person- 
nel. 

The transportation costs were mainly for the charter 
of planes and the maintenance and operation of planes and 
motor vehicles lent to the Organization. Communications 



7 U.N. Doc. A/G- 5/247 /Rev. 1, November 15, W8, pp. 
107-110. 






60 

expenditures included a considerable outlay for equipment 
because the United Nations found it necessary to set up its 
own private communications system in view of the deficiencies 
of the commercial communications in the area and the abso- 
lute necessity of good communications to the operation. 

The logistics problems of the operation (as well as 
the total costs) were undoubtedly compounded by the absence 
of effective communications, the shortage of food supplies 
in the area, the extensiveness of the mission with observers 
covering a 150 mile front and policing coastlines, ports, 

and airfields, and the necessity of reconstructing the Truce 

4-8 
Organization for the Second Truce. 

The legal status of the Truce Supervision Organization 

The legal status of the observers within Palestine 
and the Arab states was based upon those sections of the 
resolutions of July 15 and August 19 calling on all con- 
cerned to cooperate fully with the Mediator, The resolutions 
were assumed to guarantee by implication the rights and 
privileges necessary to the observers to execute their 
mission. 

This base contrasts in two significant ways with the 
negotiated agreement between the United Nations and the host 



The reconstruction of the truce 'was necessary since 
all observers were withdrawn from the area at the end of the 
First Truce. See the statement of Assistant Secretary- 
General Price in this connection. General Assembly, Of ficial 
Recor ds, 3rd Session, Fifth Committee, 157th meeting - C&ovembe] 
-5, W, P. 64-7. 



61 

states upon which the status of later peace-keeping groups 
rested. First, the status of the observers was established 
not by negotiation but; by United Nations fiat. Second, the 
rights and privileges specifically guaranteed the observers 
were not spelled out initially in any formal agreement or 
official document. lb is true, however, that the first 
instructions from the Mediator to the observers enunciated 
certain basic rights the observers were assumed to have. 
These included the rights to access, safe-conduct, and free 
movement. 

The position of the observers in Palestine became an 
issue in the fall of 1948 following the assassination of 
Count Bernadotte. The Acting Mediator pointed to "the dis- 
turbing tendency on the part of both Arabs and Jews to 
withhold cooperation from the Truce Supervision Organization 
and to place obstacles in the way of its effective opera- 
tion."^ Accordingly, he requested the Security Council 
to give special emphasis to the obligations and liabilities 
of the parties with regard to the Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation. In response to this plea and to a growing number of 
incidents involving the observers, the Security Council 
spelled out the duty of Governments and authorities vis-a- 
vis the Truce Organization in the resolution of October 19, 



^Aj.N. Doc. S/928, p. 2. 



50 



U.N. Doc. S/1022, p. 46. 



62 

1948. According to the terms of the resolution, the host 
authority had the following responsibilities: 

(a) To allow duly accredited United Nations ob- 
servers and other Truce Supervision personnel bearing 
proper credentials, on official notification, ready 
access to all places where their duties require them 
to go including airfields, ports, truce lines and 
strategic points and areas; 

(b) To facilitate the freedom of movement of Truce 
Supervision personnel and transport by simplifying 
procedures on United Nations aircraft now in effect, 
and by assurance of safe-conduct for all United Nations 
aircraft and other means of transport; 

(c) To co-operate fully with the Truce Supervision 
personnel in their conduct of investigations into 
incidents involving alleged breaches of the truce, in- 
cluding the making available of witnesses, testimony 
and other evidence on request; 

(d) To implement fully by appropriate and prompt 
instructions to the commanders in the field all agree- 
ments entered into through the good offices of the 
Mediator or his representatives; 

(e) To take all reasonable measures to ensure the 
safety and safe-conduct of the Truce Supervision 
personnel and the representatives of the Mediator, 
their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under 
their control; 

(f) To make every effort to apprehend and promptly 
punish any and all persons within their jurisdictions 
guilty of any assault upon or other aggressive act 
against the Truce Supervision personnel or the repre- 
sentatives of the Mediator. - 71 

The precise statement of the rights and privileges 
of the observers contributed to somewhat more co-operative 
relationships between the observers and the parties. It 
did not eliminate all problems. Reports continued through 
the winter of 19'+8-49 of difficulties confronted by the 
observers, particularly difficulties involving freedom of 



51 U.N. Doc. 8/10*5 i P. 68- 



6 



7, 






movement. As long as the parties viewed it in their inter- 
est to block the observers' activity , some interferences 
seemed bound to occur. Thus, the real improvement in the 
position of the observers came later with the improvement of 
the situation generally in Palestine and the negotiation of 
the armistice agreements. 

The Truce Supervision Organization in Action 

The role of the Truce Supervision Organisation 

From the practical standpoint of effects on world 
stability that which is most significant about any peace- 
keeping group is what it actually accomplishes in the field— 
what its mission is and how well it fulfills that mission. 

The role of the observers in Palestine was delineated 
by the Mediator in his directives to the men in the field. 
He was, of course, guided in his determination of functions 
by the major terms of the truce. The responsibilities of 
the observers, as laid out by the Mediator, were several. 
First, the primary function of the observers was to super- 
vise observance of the truce terms to ensure that the terms 
were not violated and that neither side benefitted during 
the truce by increasing its strength. In this connection 
they were to reconnoiter land, sea, and air for incoming 
ships and planes that might be used to introduce war ma- 
terial and fighting personnel. Second, they were to observe 



64 

investigate, and report acts contrary to the letter and 
spirit of the truce. Third, the men in the field were to 
serve in a watchdog role preventing incidents when possible. 
In this connection, they were to try to eliminate sources 
of friction between conflicting parties, acting when the 
occasion called for it as mediators and conciliators. In 

addition, they were empowered to order a halt to action 

52 
posing a real threat to the truce, although, they had no 

power to enforce such an order. 

Organization for action 

The organizational structure of UNT30 reflected both 
the role and character of that group. Control was loose as 
befits a multi-national organization in which initiative 
and resourcefulness rather than close direction are re- 
quired. The basic organizational arrangements of the 
Truce Organization in the field are shown in Figure 1. 

The Mediator was in charge of the entire truce super- 
vision mission. However, the actual working direction of 
the system of observation was in the hands of the Chief of 
Staff. It is indicative of the close working relationship 
between the Mediator and the Chief of Staff that a Swedish 



52 U.N. Doc. S/928. 
55 U.N. Doc. S/888, p. 53. 



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66 



officers held this post while Bernaclotte was Mediator and 

that when. Ralph Bunche, an American, became Acting Mediator, 

54 

the Senior United States Observer became Chief of Staff. 

The Chief of Staff was responsible for the assignment and 
direction of the observers and of the auxiliary personnel, 
for the formulation of detailed plans for land, sea, and 
air observation, and for the definition on a map of the posi- 
tions of the respective armed forces in the fighting sectors 
at the beginning of the truce. Questions of principle re- 
lating to the interpretation of the truce were referred to 

55 

the Mediator for decision. 

The power of the Chief of Staff was limited by the 
multi-national character of the Truce Supervision Organiza- 
tion. Although the mixed teams of military observers and 
the auxiliary services of the Organization (motor transport, 
aircraft services, naval vessels, and radio communications) 
were directly under the Chief of Staff, the senior national 
observers were not. Thus, when Brigadier-General Riley of 
the United States was Chief of Staff, the Senior French and 
Senior Belgian 'observers were directly under the Mediator. 
Moreover, a special institutional device, a Truce Super- 
vision Board composed of the Senior Belgian, French, and 



^^The significance of this change in the Chief of Staff 
with the change in the Mediator is pointed out by Leonard in 
his study of the truce. See Leonard, op_. cit . , p. 703. 

55 U.N. Doc. S/928, p. 6. 



67 



American Observers, a political adviser, and the Chief of 
Staff, was built into the structure of the Organization in 
the Second Truce to channel advice on the administration of 
the truce to the Chief of Staff. 

The observers were divided into mixed teams, each of 
which was under the charge of the senior observer for the 
particular area. The responsibilities of the commanding 
officer were many and varied. They included securing de- 
tailed information about the Israeli or Arab army or army 
group to which he was assigned; assigning the observers to 
various units and important bridges, airfields, etc.; sup- 
plementing the observers' general instructions with special 
instructions geared to local requirements; and taking de- 
cisions within his competence on questions referred to him 

from below and referring those he was unable to solve to 

56 
Truce Supervision Headquarters, 

Working with the observer groups, though completely 
outside the formal structure of the Organization, were the 
liaison officers. These officers were assigned by the Arab 
and Israeli Army Commands to the observers to aid and pro- 
tect them in their mission. They performed a variety of 
duties for the observers: interpreting for them, removing 
obstacles from their path, sometimes protecting them. 



Ibid, » p. 4. 






68 

Unfortunately, liaison officers also attempted to "manage" 

their observers at 'times, controlling what they saw and 

57 

heard. 

The observers were deployed somewhat differently 
during the First and Second Truces. During the First Truce 
assignment of the observers was based on geographic areas. 
Observers were stationed in Palestine and in the Arab 
states and were sent from time to time to Cyprus to super- 
vise Jewish immigration. In Palestine the observers were 
assigned to one of five sectors into which the country had 
been divided. . Headquarters and observation posts were 
located in each. Responsibility for commanding the sectors 
was distributed among representatives of the national groups 
contributing to the observation mission: the Northern area 
was under the senior Belgian officer, the Southern area 
under the senior French officer, the Western area under the 
senior American officer, and the Central area and Jerusalem 
under Swedish officers. Assignment in the Arab states was 
more fluid: observers were in Beirut and Damascus most of 
the time and were sent periodically to such places as 
Baghdad and the Egyptian ports and airfields. 

During the Second. Truce assignment was on a functional 
basis. Observers were divided into groups with one group of- 



57 

■"Mohn, op_. cit. , p. 80. 

58 U.N. Doc. S/1025, p. 7. 






69 

observers assigned to each Arab and Israeli Army Group. 
There was also one group of observers for the coast, one for 
the com;roi of convoys between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and 
one for the airfields. J Deployment of the observers was 
flexible throughout, however, and they were moved to the 
spots most needed. 

The shift in deployment practice in the Second Truce 
was for the purpose of making it possible to observe both 
armies in combat, the better to detect violations of the 
truce and to investigate complaints. Although in theory 
the truce area included not only Palestine but the seven 
Arab states involved in the conflict, in practice most of 
the observers were located in the Palestine area in view of 
the concentration of hostilities there and the limited number 
of observers. Obviously more observers could have done a 
more thorough job of surveillance. 

The organization of the observers may not have been 
the most efficient when evaluated on the basis of concentra- 
tion of responsibility. It seemed, however, to fit a 
situation in which national sensibilities had to be taken 



^Illustrative of how the deployment in the Second 
Truce worked out in practice is the deployment of the 300 
officer observers at the end of August, 1948. The dispersal 
on August 23 was as follows: 66 in Jerusalem; 24 with Tel 
Aviv convoys; 35 supervising airports in Middle Eastern 
countries; 22 supervising coasts and seaports; 113 assigned 
to ground control; and 40 stationed at headquarters. The 
New- York Times , August 23, 1948. 



70 






into account and in which it was desirable to allow con- 
siderable discretion to those in the field. 

The functioning; of the observers 

In supervising the truce and preventing advantage 
accruing to either side, the observers' functions centered 
around two sorts of activities. First, they dealt with 
violence and threats of violence. They observed (if 
possible), investigated, and reported on outbreaks and 
complaints of outbreaks of fighting. Fighting could vary 
in its dimensions from isolated sniper fire to attacks on 
convoys or even villages. It was the observers' responsi- 
bility to impress on the involved parties the seriousness 
of truce violation. In the less important situations the 
observers often settled the matter in the field themselves. 
In addition to dealing with actual truce violations, the 
observers attempted to create conditions which would reduce 
the violations to a minimum. To this end, they negotiated 
no-man's lands, established provisional armistice lines, 
arranged harvesting agreements. 

The second area of observer activity was that of 
ensuring the fairness of the truce. The observers had the 
responsibility of seeing, on the one hand, that military 
goods and personnel were not introduced into any of the 
belligerent nations during the truce and, on the other, 



71 

that necessary supplies reached isolated settlements. In 
order to prevent the influx of material the observers 
checked on incoming goods at the main ports and airfields. 
Preventing the augmentation of the forces of either side by 
men of military age posed more problems. During the First 
Truce all men of military age coming into Palestine were 
placed in camps. During the Second Truce such persons were 

checked on periodically to ensure that they were not in 

60 
military training. To ensure that essential supplies were 

delivered to Jerusalem and to remote outposts the observers 

engaged in convoy escort duty. 

The observers in Palestine found their work compli- 
cated by the belligerency of the partxes in dispute. A 
truce organization is small; it is unarmed; it cannot alone 
enforce the decisions made. If its will is to be executed, 
the parties involved must cooperate with it. They may co- 
operate either because it is to their positive advantage to 
do so or because they find it too disadvantageous not to 
cooperate. Thus, the kind of relationship the truce organi- 
zation has with those it supervises and the kind of backing 
it gets from its parent body (which may have the means to 
ensure compliance; are of crucial importance. 

In Palestine relations between the truce observers 
and those they observed were not good. The tension between 



60 U.N. Doc. A/ 64-8, p. 41. 



72 

the parties in Palestine and the feeling by one or both that 
the truce was beneficial to the other meant that the truce 
was maintained only with difficulty, with many incidents, 
and with considerable bitterness. 

As the truce lengthened, the situation became more 
serious* The long truce brought with it the strains of 
accumulated irritations from daily incidents, war nerves, 
and the economic burden of maintaining large armies. By the 
fail of 1948 these strains were expressed in the increasingly 
uncooperative and hostile attitude by the belligerents, and 
particularly by the Israelis, toward the observers. Acting 
Mediator Bunche said in this respect that a serious situation 
existed with regard to the "authority, prestige and even 
safety of personnel engaged in truce work." All sorts of 
interferences were made with the legitimate activities of 
the observers, ranging from refusal of access to certain 
ports and strategic areas to burdensome requirements on the 
movements of the observers. 

The Truce Supervision. Organization needed strong 
backing from the United Nations in view of the unfavorable 
situation in Palestine — what they received much of the time 
was lukewarm support. The support reflected the political 
atmosphere in the United Nations in respect to the Palestine 
situation—an atmosphere which might be defined as one in 



61 The New York Times, October 2, 1948. 



y 



75 

which, the Palestine problem was considered "too hot to 
handle. " Few, if any, states wanted to take action on the 
problem which would be likely to alienate Jews or Arabs. 
Nonetheless, there was concern to keep the truce intact 
until a way out of the impasse could be found. 

As a consequence of the desire to keep the truce 
alive, support was extended to the Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation by the Security Council at several critical points 
in the life of that Organization. After the expiration of 
the First Truce the Security Council took a strong stand to 
obtain agreement by the parties involved to the Second Truce. 
In the July 15 Security Council resolution which provided 
the basis for the Second Truce, the Security Council invoked 
Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter in ordering governments 
and authorities to desist from further military action. The 
declaration that failure to comply would bring consideration 
by the Security Council of further action under Chapter VII 
placed an implied sanction behind the order. 

A most significant example of Security Council bul- 
warking of the observers' position came in October, 1948. 
The situation in Palestine was fast deteriorating. Heavy 
fighting had broken out, first in Southern Palestine, then 
in the North. Calls for a cease-fire by both the Chief of 
Staff and the Mediator were ignored. The Security Council 
then intervened. At the urging of the Mediator, the Council 



74 

called, by unanimous vote, Tor an immediate cease-fire in. 
Palestine. It is true that a part of the force of this 
action was "blunted by a certain vagueness in the resolution. 
The resolution did not order, but merely called for a cease- 
fire. It did not include an effective cease-fire date nor 
specific provisions for enforcing the cease-fire. let, in 
November, following the elections in the United States, the 
Council moved still more positively to bring an end to 
hostilities by instructing the Mediator to arrange for an 
armistice. 

Thus, the parent body of the Truce Supervision 
Organization gave the Organization essential support. The 
Council helped prevent the failure of the truce supervision 
mission even though they denied the Organization all the 
power it might, in theory, have had to execute its mandate. 

Conclusions 

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
was significant not only because of its role in preserving 
a" condition of relative non-fighting while an armistice was 
sought and instituted, but also because it set a pattern 
for United Nations peace-keeping activities. The Truce 
Organization itself, in somewhat modified and reduced form, 



• ^Security Council, Official Records , 3rd Year, 367th 
meeting (October 19, W8), p. 38. 






75 

continued in existence after the truce to help preserve the 
armistice. The initial organization and its successor have 
provided experience, precedents, and personnel that have 
eased the establishment of succeeding missions. 

The experience with the Truce Supervision Organization 
contributes to our understanding, as well, of the factors 
which are important, first, to stimulating creation of a 
peace-keeping group and, second, to the effective functioning 
of that group once in being. 

The creation of UNTSO was in many ways a minimal 
response by the United Nations to a crisis situation. Three 
factors seem to be of particular significance in the origins 
of the Truce Supervision Organization. First, an imminent 
threat to the peace was presented when full-scale war broke 
out in Palestine in mid-May, 19^-8, with Israel's proclama- 
tion of independent status and the consequent Arab invasion. 
Second, the United Nations had clear responsibility for the 
Palestine situation. It had taken jurisdiction from 
Britain; it had been seeking an acceptable solution for the 
future of Palestine for more than a year. Third, the United 
Nations had direct involvement as well as some precedents 
to follow in Palestine through the actions of the Truce 
Commission which was attempting to impose a cease-fire. 
Crisis, responsibility, and involvement led to United Nations 
action — not the boldest nor most dramatic action possible, 



76 

but the strongest action acceptable to the cautious members 
of the United Nations. 

A second question which is of major concern relates 
to the capability of the Truce Supervision Organization to 
fulfill its mandate. Was the Organization equipped to 
maintain peaceful conditions in Palestine? 

The Truce Supervision Organization represents a 
classic example of the organization that grows in response 
to challenge. Not only the emergence, but also the de- 
velopment, of the Organization was a product of the 
situation and its necessities. There was little discussion 
of what UNTSO should be at the time it was established, 
though it seems to have been assumed that it would be modest 
in character. Starting modestly, the Organization expanded 
in size and scope of activities to meet its responsibilities. 

Expansion to meet new challenges was possible because 
strong leadership in the shaping of the Truce Organization 
came from the Mediator, supported by the Secretary-General. 
The political mileau in which the Truce Organization 
functioned was such that the Mediator had freedom in shaping 
and guiding the Truce Supervision Organization as long as he 
did not go too far. The Palestine issue was explosive and 
difficult and most of the representatives were willing, and 
perhaps believed it administratively necessary, to delegate 
responsibility in the matter to a subordinate unit. 






11 

Yet, tiie very explosiveness of the Palestine question 
also limited the Mediator's freedom in strengthening the 
Truce Supervision Organization- The Security Council and 
the participating delegations checked his more controversial 
or ambitious plans. Thus, when the Mediator suggested the 
permanent members of the Security Council as seconding 
states for UNTSO, the suggestion was gently vetoed in favor 
of more limited participation by the members of the Truce 
Commission: when the Mediator tried to include a small 
armed force in the operation, the powers above balked. 
This was more ambitious — perhaps more risky — than they 
wanted. In addition, support for the mission tended to be 
bland and passive. Members of the United Nations were 
cautious about over-involvement in the volatile Palestine 
situation. Nonetheless, at critical junctures in the life 
of the Truce Supervision Organization, the Security Council 
tendered the support necessary to keep the mission alive. 

Related to the question of the capabilities of the 
Truce Organization is that of its actual success or failure 
in fulfilling its mission. The evidence is mixed and the 
answer depends at least in part on how one interprets the 
role of the observers. Were they merely to observe and re- 
port on the truce — were they to prevent major truce viola- 
tions — were they to guarantee that the truce was maintained 
inviolate? 






78 

It is quite clear that UNTSO did not prevent all out- 
breaks of violence, or even all major outbreaks. Jerusalem 
was the scene of hostilities and continuous light fighting 
through the early months of the Second Truce. In October, 
I94-8 5 the entire truce almost broke down with heavy fighting 
in both the North and South of Palestine and a marked slow- 
ness in the belligerents' responses to the calls for a halt 
in the fighting. Nor did the observers prevent the intro- 
duction of at least some men and equipment into Palestine 
during the truce. 65 The effectiveness of the Truce Super- 
vision Organization in both reporting and preventing inci- 
dents was undoubtedly hampered by some discrepancy between 
the formidable responsibilities of the Organization and its 
qualifications to meet those responsibilities. 

— ' " ■ " ■■■ — ■ p --.1T' " ■ ■ ■■ " ■ — ■ """ - 

oi> Estimates on the extent of this violation vary. The 
Mediator in a report to the General Assembly stated, "Un- 
questionably, if more personnel and equipment had been 
available, closer supervision could have been maintained in 
Palestine as well as" in the seven Arab states, but I am 
convinced that if the two opposing forces did in fact manage 
to obtain war materials by clandestine methods, the amount 
would have been so limited as to have made no substantial 
difference to the relative strength of the two sides." U.N. 
Doc, A/648, p. 34. In the same vein Paul Mohn concludes 
that the Truce Supervision Organization knew that the 
clandestine entry of arms was occurring, but they could 
only contain it in reasonable limits. See Mohn, op_. cit. , 
p. 76, k more critical view of the truce violations is pre- 
sented by Edgar O'Ballance in his study of the Arab-Israeli 
war. Ee contends that the truce periods, and particularly ^ 
the First Truce period, were used by both sides, but especi- 
ally by the Israelis, to acquire aircraft, armor, artillery, 
ammunition, and even some ships. Edgar O'Ballance, op_. cit . , 
pp. I$8-39. 






79 

Nonetheless, the Truce Supervision Organization did 
maintain the truce more or less intact for over a year, 
while negotiations for an armistice were undertaken and 
successfully completed. Few would deny that the situation 
was not improved "by the observers. By concrete action — in- 
vestigating, patrolling, negotiating — they reduced tensions, 
helping to keep the situation below the boiling point most 
of the time. And, perhaps even more important, by their 
very presence the observers served to symbolize the United 
Nations concern that the truce should not be violated. In 
the words of Count Bernadotte, "The value of the operation 
was to be found mainly in the moral and psychological effect, 
and in the restraining influences that the mere presence 
of the observers in Palestine would have on the opposing 
par-exes. " 



°\ T .N. Doc. S/1025, p. 10. 



CHAPTER III 

PEACE-KEEPING THROUGH OBSERVATION- AN ESTABLISHED INSTRUMENT; 
THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVATION GROUP IN LEBANON 



Introduction 

Almost ten years to the day after the establishment 
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in 

Palestine, a second observation group came into being. The 

1 
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was established 

on June 11, 1958. The United Nations Truce Supervision 

Organization had been a new and unique experiment, coming 

into being and functioning in uncharted areas; in contrast, 

UNOGIL had the experience of several United Nations 

endeavors on which to build. UNOGIL was affected not only 

by the precedents established by the initial Palestine 

venture, but also by the precedents of the evolving Truce 

Organization, which in modified form was still in existence, 

and of the United Nations Emergency Force. Thus, UNOGIL 

represented an advanced application of the non-fighting 

force technique. 

The 194-8 Palestine Truce Supervision Organization and 

the 1958 Lebanon Observation Group were separated not merely 



"The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon will 
hereafter be referred to as UNOGIL. 

80 






81 

"by years and precedents bub also by the changes which had 
taken place over time in the shape and character of the 
United Nations itself. 

One ox the most crucial of these changes related to 
membership in the Organization. Prior to 1955 few new 
members were admitted to the United Nations because of an 
Bast-West deadlock on the entry of new states. In 1955 a 
package deal involving the entry of sixteen new members 
broke the deadlock. The reopening of the doors of the 
United Nations combined with the emergence of a number of 
new states into the world community meant that not only 
was the total number of states in the United Nations in- 
creased but also that the character of the membership 
changed. The patterns of interest and influence within the 
world organization were correspondingly modified. The in- 
fluence of the Western states declined and that of the 
Afro-Asians climbed. With the new Afro-Asian states came 
an intensified interest in and sensitivity to questions of 
colonialism, imperialism, and under-developed areas. This 
then constituted one significant cluster of changes that 
differentiate the period of the Palestine and Lebanon 
organizations . 

A second relevant development in the ten years was 
the growth in importance of the office of Secretary-General. 
Trygve Lie 5 the first Secretary-General, had believed in an 



82 

active role for the Secretary-General. Although Dag 
Hammarskjold 8 s style as Secretary-General differed from 
Lie's, Hammarskjold shared Lie's faith in the importance 
of the office and continued to strengthen it. By the time 
of the Lebanese crisis the development of the office of the 
Secretary-General had been carried forward to the point 
that a doctrine of implied powers could be enunciated. 
According to Hammarskjold, "...it is in keeping with the 
philosophy of the Charter that the Secretary-General should 
also be expected to act without any guidance from the 
Assembly or the Security Council should this appear to him 
necessary towards helping to fill any vacuum that may appear 

in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy 

2 

provide for the safeguarding of peace and security." 

All this is by way of saying that while UNOGIL was 
influenced by UNTSO precedents and by the similarity in 
their functions , it was also separated from the earlier 
organization ~by the changes which had occurred in both the 
United Nations and the world environments. 

it is the purpose of this chapter to examine UNOGIL 
with some care to determine its significance in the develop- 
ment of the non-fighting force as an instrument of pacific 



__ — ; „ 

■"Security Council, Official E e cords , 13th Year, 
837th meeting (July 22, 1958), pp. 3-4. 



83 

settlement. In the study of UNOGIL the same elements which 
were considered with respect to the Truce Supervision 
Organization in Palestine are isolated for analysis in 
order that comparisons hetween the two may be drawn. The 
chapter is divided into three main sections. The first deals 
with the creation of UNOGIL, focusing on the situation which 
brought it into being and upon the political aspects of its 
establishment and maintenance. The second part describes 
the characteristics of the group, emphasizing the role of 
the Secretary-General in its molding. The third section is 
concerned with functioning of the unit in the field. 

Conditions for Creation of UNOGIL 

The crisis area: internal conditions in Lebanon 

A starting point for consideration of the Observation 
Group in Lebanon is the situation which called the group 

into being. 

The Immediate cause for the establishment of the 
United Nations Observation Group was the outbreak of a small 
scale civil war in Lebanon in May, 1958. Lebanon brought 
the question before the Security Council in a complaint 
charging that the war was primarily a product of the inter- 
vention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs 
of Lebanon and contending that its continuance would 



84- 

endanger the maintenance of international peace and se- 
curity. In fact, the nature and cause of the violence were 
confused. 

Behind the Lebanese complaint was a situation of 
considerable complexity in the Middle Bast 'as a whole and 
within Lebanon in particular. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this study to probe deeply the internal events of 
the Middle East, some note must be taken of a number of 
significant developments in that area in the spring of 1958. 

A dominant factor in the Middle East situation at 
this time was the strength of Arab nationalism and of the 
pan- Arab movement. Both had gained impetus from the merger 
of Syria and Egypt in February, 1958, to form a single Arab 
state, the United Arab Republic. They were stimulated 
further by the strong propaganda campaign conducted by the 
United Arab Republic against the governments of the non- 
aligned Arab states. 

This nationalist fervor had significant implications 
for Lebanon due to its demographic characteristics and to 
the internal conditions in Lebanon. Demographically, 
Lebanon is divided almost evenly between Muslims and 
Christians. Prior to 1958 the potential communal problems 
that this division harbored had been kept to a minimum by 
the practice dividing government and parliamentary offices 



^Yearbook of the United Nations 1958, p. 36. 



85 

proportionately between the major groups in the country and 
hj the promises on each side not to alter the status quo. 
The Arabs agreed not to join a larger Arab state and the 
Christians not to enlist aid from the outside against any 
Arab state. 

In the spring of 1958 the harmony within Lebanon 
steadily disintegrated. Dissatisfaction with Lebanon's 
Christian and pro-Western government under President Camille 
Chamoun was rampant. This dissatisfaction arose from 
several factors. First, actions by the Chamoun government 
in both the domestic and international spheres seemed to 
threaten the delicate Muslim-Christian balance on which the 
stability of the Lebanese government rested. Elections in 
1957 had been rigged apparently to the disadvantage of many 
leading opposition (primarily Muslim) politicians. Rumors 
were persistent that President Chamoun intended to have the 
Constitution amended to allow his re-election as president. 
Adherence by the Chamoun government to the Eisenhower Doc- 
trine was deemed incompatible by many with the national 
compromise calling for non-alignment in international 
affairs , Second, internal economic and social conditions 
within Lebanon were badly in need of reform. There were 
great inequalities in wealth in the Lebanese society with the 
Muslims, by and large, on the lower half of the socio-economic 
scale* Add to these internal conditions inflammatory broad- 



86 

casts from outside against the government and an appealing 
movement to Arab unity — the result is tension. 

In May, 1958, dissatisfaction and unrest took an ugly 
turn. The assassination of an opposition journalist con- 
verted the potential violence into civil war. The war was 
notable, however, for its moderation. There were few 
casualties. The army under General Fuad Chehab, a moderate, 
acted more as an umpire than as a government agent in war. 
(The General felt that the army should not get involved in 
disputes between politicians, lest it to be rent with 
factionalism.) Moderate or not, fighting was underway and 
outside powers were at least indirectly involved. At this 
point the question was brought before the Security Council. 

The United Nations involvement 

The United Nations had no direct involvement in the 
situation in Lebanon prior to that country's complaint to 
the Security Council in May, 1958. Thus, the United Nations 
did not bear the special responsibility in this situation 
that it seemed to in the Palestine and Suez crises. In the 
latter cases the United Nations had had the questions at 
issue under prior consideration — the failure to devise any 
solution seemed to carry with it at least a moral commitment 
to halt viae overt violence which emerged. Such a commitment 
was not present in the Lebanese situation. 



87 

Nor did the situation, in Lebanon pose a clear chal- 
lenge to the United Nations when measured by the criteria 
of a threat to international peace and security. In the 
Palestine and Suez cases open fighting was occurring between 
the armies of the states involved at the time the United 
Nations intervened. Although the locus of aggression might 
be ambiguous , the threat to international peace and security 
seemed clear. In contrast, the immediate crisis in Lebanon 
was primarily internal. Real questions could be raised as 
to the degree to which the internal crisis could, on the one 
hand, be attributed to international factors and, on the 
other, affect international peace. 

The precedents for peace-keeping 

At the time of the Lebanese crisis the United Nations 
had had experience with two important peace-keeping opera- 
tions In the Middle East. It maintained a nucleus of 
observers in Palestine and a substantial force in the Suez 
area. The technique of peace-keeping was familiar and 
usable , Some personnel and equipment were in a position to 
be transferred into Lebanon. Successful past experience in 
peace-keeping made It easier presumably, from practical and 
psychological standpoints, to establish a new United Nations 
presence. 



y 






88 

It may be hypothesized that there is an inverse 
relationship between experience with peace-keeping groups 
and readiness to establish new groups. Successful experi- 
ence would tend to contribute to United Nations willingness 
to establish a new presence even in a less serious case. 

The Establishment of the Observation Group 
The establishment 

The situation in Lebanon was confused. Violence there 
was most assuredly. Less clear were the roots of the dis- 
turbances and the implications they held for international 
peace and security. The Security Council made no immediate 
judgment on the validity of the Lebanese charges. Drawing 
on past experience, the Council responded to Lebanon's plea 
for aid by injection of a United Nations Observation Group 
into the area. This positive response by the United Nations 
to a somewhat ambiguous challenge suggests a growing famili- 
arity with and consequent willingness to use the United 
Nations presence as a peace-keeping device. A brief review 
of the establishment of the Observation Group gives insight 
into the responses available to the United Nations and the 
reasons for selection of this particular one. 

The Security Council met on the initial Lebanese 
complaint from June 6 to June 11. At the June 6 Security 



The Lebanese complaint was placed before the Se- 
curity Council on May 22 , but was not considered until June 



89 



Council meeting the Lebanese Foreign Minister opened the 
discussion by presenting three major claims for his Govern- 
ment, According to Foreign Minister Charles Malik: 

The first is there has been, and there still is, 
massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the 
affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic. The 
second is that this intervention aims at undermining, 
and does in fact threaten, the independence of 
Lebanon. The third is that the situation created by 
this intervention which threatens the independence of 
Lebanon is likely, if continued, to endanger the^ 
maintenance of international peace and security. 

Lebanon specifically charged the United Arab Republic with, 
among other things, supplying arms to subversive Lebanese 
elements s participation in subversive and terrorist acts in 
Lebanon s and conducting a violent press and radio campaign 
against Lebanon. 

The Lebanese representative did not spell out pub- 
licly what action Lebanon wished the Security Council to 

take on the complaint. It was merely stated that, "We want 

6 
only that the intervention in all its aspects stop." 

Privately and unofficially Lebanese officials mentioned the 

possibilities both of an observation group and of a police 

7 

force similar to the United Nations Emergency Force. 



6, The delay was for the purpose of giving the Arab League 
a chance to try to reach a solution first. The Arab League 
considered the issue from May 31 to June 5-» but was unable 
to reach a decision acceptable to all parties. 

-^Security Council, Official Records , 13th Year, 823rd 
meeting (June 6 5 1958), p. 4. 

Ibid . , p. 22. 

The ITew York Times , June 14, 1958. 






90 

The representative of Lebanon presented his country's 
case forcefully, citing evidence to support the charges made. 
The delegate of the United Arab Republic responded to the 
Lebanese charges by denying any intervention in Lebanese 
affairs or any desire to undermine Lebanese independence. 
In his view Lebanon was merely trying to give an inter- 

o 

national cast to essentially domestic difficulties. 

The situation was complicated by the apparent in- 
jection of the dimension of East-West rivalry into it. The 
immediate responses of the United States and of the Soviet 
Union to the issues seemed more a consequence of cold war 
rivalries and alliances than of the Security Council argu- 
ments* The United States, the United Kingdom, and France, 
suspicious of President Nasser's intentions and his friend- 
ship with the Soviet Union, unequivocally supported Lebanon's 
charges,, On the other hand, the Soviet delegate indicated, 
first, that Lebanon had not proved its charges against the 
United Arab Republic in his estimation; and second, that he 
considered such charges merely an excuse to call in foreign 
troops (that is-, United States troops) to put down a domestic 
rebellion, (The latter charge was a reflection of wide- 
spread reports that Lebanon was considering asking United 



Security Council, O ffic ial Records , ljth Year, 

82Jrd meeting (June 6, 1958) , "p. "23. 
q 
^Security Council, Official Records , 13th Year, 

824-th meeting (June 10, 1958), pp. 28-29. 






91 

States military aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine to cope 
with the problem of intervention. The reports were not 
stilled "by statements by Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles to the effect that the United States would honor its 
commitments in Lebanon. ) 

Standing between the states supporting Lebanon's 
complaint and receptive to sending a peace force on the 
scale of UNEF into the area (the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France , and Iraq) and the states rejecting Lebanon's 
charges, was a third group of states whose representatives 
either did not commit themselves on the issues or expressed 
difficulty in determining the facts in the situation. Out 
of this group 5 which included Sweden, Japan, and Panama, 
came leadership for Council action. 

A resolution proposing that an observation group be 
set up to ensure against illegal infiltration of arms and 
personnel into Lebanon was presented to the Security Council 
by the representative of Sweden. (It is not entirely clear 
where the initial push for the observation group began. 
Some attribute the origins of the resolution to the Secretary- 
General.,, suggesting that at a minimum there was collaboration 
between Secretary-General Hamraarskjold and the Swedish 
representative in drawing up the resolution.) 



10 

Richard Miller, Dag Karnmarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy 

(New York: Oceana Publications^ Inc., 1961), p. 167. 






92 

The resolution was presented to the Council late on 
June 10. It was adopted the following day by a vote of ten 
in favor and one abstention. Although the Soviet Union 
denied the need for Security Council action, it abstained 
on the vote since neither the United Arab Republic nor 
Lebanon objected to an observation group. 

The operative sections of the resolution authorizing 
UNOGIL read: 

The Security Council 



O & ,1 a 



Decides to dispatch urgently an observation group 
to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is 
no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms 
or other material across the Lebanese borders; 

Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the neces- 
ary steps to that end....^ 

The United Nations had taken positive if restrained 
action on the Lebanese question. In all probability this 
was the strongest action open to the Council in view of the 
ambiguity of the situation and the divisions within the 
Council on Lebanon's complaint. 

The legal foundations 

The Security Council and the General Assembly have 
tended to be vague about the specific Charter provisions 
under which peace-keeping action is taken. This was the case 



■ x Yearbook of the United Nations 1938, p. 4-9. 



93 

with UNOGIL. No question was raised as to the Security 
Council's competence to send an observation group into 
Lebanon. However, neither the June 11 resolution nor the 
sponsor of that resolution indicated the specific authority 
under which the Council was acting in creating the Observa- 
tion Group. 

In the debate on the establishment of the Observation 
Group several interpretations of the legal foundations of 
that Group were set forth. The delegate of Panama stressed 
that the basis for Security Council action rested in Article 
29 5 which gives the Security Council authority to "establish 
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the perfor- 
mance of its functions," and not in Article 34-* which allows 
creation of an instrument for investigatory purposes. Con- 
sequently, in his view the observers should confine their 
activities to observation alone; they had no authority either 
to investigate or recommend. In contrast, the Swedish 
representative contended, without citing specific Charter 
provisions, that the Council had authority to arrange to 
observe or to investigate in order to clarify the situation 
and perhaps Incidentally to contribute to a lessening of 
tension, y The representatives of the United States and the 






12 
"Security Council, Official Records , 13th Year, 

825th meeting (June 11, 1958), pp. 2^5~. 

]X 

Security Council, Official Records , 13th Year, 
824th meeting (June 10, 1958), p. 23. 






94- 

Uaited Kingdom apparently had the hroadest view of the legal 
base of the observers' powers. Both indicated that the 

"Essentials of Peace" resolution, adopted by the General 

14 
Assembly in 194-9? calling on members "to refrain from any 

threats or acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing the 

freedom, independence and integrity of any State, or at 

fomenting civil strife and subverting the will of the people 

in any State," supplemented the Charter authority of the 

Council and supported an active role by the Security Council 

15 

and its agent in the Lebanese situation. 

Thus, the ambiguity of the Group's legal foundations 
allowed for flexibility and variation in determination not 
only of the precise Charter provisions the observers were 
acting under but, more important, of the powers they had at 

their disposal. 

The mandate 

The June 11 resolution provided in broad terms for 
the establishment of the Observation Group and defined 
loosely the functions of the Group. Neither the resolution 



'General Assembly resolution 290 (IY). 

15 
y The United Kingdom representative also cited reso- 
lution 111 (II), adopted unanimously at the Second Session 
of the General Assembly, as being relevant to the question 
at issue. Security Council, Official Records , 13th Year, 
824-th meeting (June 11, 1958) ,' p. 52. 






95 

nor the accompanying debate indicated precisely what the 
mandate of the Observation Group was supposed to be. What, 
for example., was meant by "to ensure that there is no 
illegal infiltration of personnel or arms"? This prescrip- 
tion might lend itself readily to varying interpretations 
and, in fact, became the subject of later controversy with 
respect to the functioning of the Observation Group. 

Only the representative of Panama attempted to 
clarify the mandate given the observers at the time the 
June 11 resolution was passed. His interpretation was narrow. 
In the Panamanian view the terminology of the resolution 
drew a clear distinction between an observation group and an 
investigating group. The Observation Group should not in- 
quire into or pass judgment on past events or situations. 
The principal and sole function of the Group would be to 
observe in order to ensure that there was no infiltration. 
(This interpretation left open the question of how observa- 
tion alone could halt infiltration, if observed.) In the 
words of the delegate of Panama: 

In my delegation's view, such an observation group 
would not have the authority to undertake an inquiry 
into causes and past incidents to find out whether such 
infiltration has already taken place. This is the 
essential distinction between an observation committee 
and a committee of investigation. An observation com- 
mittee is concerned with the observation of future 
events. An investigating committee, on the other hand, 
is concerned with discovering the truth about what has 
happened. 



96 

My delegation therefore considers that the limits 
within which the group is to carry out its task of 
observation should be clearly established in order to 
ensure that it does not have powers of the kind 
attributed to it in this morning's local Press and 
does not have more authority than it should have as an 
observation group, which should in no circumstances be 
regarded as a court of inquiry. ^° 

It was the Secretary-General ' s interpretation of the 
June 11 resolution that was decisive in fixing the mandate 
of the Observation Group. In a press conference held the 
day following passage of the resolution, the Secretary- 
General described his conception of the Observation Group 
in the following terms: 

First... they are there as an observer team, the 
presence of which has been considered essential and 
useful as a contribution to the preventing of 
possible illegal traffic. 

There is a distinction obviously, between regarding 
an observer activity as in general terms useful for 
the purpose and regarding these people as people who 
are supposed to intervene through direct action. I? 

The Secretary-General ' s interpretation did not change 
basically in succeeding months, Hammarskjold interpreted 
the resolution rather narrowly. He found in it neither the 
authority to expand the operational area of the observers 
beyond Lebanon's borders nor the scope of the activity be- 
yond observation. Strongly and repeatedly he indicated that 






6 
Security Council, Official Records , 13th Year, 



825th meeting (june 11, 1958), pp. 3-4." 

17 Ihe New York Times , June 13, 1958. 






97 

expansion to police-type functions could not be done with- 
out additional authority from the Security Council. He did, 
however, find authority later to substantially increase the 
size if not the scope of the operation. Although there is 
no evidence that the Secretary-General received guidance 
from the Security Council in making his interpretation, he 
certainly took into account the political realities of the 
situation. 

There was reconsideration in July and August, first 
by the Security Council and then by the Second Emergency 
Special Session of the General Assembly, of the proper role 
of the United Rations in the Lebanese crisis. The results 
of the meetings did not alter the decisions made by the 
Secretary-General with respect to UNOGIL. In both the Se- 
curity Council and the General Assembly the action taken 
(or not taken) amounted to a confirmation of the original 
resolution and of the Secretary-General's interpretation of 
that resolution. 

Reconsideration of the question of the observers' 
role in Lebanon was triggered by the arrival of 15,000 
American marines and supporting troops on the shores of 
Lebanon in mid-July. The American force came at the request 
of President Camille Chamoun for the announced purpose of 
preserving Lebanon's independence and integrity. (The sense 
of danger that led to the request for American troops arose 






98 

from a coup d'etat on July 14- in neighboring Iraq. The coup 
had resulted in the bloody overthrow of the monarchy and the 
establishment of a republic.) One implication of Lebanon's 
call for aid from the United States was that the assistance 
being provided by the United Nations was inadequate to the 
situation. Thus, the key issue before both the Security 
Council and the General Assembly meetings was whether the 
Observation Group should be retained as the United Nations 
presence or whether it should be supplemented or supplanted 
by a police force. 

The Security Council met from July 16 to July 23 on 
the Lebanese question at the request of the United States. 
Four different proposals with respect to the United Nations 
role in Lebanon came before the Council; none won acceptance. 
A brief review of the nature of the proposals is suggestive, 
however, of thinking about the Observation Group and support 
for it. 

A negative approach to the United Nations role in 
Lebanon was apparent in the Swedish and Russian resolutions. 
The Swedish representative, who had proposed the Observation 
Group initially, suggested a suspension of all observer 
activities because of the presence of United States marines. 
Swedish reasoning was that the situation had been altered 
by the arrival of the marines, for the functioning side by 
side of observers and American marines would taint the 



99 



i ft 
observers. This resolution was defeated by a vote of 



nine to two, with only the Soviet Union and Sweden voting 
affirmatively. Most of the delegates appeared to feel that 
a worsening of the situation in Lebanon hardly provided a 
propitious time for United Nations withdrawal. 

The Soviet resolution called for the immediate with- 
drawal of all United States troops from Lebanon. The 

American troops constituted the real problem in the Russian 

19 
view. y Only the Soviet Union voted in favor of this pro- 
posal although Sweden and Japan abstained. 

Neither the Soviet nor the Swedish resolutions were 
seriously considered. The real debate in the Council was 
over whether to establish a peace force to aid or even re- 
place the observers. The United States draft resolution 
proposed a peace force. Under its terms the Security Council 
would do the following: 

Invite the United Nations Observation Group in 
Lebanon to continue to develop its activities pur- 
suant to the Security Council resolution of 11 June 

1958; 

Requests, the Secretary-General immediately to 
consult the Government of Lebanon and other Member 
States as appropriate with a view to making arrange- 
ments for additional measures, including the contri- 
bution and use of contingents, as may be necessary to 



Security Council, Of ficial Records , 13th Year, 

830th meeting (July 16, 1958), p. 9 and 835th meeting (July 

21, 1958), p. 10. 

19 
^Security Council, Official Records , 13th Year, 

827th meeting (July 15, 1958), p. 19. 



100 

protect the territorial integrity and independence of 
Lebanon and to ensure that there is no illegal infil- 
tration of personnel or supply of arms or other 
material across the Lebanese borders; .. .20 

In making this proposal publicly the United States 
was bringing into the open an undercurrent associated with 
the Observation Group from the beginning. Both the United 
States and Lebanon had indicated unofficially in the pre- 
ceding weeks that they considered a force on the order of 

Pi 
\MEF necessary to cope with the situation. The Secretary- 
General had never responded favorably to the idea. The 
Council debate suggests that most of the members of the 
Security Council as well had less enthusiasm for the police 
force proposal than had the United States. Nonetheless, 
the proposal was defeated only by a Soviet veto with 
Swedish abstention on the question. 

A fourth proposal was a compromise measure put forth 
by the representative of Japan following the defeat of the 
other draft resolutions. It merely extended the life of the 
observers and by implication made possible an increase in 
their numbers. . The operative sentence of the resolution 
read as follows: 



°U.N. Doc. S/4050, Rev. 1, p. 32. 

23 
"Although .Lebanon had not submitted a formal request 

for a force , they repeatedly spoke out for some sort of 

force, For example , on June 25 Lebanon asked the United 

Nations to seal its land and sea frontiers with armed force 

and requested a United Nations emergency force similar to 

that on the Egyptian-Israeli border. See The New York 



101 

Requests the Secretary-General to make arrangements 
forthwith for such measures, in addition to those en- 
visaged by the resolution of 11 June 1958, as he may 
consider necessary in the light of the present circum- 
stances, with a view to enabling the United Nations to 
fulfill the general purpose established in that reso- 
lution, and which will, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, serve to ensure the territorial 
integrity and political independence of Lebanon, so as 
to make possible the withdrawal of United States forces 
from Lebanon; . . .22 

Although intensive efforts were undertaken to make this 
resolution acceptable to all Council members, it too was 
vetoed by the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet veto came 
not because of objections to a strengthening of the Observa- 
tion Group but because of the failure of the resolution to 
indict the United States for its invasion of Lebanon. In 
fact, Soviet amendments to the Japanese resolution included 
provisions for a strengthened Observation Group. * 

The Secretary-General evidently interpreted the 
Security Council action as almost, if not quite, a mandate 
for a strengthened Observation group. In a much noted 
statement, Secretary-General Hammarskj old announced to the 
Council following the defeat of the Japanese resolution, his 
intention of going forward with the strengthening of the 
Group. In the words of Secretary-General Hammarskjold: 



Times , June 26, 1958. In late June Charles Malik, the Leba- 
nese Foreign Minister, suggested an international force of 
7 s 000 to end the infiltration. See The New York Times , July 
1, 1958. 

22 U.N. Doc. SA055, Rev. 1, pp. 58-59. 

25 
■^Security Council, Official Records , 15th Year, 

856th meeting (July 22, 1958), pp. 4-5. 



102 

Tiie Security Council has just failed to take addi- 
tional action in the grave emergency facing us. How- 
ever, the responsibility of the United Nations to make 
ail efforts to live up to the purposes and principles 
of the Charter remains. 

• <? « * 

In a statement before this Council on 31 October 
1956, I said that the discretion and impartiality 
imposed on the Secretary-General by the character of 
his immediate task must not generate into a policy of 
expediency. On a later occasion—it was 26 September 
1957 — r said in a statement before the General Assembly 
that I believed it to be the duty of the Secretary- 
General "to use his office and, indeed, the machinery 
of the Organization to its utmost capacity and to the 
full extent permitted at each stage by practical 
circumstances." I added that I believed that it is 
in keeping with the philosophy of the Charter that the 
Secretary-General also should be expected to act with- 
out any guidance from the Assembly or the Security 
Council should this appear to him necessary towards 
helping to fill any vacuum that may appear in the 
systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy 
provide for the safeguarding of peace and security. 

It is my feeling that, in the circumstances, what 
I stated in these two contexts, on 31 October 1956 
and 26 September 1957 > now has full application. 

I am sure that I will be acting in accordance with 
the wishes of the members of the Council if I, there- 
fore 5 use all opportunities offered to the Secretary- 
General s within the limits set by the Charter and 
towards developing the United Nations effort, so as to 
help to prevent a further deterioration of the situation 
in the Middle East and to assist in finding a road away 
from the dangerous point at which we now find outselves. 

First of all — the continued operation of the United 
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon being acceptable 
to all members of the Council — this will mean the 
further development of the Observation Group so as to 
give it all the significance it can have, consistent 
with its basic character as determined by the Security 
Council in its resolution of 11 June 1958 and the pur- 
poses and principles of the Charter. 24- 



'"""Security Council, O fficial Records , 13th Year, 
837th meeting (July 22, 1958), pp. 3-4. 






10$ 

In practice if not in theory the Security Council 
action in July reaffirmed and strengthened the initial 
mandate , 

The issue of the United Nations role in Lebanon was 
re-opened in the Third Emergency Special Session of the 
General Assembly from August 8 to 21, 1958. The session 
was convened by the Security Council under the "Uniting for 
Peace" resolution. Again, no basic changes were made in the 
United Nations role in Lebanon. 

Action took place during the General Assembly session 
at two levels: that of general debate in the Assembly and of 
intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations. Broad programs 
for the alleviation of tensions in the Middle East were put 
forward in the general debate by both the Secretary-General 
and the President of the United States. Concern among the 
member states appeared to be focused not on the deep-rooted 
problems, however, but on the presence of United States 
troops in the region and the action which might be taken to 
bring their withdrawal. Although the issue of sending a 
police force to, Lebanon was alive publicly, in fact, private 
negotiations centered on the Observation Group and on the 
means of bringing about the withdrawal of the foreign troops. 
Negotiations for a resolution to achieve this end bogged 
down on the desire of the Soviet bloc and some Afro-Asian 
states to condemn the United States presence in Lebanon. 






104 

Through intensive private consultations a moderate resolu- 
tion, proposed initially by Hans Engen of Norway, won the 
unanimous recommendation of the Arab bloc and thereby the 
unanimous support of the Assembly. 

The resolution which was passed constituted a vote 
of confidence in the Secretary-General's handling of the 
Lebanon crisis. Ail arrangements implementing the resolu- 
tion were left to his discretion. The operative section 
of the resolution requested Hammarskjold: 

...to make forthwith, in consultation with the 
Governments concerned and in accordance with the 
Charter, and having in mind Section I of this reso- 
lution, such practical arrangements as \tfould ade- 
quately help in upholding the purposes and principles 
of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in 
the present circumstances, and thereby to facilitate 
the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the 
two countries. 25 

Thus, the Security Council and the General Assembly 
had each reviewed intensively and reaffirmed the initial 
decision to establish an observation group in Lebanon and 
the Secretary-General's implementation of that decision. 

Characteristics of UNOGiL 

Leadership of UN0G1L 

Secretary-General Hammarskjold exerted strong leader- 
ship both in the establishment and guidance of the Observation 

-_ 

^General Assembly resolution 1237 (SS-IH), Yearbook 
of the United Nations 1938 , p. 50. 






105 

Group . Although he operated within the framework of Se- 
curity Council and General Assembly resolutions, the 
Secretary-General made the crucial decisions with regard to 
the Group. As the Mediator had been given great leeway with 
UNTSO in Palestine, so also was the Secretary-General left 
wide discretion in shaping IHnTOGIL. It was the Secretary- 
General who determined the size, character, and mission of 
the observers. 

Hammarskj old moved in several directions in bringing 
UN0GIL into being. His first action, a preparatory step, 
was to arrange with Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns, Chief 
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to 
secure a small number of military observers who could be 
sent immediately to Beirut. It was a great aid to the 
organization of the Lebanese mission to have at least a few 
experienced observers readily available. The observers were 
able to make the United Nations presence felt at once and, 
at the same time, to assess for the Secretary-General the 
needs of the situation. On the basis of the recommendations 
made by these experienced observers, the Secretary-General 
was able to report to the Security Council on June 18 that 



26 

The first five observers arrived June 12; the second 

five on the 13th; and five more a few days later. These 
observers were under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel W.M. 
Brown of New Zealand, who served as senior observer for the 
duration of the mission. 



106 

an estimated 100 observers would be needed. Fourteen nations 
were requested to provide these observers. 

The second direction in which. Hammarskjold moved was 
to set up a control structure for the Observation Group. 
The resolution authorizing the Group did not indicate what 
sort of arrangements should be made for the leadership of 
the organization; apparently it was to be the Secretary- 
General's responsibility. The Secretary-General set up a 
three-man observation group and appointed the members of it. 
Although a three-man group had been used before, for example, 
in connection with the Indonesian question, there is a 
significant difference between the position of the Lebanese 
group and most earlier ones. The previous commissions had 
been created and their members appointed by the Security 
Council or the General Assembly; they were thereby directly 
responsible to the parent body. In the case of UNOGIL the 
three-man observation group resulted from the action of the 
Secretary-General and was thereby responsible to him rather 
than to the Security Council directly. Those selected by 
the Secretary-General for the observation group were Galo 
Plaza of Ecuador, elected chairman by his colleagues; 
Rajeshwar Dayal of India; and Major-General Odd Bull of 
Norway. The appointees represented geographically three 
major contributing areas to peace-keeping groups. Bull, 
who was Air Commander of the Norwegian Royal Air Force, was 



107 

designated executive officer in charge of observers by the 
Secretary-General. The three appointees were instructed to 
go immediately to Beirut. There the first meeting of the 
group was held on June 19 with the Secretary-General present 
to provide a liaison with the Secretariat and generally to 
get the operation under way. 

Thus, less than ten days after the passage of the 
June 11 resolution, the necessary steps to bring a full- 
fledged operational observation group into being had been 
taken, while a rudimentary group had been functioning for 
nearly a week. This speed contrasts with the time taken to 
get the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization under- 
way in 1948 and suggests the usefulness of experience and 
precedents in the early stages of a peace-keeping operation. 

The Secretary-General played an important role not 
only in the initiation of the Observation Group, but also 
in the guidance of the Group during its existence. He 
seems to have been far more important' than the three-man 
observation group in providing leadership. It was he who 
made the important decisions on the composition, financing, 
and range of activities of the observers. 

One of the perennial problems arising out of the 
Secretary-General's strong leadership and wide discretion 
in peace-keeping operations is that of United Nations con- 
trol over the Secretary-General (or over any other responsible 









108 

executive agent, for example, the Mediator in Palestine). 
It has been difficult to reconcile the need for discretion 
by the executive with the need for ultimate control by the 
political organs of the United Nations. In the Lebanese 
case, as in others, the Security Council and the Assembly 
tended virtually to abdicate their powers and responsibili- 
ties to the Secretary-General. 

The Secretary-General's power to create and mold a 
peace-keeping group is, of course, never unlimited even 
when the formal controls of the Council are very loose. In 
the case of the Observation Group in Lebanon there were at 
least three sorts of restraints on Hammarskjold. One of 
these, the Advisory Group, has considerable potential for 
development as an effective instrument of over-all guidance. 

First, the Secretary-General operated within the 
framework of precedents set during the lifetime of the 
United Nations with respect to similar types of organiza- 
tions. He did not create the Observation Group in a void. 
The precedents established and the experience gained in 
setting up truce organizations in Indonesia, Kashmir, and 
Palestine and an emergency force in Suez undoubtedly in- 
fluenced many of the decisions which Hammarskjold had to 
make with respect to the group in Lebanon — decisions, for 
example., on the composition of the group, on its relations 
with the host state, on the scope of authority. 






109 

Second , in making his decisions the Secretary-General 
had a number of sources of advice, both technical and poli- 
tical, upon which to draw. The observers themselves, 
particularly the experienced observers borrowed from the 
Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, channeled to 
the Secretary-General both information and recommendations 
that influenced the shaping of the organization. In a sense 
they fitted the group to the situation. The presence in the 
region at crucial times of close Secretariat advisers Ralph 

Bunche and Andrew Gordier suggests an important role for 

27 

them in the evolution of the Observation Group. Finally, 

the Secretary-General consulted actively if informally with 
the national delegations. Consultations between the 
Secretary-General and the representatives of Sweden, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Republic, 
and Lebanon were reported both before and following passage 
of the June 11 resolution. 

Third, an advisory committee was established by the 
Secretary-General on July 18. On that date Hammarskjold, 
moved to supplement the informal channels of communication 
by establishing a formal channel in the form of a seven-man 



^Bunche was placed in charge of activities in Lebanon 
in the Secretariat sometime in July and appeared in Lebanon 
during the tense period in late July for consultations and 
to look over the operation. The New York Times , September 
10, 1958. 









110 

group to consult on plans for the development of UUOGIL. It 
is revealing that the Advisory Committee was not established 
until the Observation Group had been in operation over a 
month and at a time when it faced a kind of crisis of confi- 
dence both within the United Nations and Lebanon. Moreover, 
those asked to serve on the Committee were the same persons 
serving on the UNEF Advisory Committee which suggests a 
precipitous creation for the device. The establishment of 
the Advisory Committee reflected the crisis which confronted 
the Observation Group at that time with the entry of United 
States marines into the area and the weakening of support 
for the Group. The Advisory Committee, once established, 
was apparently used very little in connection with the 
Observation Group; the only references made to it are to 
its establishment. Its creation was designed to stimulate 
and demonstrate support for UMOGIL in a period of crisis. 
Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee device has a potential 
as a control instrument as well which could be further 
explored. 

Support for UNOGIL 

Men for UNOGII .-The size and composition of the peace- 
keeping group has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of 
that group in carrying through its mandate. 

A rough theory of ideal composition for peace-keeping 
missions, which had emerged in the period between establish- 






Ill 

ment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in 
Palestine and the setting up of the Observation Group in 
Lebanon, was applied in organizing UNOGIL. Experience and 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold were primarily responsible 
for the development of the theory. 

In the early truce supervision organizations the 
primary determinant of composition seemed to be expediency — 
who was available in the area to serve. Participation 
tended to be narrow. (A principal rule of composition 
followed was exclusion of the Soviet Union from participa- 
tion.) By 1958 the organization of the peace-keeping group 
had become more sophisticated. The principles of composi- 
tion followed in determining the composition of UNOGIL were 
three-fold. First, there should be no participation in the 
peace-keeping operations by the five permanent members of 
the Security Council. In fact, one of the functions of such 
groups had come to be the isolation of explosive situations 
from the great power conflicts. Second, there should be 
exclusion of representatives from states which might have a 
direct interest in the situation. Thus, no Middle Eastern 
nations were invited to contribute to UNOGIL. Finally, 
there should be a wide geographic base for the Group. 
Application of this principle could first be observed in the 






112 

steady broadening from 1953 of the base of the Palestine 

28 

Truce Supervision Organization. 

The observers serving in UNOGIL came initially from 
fourteen nations; ultimately a total of twenty-one states 
contributed to the Group. In fact, however, the geographic 
base may have been somewhat less representative than it 
first appears. Initially well over three-fourths of the 
observers came from Canada and Western Europe. Of the first 

108 observers, 85 came from nations of the Western bloc; 

29 

fifteen from Asia; and eight from Latin America. 

All in all, these principles seemed to be of a nature 
to contribute to the strength of the peace-keeping group and 
to constitute a significant advance over the early ad hoc 
approach to composition. 

The size of the Observation Group in Lebanon, like 
that of the Palestine organization, grew in response to 



^ In setting up UNOGIL the Secretary-General did not 
specifically refer to the principles he was following in 
the selection of observers other than indicating that the 
Group should be composed of "highly qualified and experi- 
enced men who have to be collected from various corners of 
the globe." Security Council, Official Records , 13th Year, 
825th meeting (June 11, 1958), p. 18. These principles were 
laid down specifically, however, in the Secretary-General's 
study of the experience derived from UNEF which was issued 
in 1958. U.N. Doc. A/39^+3, pp. 28-29. 

°See Appendix B for a break-down of the national 
composition of UNOGIL. The twenty-one states supplying ob- 
servers or other personnel were Afghanistan, Argentina, 
Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, and Thailand. 



113 

circumstances. There is probably little question that the 
Group ivas under-strength to meet its responsibilities fully, 
particularly in the early phases of the operation. The 
initial estimate, made by experienced observers from UNTSO 
on the scene, was that approximately 100 observers would be 
needed. By the end of June the one hundred men were on duty. 

A second spurt of growth occurred after July 15, 
1958. This growth was a response to the Observation Group's 
assessment that additional observers and equipment were re- 
quired to adequately perform their mission. The observers' 
request for nearly a hundred additional observers, almost 
double the number in the field, and for non-commissioned 
officers to handle routine tasks was given impetus by the 
arrival of the United States marines and the Secretary- 
General's judgment that the Observation Group was more im- 
portant than ever. 

A third period of growth came in late September and 
early October when the organization again doubled in size, 
a somewhat peculiar time to so greatly strengthen the 
organization since the problem of infiltration seemed 
virtually over. The civil war was, to all intents and pur- 
poses, ended. In less than two months the entire mission 
would be liquidated. 

The pattern of growth in the Observation Group is 
indicated in Table 1, showing the number of observers at 










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115 

the time each of the reports of UNOGIL were issued, com- 
mencing with the Second Interim Report, which marks 
attainment of the size initially desired. 

In addition to the observers there was a civilian 

staff of 126 connected with the mission: 34- general service 

■50 
staff; 17 professional staff; and 75 field service staff. 

While the usual practice of having the seconding governments 

pay the salaries of the observers was followed, it was 

necessary to provide not only travel and subsistence but 

salaries as well for the civilian staff. 

Honey: the financial base of UNOGIL . -The United 
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was a relatively expen- 
sive venture for the United Nations. The expenditures for 
1958 for UNOGIL were slightly greater than those for the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization for 194-8. The 
Observation Group in Lebanon cost $3,665,831; UNTSO had cost 
$3,581,600. (It might be noted that UNTSO was a lengthier 
and somewhat more ambitious operation than UNOGIL.) By 1958 
the United Nations was more accustomed, and perhaps more 
stoical, toward large expenditures than it had been earlier. 
While questions regarding the financing of UNTSO were raised 
both at the time the resolution authorizing the Organization 
was passed and at the time the supplementary estimates were 
approved, the arrangements for the financing of UNOGIL were 



5 °U.N. Doc. A/C. 5/763 (November 14, 1958). 






116 

handled routinely, with little questioning or grumbling by- 
representatives. The difficulties of Suez financing may 
have made these outlays seem trivial indeed. The lack of 
visible concern over financing UNOGIL may also be attributed 
to the fact that since the operation was virtually completed, 
practically no new commitments were involved. 

The methods used to finance the Observation Group 
were nearly identical to those connected with the Palestine 
operation. Initially, the Secretary-General spent for 
IMOGIL under the authority vested in him by General Assembly 
resolution 1231 (XII) to incur expenses of up to two million 
dollars to meet unforeseen and extraordinary costs relating 
to the maintenance of peace and security. (It was under an 
almost identical authority that Secretary-General Lie met 
the costs of the Palestine operation.) In late July when 
it became apparent that an expansion of the Group's activi- 
ties would lift its expenses above the two million dollar 
limit, the Secretary-General obtained the concurrence of 
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions to enter into commitments of up to four million 

dollars. 

The spending by the Secretary-General under his 
emergency authority still left open the question of how 
these outlays would be covered by the General Assembly. 
The Secretary-General suggested two alternative methods by 
' which the General Assembly might meet the estimated 1958 



117 

expenditures of $3,800,000: first, appropriations could be 
included in a regular or special section of the 1958 budget; 
or second, they could be carried in authorized special 
accounts for which, funds would be appropriated and assessed 
in accordance with the scale of contributions approved for 
1959 for regular budgetary expenditures. For the possible 
1959 outlay the Secretary-General suggested either that a 
provisional appropriation be made in the 1959 budget or that 
the Secretary-General use his authority to incur expenses 

•4. 51 

relating to peace and security. 

The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly deter- 
mined, in accordance with the advice of the Advisory Com- 
mittee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, that the 
expenses for both 1958 and 1959 should be included in the 
regular budget. The inclusion of the items in the regular 
budget thereby avoided the difficulties of non-payment of 
s-oecial assessments which had developed in connection with 
the financing of UNEF. In view of the difficulties which 
had already emerged in connection with the LTTEF approach 
to financing peace-keeping, it is rather surprising that 
the Secretary-General indicated no preference as to the 
mode of financing UNOGIL. 



51 U.H. Doc. A/C. 5/765 (November 14, 1958), p. 25. 






118 

Material: the logistic base of UNOGIh .-An observation 
group, however capable, balanced geographically, adequate 
in number, and well-financed, needs adequate equipment to 
carry through its mission. Just as the observers themselves 
seemed to have been assembled in Beirut with few of the 
uncertainties tied to the early days of the Palestine opera- 
tion 5 so also was the necessary equipment collected rapidly 
and with apparent ease. The experience gained in the 
Palestine and Suez operations contributed to the efficiency 
demonstrated in organizing the United Nations operation in 
Lebanon. 

The acquisition of equipment in the Lebanon case 
differed in two significant ways from the earlier Palestine 
venture. First, the existence in the area of the Truce 
Supervision Organization and UNEF gave the United Nations 
its own organizations from which equipment could be borrowed 
and made readily available. Second, the difficulties the 
Palestine group had experienced arising from the borrowing 

of much equipment from member states were avoided by pur- 

32 

chasing or renting nearly all items needed. 



* Over $500,000 x-^orth of equipment, including Jeeps, 
planes, helicoptors, automotive equipment, and field sup- 
plies, was made available to UNOGIL on a cost reimbursable 
basis by the United States Government. This was equipment 
similar' to that being provided 1MB?. See U.S. Participation 
in t he UN, Report by the President to the Congress fo r the 
Year 1^58 (Washington: Government Printing Oifice, 1959")* 
pi 240. 






119 

As with, the Palestine organization the nature of the 
mission made transportation and communication items the main 
requirements. The operational expenses of UNO GIL were 
$1 } 600 5 000. The hulk of this sum, approximately 80 per 
cent, went for the purchase or rental of equipment. The 
scope of the operation and something of its character is 
suggested in the breakdown of these expenses: 59.7 per cent 
was devoted to transportation equipment; 16. 3 per cent to 
communications equipment; 7.7 per cent to field equipment; 
and .5 per cent to supplies and services. ^ Another 5.6 
per cent or $90,000 went to the rental and maintenance of 
the premises. 

The legal status of UNOGIL 

In the decisions on composition, size, and financing 
the foundation of the UNOGIL personality was laid. The 
organization's legal personality was also set in the early 
days of the organization. The legal position of the Obser- 
vation Group in Lebanon was based on a letter of June 13, 

1958, from the Secretary-General to the Foreign Minister of 

34- 
Lebanon. 

In the aforementioned letter, constituting an agree- 
ment, three main propositions with respect to the Observation 



55 U.N. Doc. A/0. 5/763, Annex I (November 14, 1958), 
pp. 26-27. Another $2,200,000 was spent on personnel costs 
travel, subsistence, and some salaries. 

5 ^U.N. Doc. SA029. 



120 

Group's position in Lebanon were set forth. First, the 
Secretary-General suggested that the Lebanese Government 
extend to the Observation Group (the three senior members, 
the military observers, and the Secretariat members) over 
and above the status they enjoyed under the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations^ the 
privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities which 
are enjoyed by diplomatic envoys in accordance with inter- 
national law. Secondly, the Secretary-General stated that 
the privileges and immunities necessary for the observer to 
fulfill his functions included: "freedom of entry, without 
delay or hindrance, of property, equipment and spare parts; 
freedom of movement of personnel, equipment and transport; 
the use of United Nations vehicle registration plates; the 
right to fly the United Nations flag on premises, observa- 
tion posts and vehicles; and the right of unrestricted com- 
munication by radio, both within the area of operations and 
to connect with the United Nations radio network, as well 
as by telephone, telegraph or other means." Finally, the 
Secretary-General indicated his expectation that the Leba- 
nese Government would provide at its own expense all 

^^For an enumeration of the privileges and immunities 
of the members of the United Nations see, "Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations," Unit ed 
Nations Textbook , Compiled by the "Professor Telders Study 
Group~Tor International Law at Leyden University, assisted 
by P.M. Baron von Asbeck and J.H.W. Verzijl (Leiden: Lexden 
■ University Press, 1958), pp. 210-215. 



121 

necessary premises for the observers (Including office space 
and areas for observation posts and field centres, which. 
would be inviolable and subject to exclusive control and 
authority of the Observation Group) as well as necessary 

■zf. 

means 01 transportation and communication. 

There appear to have been no difficulties in the 
implementation of the provisions respecting the extension 
of privileges and immunities to the observers. The pro- 
visions regarding Lebanese responsibility for the expenses 
of the premises and of the means of transportation and 
communication evidently raised more difficulty. It is not 
clear from the letter exactly what share of the costs 
Lebanon was to bear; a major part of the operating expenses 
went for rental of premises and the purchase, rental, and 
operation of transportation and communications equipment. 
Did the Secretary-General propose that all these costs were 
to be borne by Lebanon? If not all, what share of responsi- 
bility was to be their' s? These details were apparently to 
be resolved in consultations between representatives of the 
Government of Lebanon and of the Secretariat. Seemingly, 
the consultations did not result in Lebanon assuming any of 
these costs, for the budget estimates include charges for 
both transportation and communications .items and for the 
rental of headquarters premises in Beirut and of out- 
stations. Although a budget notation indicated that 



56 u.n. Doc. S/4-029, PP. 73-74. 



122 

negotiations were underway in the fall of 1958 with Lebanon 
for a possible reimbursement of rental costs, a perusal of 

later financial records gives no indication that such 

57 

reimbursement was ever made. 

UNOGIL in Action 

The role of the observers 

We come now to the central question with respect to 
an observation group or a peace force — what did it do, in 
fact, to promote peaceful settlement? 

The role of the observers in Lebanon was defined 
initially by the June 11 resolution which instructed them 
"to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of person- 
nel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese 
borders." It was apparently tacitly assumed that the 
observers would not only determine if illegal infiltration 
was occurring but would also help prevent or halt such 
illegal activities. The observers would accomplish their 
objectives by patrolling and observation; they were to have 
no enforcement powers nor were they to intervene directly 
in any situation. It was assumed, first, that the mere 
presence of the observers would have a restraining effect 
on infiltration if such infiltration were occurring in fact; 



^U.R. Doc. A/G. 5/763 (November 14-, 1958). 



123 

and second, that reports by the observers of illegal move- 
ment from outside would bring moral, perhaps stronger, 
pressure from United Nations headquarters for a cessation 
of such nefarious activities, 

From mid-July forward the primary function of the 
Observation Group seemed to undergo a de facto change. 
Related to this change were changes in' the environment in 
which the observers operated — changes brought about by an 
improvement in the internal situation in Lebanon and by the 
entry of United States troops. While in theory the main 
role of the observer was still to ensure against infiltra- 
tion, in fact their main function seemed to be to serve as 
an international presence to enable the American troops to 
withdraw from the area gracefully. 

The broad terms of the June 11 resolution and of 
later resolutions were never translated into explicit 
instructions for the observers. The Lebanon operation was 
put into effect by a group of experienced observers from 
the Truce Supervision Organization who apparently drew on 
their experience rather than on explicit directives from 
headquarters to determine precisely how the organization 
should function to carry through its mission. 






124- 

The organization ox UNOGIL 

The organization of UNOGIL, like that of UNTSO, was 
loose. Control from above was limited. The chain of 
command ran from the Secretary-General to the Executive 
Member of the three-man observation group , who was designated 
the Chief of Staff. Under the Chief of Staff was the Chief 
Military Observer, an experienced observer on loan from 
UNTSO. The main observation stations came directly under 
the control of the Chief of Staff rather than under the 
Chief Military Observer. The observation stations were 
manned by multi-national observer groups. Thus, there was 
more integration of units in the Observation Group than was 
possible in a peace-keeping force. 

In the early weeks of the operation, the organization 
was highly decentralized with the maximum number of obser- 
vers in the field and a skeleton headquarters organization, 
consisting only of an operations branch staffed with a few 
evaluation officers. As the Group expanded in size, the 
headquarters organization increased in complexity and 
specialization of functions was inaugurated. By August the 
headquarters was organized on full military lines with a 
deputy chief of staff and four section chiefs to deal 
respectively with personnel, evaluation of information, 
operations, and logistics. Figure 2 summarizes the organi- 
zation of the Group. 






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126 

The functioning; of UNOGIL 

The observers began to function very quickly, though 
on a limited scale . Within forty-eight hours of passage of 
the June 11 resolution setting up the Observation Group, the 
first patrols had begun. The history of the Group's 
mission is one of a steady growth in intensiveness and ex- 
tensiveness of operations. Although there was a continuous 
expansion of UHOGIL's activities, the operations of the 
organization can be divided into two broad phases, with 
mid-July the break point. 

Phase I , -The first phase of the Observation Group's 
mission centered on two objectives: first, to be seen and 
to see as much as possible thereby malting the United Nations 
presence definitely felt; and secondly, to lay the ground- 
work for a more ambitious program than was possible under 
the initial conditions.. The observers had made notable 
progress in both areas by the middle of July. 

The methods used for surveillance throughout this 
period were the regular and frequent patrols of all acces- 
sible roads from dawn to dusk by United Nations observers 
in jeeps. Late in June the jeep patrols were supplemented 
by aerial reconnaissance, first by helicopter and then by 
both helicopter and airplane. The operation might be des- 
cribed as of the probing type; patrols fanned out toward 
the border from the headquarters initially and later from 



127 
the headquarters and the stations and sub-stations set up 
in the countryside as near to the border and infiltration 
routes as possible. The nature of the operation in its 
first days is described in a report from the Secretary- 
General to the Security Council. 

The United Nations observers, in vehicles painted 
white with United Rations insignia, began active recon- 
naissance on the morning of 13 June in Beirut and its 
environs. Officials of the Group in Beirut, from the 
beginning, requested of the Lebanese authorities that 
the United Nations observer teams be accorded complete 
freedom of movement throughout government -he Id areas. 
Beirut Headquarters informs us that in a few initial 
trips "of uncertain and dangerous nature," pilot jeeps 
manned by Lebanese troops have been used to check roads 
half an hour in advance of the United Nations teams and 
half an hour behind them. The observer teams have in 
each subsequent instance proceeded without pilot 
vehicles. We are also advised that the initial purpose 
of the patrols and road reconnaissances was to have 
United Nations observers and vehicles appear in as many 
areas as possible as soon as possible. In consequence, 
the observer teams have covered most main road areas 
in government-held regions, and have reached and entered 
areas not held by government forces. The observer teams 
are now working according to a schedule, and the plan 
being followed is to have them probe further each day 
in the direction of the frontier. Their observation 
task in connexion with any "illegal infiltration of 
personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the 
.Lebanese borders" is greatly complicated by the fact 
that, as reported by Observation Group headquarters in 
Beirut, only a small part of the total frontier appears 
to be controlled by government forces. The observer 
teams are composed of two observers, each with a radio- 
equipped vehicle, and one radio officer with a communi- 
cation jeep. The three members of the team in their 
vehicles operate in a convoy at safe intervals and keep 
in constant communication with each other. 5° 



5S U.N. Doc. S/4-029, p. 71. 



128 

The observers issued two reports covering their 
findings to July 15, 1958. They described the many 
difficulties under which their mission was operating and 
.gave a region-by-region report of the evidences of infil- 
tration found. In neither report was evidence of massive 
infiltration given. In the first report the observers 
concluded: 

The patrols of the Group have .reported substantial 
movements of armed men within the country and concen- 
trations at various places.... 

The arms that were seen consisted mostly of a 
varied assortment of rifles of British, French and 
Italian makes.. Some hand grenades were also seen at 
various places. Occasionally, opposition elements 
have been found armed with machine guns. Mines seen 
near the Baalbek area were of British and French makes. 
XL has not been possible to establish from where these 
arms were acquired; but, in this connexion the remarks 
contained in paragraph II of the present report should 
also be borne in mind. [Paragraph 11 notes that the 
peoples of the border areas have traditionally borne 
arms and possession of arms is a common practice.] 
For was it possible to establish if any of the armed ■ 
men^observed had infiltrated from outside; there is 
little doubt, however, that the vast majority was in 
any case Lebanese. 39 

In the second report there are suggestions of some 
sort of nefarious activities occurring, but only on a 
limited scale and in a few places. Some truck and mule 
convoys were observed under suspicious circumstances, while 
in certain areas the movement forward of the observers was 
blocked by such obstructive tactics as mines and sniper fire.' 4 " 



3 a T .K. Doc. S/4-04-0 and Add. 1, pp. 8-9. 
°U.N. Doc. S/4069, PP. 86-89. 






129 

The reaction to the observers' first reports was 
strong and not entirely favorable. The conclusion that there 
was no massive infiltration was not popular with those who 
had been most eager to see the Observation Group created. 
The difficulties of UNOGIL were thereby compounded. On the 
one hand, the reliability of the reports and of the mission 
itself was questioned. It was suggested that the sub- 
stantial limitations the observers functioned under cast 
doubt on their findings. ' On the other hand, the basis 
of support for the operation within Lebanon and the United 
Nations was considerably weakened for a time. 

There is little question but that the observers did 
operate initially under considerable handicaps. It is more 

difficult to determine the precise effect these limitations 

4-2 

had on the work of the observers. it may be noted that 

over the months efforts were made by the observers to remove 
or lower the barriers to a complete surveillance. 



Hhl 

""United States sources, for example, suggested that 
the reports by the observers were inconclusive. The New 
York Times, July^6, 1958. See also the comment of the French 
delegate in the Security Council. Security Council, O fficial 
Record s, 13th Year, 828th meeting (July 15, 1958), p. "SI 

Great emphasis is placed on the weaknesses of UNOC-IL 
in Qubain s s study of the Lebanese crisis. With respect to 
the UITOGIL role in the first phase of operations he" con- 
cludes : "it is rather difficult to arrive at any conclusion 
other than that, because of the lack of adequate number of 
observers and equipment and because of the extremely diffi- 
cult .circumstances under which it operated, UNOGIL was, 
during this period 3 hardly in a position to be able to de- 
tect infiltration of men and smuggling of arms, if indeed 



130 
The first factor limiting the observers' activities 
was confined primarily to the early phases of the operation 
and was probably unavoidable given the lack of a stand-by 
peace-keeping group. In the early days of the operation 
there was a shortage of both men and equipment in terms of 
the demands of the mission. Both had to be assembled and 
brought to the scene rapidly. The first estimate of 100 
observers as necessary for the mission had to be revised 
upward in early July to a figure double the original. Equip- 
ment requirements were corresondingly increased. 

A limited number of observers and concern for their 
safety (perhaps occasioned in part by the problems raised 
when nationals are killed in a United Nations peace-keeping 
mission) contributed to a second limitation on the effec- 
tiveness of the observers' activities during the early weeks 
of the operation— the failure to patrol at night or in many 
frontier areas. Although consideration was given to under- 
taking night patrols and patrols without safe conduct 
agreements , it was determined that such patrols were too 
dangerous to use except in rare instances. Yet common sense, 
as well as the reports of the observers themselves, suggest 
that if infiltration was occurring, it would be most likely 
to take place at night. 



they .were taking place. The first report must be understood 
as reflectxng what the Observation Group was able to see— 
nooning more." Eahim Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, 
D.C.: The Middle East Institute"!^!" ) , p. 14-7 7 



131 
The terrain and the demographic character of the area 
also created difficulties for the observers. The areas in 
which the likelihood of infiltration was greatest were also 
most inaccessible — mountainous, barren, traversed by few 
roads fit for vehicular traffic. To further complicate the 
situation in these areas the population was composed largely 
of tribesmen accustomed both to moving freely back and forth 
across the border between Lebanon and Syria and to bearing 
arms. Distinguishing infiltrator and local resident was 
most difficult under these circumstances. It was not until 
well along in the mission that adequate surveillance of 
these areas was possible. 

The internal situation in Lebanon further compounded 
the problems of the observers, while raising provocative 
questions regarding the proper role of a United Nations 
peace-keeping group in a civil war situation. The use of 
the peace-keeping group in a civil war situation such as 
that found in Lebanon poses practical and philosophic 
dilemmas. The peace-keeping group enters the host country 
at the invitation or at a minimum with consent of the 
government. The government may assume that the peace-keep- 
ing group is there to assist it in its difficulties. let 
in order to carry through its mission, the group must deal 
with and perhaps tacitly recognize rebel elements. The 
peace-keeping group may thereby be caught between the 



132 

government and the opposition. What should its position 
be — support for the established government which permitted 
entry of the United Nations mission or strict neutrality 
between the established government and those seeking to 
overthrow it? This is not an easy question to answer either 
in theory or in the field* It was not an easy question to 
answer in Lebanon. 

The questions of observer access to the frontier 
areas and the observer role vis-a-vis government and oppo- 
sition were intertwined in Lebanon. On arrival in Lebanon 
the observers found that in most areas they could not reach 
the "frontier to check on infiltration because over 90 per 
cent of the frontier was under the control of the opposition. 
To gain access to many of the frontier regions the observers 
had to deal directly with opposition leaders. Thus, sound 
relations with both government and opposition seemed 
essential. 

In what was- a crucial, if little stressed, decision 
for the development of UNOGIL activity, the Secretary- 
General determined that the observers should hold themselves 
neutral in the struggle within Lebanon. The reasoning be- 
hind this decision is suggested in the first report of 
U1T0GIL in which it is stated: 

The existence of a state of conflict between opposing 
armed forces in a territory to which an independent 
body of observers seeks free access throughout imposes 






133 

upon that body an attitude of discretion and restraint 
if the express or tacit acceptance of its presence is 
to he obtained from those exercising authority or 
effective control on different sides in the conflict. 
The Observation Group is fully conscious of the fact 
that its methods of observation and its use of the 
information it receives must duly reflect the indepen- 
dent character of its status and its complete objec- 
tivity and impartiality to the present conflict. ^"3 

The observers, with patience and persistence, gained 
access to first one part and then another of the frontier 
so that by mid-July they were able to report that admission 
had been gained to all areas. As access was gained to 
new areas, new stations and sub-stations closer to the 
frontier could be established and more complete surveillance 
achieved. 

Although establishment of working relations with the 
opposition and of a position of neutrality in Lebanon's 
civil war solved some of the problems of. UETOGIL in estab- 
lishing effective surveillance, it raised new difficulties. 
A peace-keeping group relies on its presence and prestige 
in situations of violence to restore calm. It needs co- 
operation with the parties involved and support from United 
Nations headquarters. Both cooperation with the Government 
of Lebanon and support from the members of the United 
Nations were shaken by the UNOGIL position of neutrality. 



-TJ.K. Doc. S/404-0 and Add. 1, p. 5. 

■ ^The arrival of the United States marines caused a 
temporary renewal of restrictions in some areas. 






134- 

Apparently the Lebanese Government and some of the states 
supporting establishment of an observation group had assumed 
that it would act on behalf of the official government. 

Relations between UNOGIL and the Government of 
Lebanon had been cool from the early days of the operation. 
Although the Government of. Lebanon had set up a five-man 
commission "to take all necessary measures to facilitate 
the task of the United Nations Observation Group, to supply 
said Group with all information coming to the knowledge of 
the Lebanese Government about the infiltration of arms and 
armed men and other material from across the Lebanese 
border,, and to assure the contact between the various 
sections of the Lebanese Administration and [the] Group," 
cooperation of the two seems to have been limited in practice, 
Friction arose over interrogation of accused Syrian infil- 
trators by the observers, over the scope of the observers' 
activity, and, most of all, over their findings. 

The Government of Lebanon responded publicly to the 
observers' first report with the circulation of a formal 
commentary on it as well as with statements in the Security 
Council which purported to show first, that the report was 
not based on sufficiently complete observation to be 
authoritative; and second, that what had been observed 



^ 5 U.N. Doc. SA029, p. 73. 



135 

tended to corroborate rather than discredit the Lebanese 

4-6 
charges. Privately the officials questioned both the 

objectivity and the activity of the observers. A statement 
attributed to the President of Lebanon and widely circula- 
ted, though later denied officially, suggests the feeling 
of Lebanon's leaders toward the observers. 

It is difficult for me to comment on the activities 
of the observers because they appear to be doing 
nothing. As far as I can see, they spend their time 
at the new Aero Club in Beirut and on beaches and up 
at the mountain resort. 

* • 9 

The observers contented themselves with quick 
picnics in certain Lebanese areas and at banquets 
given in their honour here and there, ^? 

The enthusiasm for the Observation Group declined 
sharply in the early weeks of the operation among some of 
its strongest initial supporters. Unofficial statements by 
officials in both the United States and British Governments 
tended to throw doubt on the value of the observers' reports 

by indicating that their own sources of information bore out 

4-8 
the Lebanese claims rather than the findings of UNOGIL. 



S/4-Q4-* 



rb The New York Times , July 9, 1958, and U.N. Doc. 



' Security Council, O fficial Records , 13th Year, 
828th meeting (July 15, 1958), p. 6. Some dissatisfaction 
with UNOGIL among Lebanese officials had been reported 
earlier as well. See The New York Times , June 23, 1958. 

^ 8 The New York Times , July 7, 1958, and The New York 
Times , JuTy 337 ^955. 



136 

Phase II . -The operations of the Observation Group 
after mid-July reflect a new phase of its mission. By then 
the foundations of the organization had been laid — stations 
had been and were being established progressively closer to 
the frontier while access to almost all parts of the country 
had been secured. This meant that much more thorough 
patrolling was possible. Moreover, internal developments 
in Lebanon, particularly the election of the neutralist 
General Fuad Chehab to succeed President Chamoun in 
September, took much of the drive out of the civil war and 
reduced the hostility toward the observers at the same time. 
Finally, the presence of United States marines added a 
complicating note to an already complex situation. The 
observers attempted to keep the complications to a minimum 
by emphasizing the complete independence of their mission 

and that of the troops and by refusing to have any contact 

4-9 
with the troops. 

In the period from July 15 forward there was a steady 

growth in the size and complexity of the Observation Group 

and in the intehsiveness of its activities. There was, at 

the same time, a decline in all evidences of infiltration. 

^Rather interesting are the conflicting statements 
with respect to the relations of United States forces and 
United Nations observers. United States Ambassador Lodge 
announced that the marines had been instructed to cooperate 
helpfully and establish and maintain liaison with the ob- 
servers. The United Nations observers announced that they 
saw no basis for establishing any contact or working rela- 
tionship with non-Lebanese forces. The New York Times , July 
17, 1958. 






137 

The increased activity of UNOGIL is graphically 
indicated in Table 2 showing the growth in stations and the 
increase in air and ground patrolling. However, these 
figures do not tell the whole story, for the nature as well 
as the extent of the operations changed. 

The establishment of a larger number of stations and 
sub-stations closer to the frontier and their staffing with 
more observers made possible a change in the method of 
observation. There was a shift from the early probing type 
of operation to a constant surveillance of main routes from 
permanent posts. By September mule and foot patrols in the 
rugged areas had been introduced to supplement the vehicular 
ground patrols formerly relied on. Air patrols were also 
used increasingly with reliance on advance planning and radio 
communication to synchronize ground and air activities. 
Night patrolling commenced in August on a regular basis. 

While the reports of the observers in the second 
phase of operations reveal an increasingly effective organi- 
zation s they also reveal a parallel decline in evidences of 
infiltration. It is not suggested, either here or in the 
observers' reports, that the decline was directly attributable 
to the presence of the observers. Rather it seems to be re- 
lated to internal developments in Lebanon. The presence of 
the observers may, however, have helped to promote or make 
possible those internal developments. 








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138 



139 

The reduction of infiltration was reflected first in 
the third report of the observers. They concluded: 

As will be seen from the observations made in the 
report, the situation in regard to the possible 

J infiltration of personnel and the smuggling of arms 

from across the border is that, while there may have 
been a limited importation of arms into some areas 
prior to the presidential election on 3 July, any 
such movement has since markedly diminished. A 
virtual truce has prevailed since about that time in 
most of the disturbed areas. 50 

The fourth report of the observers found "that no 
cases of infiltration have been detected and that, if any 
infiltration is still taking place, its extent must be re- 
garded as insignificant.*^ 1 In fact, examples not of 
infiltration but of "exfiltration" (the departure from 
Lebanon of persons who had presumably entered for illegal 
purposes)^ 2 were noted in the fourth and fifth reports of 

TMOGIL. 

There is a seeming paradox in the continued augmen- 
tation of the Observation Group's activities long after 
significant infiltration was observed. Why, for example, 
double the number of observers and the amount of patrolling 
in October when the issue appeared resolved? It may be 
hypothesized that the strengthening of the Group after the 



5°U.N. Doc. S/4-085, p. 137. 
51 U.N. Doc. SA100, p. 168. 
52 U.N. Doc. S/4114, p. 11. 



14-0 

crisis in Lebanon was virtually over, related to the General 
Assembly resolution in August which requested the Secretary- 
General "to make forthwith, in consultation with the 
Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter 
and having in mind section A of this resolution, such 
practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding 
the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to 
Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances and thereby 
facilitate the early withdrawal of foreign troops. "^ 

In short, a de facto shift in the reason for the 
observers' presence seems to have occurred. They were there 
not to stop infiltration, but to provide the international 
presence which would enable American troops to withdraw 
from the area without loss of prestige. The early reports 
of the observers indicating no evidence of massive infiltra- 
tion had been subject to question on the grounds that the 
observers were inadequate in number to really survey the 
scene. Thus, an effective, strong organization which could 
issue reports which would not be challenged was necessary 
before withdrawal of United States troops could be justi- 
fied. 54 



— „_ 

^General Assembly resolution 1237 (ES-III). Yearbook 

of the United Nations 1958, p. 50. 
__ . 

' Qubain interprets somewhat differently the increase 
in men and materials in August and September. He suggests 
that the "real life began to be pumped into [the Observation 






14-1 

This interpretation of the observers' second role 
would seem to "be confirmed by the timing of their withdrawal 
from Lebanon. It was shortly after the departure of the 
United States marines that the liquidation of UNOGIL 
commenced. 

Conclusions 

The Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and 
the Observation Group in Lebanon represent the most ambitious' 
observation organizations established by the United Nations. 
A comparison of the similarities and differences of the two 
missions is revealing of the nature and development of this 
peace-keeping technique. 

An examination of the circumstances surrounding the 
establishment of the Lebanon and Palestine groups suggests 
that it was far easier to bring the later group into 
existence — easier both politically and administratively. 

In 194-8 the peace-keeping group represented a new, 
little-used technique; only the gravest emergency could call 
it into being. , The United Nations responsibility to act in 
the Palestine crisis in May, 194-8, was clear: the United 
Nations had prior involvement and commitments in the 



Group] only after the threat of international war became 
dangerously real — with the landing of American troops in 
Lebanon, the landing of British troops in Jordan, the coup 
in Iraq and the threats of the Soviet Union." He suggests 
a correlation between the increase in patrolling and the 
increase in international tension. Qubain, op_. cit . , p. 151. 









142 

situation and virtually full-scale war was taking place. 
Even in this critical situation the United Nations response 
was slow and minimal. By 1958 the United Nations was far 
more ready to use the peace-keeping technique. In Lebanon 
the United Nations responsibilities were less apparent than 
in Palestine and the situation more confused, involving 
both internal and international dimensions. Yet it was 
actually easier to win acceptance for the Observation Group 
in Lebanon. It might well be that the United Nations 
presence would not have been injected into the murky Leba- 
nese situation if the Group had not been relatively easy to 
call into being because of the groundwork laid for it by 
earlier United Nations ventures. 

It was also easier administratively to field an 
observation group by 1958. Experience again eased the way. 
It had taken nearly two weeks to get the first observers 
into action in Palestine; it took less than two days in 
Lebanon. Technical and administrative problems connected 
with the Observation Group posed fewer difficulties than 
they had with UNTSO. Questions relating to personnel, 
equipment, financing which had loomed so large in the 
Palestine venture were quickly answered on the basis of 
precedent and the advise of experienced observers on the 
scene to help organize the Group. Thus, past successful 
experience with peace-keeping groups had laid a base of 



14-3 

psychological and administrative preparedness for the 
peace-keeping mission. 

In the Lebanese situation it proved' easier to estab- 
lish the Observation Group than to ensure its effective 
operation once in the field. Prior experience did not re- 
solve the substantive difficulties UNOGIL encountered. The 
civil war in Lebanon posed practical and philosophic 
problems for the observers. It was not clear from the 
resolution creating the Group precisely what its mission 
was to be or what its relations should be vis-a-vis the 
Government and the opposition in Lebanon. The Secretary- 
General, who took initiative in establishment and direction 
of UNOGIL, determined first, that the observers should be 
neutral between the opposing parties in Lebanon; and second, 
that their mission should be confined to observation. The 
consequence was that the UNOGIL role was rather passive. 
Whereas the Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine 
actively tried to reduce tensions — investigating, inspecting, 
resolving disputes in the field—the Observation Group con- 
fined itself to, simply being on the scene. It was by the 
mere fact of their presence that they were, first, to dis- 
courage infiltration and, second, to help insulate the area 
from the conflicts of the major powers. 

The observers confronted a variety of difficulties 
in carrying through their mission in the field. First, the 



144 

size and equipping of UNOGIL was initially inadequate to 
the task assigned. The fact that relatively few observers 
were on the scene in the early phases of the operation cast 
a shadow on the authority of the early reports of UNOGIL. 
Second, the civil war situation made it difficult for the 
Group to establish cooperative relations with both factions. 
Establishment of necessary working relations with the rebels 
aroused the hostility of the Government of Lebanon to the 
observers. Moreover , the divisions within Lebanon were 
reflected in the United Nations. Thus, almost any move by 
the observers in Lebanon brought a loss of support from 
some faction at United Nations headquarters. Finally, the 
mandate of the observers — to observe only — restricted the 
observers, to a limited role in the crisis from the outset. 

Many of the difficulties confronted by UNOGIL in 
carrying through its mission were not foreseen or provided 
for by the Security Council at the time the Group was 
established. This suggests one of the problems of too 
rapid an establishment of a peace-keeping group. The group 
may be thrust into a situation beyond its capacities. Ease 
in the creation of a force provides no assurance that the 
force, once in the field, will find it equally easy to cope 
effectively with the crisis. 



145 

It should be noted that there were several efforts 
to transform the Observation Group in Lebanon into a mili- 
tary unit which could stop infiltration by sealing off the 
borders. None were successful. The Secretary-General's 
opposition to a peace force for Lebanon and the general 
lack of enthusiasm for such a unit blocked a more ambitious 
venture. Technically, a force was possible; politically 
it was not feasible. As in Palestine, UNOGIL represented a 
compromise for the United Nations between doing nothing in 
a crisis and involving itself too deeply in a military 
effort, 

Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
despite all its limitations UNOGIL did contribute to 
dampening down the internal crisis in Lebanon and to the 
consequent negotiated settlement between the warring 
factions. Perhaps even more important the presence of the 
Observation Group on the scene enabled the United States to 
withdraw its marines from Lebanon quickly and without loss 
of prestige. Thus, not only may there be difficulties, 
unanticipated at the outset, with the peace-keeping group; 
there may also be unanticipated benefits. 



CHAPTER IV 
BEYOND THE OBSERVERS: THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE 

•^ Introduction 

The observer group represents one kind of military 
presence utilized by the United Nations; the peace-keeping 
force represents a related but more ambitious use of the 
military man to promote peaceful settlement. The first of 
the peace-keeping forces came into being in November, 1956. 
More than 5>000 men drawn from ten nations were sent into 
Egypt in the wake of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion. 
They were not to fight. Their mission was to stabilize 
the situation and to guarantee that peace, however uneasy, 

would be maintained in the area. 

1 
The United Nations Emergency Force, hailed as a new 

and unique instrument in the arsenal of United Nations 
peace-keeping devices, was in part new and in part an ex- 
tension of the observer group technique. The Force was 
para-military. ■ More than an observer group, it was also 
less than a military force with military objectives and 



The United Nations Emergency Force will hereafter 
be referred to as UNEF. 

146 






- 






14? 

2 
methods. UNSF lias been judged a successful innovation; 

it did contribute to the maintenance of peace. Although 
the Secretary-General was unwilling to conclude from the 
UNEF experience that a stand-by force should be estab- 
lished, UNEF did lay a foundation of experience, rules, 
and principle which would make it easier to establish 
future peace -keeping forces. 

Conditions for Creation of UNEF 

The crisis area 

The immediate cause for the establishment of the 
United Nations Emergency Force was the outbreak of hostili- 
ties in the Middle East. The area had been potentially 
explosive for years; Arab-Israeli bitterness had intensified 
rather than dissipated in the period since the armistice 
agreements had been signed in 194-9. On October 29, 1956, 
the situation exploded. Israeli forces invaded Egypt, 
moving first into the Sinai Peninsula, then across Gaza and 
into' Egypt proper. The avowed aim of the Israeli move was 
defensive: to forestall aggression by Egyptian-trained 
fedayeen bands and to open the Suez Canal and the Gulf of 
Aqaba to Israeli shipping. 

_ _ 

The Secretary-General in reports on UNEF and the 
national representatives in statements on UNEP have praised 
the Force as a useful instrument to stabilize the area. See 
Gabriella Eosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 106. 

3 U.N. Doc. A/3943, PP. 27-28. 



1*8 

The initial Israeli attack was followed "by the 
issuance of an Anglo-French ultimatum to Israel and Egypt 
calling for the cessation of fighting in twelve hours, the 
withdrawal of all troops within a ten-mile radius of the 
Suez Canal area, and the temporary British and French 
occupation of positions at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. 
The British and French justified their move as an effort to 
act in a crisis situation to protect the Canal and to stop 
Israeli-Egyptian fighting on behalf of a world community 
too paralyzed to act. In fact, one must interpret the 
Anglo-French moves in the light of the nationalization of 
the Suez Canal by the Government of Egypt and the failure 
of the British and French to negotiate an agreement with 
President Nasser of Egypt on the Canal. The Anglo-French 
aims seemed designed not only to protect the Canal, hut 
also to force an acceptahle solution on the Canal question 
and perhaps, hopefully, to bring the downfall of President 
Nasser. The ultimatum, which was rejected by Egypt, was 
followed by an Anglo-French air attack on military targets 
in Egypt, commencing on October 31, 1956. 

The United Nations involvement 

Serious as was the threat to world peace posed by 
this crisis, one must understand something of the background 
of the Suez problem to comprehend fully why the United 
Nations was compelled to act. 



149 

There were two dimensions to the Suez crisis: 
Egyptian-Israeli relations constitute one dimension; 
Egyptian-Anglo-French relations comprise the other. The 
United Nations had prior involvement with each dimension of 
the problem and a special responsibility therefore to re- 
solve a crisis which it had been unable to prevent. Yet 
the crisis was not easy to resolve. It arose out of a 
complicated situation; there were rights and wrongs on both 
sides. What was the nature of the problem and the United 
Nations ties to it? 

The Israeli-Arab problem had long been on the agenda 
of one United Nations organ or another. The Israeli attack 
represented the culmination of a bitterness in Arab-Israeli 
relations which had existed since the creation of Israel. 
Although Israel took the initiative in the Suez situation, 
the attack could hardly be deemed unprovoked. 

It will be recalled from the earlier examination of 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization that the 
Arab-Israeli war had ended in 194-9 with the signing of 
armistice agreements between Israel and each of the major 
Arab belligerents in that war, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Syria. Despite the establishment of considerable machinery 
to police the armistice, the armistice was never designed 






150 

to be or permanent duration. Yet, the political settlement 
which was designed to end the armistice did not come. Arabs 
and Israelis proved too deeply divided by bitterness, 

suspicion, and nationalism to be able to resolve their out- 

5 
standing problems. The extension of an armistice never 

designed to be permanent into semi -permanency was accompanied 

by a deterioration over the years in the relations between 

Israel and its Arab neighbors. Lieutenant-General E.L.M. 

Burns, Chairman of the Truce Supervision Organization and 

later the first head of UTTEF, wrote in this connection: 

...the armistice agreements were drawn up envisaging 
that peace would be made after not too long a period 
of negotiation between the parties. When this did not 
happen, and hostility hardened as time went on, and 
positions became less and less reconcilable, there was 
a break-down in many respects of the armistice machinery 
which had been set upon the assumption that there would 
be mutual goodwill and that the parties would move in 
the direction of peace." 



Thus, the first article in each of the General 
Armistice Agreements begins, "With a view to promoting the 
return to permanent peace in Palestine..." and goes on to 
say, "The establishment of an armistice between the armed 
forces of the two parties is accepted as an indispensable 
step towards. . .the restoration of peace in Palestine." 
Quoted in Lieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and 
Israeli (New York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1962), p. 28, 

''Among the outstanding problems were a) the Arab 
refugees, some 900,000 had left Israel during the Arab- 
Israeli war and now desired to return; b) the Israeli 
boundaries which the Arabs held should follow those set out 
in the General Assembly partition plan; c) the future status 
of Jerusalem; d) the compensation for Arabs with property in 
Israel. 

6 

Burns, op_. cit . , p. 28. 






-, 



151 

The deterioration of relations "between Israel and 
Sgypt quickened in the period after 1955. This quickening 
was reflected in an increasing number of violent incidents. 
The peace-keeping machinery seemed less and less equipped 
to cope with the situation confronting it. On the one hand, 
Egyptians expressed hostility to the very existence of 
Israel in the most bitter terms. Their hostility took 
concrete forms as well: an economic boycott was imposed on 
Israel and her shipping was blockaded from use of either the 
Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba. And from 1955 forward there 

were fedayeen raids from across the Egyptian border into 

7 

Israel. The Israelis responded to the fedayeen raids with 

a policy of retaliatory raids. The seriousness of the 
situation by the beginning of 1956 is suggested by the 
following comment from the diary of the Chief of the Truce 
Organization: 

The year ends with uncertainty as to what is ahead. 
I feel that unless a positive move is made towards a 
peace settlement there will be dangers of hostilities 
on a larger scale. These may begin with Jisr Banat 
Yakub Canal project — or may be precipitated by a small 
- scale action near Gaza or el Auja. 





^ e fedayeen were Palestinian agents whom Israelis 
charged were organized by the Egyptians and sent into Israel 
to carry out attacks on the populace and to destroy prop- 
erty. Although the Egyptians denied any official connection 
with the fedayeen , the evidence pointed to some official 
backing. lb id . , p. 86. 

Ibid . , p. 123. 






152 

The United Nations officials intensified their 
efforts to cope with the situation. A proposal for a United 
Nations force to he imposed between Egypt and Israel was 
briefly considered, then dropped. In April and May, 1956, 
the Secretary-General, under instructions from the Security 
Council , traveled through the area. He sought to break the 
chain of action and reaction which was leading the Middle 
East toward catastrophe by placing the cease-fire provision 
of the armistice agreements in a privileged position. His 
mission was of limited success. 

The Middle Eastern picture was complicated by the 
injection of the second dimension. On July 26, 1956, 
Egyptian President Nasser announced the nationalization of 
the Suez Canal, an event which, in the words of Anthony Eden, 

Q 

transformed everything in the Middle East. 

Britain and Prance reacted violently to the announce- 
ment of nationalization. Even before nationalization, the 
Governments of both countries had viewed Nasser with sus- 
picion and some hostility. The nationalization seemed to 
confirm their suspicions. It threatened Anglo-French 
national interests directly and significantly. First, both 
the British Government and French nationals had substantial 
investments in the Canal Company. Moreover, vital commerce 



: — s 

Joseph Lash, Dag Hammarskpold: Custodian of the 

Brushfire Peace (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 

1961), p. 76. 






153 

and oil supplies necessary to the French, and British 
economies passed through the Canal. 

In view of past provocations and the serious impli- 
cations of nationalization, the immediate response of 
Britain and France was toward forceful action to cope with 
the situation. However, the United States placed res- 



traints on the. French and the British. From July through 
October a solution by compromise and conference was sought. 
Conferences in London and efforts to negotiate with Nasser 
proved unsuccessful. In October the issue came before the 
Security Council; here too a solution was elusive. (Brought 
before the Council by Britain and France, the aim may have 
been to demonstrate that every expedient had been tried.) 
The failure of the United Nations to resolve the Suez prob- 
lem seemed to give it a special responsibility for the 
pacification of the situation after it exploded. 

In addition to the moral challenge posed to the 
United Nations by the Middle East crisis because of the 
organization's long concern with the region, political 
factors also pushed the United Nations toward an active role 
in the crisis. A majority of states in the United Nations 
by 1956 were non-European and anti-colonial. Their reaction 
to the Anglo-French action was strong. Too, the United 



Robert Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors (Garden City: 
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1964), p. 380. 



154 

States had chosen to use the United Nations as a means of 
resolving the crisis and forcing France and Britain to re- 
treat from a policy the. United States strongly disapproved. 
Lending impetus to the moves by the United Nations was the 

fear of Russian intervention in the crisis which was viewed 

1 1 • 
as a real possibility at the time. 

If the need for United Nations action in the crisis 
was clear, far less clear was the form which that action 
should take. It seemed unlikely that the parties would 
respond positively to mere requests that they withdraw from 
the area. Yet, there was little desire to invoke enforce- 
ment measures to bring a cease-fire in Suez. Few were 
willing to condemn the Anglo-French-Israeli attack as 
unqualified aggression. There was recognition that what 
had happened had emerged from "a murky background." 

It was out of this confused and dangerous situation 
that UNSF emerged as the solution that trod the middle 
ground. UNEF seemed to provide an answer that was both 
feasible and promising of results. 



11 

Ibid . , pp. 390-1. See also Herman Finer, Dulles 

over Suez . The Theory and Practice of his Diplomacy 

'('Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 421. 

12 

General Assembly, Official Records , First Emergency 

Special Session, 561st plenary meeting (November 1, 1956), 

p. 10. 

13 
^For analyses of UNEF that emphasize its character as 

a solution between pure coercion and pure conciliation see 

Stanley Hoffmann, "Sisyphus and the Avalanche: The United 

Nations, Egypt, and Hungary," International Organization , Vol, 

II (1957), P. 452, and Rosner, op_. cit ., p. 21. 



155 
The Establishment of UNEF 

The establishment 

The United Nations Emergency Force was created by the 
General Assembly acting in its First Emergency Special 
Session. The Special Session was convened under the "Uniting 
for Peace" resolution 1 ^ after the Security Council failed to 
act on either a United States or a Soviet cease-fire resolu- 
tion because of the negative votes of France and the United 
Kingdom. The session met from November 1 to November 10. 
Meetings were long, running to the early morning hours on 
several occasions; and behind-the-scenes consultations were 

intensive. 

Credit for initiating UNEF is generally accorded to 

15 
Lester Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada. ' Pearson was 

the driving force behind the idea of using a military force 



^Ihe relevant parts of the "Uniting for Peace" reso- 
lution provide: that emergency special sessions of the 
General Assembly be called on 24-hour notice on the vote of 
seven members of the Security Council or a majority of the 
General Assembly if the Security Council because of a lack 
of unanimity among its permanent members fails to act m any 
case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, a 
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. It might be 
noted that some question was raised as to the legality oi 
the move since it was argued that the action on which the 
Security Council failed to act did not fall under Chapter 
VII of the Charter. 

15 The credit for first proposing an international 
force has been claimed by Sir Anthony Eden, Prime Minister 
of Britain at the time. Eden did make reference to the 
association of a United Nations force with the Anglo-French 






156 

to secure the peace in the Middle East. Not only was he 
the first to suggest a force in explicit terms, but he also 
worked intensively to convince the Secretary-General and the 
members of the Assembly of the merit of his suggestion. 



police action in a statement to the House of Commons on 
November 1, See Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of An t hony Eden: 
Fu ll Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, i960)", pp. 
595-99, and" 605. 

Also on November 1, Sir Pierson Dixon, the United 
Kingdom representative in the United Nations, did make a 
kind of off-hand reference to internationalization of the 
action in his opening statement to the Emergency Special 
Session. He said, "The first urgent task is to separate 
Israel and Egypt and to stabilize the position. That is 
our purpose. If the United Nations were willing to take 
over the physical task of maintaining peace in the area no 
one would be better pleased than we. But police action 
there must be to separate the belligerents and to stop the 
hostilities." General Assembly, Official Records , First 
Emergency Special Session, 561st plenary meeting (November 
1, 1956), p. 8. However, the British representative did 
not follow up his opening comment. Nor did the other dele- 
gates accept the idea that the British had originated the 
plans for a force. See, for example, the statement of K. 
Menon of India, General Assembly, Official Recor ds , 11th 
Session, 596th plenary meeting (November 26, 1956), p. 350. 

16 
^Jester Pearson apparently came to the Emergency 

Special Session with the idea of some sort of force in mind. 
Initially he was considering an arrangement which would 
internationalize the French and British troops on the scene, 
making them, in fact, the protectors of the peace that they 
were claiming to be. Once at United Nations Headquarters 
Pearson realized that the hostility to the French and Brit- 
ish invasion precluded the idea of investing their troops 
with the mantle of the United Nations as protectors of the 
peace. Nonetheless, the necessity for extricating the 
British and the French from a difficult situation remained 
as did the ominous threat to world peace and stability. 
Out of these needs came the proposal for an international 
force of new form. See Finer, op. cit. , pp. 4-05-4-04- and 
William Frye, A United Nations Peace Force (New York: Oceana 
for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1957) s 
p. 50. 



157 

The General Assembly did not consider the question 
of a force until its second day of meetings. The first 
sessions were devoted to debate on a United States draft 
resolution calling for a cease-fire. Members of the world 
organization were impressed with the need to bring a halt 
in the fighting before anything else was attempted. 

Debate on the resolution revealed that United Nations 
thinking on the Suez question fell on a continuum. At one 
end was the view, held by the Arab bloc and the Communist 
states, that the British-French-Israeli action was overt, 
unmitigated aggression and that the General Assembly should 
act accordingly. At the other extreme was the acceptance, 
oj such states as New Zealand and Australia, of the Anglo- 
French justification of their action and the consequent 
reluctance to place pressure, not to mention sanctions, on 
those states. The bulk of Assembly opinion lay between the 
two extremes. Most members discounted the possibility of 
attributing blame for the events solely to one side, con- 
sidering that behind the invasion was a complex pattern of 
provocations and counter-provocations. Nonetheless, there 
was wide disapproval of the Anglo-French-Israeli action and 
acceptance of the need to halt the invasion. 

The United States cease-fire resolution was passed 
in the early morning hours of November 2 by a vote of 64- 
in favor, 5 against, and 5 abstentions. Voting against the 



158 

resolution were the United Kingdom, France, Israel, New 
Zealand, and Australia. Abstaining were South Africa, 
Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Laos. 

Almost immediately after passage of the cease-fire 
resolution which set forth the United Nations objectives in 
the Suez crisis came the first direct proposal for a peace- 
keeping force. Lester Pearson of Canada suggested a United 
Nations force large enough to keep the borders at peace, 
while a political settlement was worked out as a means of 
remedying, at least in part, the deficiencies of the cease- 
fire resolution. Pearson explained that Canada had ab- 
stained on the cease-fire resolution because it provided 
neither for the steps to a peace settlement nor for the 
ensuring of compliance with the cease-fire and withdrawal 
provisions. In Pearson's words: 

The armed forces of Israel and of Egypt are to with- 
draw or, if you like, to return to the armistice lines, 
where presumably, if this is done, they will once again 
face each other in fear and hatred. What then? What 
then, six months from now? Are we to go through all 
this again? Are we to return to the status quo ? Such 
a return would not be to a position of security, or 
even a tolerable position, but would be a return to 
terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and 
counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization would 
be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investi- 
gate. J- 7 



'General Assembly, Official Records , Pirst Emergency 
Special Session, 562nd plenary meeting (^November 1, 1956), 
p. 36. 






159 

Once planted, the idea of a force grew and matured 
quickly. The Pearson proposal met a felt need. In the 
words of the United States representative Henry Cabot Lodge, 
"We are looking for something that will meet the immediate 
crisis which is in front of us, as well as something that 

will go to the causes and into the more long-range sub- 

. , ,,18 
ject;s. 

The need for a means of meeting the immediate crisis 
was made more apparent by the failure of the invaders to 
heed the General Assembly's cease-fire call. Impetus was 
given to the establishment of a United Nations force by the 
announced willingness of the Eritish and French to halt 
military operations on the condition that the Israelis and 
Egyptians accept a cease-fire and that an effective inter- 
national force be set up. Although such a force would not 
go to the roots of the conflict, it would provide time to 
seek solutions to the basic problems. 

The period of maturation for the idea of the force 

was brief. The transformation of the idea into detailed 

19 
plans for a force came within ninety-six hours. By the 



l8 General Assembly, Official Records , First Emergency 
Special Session, 563rd plenary meeting (November 3, 1956), 
p. 55. 

-^The rough outlines of a plan for an emergency force 
were aoparently°sketched out at a luncheon meeting held 
November 2 between Lester Pearson, Secretary-General _ 
Eammarskjold, and key Hammarskjold aide, Andrew Cordxer. It 
was at this luncheon that Pearson is supposed to have sold 
- Hammarskjold on the merits of the peace force xdea. See 
Lash, op_. cit . , p. 85. 






160 

time the Assembly convened on the evening of November 3 
much of the preparatory work for the force had been done. 
Egypt had been consulted, while Pearson had been in touch 

with members of the Commonwealth. (Apparently Israel was 

20 
not among those consulted on the force.) Representatives 

of several of the important blocs in the United Nations had 

21 

been drawn into the planning stages. Several delegations 

were sounded out on supplying troops. Active lobbying to 
win support for the force was undertaken. The United States 
delegation apparently played an important role behind the 
scenes in building sufficient support for the concept of a 
force to bring such a force into being. 

Three important resolutions were passed between 
November 3 and November 6 relating to the Force. These 
resolutions, along with the November 2 cease-fire resolution, 
constitute the basis for the establishment and operation of 
UNEP. In the first resolution, proposed by the representa- 
tive of Canada and passed by the Assembly in the early 
morning hours of November 4-, the Secretary-General was called 
upon to submit a plan for an international force within 
forty-eight hours. The operative paragraph read: 



__ 

General Assembly, Official Records , First Emergency 
Special Session, 565th plenary meeting (November 4, 1956), p. 

85. pi 

Included in the early planning x^ere Hans Engen of 
Norway, Arthur Lall of India, Francisco Urrutia of Colombia, 
and Lester Pearson of Canada. 









161 

Requests, as a matter of priority, the Secretary- 
General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a 
plan for the setting up, with the consent of the 
nations concerned, of an emergency international 
United Nations Force to secure and supervise the 
cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the 
terms of the aforementioned resolution. ^ 

yithin seven hours the Secretary-General had returned 
to the General Assembly with his first report. 

The second resolution laid out the command structure 
of the Force. The resolution provided for the appointment 
of Major-General B.L.M. Burns, who was serving in the area 
as Chief of the Truce Supervision Organization, as Chief of 
Command. It further authorized Burns to organize a small 
staff by a) recruitment from the Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation of a limited number of observers drawn from countries 
which were not permanent members of the Security Council 
and b) recruitment directly from member states of the addi- 
tional number of officers needed. The resolution (1000 
(ES-I)) was based on recommendations set forth in the 
Secretary-General's first report. The resolution passed 
with relatively little discussion or opposition by a vote 
of 57 in favor to none opposed, with 19 abstentions. 

The third resolution brought the Force into being 
and laid out the guiding principles for its organization 
and operation. The resolution followed directly out of the 



_™«j 

General Assembly resolution 998 (SS-I). 



162 

Secretary-General's second report on the Force in which 
Hammarskjold' s basic plans for a force were presented. The 
Assembly accepted the Hammarskjold proposals virtually with- 
out change. The adoption of the resolution embodying the 
plans for the Force by a vote of 64 in favor, none against, 
and 12 abstentions constituted a resounding vote of confi- 
dence in the Secretary-General and his plans. Only the 
members of the Communist bloc, South Africa, Egypt, and 
Israel abstained. 

The Secretary-General, working with members of the 
Secretariat, with representatives of participating delega- 
tions, and with Major-General E.L.M. Burns, the first 
commander of U5TEF, had developed relatively detailed plans 
for a force in a remarkably short time. ' But the Secretary - 

General was not only the chief architect of the Force, but 

24 
also the chief administrative and executive officer. It 

was under Hammarskjold' s hand that the skeletal plans for a 

force were converted into the reality of a force operating 

in the field. 



*It might be noted that the Secretary-General asked 

Burns for his recommendations on the type of force to set 

up. Burns proposed a much more ambitious force than 

actually came into being. He suggested a force of division 

size with air and tank detachments. Burns, op_. cit . , p. 188, 

24 

Rosner, op. cit . , p. 132. 



163 

Three days after passage of the November 7 resolution 
formally establishing the Force, the first UNEF troops 
arrived at the staging area in Capodichino, Italy. They 
awaited only the consent of the Egyptian Government to de- 
part for Egypt. On November 15 the first United Nations 
troops landed in Egypt. Advance units from UNTSO had been 
in Egypt even earlier. 

The legal foundations of UNEF 

The character of the United Nations Emergency Eorce 
was shaped in part by its legal foundations. The fact that 
the Force was established by the General Assembly had signi- 
ficant implications with respect to the scope of powers of 
the Force. It automatically lifted the Force out of the 
realm of the enforcement action which may be instituted by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. As 
an organ established by the Assembly, the existence and 
operations of the Force would, of necessity, be based on the 
consent of the states involved rather than on any obliga- 
tory basis. 

The resolution establishing the Force made no refer- 
ence to the legal basis of the Force. Nor was this question 
touched on in Assembly debate. There was, however, no 
question raised as to the authority of the Assembly to 
undertake such action. The Secretary-General in reports 



164 

and statements cited at various times two sources of power 
for the establishment of UNSF: Article 22 of the Charter 
and the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. 

In discussing the legal foundations of UNEF, 
Secretary-General Hammarsko old referred most frequently to 

Article 22 of the Charter, viewing the Force as a subsidiary 

25 

organ of the General Assembly. v Legal debate has centered 

on the question of whether the terms of Article 22, 
authorizing the General Assembly to establish such subsidi- 
ary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions are broad enough to encompass a subsidiary organ 
as ambitious and unprecedented as UNEF. A strong case can 
be made for an affirmative answer. In the first place, the 

General Assembly has created over 100 subsidiary organs, 

. . 26 
varying greatly in character, under this provision. 

Whether viewed merely as an expanded observer group or as a 

para-military force, UIEf does not seem so different from 

the other subsidiary organs as to be beyond the pale. This 

is especially true since UHEF's dependence on consent and 

its non-fighting character clearly distinguish it from 



_ 

^On occasion the Secretary-General also referred to 
the Force as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations. For 
example, in a February, 1957 , agreement with Egypt on the 
status of the Force, U1TEF is referred to as an organ estab- 
lished in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter. Yet 
in the URSF Staff Regulations UNEF is referred to as a sub- 
sidiary organ of the United Nations. 

26 

Rosner, op_. cit . , p. 40. 



165 

enforcement action. In the second place, a fairly wide 

interpretation has been given to the General Assembly's 

27 

power to create subsidiary organs. ' In the third place, 

the functions performed by the Force can be considered as 
"reasonably necessary for effective exercise of the proper 
powers of the Assembly, and in particular , its power under 
Article 11, 'to make recommendations' with regard to 
questions relating to the maintenance of international peace 

no 

and security." For example, investigation of a situation 
by UNEF could well be essential to recommendations made by 
the Assembly; patrolling activities might be just as impor- 
tant to implementation of. the recommendations. 

On occasion the Secretary-General also invoked the 
"Uniting for Peace" resolution as a source of authority for 
creation of UNEF, In his second report on the Force 
Hammarskjold referred to the decision reached by the Assembly 
on the basis of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution (resolu- 
tion 337 (V)) without elaborating on the precise relationship 
of the resolution and the Force. The "Uniting for Peace" 



™ 

1 Julius Stone, "Legal Bases for the Establishment of 
Forces Performing Security Functions," Paper prepared for 
the Conference on the United Nations Security Forces, Oslo, 
Norway, February, 1964 (mimeographed), p. 10. Stone noted 
that in a case involving the Administrative Tribunal the 
International Court majority advised that "the General 
Assembly had power to create this organ, as involved in per- 
forming effectively the Assembly's power under Article 101 
to make regulations for United Nations staff, even though it 
could itself not perform this judicial function." 

Ibid . , p» i.y» 



166 

resolution, in both sections A and C, envisaged use of 
armed force against an aggressor. Although UNEF was not 
established for that purpose, its validity might be assumed 
on the premise that the "right to establish such a smaller 

force was implicit in the right to establish a more 

29 
ambitious force." 

A key to UNEF's operation, legally and practically, 

was consent. As a non-enforcing type of force created by 

the Assembly, consent was necessary to its operations. 

Consent of two sorts was basic: consent by the states 

sending contingents and consent by the host state, Egypt, 

to the presence of the Force on its territory. From a 

practical standpoint at least the tacit consent of Israel, 

the United Kingdom, and France was necessary as well. (The 

need legally for their consent to the Force was vehemently 

denied by a number of delegates who contended that one 

could hardly hold that an aggressor's consent was necessary 

to action to end that aggression.)^ If these states had 

not cooperated, with UNEF, a far larger force with a broader 

mandate would have been necessary. 



■\Louis Sohn, "The Authority of the United Nations to 
Establish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations Force," 
American Journal of International Law , Vol. 52, No. 2 (April, 

1^58), p.. '233. 

30 

' See, for example , the comment of the representative 

of El Salvador, General Assembly, Official Records , First 

Emergency Special Session, 563rd plenary meeting (November 

3, 1956), pp. 70-71. 






167 

The need to base the establishment of the Force on 
the consent of the participating states was established 
formally at the outset of the consideration on the Force. 
The Canadian draft resolution calling on the Secretary- 
General to submit a plan for an emergency international • 
force stipulated that "the consent of the nations concerned" 
should be obtained. Debate clarifying the meaning of this 
phrase revealed that the sponsor had intended that "the 
nations concerned" refer to the nations contributing to the 
Force, In short, the Assembly was not imposing an obliga- 
tion on any state to contribute to the Force against its 
will. 

The legal basis for the participation of the member 
states rested on the letters of the participating states 

offering to contribute to the Force and the Secretary- 

32 

General's response to those letters. These agreements 

shed light on certain other questions of importance relating 
to the extent of consent required of the participating 
states. First, these agreements suggest that a state can 
make its decision to contribute to the Force conditional. 
Several states in stating their willingness to participate 
in the Force imposed conditions on that participation. 



^Ibid. , pp. 70-71. 

- 32 U.N. Doc. A/3302/Add. 1 to Add. 30; U.N. Doc. 
A/3302, Annexes 1 to 6; and U.N. Doc. A/39^3, Annex 1. 



168 

Thus, Sweden assumed that the Force would he limited to the 
objectives in the resolution, that it would not remain on 
watch duty for an unspecified time, that the consent of the 

host state would he forthcoming, and that a large share of 

35 
the costs would he home by the United Nations. ' India 

indicated that its willingness to contribute was based on 
similar assumptions regarding the nature of the Force and 
its relationships to the host state and to the United 
Nations. The Secretary-General in accepting the condi- 
tional offers without objection seemed to accept the right 
of the state to impose such conditions. The question of 
whether failure to adhere to these conditions would auto- 
matically free the contributing state of any obligations it 
had assumed with respect to the Force was not answered di- 
rectly although this would seem to he the implication. In 
practice although the temporary nature of the Force went by 
the wayside, neither Sweden nor India, which cited this as 
a condition of participation, has withdrawn its contingents, 

The latter question leads to a related one: what is 
the exact nature of the commitment given by a state when it 
consents to contribute men to a United Nations force? Can 
the state withdraw its men at will? The answer is appar- 
ently so. In the letter constituting the formal agreement 



^u.N. Doc. A/5302, Annex 7. 
^U.N. Doc. A/3302/Add. 4/Rev. 1. 






169 

between the United Nations and the participating states the 
Secretary-General asked only that adequate prior notification 
he given before withdrawal of the contingent. The experi- 
ence with the United Nations Force in the Congo suggests 
that whatever moral or legal obligations might be imposed 
by the agreement to participate, the participating state 
will, in fact, withdraw its contingents whenever it wishes. 
Just as the consent of the participating states was 
necessary before the Force could be established, so also 
was the consent of the host country, Egypt, necessary be- 
fore the Force could begin to function. This too was a 
condition of the Force's operation from the outset. In his 
second report on the Force, the Secretary-General said, 
"While the General Assembly is enabled to establish the 
Force with the consent of those parties which contribute 
units to the Force, it could not request the Force to be 
stationed or operate on the territory of a given country 
without the consent of the Government of that country. "'" 
Several of the offers to contribute units to the Force 
specified that Egyptian consent should be given to the 
operation. In fact, the principle that Egypt's consent was 
necessary seemed to be quite generally accepted. The legal 
requirements coincide with the practical. As the first 



55 U.N. Doc. A/3302, p. 20. 






170 

Commander of the Force pointed out, it would have been 

virtually impossible for a Force like UKTEF to function 

56 

effectively against Egyptian will. 

The importance of the condition of Egyptian consent 
is indicated by the fact that the entry of UNEF units was 
delayed for a few days following the passage of the resolu- 
tion formally establishing the Force until specific 
Egyptian consent could be obtained to their entry. The 
delay occurred despite the fact that the prior acceptance 
by the Egyptian Government of the resolution setting up 
the Ml? Command was considered to constitute acceptance 
of the Force. 

The mandate 

The mandate under which a peace-keeping group operates 
has a bearing on the effectiveness of the group. The neces- 
sities of getting the force established initially may 
conflict with the necessities of a strong, effective force. 
The tendency may be to define the mandate in broad, non- 
controversial terms in order to field the force as quickly 
as possible. If the terms of the mandate prove too limiting 
to the force in the field, it will either have to narrow 
its objectives or widen its mandate (either with or without 
formal approval). 



'Burns 5 op. cit. , p. 207. 









171 

The mission of UNEF was defined on the basis of the 
cease-fire resolution of November 2 (resolution 997 (ES-I)) 
passed by the General Assembly at the outset of the Suez 
crisis. The mandate was further elaborated in early 1957. 

The terms of the cease-fire resolution of November 2 
were highly significant in the development of UNEF. What, 
then s were these terms? To meet the immediate crisis the 
resolution called for a cease-fire, a halt in the movement 
of military forces and arms into the area, and withdrawal 
of the parties involved behind the armistice lines. To 
meet the more fundamental problems, all parties to the 
armistice agreement were urged to desist from raids across 
the armistice lines into neighboring territory and to ob- 
serve the armistice agreements. It was urged further that 
steps be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and to restore 
secure freedom of navigation. 

The November 4- resolution establishing UNEF referred 

to the November 2 resolution in defining the role of the 

Force. Thus, operative paragraph 1 of the former resolution 

read: 

Establishes a United Nations Command for an emergency 
international Force to secure and supervise the cessation 
of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of 
General Assembly resolution, 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 
1956;. ..37 



-fn 

■General Assembly, Resolution 1000 (ES-I). 



172 
However, the reference to the cease-fire resolution raised 
as many questions as it answered with respect to the mission 
of UREF. Debate swirled around the phrase "all the terms 
of the General Assembly resolution." The question of the 
precise responsibilities of the Force was left unanswered 
at the time UREF was established. It was raised again, more 
insistently, in January and February, 1957, because of the 
difficulties confronting the Force in the field. 

Major debate over the proper functions of UHEF was 
triggered in January, 1957, by the Israeli refusal to with- 
draw from the Sharm-el -Shaikh area at the Gulf of Aqaba or 
from the Gaza Strip. In Israeli opinion these areas were 
bound inextricably to its security.^ 8 Thus, in Israel's 
view withdrawal had to be tied to effective guarantees for 
Israeli security. " 

The Israeli position raised the question of the 
proper role for UREF before and after Israeli withdrawal. 
Debate in the Assembly revealed little consensus among the 
United Nations members on the functions of the Force. 

The Israelis visualized an important role for the 
Force. UREF should take over from the Israelis in disputed 



38 

The fedayeen attacks had been mounted from the Gaza 

region, while control of the Sharm-el-Shaikh area had been 
used to prevent Israeli shipping from using the Gulf of 
Aqaba. Israel held these acts were contrary to international 
law and to the armistice agreements, and that their re- 
sumption should be prevented. 

39 

-"General Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, 

638th plenary meeting (January 17, I9577i P. 889. 






173 

areas. It should be capable of maintaining peace while a 
basic solution to questions at issue was sought. It should 
remain in the area until that solution was reached and 
implemented. The Israeli position was supported by the 
United Kingdom, Norway, Canada, and New Zealand, among 
others. A statement by Lester Pearson is typical of this 
approach: 

While the political climate of the Middle East is 
maturing towards the time when conditions will be more 
appropriate for a comprehensive settlement, it is 
essential, I think, for the countries of the region, 
and indeed for us all, that there should be no return 
to the former state of strife and tension and conflict 
on the borders; that security should be maintained and, 
indeed, guaranteed. I suggest that for this purpose 
there will be a continuing need, during the period 
until a political settlement is achieved for the 
stabilizing international influence that the Emergency 
Force . is now exercising. And this essential stabilizing 
role might well require the continuing presence of a 
United Nations force along the boundary of Egypt and 
Israel; perhaps also for a time in the Gaza Strip and, 
with the consent of the States involved, along the 
borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours, though 
that of course would require further resolution from 
the United Nations Assembly. ^ 

In direct opposition to the approach of Israel and 
Its friends was that of the Communist and Arab blocs. In 
their opinion the primary purpose of the Force was to end 
the aggression committed against Egypt and to secure the 
withdrawal of the invading forces. The emphasis was on the 



4-0 

A statement by Lester Pearson to the Canadian 

Parliament which was quoted by the Australian representa- 
tive to the United Nations in the 639th meeting. General 
Assembly, Official Reco rds, 11th Session, 639th plenary 
meeting (January 17, 1957), p. 904- . 






174 

temporary and limited nature of the Force; its stay in the 
Middle East was viewed as entirely dependent on Egyptian 
consent. For example , in the opinion of the Soviet dele- 
gate, it would be a flagrant contradiction of the Charter 

and of the Force's original purpose for TJNEF to occupy Gaza 

41 
or the Straits. 

The hulk of Assembly opinion fell somewhere between 

these two poles with respect to the role of the Force. 
■ 

Hammarskj old's opinion, characteristic of the majority, was 

set forth in reports and statements to the Assembly from 
January through April, 1957* The Secretary-General and a 
number of the delegates were willing to recognize at least 
the possibility of a role for the Force in bringing a 
solution to the outstanding issues in the Middle East, but 
they indicated that first the Israelis must withdraw. 
Hammarskjold stressed again and again that the United 
Nations could not condone a change in the situation result- 
ing from military action contrary to the provisions of the 
Charter. Nor could the Force take any action to impose a 
political settlement in the interest of one party. It must 
be neutral. Thus, in his report of January 24 the Secretary - 
General said: 



General Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, 
646th plenary meeting (January 29, 195?)} p. 1002. 



175 

(a) The United Nations cannot condone a change of the 
status juris resulting from military action contrary 
to the provisions of the Charter. The Organization 
must, therefore, maintain that the status juris 
existing prior to such military action be re-estab- 
lished by a withdrawal of troops, and by the re- 
linquishment or nullification of rights asserted in 
territories covered by the military action and 
depending upon it. 

(b) The use of military force by the United Nations 
other than under Chapter VII of the Charter requires 
the consent of the States in which the Force is to 
operate. Moreover, such use must be undertaken and 
developed in a manner consistent with the principles 
mentioned under (a) above. It must, furthermore, be 
impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a 
means to force settlement, in the interest of one 
party, of political conflicts or legal issues recog- 
nized as controversial. ^^ 

The Secretary-General went on to specify that deploy- 
ment of UNEF in Gaza would have to be on the same basis as 
its deployment along the armistice line in the Sinai 
Peninsula. Any widening of Its functions would require the 
consent of Egypt. With respect to Sharm- el -Shaikh he said: 

Israel troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm- 
el-Shaikh area, would be followed by the United Nations 
Emergency Eorce in the same way as in other parts of 
Sinai. The duties of the Force in respect of the 
cease-fire and the withdrawal will determine its move- 
ments. However, if it is recognized that there is a, 
need for such an arrangement, it may be agreed that 
units of the Eorce (or special representatives in the 
nature of observers) would assist in maintaining quiet 
in the area beyond what follows from this general 
principle. In accordance with the general legal 
principles, recognized as decisive for the deployment 
of the United Nations Emergency Eorce, the Force should 
not be used so as to prejudge the solution of the con- 
troversial questions involved. The UNEF, thus, is not 



42 U.N. Doc. A/3512, p. 4-7. 






176 

to be deployed in such, a way as to protect any special 
position on these questions, although, at least 
transitionally, it may function in support of mutual 
restraint in accordance with the foregoing, ^~5 

The debate in the spring of 1957 about the proper 
mission of the Force was never definitively resolved. The 
February 2 General Assembly resolution recognized that the 
maintenance of the armistice required placing UHEF on the 
Armistice Demarcation Line and implementation of "other 
measures" proposed in the Secretary-General's report — but 
the so-called "other measures" were never spelled out. The 
role the Force came to play in the area was dictated by 
circumstances and expediency. UN1F has not withdrawn from 
the area, but neither has it taken responsibility for 
policing or policy enforcement. UNEF's primary function 
has been to serve as a symbolic presence. It has served 
to observe and to calm by its presence. It has been able 
to do little to resolve the basic conflict in the Middle 
East. 

' Not all have viewed with favor the limited role of 
the para-military force. Thus, one critic caustically 
comments that: 

If, as the Secretary-General thinks, this is "a para- 
military organization," its para-military functions 
seem to be limited to that of a buffer between the 
withdrawn belligerents, a United -Nations symbol 
approaching no nearer to a military function than the 



^ Ibid . , p. 50. 









177 

steady maintenance of the inert but receptive posture 
of a sandbag, even if a sandbag has a surrounding 
halo.* 14 

Yet even an inert sandbag, particularly an inert sandbag 
with a halo, can be most useful in an explosive situation. 
And given the basic characteristics of sandbags-~and of 
para-military United Nations forces — it is perhaps wisest 
to keep responsibilities commensurate with power. 

Characteristics of UNEF 

Let us turn now to an examination of the character- 
istics of the United Nations Emergency Force. These 
characteristics were not spelled out at the time the con- 
cept of the Force was approved by the General Assembly with 
virtual unanimity. The central characteristics emerged 
over time — a product of past experience, the ideas of the 
molders of the Force, and of the situation itself. 

The task of translating a general directive for a 
force into a force-in-being, able to meet its responsibili- 
ties effectively, was monumental. Because UNEF represented 
an innovation in the United Nations arsenal of peace instru- 
ments, there were few precedents to guide the planners and 
administrators. Experience with the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization in Palestine was helpful, but not 
entirely applicable. The path-breaking was made more 



Stone, op_. crt. , p. 11. 






178 

difficult because the United Nations was ill-prepared for 
such activity: its administrative superstructure was in- 
adequate to the heavy responsibilities a peace-keeping force 
imposed, while intelligence activities and advance military 
planning were nil. The enthusiasm the member states ex- 
pressed for the concept of a force was not matched with a 
comparable willingness to support, in both material and 
non-material terms, a strong force. Despite these handicaps 
a force was constructed which worked. 

Leadership of UNSF 

The leadership and influence exerted by the Secretary- 
General over the creation, shaping, and operation of IMEF 
was great. The General Assembly gave the Secretary-General 
the responsibility for developing, with virtually no formal 
guidance from the Assembly, the initial plans for the Force 
and for implementing these plans. The Assembly accepted 
without objection Hammarskjold 1 s contention in his second 
report on the Force that 

If the force is to come into being with all the 
speed indispensable to its success, a margin of 
confidence must be left to those who will carry 
the responsibility for putting the decisions of 
the General Assembly into effect. ^ 

The generality of the Assembly action and the degree 
of discretion vested in the Secretary-General was unusual; 



^.ff. Doc. A/5302, p. 22. 






179 

the UNEF operation increased both the authority and the 
responsibilities of the office of the Secretary-General. 
The justification for vesting such broad powers in the 
executive officer of the United Nations was the need for 
speed. Undoubtedly, the difficulty of reaching agreement 
in the Assembly, in view of the member states' different 
approaches to the Force and its role, was also a factor in 
the issuance of broad instructions. 

The Secretary-General gave policy guidance to the 
Force both at United Nations headquarters and in the field. 
Final authority for organizational, administrative, and 
financial operations of the Force was vested in the Secretary- 
General. Although the Commander of the Force was appointed 
by the General Assembly, he was an agent of the Secretary- 
General in fact. For example, the Commander was directed 
to take decisions relating to the organization of the Force 
and to recruitment only in consultation with the Secretary- 
General. Authority to issue regulations and supplemental 
instructions for the Force was vested in the Secretary- 
General. 

The Secretary-General in directing the Force was 
himself ultimately responsible to the General Assembly. Two 
advisory groups of rather different nature assisted him in 
carrying through his functions, though they apparently 
exercised relatively little control over his decisions. 



180 

The resolution establishing UNEF set up an Advisory 
Committee composed of representatives from Brazil, Canada, 
Ceylon, Colombia, Norway, and Pakistan and chaired by the 
Secretary-General. The Committee was directed to undertake 
the development of "those aspects of the planning for the 
Force and its operation .not already dealt with by the 
General Assembly and which do not fall in the area of the 
direct responsibility of the Chief of the Command."^ 6 It 
was also empowered to request the convening of the General 
Assembly and to report to the Assembly whenever matters 
arose which were of such urgency and importance as to re- 
quire consideration by the General Assembly itself. No 
official records or reports were ever issued by the Com- 
mittee. Apparently its influence in the shaping of UNEF 
was minimal. Its primary use seems to have been as a device 
to ratify and rally support for the policies made by the 
Secretary-General. Thus, the period of the Advisory Com- 
mittee's greatest importance was in early 1957 when the 
crisis over Israeli withdrawal made additional support for 
the Secretary-General desirable. ' 



General Assembly, Resolution 1001 (ES-I). 
47 
'Maxwell Cohen, "The United Nations Emergency Force: 

A Preliminary View," International Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2 
(Spring, 1957), p. 12^1 For comments on the Advisory Com- 
mittee that view it as an important innovation and as a link 
between the Secretariat and the main body of Assembly opinion 
see G. S. Murray, "United Nations Peace-Keeping and Problems 
of Political Control," International Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4 
(Autumn, 1963), pp. 4-4-9-450. 



181 

In addition to the formal Advisory Committee, an 
informal group composed of the military representatives of 
the states contributing contingents to the Force was set up. 
(A United States representative also met. with the group, 
apparently because, of the extensive logistic support the 

h O 

United States was providing UUEF.) This group worked 
closely with Ralph Bunche, the United Nations Under-Secretary 
in charge of UEEF questions, on the logistical and opera- 
tional problems confronting the newly-established force. 
The problems of the committee in working out the operational 
details for the Force were many. For example, they had 
relatively little information available on which to base 
their plans. A comprehensive list of questions, covering 
such matters as general organization of the Force, suita- 
bility of the equipment of the contingents, accommodations 
available in the area, legal status of the Force, etc., was 
submitted to Major-General Burns. Burns had little specific 
information of the sort needed by the committee, however, 
and confined his response to his views on the desirable 

organization of the Force and to how in principle admini- 

4-9 
strative problems should be met. In fact, the problems 

tended to be dealt with ad hoc . They were met when they 

became sufficiently pressing to demand attention. 



.. 






Frye, op. cit., p. 25. 

4-9 

Burns, op_. cit . , p. 209. See also note 36 on p. 

307 for the questions submitted to Burns by the Committee. 



182 

Although, final political control of UNEF was vested 
in the Secretary-General, many of the routine decisions on 
its operations were, of necessity, the responsibility of the 
Commander of the Force, assisted by a United Nations Command. 
The November 5 resolution creating the UNEF Command had 
designated Major-General E.L.M. Burns, a Canadian, as the 
first Commander. (He was later succeeded by Lieutenant- 
General P.S. Gyani of India who served in the post four 
years. He in turn was succeeded on January 1, 1964, by 
Major-General Carlos Flores Paiva Chaves of Brazil.) Burns 
was well-qualified for the position. At the time of his 
appointment he was serving as Chief of the United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization. Thus, he had some aware- 
ness of the problems of the Middle East and of the politi- 
cal and geographic conditions under which the Force would 
operate. In addition, he had long demonstrated his interest 
in the activities of the United Nations, serving, for 
example, as an alternate member of the Canadian delegation 
to the General Assembly in 19^9 and as national president 
of the United Nations Association in Canada in 1953 and 



1954. 



The responsibilities of the Commander were not 
spelled out in the General Assembly resolutions establish- 
ing the Command and the Force itself. Nor was the Commander 
given a precise description of his mission prior to assuming 



183 

his duties. In this connection Burns states: 

Arrangements had been made for me to leave in the 
late afternoon of November 19 to return to Egypt and 
take over command of the force. At the meeting of 
the Advisory Committee no confidential conversation 
with the Secretary-General was possible. He, Mr. 
Cordier, Dr. Bunche, and I had lunch together, but 
there was no chance for the unhurried talk I should 
have liked in order to clear my mind as to my task 
and general responsibilities. It is the practice, 
when a commander is sent out with a military expedi- 
tionary force, to provide him with a general instruc- 
tion as to what he is expected to achieve, what his 
relations should be with allies or authorities of the 
country in which he is to operate, and other guiding 
principles for his action. Of course, in the circum- 
stances, it was impossible for such a document to be 
drawn up by the UN Secretariat, since so many matters 
relating to UNSF were improvised, and so much was 
dependent on political conditions, which were fluid 
and in the course of development. I understood this, 
but my difficulties were increased by the absence of 
a definite instruction as to how it was intended that 
the force would be constituted and would function, and 
its relations to the Egyptian authorities.- 70 

The responsibilities to be assumed by the Commander 

were defined formally, though still in rather general terms, 

51 
in the Secretary-General's report of November 21, 1956. 

The Co mm ander would, as a matter of course, exercise full 

command responsibility over the Force: all orders to the 

Force would be Issued by him and responsibility for the 

performance by the Force of its functions and for its good 

order would be vested in him. He was given complete charge 

as well over such matters as billeting, the provision of 



^ Burns, op. cit . , p. 218. 
51 U.N. Doc. A/3383, pp. 13-14. 






184 

adequate food and supplies, and transportation arrangements. 
However, decisions on the selection of his staff and on the 
inclusion in the Force of such supporting units as might he 
found necessary were to he taken in consultation with the 
Secretary-General. 

Thus, responsibilities for leading the Force were 
divided between Secretary-General Hammarskjold at United 
Nations Headquarters and Major-General Burns at field head- 
quarters. The leadership exercised by both seems to have 
been strong and effective. 

Support for UNEF 

Men for UNEF . -Decisions had to be taken not only on 
the direction of the Force but also on its composition. It 
was decided at the very outset that UNEF should be a truly 

international force, not a national group acting under 

52 

United Nations colors. 



^ An international force was contrasted by Hammarskjold 
with two other possibilities: the Korean model in which the 
United Nations might charge a country or group of countries 
to provide independently for an emergency international force 
for purposes determined by the United Nations or alterna- 
tively the model in which an emergency international force 
might be set up by agreement among a group of nations, later 
to be brought into an appropriate relationship with the 
United Nations. If the United Nations had deputized France 
and the United Kingdom to act as its agent this would ap- 
parently constitute an example of the last sort. The inter- 
national model put heavy responsibilities on the United 
Nations for the organization and maintenance of the Force, 
but it also gave the United Nations the greatest degree of 
direct control over the Force. In the Suez situation it was 
• orobably the only feasible alternative. U.N. Doc. A/3302, p. 
20. 






185 

The Secretary-General had what might seem on first 
view to "be "an embarrassment of riches" from which to choose 

in selecting those who would participate in UNEF. Twenty- 

53 
four nations in all offered to contribute men to the Force. 

The riches were, in fact, not so great when account was 
taken by the Secretary-General of political and military 
factors in determining the final composition of the Force. 

Hammarskjold immediately eliminated a number of 
states from consideration as contributors for political 
reasons. First, participation by the permanent members of 
the Security Council was ruled out, both to keep the Cold 
War out of an already difficult situation and to make quite 
clear that the United Nations was not casting a mantle of 
legality over the Anglo-French action. Second, states 
likely to have a special interest in the problem were ex- 
cluded from participation. This eliminated the Arab states 
and states tied closely to either bloc, such as the East 
European states. Finally, apparently states objected to 



-^The twenty-four states offering to contribute 
military men to' UNSF were: Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, 
Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rumania, 
Sweden, and Yugoslavia. U.N. Doc. A/3302/Add. 1 to 30 and 
U.N. Doc. A/3302, Annexes 1 to 6. 

^It might be noted that Czechoslovakia offered at 
least twice to contribute a battalion of troops and to 
provide the transport to their destination. The offers 
were not accepted. Ibid . , Add. 19. 



186 

•by Egyp-c were out also despite the Secretary-General's con- 
tention that the composition of the Force was not subject 

55 

to agreement by the parties involved. yy The question of 

the host country's veto raises a difficult problem. In 
theory, a force to be entirely impartial should not be 
shaped, even in part, by the parties to the dispute. In 
practice, since a force must operate with the consent of the 
host country, inclusion of troops to which that state 
strongly objects would seem to complicate the task of the 
force unnecessarily. 



^ihere is some debate as to Egypt's precise role in 
relation to the composition of UNEF. Canadian combat troops 
and Pakistani troops were recipients of an Egyptian veto. 
The Egyptian explanation for rejecting the Canadian troops 
was that the Canadian soldiers were dressed like British 
soldiers and were subjects of the same Queen. Ordinary 
Egyptians would not understand the difference and_ there 
might be unfortunate incidents. See Burns, op_. cit. , p. 198. 
In her study of U1TEF Gabriella Rosner questions the signifi- 
cance of the Egyptian voice in the determination of the 
Force's make-up, considering it simply one facoor among 
many which the" Secretary-General took into account. Rosner 
points out that with respect to Canada, Commander Burns 
actually needed reconnaissance, air, transport, administra- 
tion, signal, engineering, and medical units as well as foot 
soldiers. (In fact, these units were in shorter supply than 
the foot soldiers.) She also notes that by September, 1957, 
the Canadian contingent was the largest single national 
group participating in the Force. Her view is expressed in 
the following" quotation, "While the attitude of the Egyptian 
Government in these two cases was, undoubtedly, a factor 
influencing the Secretary-General's decision, his position 
would appear to have been that with many more offers made 
than were needed, it was unwise to accept an offer which 
might jeopardize the success of the whole operation unless 
it was the only way of meeting a particular need." Rosner, 
op . cit . , pp. 120-121. 



.-- 



187 

Exclusion of certain states from participation in 
the Force provided no answer as to who should serve. The 
actual determination of the composition and the size of the 
Force was made on the oasis of several considerations: a) 
the needs of the Force on the "basis of its functions and 
responsibilities; b) the desirability of balance in the 
Force in terms of geographic distribution and military 
organization; c) the comparative utility of the troops 
offered in the light of needs; and d) the relative availa- 
bility and economy of transport for troops offered together 

56 
with their essential equipment. 

After all the relevant factors were taken into 

account, a comparatively small number of states of limited 

military power remained as potential contributors. Ten 

nations — Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, 

Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia — were tapped to 

supply the troops for the United Nations Emergency Force. 

Thus, the Force encompassed contingents representative of 

the major geographic areas and non-aligned blocs then in 

the Assembly. 

There has been a remarkable stability in the size 

57 
and source of troop contributions to UNSF over the years. 



56 U.N. Doc. A/5694, p. 2. 

" ^The table in Appendix B shows how UNSF looked 
initially and over the years in terms of composition. 






188 

The force initially had approximately 6,000 men; in 1964 
it numbered a little over 5,100. Of the original ten 
seconding states, seven continue to supply all the men for 
the Force — the Finnish and Indonesian units were withdrawn 
in 1957 and the Colombian unit departed in 1958. Canada and 
the Scandinavian states have contributed approximately one- 
half of the troops over the years, while the Afro-Asians 
have provided about one-fourth. India, the largest single 
contributor, took up much of the slack left by the with- 
drawal of the other Afro-Asian participant, Indonesia. 

The Secretary-General may have been less successful 
in achieving military balance than he was in establishing 
geographic and political balance. Major-General Burns, as 
the Commander, criticized the initial military weakness of 

the Force, pointing particularly to its odd size units and 

58 
its over-balance of infantry units. 

Moreover, only about one-half the total force in the 
area, less than 3,500 out of 6,000 men, were available for 
patrol and guard duties. ^ The remaining units were engaged 
in vital support functions and were neither suitable nor 
available for active duty. Throughout the life of the Force 
around half of the men have been engaged in support activi- 
ties. In report after report on the Force the Secretary- 
General pointed out that the deployment of the Force for 



^ Burns, op. cit . , p. 190. 
59 U.N. Doc. A/369^, P. 3. 



189 

its task was quite thin and emphasized the need for main- 
taining UN3F at its initial strength if it was to perform 
its assigned duties. Despite the warnings, a reduction in 
size of the Force did occur over the years so that by 1964- 
it was about five-sixths its original size. No correspon- 
ding reduction in its effectiveness seems to have occurred. 

The practices followed regarding rotation of troops 
have not eased the problem of having an adequate number of 
trained men on hand. Initially it had been anticipated 
that units would be rotated no oftener than once a year. 
In fact, all units except the Canadian and Indian have been 
rotated semi-annually. As dates of conscription of volun- 
teer service drew to a close, it was necessary to return 
contingents to their home states. Too, the nature of the 
climate and terrain and the monotony of the duties led to 
the conclusion that frequent rotations were desirable. 
Nevertheless, the semi-annual rotation would seem to impose 
an unnecessarily high cost on the Force, both in terms of 
transport and of frequent personnel turnover. 

The status of the troops in the various contingents 
has varied. In some cases they have been professional 
soldiers, drawn from the regular army; in others, volunteers 
or conscripts, enrolled for a specific term of service. 
(Most of the officers came from the ranks of the profes- 
sional soldiers.) Although the various contingents were 









190 

not so well-trained as initially desired, the calibre of 
men was generally high, and the nature of duties undertaken 
by the Force such that the lack of training posed no seri- 
ous problems for the operation of the Force. 

The combination of frequent rotations and volunteer 
troops with relatively little training would seem to pose 
particular difficulties for an international force faced 
with more challenging responsibilities than those con- 
fronted in Gaza or Sinai. If the United Nations forces 
are to undertake many missions like those of the Congo and 
Cyprus, some re-thinking on training and rotation seems 
necessary. 

Money: the financial base of UNBF .-The success of 
a peace-keeping group is determined at least in part by the 
adequacy of the resources which undergird it. The more 
costly the venture, the greater is likely to be the problem 
of material support. 

UNEF was expensive in terms of the general level of 
United Nations expenses at that time. In the first year the 
Force's operational costs were ■$23,920,500 — its total obli- 
gations taking account of reimbursements came to about 
330,000,000. This sum was approximately one-third of the 
regular budget for the Organization for 1957. The most 



Burns, 00. cit . , p. 189. 






_y 



191 

expensive peace-keeping operation the United Nations had. 
engaged in prior to IMEF had been in Palestine, and the 
costs of the Truce Supervision Organization there never 
exceeded $5-5 million. In fact, the actual UNEF costs were 
greater than indicated by the budget. Generous contribu- 
tions of men, material, and transport facilities from member 

61 
states reduced substantially the initial outlay. 

Although the costs of UNEF have been reduced over 
the years, it has remained an expensive undertaking for the 
United Nations. Costs have been stabilized at around $19 
million annually. (The costs of a peace-keeping group are 
almost always largest in the first phase of operations be- 
cause of several factors: the initial costs of getting a 
force in being and underway; the somewhat greater responsi- 
bilities of a force in its first phase of operations; and 
the inexperience of those responsible for the operation. ) 

Providing the financial support to maintain a Porce 
of adequate size in the field has been one of the most 



67 

Examples of the contributions are numerous. 

Countries sending contingents not only covered the ordinary 
expenses (such as salaries of their men), but also provided 
much equipment without charge. Transport of troops and 
equipment from home base to staging area valued at $2.25 
million was provided by the United States. The Canadians 
transported their men to the area of operations at a cost 
to them of $772,131. The Swiss Government picked up a 
$390,000 bill for the initial costs of commercial air trans- 
port. from the staging area to Egypt. The Scandinavians 
arranged regular air transport service to and from Naples. 



192 

challenging and controversial problems faced by the United 
Rations in connection with TJNEF. The problem of financing 
posed no real barrier to the establishment of the Force 
probably in part because of the Secretary-General's consci- 
ous decision to avoid the hard financial issues at the out- 
set. Financing has, however, threatened the continued 
existence of an effective force. The members of the United 
Nations have been deeply divided over the question of 
financing UNEF and. the peace-keeping force which followed 
it in the Congo. Argument on the financing of the Force 
has been couched largely in legal or economic terms, yet 
it is political factors which seem to be most determinative 
of the positions of member states on the issue. Extensive 
debate and intensive study by working groups as well as 
legal advisory opinion have not served to resolve with 
finality the issue of financing. It can be argued that 
this is so because the basic political consensus on which 
important decisions must rest is missing. 

The issue of financing UNSF was, in fact, not one 
single issue but three related ones. The outstanding 
financial questions posed by TJNEF were: a) the inclusion 
in or exclusion from the regular budget of the costs of 
UNEF; b) the scale of assessments to be used to apportion 
the charges for TJNEF among the member states; and c) the 
nature of the legal obligation of member states to meet 






193 

assessments for UNEF and the related practical problem of 
how compliance with a legal obligation might be ensured. 

The formula which has been developed, partly by trial 
and error, for financing the Force has four main elements: 
a) that the costs should be financed outside the regular 
budget of the United Nations; b) that the regular scale of 
assessments should serve as the basis for apportioning UNEF 
costs; c) that certain modifications should be injected 
into the UNEF scale of assessments to take account of 
special circumstances; and d) that the expenses for UNEF 
are expenses of the organization and obligatory upon all. 

The decision that all of the costs of the Force borne 
by the United Nations should be financed outside the regu- 
lar budget was one of the earliest and most crucial made by 
the Secretary-General on the financing of the Force. It 
was briefly alluded to in the Secretary-General's November 
6 report on UNEF. On November 21 Hammarskjold followed 

up the earlier suggestion with the recommendation that a 

63 
Special Account be established to handle UNEF finances. 

The General Assembly approved the Secretary-General's pro- 
posal for a Special Account on November 26. Only the 
Communist states opposed the establishment of the Special 



62 U.N. Doc. A/3302, p. 21. 
^ 5 U.N, Doc. A/3383, p. 1*. 

General Assembly, Official Recor ds, 11th Session, 
596th plenary meeting (November 26, 1956), p. 3^3. 



j/ 



194 

Fund. However, there were great differences of opinion 
among the member states as to the implications of the 
Special Fund, particularly with respect to the nature of the 
obligations that it imposed on member states. There is no 
question, however, that the fact that UREF was financed 
through a special account cast a shadow of ambiguity on the 
entire issue and served as support for those who would deny 
any obligation to pay for the Force. 

Why did the Secretary-General make the decision to 
finance UitfEF's initial expenses on an ad hoc and special 
basis rather than as a part of the regular budget? Why 
depart from the precedent set by the observer groups of 
financing through the regular budget? Insight into the 
Secretary-General ' s reasoning is found in his 1958 Summary 
Study of UNEF experience. In that document the Secretary- 
General reveals that two sorts of considerations influenced 
him. First, the Secretary-General wished to avoid the delay 
in getting the Force in the field which almost surely would 
have occurred if the attempt had been made to resolve the 
questions of financial responsibility before the Force 
commenced to function. The Secretary-General was aware 
apparently that there was little unanimity in the Assembly 
as to the proper means to finance the Force. In the second 
place, the uncertainty about UREF seemed to argue against 
including its expenses in the regular budget. There was 



195 

uncertainty as to tlie scope and duration of UNEF's assign- 
ment, as to the extent of assistance and grants which would 
be tendered to the United Nations, and as to the total costs 
of the mission. In addition, the Secretary-General 
apparently under-estimated the disadvantages of using the 
Special Account. He did not feel that the Special Account 
carried with it any implication that the expenses of UNEF 
were not thereby legally and morally obligatory on the 
members of the organization. Hammarskgold viewed the UNEF 

expenses as "United Nations expenditures within the general 

65 
scope and intent of Article 17 of the Charter." ' Article 

17, which provides that the expenses of the Organization 

shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General 

Assembly, and Article 19, which provides the sanction of a 

loss of vote in the General Assembly for a state two years 

in arrears, have figured prominently in the legal debate 

over the financing of peace-keeping operations. The 

Secretary-General made it quite clear that his intention in 

setting up the Special Account was not to by-pass Articles 

17 and 19. 

The decision to set up a Special Account caused few 
problems although the implications of that method of 
financing were to become highly controversial. In contrast 



65 General Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, 
Fifth Committee, 54-1 st plenary meeting (December 3, 1956), 
pp. 46-4-7. 






196 

to the ease with which this decision was reached was the 
difficulty encountered with respect to the crucial question 
of how to allocate the expenses of the Force among the 
members of the United Nations. The principle arrived at 
was "collective responsibility" modified by special con- 
siderations. It was a principle which was accepted only 
with the greatest difficulty and which was hedged with 
qualifications . 

The issue of how to allocate the expenses of UNEF 
was ignored in the earliest days of the Force's operation. 
In his report of November 21, the Secretary-General had 
recommended that the expenses of the Force be allocated on 
the basis of the scale of assessments to be adopted for the 
United Rations budget for 1957. While the Fifth Committee 
acted favorably on the other recommendations in the 
Secretary-General's November 21 report, it held in abeyance 
action on this recommendation, pending further study. The 
Secretary-General repeated his earlier recommendation in 
more forceful terms on December 2, indicating that after 
careful study he had concluded it was the only equitable and 
practical approach to the financing of UNEF. 

A wide range of opinion was revealed in the debate in 
the Fifth Committee on the Secretary-General's proposal for 
financing the Force. Two main issues emerged: a) how should 



o 



E 



U.N. Doc. A/3383, P. 14. 






197 

the costs of the operation be divided among the members, 
and b) what was the nature of the obligation of the members 
to pay for the Force. Opinion ran from total support for 
use of the regular scale of assessment and for the concept 
of obligatory assessments to total rejection of this 
approach. The positions taken in the early debate were held 
by the states with relatively little modification over the 

years. 

At the positive end of a continuum of opinion running 
from support to non-support for the principle of collective 
responsibility for the Force stood such states as Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and most of the Western European nations. These states con- 
curred in the opinion of the Secretary-General that "since 
the General Assembly had established the Force as a United 
Nations instrument for the accomplishment of certain stated 
purposes, the logical consequence appeared to be that the 
United Nations must itself assume full and final responsi- 
bility for its effective functioning, including responsi- 
bility for the financial and other obligations involved." 
In general, they held that the expenses of the Force 
(excepting those which individual governments might elect 
to bear) should be considered as United Nations expenses 
within the scope and spirit of Article 17 of the Charter. 



^'General Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, 
Fifth Committee, 541st meeting (December 3, 1956), p. 47. 









_y 



198 

The same states which were the firmest advocates of 
collective responsibility also held that the expenses of the 
Force should he apportioned under the formula used for the 
regular expenses of the Organization. However, some ac- 
cepted the need to modify the assessment formula to take 
account of special factors, such as the limited resources 
of the smaller states. 

A second approach to the financing of the peace- 
keeping force characterized some of the African and Asian 
states. On the one hand, they admitted that the action of 
the General Assembly in creating UNEF imposed a financial 
responsibility on the member states to pay for the Force. 
On the other hand, they stressed the need to apportion the 
expenses of the Force fairly and equitably. Translated, 
fairly and equitably meant so that the expenses would not 
fall too heavily on countries with under-developed economies, 



The representative of the United States, for ex- 
ample, recognized that full application of the principle of 
collective responsibility might create difficulties for 
smaller countries. He indicated that the United States was 
willing to make large voluntary contributions to ease the 
burden of the membership as a whole. General Assembly, 
Official Records , ilth Session, Fifth Committee, 553rd 
meeting (December 17,- 1956), pp. 115-16. Denmark and Brazil, 
both contributors to the Force, held that special considera- 
tion should be given those countries providing troops in 
order not to place an unwarranted burden on them. See 
General Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, Fifth 
Committee, 5^th meeting (December 5^ 1956), p. 67 and 
555th meeting (December 18, 1956), p. 150. 



199 
The capacity of each member to contribute should be one 
determinant of the scale of assessment. 6 ^ 

In contrast to the aforementioned states, which 
accepted the principle of collective responsibility, were 
those states which denied that the expenses of U1TEF consti- 
tuted an obligatory charge on the member states without, 
however, denying the legality of the Force. In their 
opinion Articles 17 and 19 were inapplicable. This opinion 
with variation was held by a number of the Latin American 
and Arab states. If the Force were not to be supported by 
obligatory assessments, how then was it to be maintained? 
The Latin American states suggested in effect that the bulk 
of funds come from voluntary contributions. They proposed 
that assessment of member states be limited to an amount 
equal one-tenth of the regular budget. They also expressed 
agreement with the Spanish contention that the permanent 
members of the Security Council bore a special responsibility 
for financing the Force since Article 27 assigned them a 

preponderant role in the maintenance of international peace 

70 
and security. ' The Arab states coupled the special 



'See, for example, the position of India, General 
Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, Fifth Committee, 
54-7th meeting (December 10, 1956), p. 82. 

70 

The representative of El Salvador spoke on behalf of 

the Latin American delegations. General Assembly, Official 
Records , 11th Session, Fifth Committee, -547th meeting 
(December 10, 1956), p. 81. For the Spanish position see 
General Assembly, Official Records, 11th Session, Fifth 
Committee, 54-5 th meeting (December 6, 1956), p. 71. 



200 

responsibility of the permanent members of the Security 
Council with, the special responsibility for the situation 
oi the aggressors. 

Holding the most extreme position on the negative 
end of the continuum were the members of the Communist bloc. 
Although they had abstained on the resolution establishing 
UNE3?, they contended that the decision to establish UNSF 
was illegal. The establishment of United Nations armed 
forces was exclusively within the competence of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. Any financial 
arrangements respecting the Force should be made under 
Article 4-3 of the Charter. The Communist representatives 
did not distinguish between a fighting force created by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII and a non-fighting force 
created under some other section of the Charter. They con- 
tended that they could not participate in financing an 

illegal force and voted no on all resolutions related to 

72 

UNEF financing.' 

Egypt, suggested, for example , that the expenses be 
met orimarily by those states whose actions made the opera- 
tion" necessarv and by the permanent Security Council members 
General Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, Fifth 
Committee, 54 5th meeting (December 6, 1956), p. 70. 

? 2 Despite the Soviet contention that the Force was 
illegal, they did have a suggestion for its financing. The 
aggressors, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, should 
Day for it. General Assembly, Official Records , 11th 
Session, Fifth Committee, 555th meeting (December 18, 1956), 
p. 129. 



201 

After all the debate, the Fifth Committee accepted 
the Secretary-General's recommendation that the initial $10 
million authorized for the UNSF account be apportioned on 
the basis of the scale used for the regular budget. The 
vote was 57 in favor, 8 opposed, with 9 abstentions. J 
Only the members of the Communist bloc voiced outright 
opposition. 

Despite the large vote in favor of the resolution on 
UNEF financing, the pattern of financing set forth in that 
resolution was not embraced with enthusiasm. Acceptance 
was hedged with qualifications. Most important of these 
was the specification that the decision was not to be con- 
sidered as establishing a precedent. Thus, the resolution 
indicated that the General Assembly: 

Decides that the expenses of the United Nations 
Emergency Force, other than for such pay, equipment, 
supplies and services as may be furnished without 
charge by Member Governments, shall be borne by the 
United Nations and shall be apportioned among the 
Member States to the extent of $10 million, in ac- 
cordance with the scale of assessments adopted by the 
General Assembly for contributions to the annual bud- 
get of the organizations for the financial year 1957. 






Decides further that this decision shall be with- 
out prejudice to the subsequent apportionment of any 
expenses in excess of $10 million which be incurred 
in connexion with UEEF.74- 



75 U.H. Doc. A/5560, p. 69. 

Ibid., p. 70. This became General Assembly resolu- 



tion -i08TTli5.' 



.,■'■ 



202 

Despite the disclaimer, the resolution on UN3F 
financing did, in fact, set a pattern for the financing of 
peace-keeping operations which was followed not only for 
UNEF but also for the United Nations Force in the Congo. In 
theory, the regular scale of assessments determined all 
contributions. In practice, the principle of collective 
responsibility was tempered. A modified scale emerged with 
the incorporation of the principles of voluntary contribu- 
tions and of reduced assessments for cause. 

The first modification introduced was that of the 
voluntary contribution. In February, 1957, at the Secretary - 
General's request the General Assembly authorized him to 
incur expenditures of up to $16.5 million, $6.5 million more 
than initially authorized and provided for in the December 
resolution assessing members for the expenses of TJNSF. The 
resolution invited member states to contribute voluntarily 
the additional $6.5 million. The expedient of relying 

completely on voluntary contributions for authorized expen- 

75 
ditures proved unsatisfactory. Voluntary contributions 

were not used again as the sole support of obligations in- 
curred. But, the use of voluntary contributions was not 
cast out completely. Thus, from 1957 to 1962 twenty-two 



^^The United Nations had pledges of $5,800,550 almost 
immediately, but cash received by October, 1957, totaled 
only $586,500. The Secretary-General termed the voluntary 
approach an inadequate and insecure method of financing. 
U.N". Doc. A/3694, P. 12. 



203 

governments made contributions totaling over $26 million, 
almost 20 per cent of UNEF's cost. 76 

A second modification, the principle of reduced 
assessment, was adopted in I960. A resolution sponsored by 
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and 
Yugoslavia provided that contributions pledged before 
December $1, 1959, should be applied as a credit to reduce 

by 50 per cent the contributions of as many governments as 

77 
possible, beginning with those assessed at .04 per cent. 

The same type of formula with a more generous maximum re- 
duction for those least able to pay was included in each 
UNEF budget after I960. 

The critical problem relating to THE! financing was 
not simply one of working out an acceptable financing 
formula. It was also one of getting money enough to run the 
Force. Differences among the member states as to the kind 
of obligation members had to support UNEF were reflected 
concretely in the paid or unpaid assessments for the Force, 
On the one hand, an overwhelming majority voted year after 



' The United States contributed approximately $23 
million, the United Kingdom $2.5 million, and France $400,000. 
Nineteen other states contributed amounts varying from 
$310,000 to $1,000. The contributing states were Canada, 
Australia., New Zealand, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, Italy, Belgium, Iceland, Greece, Austria, Japan, 
Mexico, Ceylon, Pakistan, Liberia, Burma and the Dominican 
Republic. John G. Stoessinger, Financing the United Nations 
System (Washington : The Brookings institution, 1964), p. 112. 

77 U.N. Doc. A/4335, p. 32. 






204- 
year to authorize the Secretary-General to spend for UNEF 
and accepted the formula for assessing expenses set forth 
by the Fifth Committee. On the other hand, a great many 
states did not pay or were slow in paying their share. 

UNEF fell steadily deeper in debt. The scope of the 
problem is suggested by looking at the status of the Special 
Account for selected periods. On October 7, 1957, after the 
Force had been in existence nearly a year the Secretary- 
General reported receipts of only $5 » 74-3, 644- of the initial 
$10 million assessed.' By the end of 1961 the account 
arrears was over $26 million and 73 states were behind in 
their payments to the account. By mid-1963, $27,34-9,581 
was due for the 1957-1962 period. Forty-eight states had 
paid their assessments in full, while fifty-six states were 
in arrears. Of the latter twenty-seven had paid nothing at 
all on the UNEF assessments, while eight states had paid 
less than one-fourth the amount due. " 

An examination of who paid and who did not suggests 
where the hard support for the Force rested. The strongest 
support came from the United States and those middle-sized 
European and English-speaking states which had given the 
Force strong backing in the debates. Not surprisingly, the 
least material support came from those most opposed to the 



78 U„N. Doc. A/3694- , p. 9. 

79 U.N. Doc. A/C. 5/974- (May 14, 1963) (mimeograph) 
Annex III, pp. 1-4- . 



205 
Force . Thus, the Communist bloc states paid none of their 
assessment for UHKP in the 1957-1962 period. In the same 
period only two Arab states paid anything, and those two 
paid less than half their assessment. While the absence of 
contributions from these states was based primarily on 
political grounds, a number of under-developed states also 
contributed little or nothing of their assessment on grounds 
of economic inability to pay. 

With the establishment of the far more expensive 
United Nations Force in the Congo, the same financial prob- 
lems arose. The costs of UNEF and the Force in the Congo 
combined brought the United Nations to the brink of 
financial disaster. As will be seen when the financing of 
the Force in the Congo is examined, extensive debates in the 
Fifth Committee and exhaustive exploration of the question 
of financing by various special working groups achieved 
little more than a reiteration by the members of the posi- 
tions that they had taken on financing peace-keeping 
operations in the early debates on UNEF. 

By 1961 something seemed necessary to get the question 
off dead-center. Two extraordinary moves were made. On the 
one hand, a temporary expedient was resorted to in order to 
ease the financial crisis. On the suggestion of Secretary- 
General U Thant the United Nations floated a $200 million 
bond issue. Second, an effort was made to deal not merely 



206 

with the symptoms of the problem hut with the problem itself. 
In December, 1961, the General Assembly requested an advisory 
opinion from the International Court of Justice on the 
question of whether the expenses of a peace-keeping force 
constituted an obligation under Article 17 of the Charter. 
Although the financing of the peace forces was basically a 
political issue, the debate was couched in legal terms. 
The decision would help settle the legal questions at issue. 
The Court's opinion, handed down in July, 1962, was that the 

expenses were expenses of the Organization within the mean- 

80 
ing of Article 17. The opinion was- accepted by the General 

o-i 

Assembly on December 19, 1962. 

Despite the denial by a few states of the validity or 
significance of the International Court decision, it did 
strengthen the financial position of the two peace-keeping 
forces. Yet, it has also served to illustrate that the 
financing problem is more political than legal. Even with 
legal authority behind him, the Secretary-General has not 
considered it wise to finance recent peace-keeping ventures 

as regular expenses of the Organization. 



International Court of Justice, Certain E xpenses of 
the United Nations ( Article 17 , paragraph 2 of the^ Charter" !, 
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports, 1962, pp. 
179-80. 

81 A number of states which had abstained on the issue 
of referring the question to the Court accepted the decision 
once handed down. The vote on referring the question to the 
Court was 52-11-32. The vote on acceptance was 75-17-14. 
See U.N. Doc. A/5580, p. 7. 






207 

Material: the logistic "base of IMEF .-The logistic 
problems which, confronted the Force can be divided into two 
categories: those which concerned the establishment of UNEF 
and those related to the maintenance of the Force in the 
field. 

The initial logistic problems had to be solved in an 
atmosphere of emergency, under the stresses imposed by the 
need for speed and improvisation. The scope of the United 
Nations endeavor is suggested if one considers that a force 
had to be created, transported to the field -of duty, uni- 
formed or in some way made identifiable, fed, equipped and 

supplied — all within a few days time and with virtually no 

82 
advance preparation. 

One of the first logistic problems to be met was that 
of getting the troops into Egypt. To meet this problem a 
staging area and transport facilities were needed. Convinced 
of the importance of having troops immediately available to 
move into Egypt, Hammarskjold undertook negotiations for 
troop contributions even before formal passage of the reso- 
lution creating the Force. As a consequence immediately 
after passage of that resolution, the Secretary-General was 



— 

For a discussion of logistic problems encountered 
in the early stages of the operation see William Frye, op . 
cit . , pp. 22-31 and P. 0. Donovan, "How the United Nations 
Troops Were Mobilized," The Reporter , Vol. 16, No. 1 
(January 10, 1957), PP . ' 3^ : 3"2T~^ 



208 

able to inform the Government of Egypt that a force composed 
of units from Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden could be constituted without delay. When Presi- 
dent Nasser hesitated in consenting to the entry of the 
Force, it was decided to bring the Force together at a 
staging area close to Egypt. Such a move would place 
pressure on the Egyptian Government to assent to the Force 
and would expedite the entry of the troops once consent 
came. 

Italy offered the airfield at Capodichino near Naples 
as a staging area. The United States, Canada, and Italy 
contributed transport services. (The United States con- 
tributed the lion's share — transport services valued at 
$2.25 million.) Arrangements were made for Swissair to 
convey the troops from Capodichino to Egypt on a commercial 
basis since the November 7 resolution was interpreted as 
prohibiting the entry of American planes or pilots into 
Egypt. 5 

An effort was made to reduce the logistic responsi- 
bilities immediately confronting the United Nations by 
requesting that national troop contingents carry from home 



^One of the side effects of the Swissair arrangement 
was that much of the heavy equipment of the national con- 
tingents, brought to the staging area in United States Air 
Force flying boxcars, had to be left at- Capodichino because 
Swissair did not have planes large enough to fly it into 
Egypt. 



209 

supplies and equipment needed for the first few days of 

84- 
operation. The effort was commendable, hut not entirely 

successful. Not. all the troops came adequately provisioned, 

and ad hoc arrangements had to he made. For example, Egypt 

provided cooking stoves, tents, and some light equipment for 

some of the inadequately provisioned units. 

The difficult problems relating to transportation, 
communications, equipment, and supplies for the Force were 
intensified by the general lack of information at United 
Nations headquarters about both the terrain and climate of 
the area and the supply and equipment requirements of the 
various national contingents. 

The difficulties of acquiring supplies needed for 
the Force were greatly eased by the assistance of the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The United States made 
available to the United Nations for compensation equipment 
and supplies from its stores in Southern Europe. Some prob- 
lems apparently developed in the handling of the transac- 
tions, yet the availability of the supplies was a boon to 
the operation. The United Kingdom provided ground transport 
which it had in the area to the Force, thereby easing the 
problems caused by an initial shortage ,of vehicles. 



84 

The contingents were asked to bring personal side- 
arms, tents, essential light equipment, and a 10-day ■ ■ 
supply of rations. 

Burns, op_. cit. , p. 206. 



210 

A host of other problems, major and minor, had to he 
solved in the early days of the Force. There was, for 
example, the problem of the ready identification of United 
Nations soldiers so that they would not be mistaken for 
British or French and become snipers' targets and so that 
their presence, their most potent weapon, could be felt. 
The idea of uniforms for the Force was discarded as im- 
practical. The use of blue berets as an identifying 
symbol was then proposed, but the proper color berets were 
unavailable. This dilemma was resolved by painting the 
liners of United States helmets blue. 

The initial logistic problems were met with energy 
and imagination. The solutions hit on might not be the 
best of all possible ones, but they generally worked and 
they met the requirement of rapid action. As the Force 
settled down to a routine and its tour of duty stretched out 
over the years, it was possible to improve and strengthen 
the initial logistic arrangements and to resolve some of the 
logistic problems that had arisen with the international 
force. 

The supply and provisioning of UNEF which had been 
a crucial problem initially was put on a routine basis. 
Continuous efforts, perhaps spurred by the financial prob- 
lems of the United Nations, were made to develop a more 
economical and efficient support system. 



86 Ibid. , p. 257. 



211 

Three areas in which marked improvements were made 
in operating efficiency and economy can he singled out. 
First, there was a general tightening of the UNEF organi- 
zation over the years. Some of the support troops were 
dropped; some were replaced with local personnel. Second, 
the cost of rations for the Force was sharply reduced over 
the years. In the early months the cost of food supplies 
was high, a fact attributed to the necessity of giving 
special attention to the dietetic requirements of the vari- 
ous national groups and to the necessity of importing the 
hulk of provisions. Improved procurement practices, estab- 
lishment of a revised rations scale, and better methods of 
control issuance and usage made it possible to reduce the 

on 

per man cost from the original $2.30 to 67 cents by 1962. 
Third, the policy was established of standardizing 
the equipment and bringing it under United Nations rather 
than contingent ownership. At the outset there was great 
variety in the equipment of the various contingents; 
operating under an emergency and on the assumption of a 
temporary force-, little effort had been made at standardiza- 
tion. Some items were contingent owned; others were pur- 
chased by the United Nations from a variety of sources. To 
illustrate, in the early months of the operation there were 



"^U.N. Doc. A/3694, Annex A, p. 15 and U.N. Doc. 
A/5W, p. 23. 



212 

some forty different types and makes among the approximately 
1,000 self-propelled vehicles in use by the Force. The bulk 
of these were contingent owned. By 1959 there were 585 
UNEF-owned vehicles as compared to 313 contingent owned. 
By 1963 out of 90? self-propelled vehicles only three were 
contingent owned. 8 ^ These figures suggest the trend to 
acquisition and standardization of equipment by the Force 
as it developed experience with its needs in the field and 
as the operation settled into semi -permanency. Thus, experi- 
ence was gained over the years in the efficient feeding and 
equipping of an international force. The logistic base grew 
stronger. 

The legal status of UNEF 

The precise legal relations between IMEF and the 
Government of Egypt were laid out in two documents: an aide - 
memoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of 
UNEF in Egypt drawn up on November 20, 1956, after a meeting 
between Secretary-General Hammarskjold and Egyptian offi- 
cials 4 and an exchange of letters in February, 1957, which 
spelled out in detail the status of the Force in Egypt. 

The aide- memoire constitutes the basic foundation of 
TMEF-Egyptian relations and serves as the model for suc- 
ceeding agreements between peace-keeping forces and the host 



88 U.N. Doc. AA160, p. 5. 
89 U.N. Doc. A/5495, P. 12. 



213 

90 -' 

country. In the aide - memoire the Government of Egypt 

declared that 

...when exercising its sovereign rights on any 
matter concerning the presence and functioning 
of UNEF, it will he guided in good faith hy its 
acceptance of General Assembly resolution 1000 
(ES-I) of 5 November. 

In turn the United Nations officials stated that 

...the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good 
faith, by the task established for the Force in 
the aforementioned resolutions; in particular, the 
United Nations, understanding this to correspond 
to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms 
its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is 
completed. 

The February agreement on the status of UNEF, which 
was a follow-up to the aide - memoire , was also highly signi- 
ficant not only by its impact on UNEF-Egyptian relations 

but also because it enunciated a number of guiding principles 

91 
for host country peace-keeping force relations. 

A central principle of the February Agreement was 
that as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, UNEF was 
entitled to the privileges and immunities necessary for the 
achievement of its purposes. The legal status of the Force 
was based on the principle that complete independence from 
local authority was necessary for UNEF to perform its inter- 
national functions. Translated into concrete terms the 



^°U.N. Doc. A/3375. 



91 



U.N. Doc. A/3526. 



214 

principle meant, among other things, that United Nations 
premises were inviolable and subject to the exclusive con- 
trol and authority of the Commander; that members of the 
UNEF Command, Force, and Staff enjoyed to varying degrees 
the privileges and immunities; that provision was made for 
appropriate display of the United Nations flag, for a pre- 
scribed uniform, and for distinctive identification of 
United Nations equipment. 

A basis for cooperation between the Force and Egypt 
rested in a second important principle — freedom of movement. 
Within the "area of operations" 9 of the Force and to and 
from points of access members of the Force were to have 
complete freedom of movement, an important prerequisite for 
an effective force. In its turn the United Nations acknow- 
ledged the obligation of the members of the Force to respect 
the laws and regulations of Egypt and to refrain from actions 
incompatible with their international status. 

One of the note-worthy and potentially troubling 
provisions of the February Agreement, one which set a rather 
unfortunate precedent, was that respecting criminal juris- 
diction. The UNEF arrangement was a unique one, revealing 
much about the nature of UNEF. It provided that members of 



~^"Area of operations" was deemed to include areas 
where UNEF was deployed, its installations and _ premises, 
and its lines of communication and supply. Ibid . , p. 55. 



215 

the Force should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of their 
respective national states with respect to criminal offenses 
committed in Egypt. The principle was justified by the 
Secretary-General as a means of preserving the independence 
of the Force and of facilitating contributions by member 
states to the Force. Although the provision apparently 
caused no great great difficulty with respect to UKEF- 
Egyptian relations, perhaps because of the relatively few 
incidents, both the Secretary-General and certain of the 
delegates recognized that the principle could give rise to 
legal problems. Thus, in his 1958 Summary Study of UTTEF 

Hammarskjoid indicated that he had requested the partici- 

93 
pating states to review the position under their laws. 

The problem of balancing the independence of the Force 

against the potential jurisdictional vacuum has not yet been 

resolved. 

The members of the Force are not so far outside 
Egyptian law on civil matters. Although they enjoy immunity 
from civil process for an official action, they can be sub- 
ject to Egyptian jurisdiction under certain safeguards for 
their personal actions. 

These provisions on the status of UNEF reveal that 
it had extraordinary rights and privileges in Egypt. They 
point up the unique quality of the non-fighting force. 



95 U.N. Doc. A/394-3, p. 26. 



o 



16 






Inherent in such an agreement is the assumption of coopera- 
tion and relative good will between the force and the host 
state. 



UNEF in Action 

The role of the Force 

Of all the uses by the United Nations of non-fighting 
units in a peace-keeping capacity, ranging from the missions 
involving a handful of observers to those encompassing 
thousands of soldiers, the most praised and the least criti- 
cized has been UNEF. It has served as the prototype and 
inspiration for those peace-keeping missions which have been 
established in its wake. To fully understand the basis for 
the success of the Force, it is necessary to look beyond 
its origins and characteristics. The ultimate test of the 
Force rests in its functioning once in being. UNEF managed 
successfully the difficult role of being part observer 
group and part military force. An examination of UNEF in 
the field can offer insight into how this has been accomp- 
lished and what' factors affect the success of peace-keeping 
missions, 

The United Nations Emergency Force has played a dual 
role in the Middle East. In the first phase of its opera- 
tions in the period preceding and coinciding with the with- 
drawal of British, French, and Israeli forces from Egypt, 



217 

UNEF undertook to secure and supervise the cessation of 
hostilities. In the period following the withdrawal of 

invading troops, the Force has he en charged with the task 

94- 
of maintaining peace in the Middle East. 

UNEF's responsibilities during the first phase of 
operation were set forth primarily in two resolutions: 
resolution 1000 (ES-I) of November 5, 1956, and resolution 
997 (ES-I) of November 2, 1956. Under the terms of the 
former resolution the Force was "to secure and supervise 
the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the 
terms" of resolution 997. All the terms of resolution 997 
would seem to include not only overseeing the cease-fire 
and withdrawal of all forces behind the Armistice lines 
but also ensuring that there was a scrupulous observance 
of the provisions of the armistice agreement and a halt to 
raids across the armistice lines. Nonetheless, the phrase 
"all the terms" left room for interpretation as to the pre- 
cise mandate given the Force and was to become a source of 
controversy. 

The responsibilities of the Force in the period 
following the departure of the Allied and Israeli forces 
were defined by resolution 1125 (XI) providing for the 
"placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the 
Egyptian-Israel armistice demarcation line and the imple- 



^Ibid., p. 10. 



218 

mentation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary- 

95 
General's report." y Again, the "other measures" were not 

spelled out. The ambiguity remained. 

The organization of UNEl? 

The Chief of Command of UNEF was given full responsi- 
bility for the functioning of the Force. The Commander had, 
in fact, a dual role to perform: he was to serve both as 
leader of the Force and as representative of the United 
Nations in the area. Political, military, and administra- 
tive responsibilities devolved upon him. He was to direct 
the over-all operation, to supervise the day-by-day 
activities of the Force, to represent the Secretary-General. 

The Commander was assisted in carrying this heavy 
burden of duties by the United Nations Command, a military 
staff organization under a Chief of Staff. The Chief of 
Staff served as second in command in the operation. The 
Command itself was composed of officers designated by the 
Commander in consultation with the Secretary-General. 

The first improvised UNEF staff, set up in Cairo on 
November 12, 1956, was composed of officers from the United 



_ — 

Ibid., p. 16. 



219 

96 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization. The availability 

of the experienced personnel from UNTSO was important to 
the rapid establishment of the Force; a nucleus of officers 
with experience both in the geographic area and in a re- 
lated phase of peace-keeping were immediately available to 
help organize the operation. Once the Force was fully 
established, the improvised staff was replaced by officers 
from each of the contingents composing the Force. Selection 
in practice seems to have been by the Commander and the 
national contingents, acting in cooperation. At the Com- 
mander's request the nations contributing troops to UNEF 
were asked to submit names of officers suitable for staff 

service. (Suitability included staff training and experi- 

97 
ence and a good working knowledge of English. ) 

The permanent headquarters organization adopted was 
a three-branch organization: personnel; operations and in- 
telligence; and logistics. In establishing the permanent 
staff organization for UNEF a conscious effort was made to 
create a staff exceptionally strong in both the number and 

^ 6 The officers from IMTSO who made up the first UNEF 
staff included an operations officer (Norwegian) , an admini- 
strative officer (Swedish) and three liaison and intelli- 
gence officers (Dutch, Swedish, and American — the latter 
despite the fact that the resolution establishing the Com- 
mand specifically excluded participation by the permanent 
members of the Security Council). Burns, op_. cit. , p. 307. 

• 97 Ibid. , pp. 210-211. 



220 

rank of officers serving in it. A colonel was to serve 
as Chief -of -Staff and lieutenant-colonels as branch heads. 
Within each branch were to be from three to six majors 
and captains. The reasoning behind the creation of a strong 
staff was, first, that the Force was in the process of 
organization and, second, that the international character 
of the Force would complicate staff work. For example, 

nine subordinate units rather than the usual three to five 

98 
were under headquarters control. 

The chain of command of UNEF ran directly from the 
Commander to the commanding officers of each of the national 
contingents. The by-passing of intermediate command 
officers occurred because the national contingents served 
in the Force as self-contained units. Each had its own 
commander who could not be changed without consultation be- 
tween the Commander of UNEF and the contributing government. 
Although the Commander of each national unit was militarily 
subordinate to the Commander of UKEF, he was permitted to 
communicate with his government on questions concerning his 
contingent. The national unit commander was subject to 

orders and instructions, however, only from the Commander 

99 
and through him the Secretary-General, y He in turn was 



__ 

^ Ibid. , p. 221. Experienced civilian United Nations 
personnel handled procurement of stores and equipment, 
questions of finance and general administration, and public 
relations. 

99 U.N. Doc. A/3694, p. 3. 






221 

responsible to the Commander-in-Chief for the proper 

a jj l 1 J * V N 10 ° 

functioning and discipline of his unit. 

Problems of coordination and control loom large in 
an army as loosely-structured as was this one. A number of 
steps were taken to minimize the potential difficulties. 
First, contingents supplying units for more than one 
functional task usually designated one over-all contingent 
commander. Second, reliance for most administrative and 
support functions was placed on the Canadians and Indians 
in order to minimize the necessity of coordinating several 
national units at this level. Finally, liaison officers 
were designated by some of the governments to serve as a 
link between the contributing government and the Force. 

These arrangements, while practical and workable, 
suggest the limits and dilemmas of UEEF as an international 
force. First, it was not an integrated international force, 
for the national units remained almost entirely separate. 
Second, the limits on the Commander's control over subordi- 
nate units, which caused no particular difficulty in the 
TJ1TEF operation,, could prove serious in different circum- 
stances. It might be hypothesized from the experience of 
UITEF and of succeeding peace-keeping missions that the 
deeper the involvement of the United Nations force, the more 



• 100 U.N. Doc. A/394-3, P. 18. 






important the limitations will become. Yet the means of 
eliminating the limitations are not in easy reach. Until 
some sort of stand-by international force exists, it is 

almost mandatory in an emergency that self-contained units 

101 
be provided by participating states. To Join together 

small groups of different nationalities would involve a 

loss of time and efficiency that could be critical. 

The functioning of UNEF 

Phase I: the withdrawal . -In the first phase of 
operations the Force's responsibility was to facilitate the 
withdrawal of the Anglo-French and Israeli forces from 
Egyptian territory with as much expedition and as little 
bloodshed as possible. 

The Anglo-French withdrawal took place in mid- 
December. The Israeli withdrawal, scheduled to be handled 
expeditiously and in one move, was actually carried out in 
four stages: December 3, 1956; January 7-8, 1957; January 
15-22; and March 6-12, 1957. The bulk of United Rations 
troops were concentrated in the Suez Canal area from the 



In the Suez crisis both the Secretary-General and 
the Commander expressed the view that during the first 
period at least the Force would have to be composed of a 
few units of battalion strength, drawn from such countries 
as could provide these units without delay. In the event, 
the United Nations did not get as large or as self-contained 
units as desired. U.3J. Doc. A/3302, p. 21 and Burns, op_. 
cit. , p. 188. 



22J 

time of their arrival in Egypt until the departure of the 

last British and French troops from Port Said on December 

1 0? 
22, 1956. As soon as the Anglo-French troops were out, 

almost all UNEF men were deployed to the Sinai area. 

The cease-fire, the withdrawal, and the presence of 
the United Nations Emergency Force were linked in the view 
of the invading states. What did the Force actually do to 
ease the transition from occupation to withdrawal? 

The Force undertook a variety of responsibilities. 
In the initial stages of the operation before UNEF had been 
built up to strength and before evacuation details had been 
completed, the mere presence of the Force was considered 
helpful to the situation. Patrols were sent out for the 
purpose of showing UNEF colors. Burns comments in this 
respect: 

Up to that time they [a Norwegian company camped 
in a park in Port Said] had no specific responsi- 
bilities in keeping order, but their presence had 
been welcomed by the people, and doubtless had an 
influence for good. Above all, it showed both the 
Allies and the population that UNEF was a reality, 
and that when it was built up in strength it could 
perform its allotted task of interposing between the 
combatants and "helping to maintain peaceful con- 
ditions. "10J 



■^^Since the first stage of the Israeli withdrawal _ 
from Sinai took place simultaneously, the only unit avail- 
able to follow up the Israeli withdrawal was a Yugoslav 
reconnaissance unit. Burns, op. cit. , p. 233. 

105 Ibid. , p. 225. 






224 

A second principal function which the Force served 
was the separation of the armed forces of the opposing sides 
by the physical interposition of UNEF between them. The 
separation of the belligerents, designed to prevent hostile 
acts, was quite successful in achieving that end. Shortly 
after the first UNEF contingents had arrived in Egypt, 
units of the Danish-Norwegian battalion were deployed between 
Egyptian and Allied Forces in the Port Said area. As the 
Allied forces withdrew, the United Nations troops moved 
forward, keeping themselves between the two parties. In the 
final stages of the evacuation the Allied forces were 
separated from the Egyptians by a barbed wire fence and a 
neutral zone, occupied by United Nations troops and pro- 
hibited to Egyptians, military or civilian. The same type 
procedure was used in connection with the Israeli withdrawal 

through the Sinai. 

Third, the United Nations men took over some admini- 
strative and security responsibilities in both regions. 
(These responsibilities were more extensive in the Suez 
Canal area than in the sparsely-populated Sinai desert.) 
In the plans drawn up by the UNEF and Allied commanders a 
steady broadening of the responsibilities assigned the 
Force was envisaged. For example, initially the Force was 
charged with securing peaceful conditions, in cooperation 
with local authorities, in assigned areas in Port Said and 









225 

Port Fuad and with, guarding certain vulnerable points, such 
as the electric generating plant, the water pumping stations, 
the sewage installations, and the food warehouses. By the 
time the evacuation reached its final stages UNEF had taken 
over responsibility for all vulnerable points outside the 
narrow zone to which the Allied forces had withdrawn and, 

in cooperation with local authorities, for the general 

104 

maintenance of peaceful conditions. The Force was con- 
cerned not only with public order but also with civilian 
welfare. It assumed some administrative functions with 
respect to public services and utilities, and it arranged 
for provisioning of the local population with foodstuffs. 
With the entry of Egyptian authorities UNEF turned control 
over to them. In general, UNEF duties were varied, includ- 
ing such other functions as repairing damaged roads, clear- 
ing minefields, engaging in investigation, and arranging 

105 
and carrying out the exchange of prisoners. 

The question of the responsibilities of the Force 

vis-a-vis the withdrawal of the invading states was raised 



104- 

The term law and order was avoided due to Egyptian 

insistence that the maintenance of law and order was the 

prerogative of the Egyptian authorities and their apparent 

suspicion that UNEF maintenance of law and order might be 

the opening wedge for IMEF occupation of their territory. 

Ibid ., p. 228. 

^It might be noted that in the Egyptian-Israeli 
exchange Israel exchanged 6,000 Egyptians for three 
Israelis. Ibid . , p. 246. 






226 

in more urgent and controversial form with respect to the 
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The Israelis refused to 
complete their withdrawal until some assurance was given 
that UNSF would be competent to restore peace and security 
in the area. 

The refusal to withdraw raised, first, the question 
of the power and competency of the Force to negotiate a 
withdrawal. Early negotiations on this issue were left 
largely in the hands of the field commander. He had little 
success in persuading the Israelis to depart, for he had 
limited bargaining power to oblige acceptance of United 
Nations terms. The sanctions which might normally be 
available to a military commander (particularly the threat 
of resumed hostilities) were not his. Nor were political 
sanctions at the disposal of the Force. 

Before the impasse created by the Israeli refusal to 
withdraw could be broken, extensive activity at United 
Nations headquarters involving both pressures and conces- 
sions was necessary. On the one hand, talk of sanctions 
against Israel .increased. 106 The February 2 General Assembly 



ina 



The U.S. Secretary of State indicated American will- 
ingness to cooperate in imposing sanctions on Israel in 
discussions of" this question. The United States was already 
imposing sanctions in the sense of having cut off all 
government aid to Israel. For a critical discussion of 
United States policy see Finer, op_. cit . , pp. 4-70-74, 
477-82. 



227 

resolution called on Israel to withdraw "behind the armistice 
demarcation line without further delay. On the other hand, 
both the February 2 resolution and statements by the 
Secretary-General seemed to recognize at least in part the 

Israeli contention that withdrawal presupposed a viable 

107 

United Nations Force. 

The actual withdrawal of the Israeli forces, announced 
on March 1, 1957, raised the question of what precisely the 
future role of UNEF should be. The Israeli Government made 
it clear that the withdrawals were being made on the basis 
of certain assumptions with respect to the role of the 
United Nations Force. In withdrawing from Sharm- el -Shaikh 
they assumed that the Force would be stationed in the 
Straits of Tiran to protect free and innocent passage and 
that any withdrawals of the Force would be preceded by 
consultations with the Advisory Committee. In withdrawing 
from the Gaza Strip they expected that UNEF would be de- 
ployed there, that the transfer of military and civilian 
control from the Israelis would be exclusively to UNEF, and 

■ L0 ^The February 2 resolution recognized that the main- 
tenance of the Armistice required placing UNEF on the armi- 
stice demarcation line and implementation of the other 
measures, still undefined, proposed in the Secretary-General's 
report. In addition, a February 22 statement by the 
Secretary-General indicated that "it is the desire of the 
Government of Egypt that the take-over of Gaza from the 
military and civilian control of Israel in the first instance 
would be exclusively by the United Nations Energency Force." 
General Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, &59th 
. plenary meeting (February 22, 19b7) , P« H92. 



228 

that the administration of Gaza would remain in United 

Nations hands until definite agreement was reached on the 

1 CiP, 

future of the Strip. 

The assumptions were never recognized as conditions 
of withdrawal by the Secretary-General. Despite some 
earlier concessions to the Israeli view of an active force, 
the Secretary-General considered that the Israeli withdrawal 
must be unconditional. 

The role taken by UNEF with the Israeli withdrawal 
from the area and the UNEE entry was neither as active as 
the Israelis had hoped nor as passive as they had feared. 
Although the assumptions on which Israel had based its 
withdrawal failed in large part to come to pass, the situ- 
ation did not return to its pre-Suez status. First, UNEE 
has remained on patrol in the Sharm-al -Shaikh area allowing 
Israeli shipping to move freely through the Straits of Tiran. 
Second, the Gaza Strip has not reverted to its earlier 
position as an armed base for fedayeen attacks. It is true 
that the United Nations Force did not maintain control in 
Gaza for an indefinite period as the Israelis had hoped they 
would. In fact, only one week after the United Nations 
assumed responsibility for the region, Egyptian civilian 
authorities returned to the area, possibly in violation of 



108 General Assembly, Official Records , 11th Session, 
666th plenary meeting (March 1, 1957), p. 1276. 



229 

an understanding with the Secretary-General. 10 9 (The Force 
turned control over to the Egyptians without question for 
the Secretary-General held that action by the Force on 
territory under Egypt's ownership or control required 
Egyptian consent.) However, Egyptians "brought no mili- 
tary men into the region initially and have kept the mili- 
tary force in the area limited in size. A restoration of 
Egyptian civil control has not meant a resumption of attacks 
on Israel. 

Phase II: the stabilization of the area . -In the eight 
years since the withdrawal of the Israeli Army from its last 
outposts on Egyptian territory, UNEE has preserved relative 
quiet on the Egyptian-Israeli borders. The responsibili- 
ties of the Eorce in this period were defined by resolution 



. ___ 

There is considerable confusion, surrounding any in- 
formal commitment the Egyptian President might have made 
with the Secretary-General concerning the Egyptian return to 
Gaza. The only formal commitment by the Egyptian Government 
was that the take-over from Israel would be exclusively. by 
UNEE in the first instance . Apparently there was a general 
expectation among the Secretary-General's field representa- 
tives that the United Nations occupation would be of longer 
duration. See "Burns, op. cit . , pp. 269-70 and Henry Mason, 
"The United Nations Emergency Eorce," in International Law 
and the Middle E ast Crisis: A Symposium , Tulane Studies in 
Political Science, Vol. IV (New Orleans: Tulane University, 
1957), p.. 43. 

110 

In early March Ralph Bunche was reported to have 

pointed out that the United Nations had never questioned 
Egypt's legal rights in Gaza and denied that the United 
Nations had undertaken to internationalize the Strip. The 
New York Times , March 12, 1957. 



230 

1125 (XI) providing for "the placing of the United Nations 
Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel armistice demarca- 
tion line and the implementation of other measures as 
proposed in the Secretary-General's report." In fact, the 
Force has done little with respect to the nebulous "other 
measures. " 

Interposed between the armed. forces of Egypt and 
Israel, UNEF has concentrated on maintaining quiet through 
deployment and patrolling. The major deployment of the 
United Nations troops has been along the Egypt-Israel 
armistice demarcation line and along the international 

frontiers south of the Gaza Strip — a length of 273 km. in 

ill 
rugged terrain. In addition, the Force has a "watching 

interest" over the coastline of the Sinai Peninsula from 

the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba to the Straits of 

Tiran, a distance of 187 km. The deployment along the 

lines is by national units; there is no effort to create 

an international force with multi-national units and assign- 

4. 112 
ments. 



The perimeter of the Gaza Strip, from the Mediter- 
ranean Sea in the north to the international frontier in the 
south is 60 km. long, while the international frontier ex- 
tending from the sea southward to the Gulf of Aqaba is 213 

The deployment, to illustrate the pattern followed, 
was as follows in September, 1963: on the armistice demarca- 
tion line, which had been divided into four sectors, were a 
Danish-Norwegian battalion (sector 1); a Swedish battalion 
(sector 2); an Indian battalion (sector 3); and a Brazilian 
•battalion (sector 4); on the international frontier Canadian 






231 

In order to carry through its functions the Force 
has developed an extensive patrolling and observation system. 
At the same time emphasis has been placed on maintaining 
working arrangements with Egyptian authorities. Let us 
briefly consider how the Force operates. The methods of 
observation used vary with the sensitivity of the area. 
Along the armistice demarcation line coverage is by means of 
observation posts by day and patrols by night. There are 
over 70 observation posts on the line which are in all cases 
intervisible. Thus, movement at any point along the line 
can be detected. These posts are staffed during the day by 
two men each, while a mobile reserve is maintained at company 
or platoon headquarters to provide support for the observa- 
tion posts when needed. These reserves are organized so 
that they are able to reach any trouble spot within ten to 
fifteen minutes. At night the men in the observation posts 
are withdrawn and numerous patrols are sent out. Reserves 
at headquarters and a system of flare signals enable the 
observers to call help when necessary. 

Less extensive observation is required on the inter- 
national frontier. Here rough terrain limits the infiltra- 
tion in many sectors. The Force follows a policy of 
patrolling certain sensitive areas daily by vehicle; other 



and Yugoslav reconnaissance units held responsibility in 
sectors 1 and 2 respectively. It might be noted that this 
deployment was virtually the same over the years. U.N. Doc. 
A/5494, PP. 3-4. 






232 

less accessible areas are covered by air reconnaissance a 
few times a week. At especially sensitive points camps and 
observation posts are set up. Mobile reserves and a system 
of communications are maintained here, linking reconnais- 
sance units and aircraft. 

The Force's operations have been facilitated b.y the 
arrangements, worked out on an informal basis, for coopera- 
tion between United Nations and Egyptian authorities. A 
working paper prepared by the Commander of UHEP outlining 

the conditions deemed necessary for the successful function- 

113 
ing of UNEF served as a basis for these arrangements. 

One of the areas for which a joint plan of action was pre- 
pared was the halting of infiltration. The Egyptian 
authorities agreed to prevent infiltration across the 
armistice demarcation line by the inhabitants of the Gaza 
Strip or by others and to give this policy ample publicity 
among the local population. The penalties against infiltra- 
tion in force when Egypt had previously been in control of 
the Strip would be reinstated. UNEE was to have the right 
to assist in preventing infiltration, and the local populace 
was to be fully informed of this right. The Eorce was given 
authority to take infiltrators into custody in a zone ex- 
tending back 750 meters from the armistice demarcation line, 
although those taken were to be turned over to Egyptian 



115 Burns, 00. cit. , pp. 273-27^. 



233 

authorities „ Finally, a special unit of the Egyptian 
police, which was to cooperate daily with UNEF, was to he 
established to control infiltration. No such special unit 
was ever created, hut close relations have been developed 
between units of UNEF and police detachments in the four 
districts into which Gaza is divided. In fact, UNEF was 
regrouped so that its battalion boundaries would correspond 

to the administrative sub-districts in the Gaza Strip with 

114 
the express intention of facilitating sucn cooperatxon. 

There was also agreement on certain rights that would 
be accorded UNEF to enable it to operate effectively. Among 
the more important of these was the right to defend itself 
against hostile action and the right to freedom of movement. 
Defensive action by the Force in a couple of early incidents 
demonstrated to the populace that the Force did have some 
power behind its presence and helped to quiet the situation. 

Nonetheless, the Force has worked under serious 
limitations in carrying through its functions. So serious 
have been the restrictions on the Force's power of preven- 
tive action, in fact, that the Commander of the Force has 
commented that it is surprising that infiltration has been 
kept to such low figures. Most important, UNEF has no 
right to use force to back up its orders. It can fire only 



' 1_W UJ. Doc. A/39^3, p. 16. 









2J4 

in self-defense or, at the outside limits, to resist demands 
that it move from its positions. Early in the history of 
UKTEF the Commander in the field requested authority to use 
force to stop infiltration if necessary. Specifically, he 
asked that permission be granted to fire at persons in the 
prohibited zone who refused to halt in the hours of darkness, 
His request was based on the following reasoning: 

infiltration usually took place by night, and if one 
of our posts or patrols saw the infiltrators they 
could call upon them to halt; but it was unlikely 
that such a command would be obeyed, especially as it 
would not be given in Arabic (or Hebrew). In the 
past unauthorized persons moving about in this area 
in the dark had done so at their peril, and might be 
fired upon before being challenged. If UNEF could 
only challenge, and not fire, this would soon become 
known, and our presence would have little deterrent 
effect. 115 

The question was discussed with the Secretary-General and 
the Advisory Committee without results. They instructed 
that the Force should not fire on infiltrators or become 
embroiled in hostilities with either side. The representa- 
tives of the nations contributing troops were particularly 
opposed to the involvement of the Force in any serious 
military action. 

The second major limitation on the Force has been its 
failure to complete its deployment. The Israelis have 
steadily refused to allow the Force to be stationed on their 



115 

^Burns, op_. cit . , p. 272. 






235 

side of the demarcation line or to permit such obstacles 
as mines and "barbed wire to be set up. 

Despite these limitations there is little question 
that the Force has been effective in its primary function 
of maintaining quiet in the area. Each of the Secretary- 
General's yearly reports on IMEF has commented favorably 
on its actions. The cases of infiltration and incidents 
along the armistice demarcation line and the international 
frontier have been few in number and of minor nature. There 
has been little need in recent years for UNEF to employ its 
arms; the pattern of deployment and constant patrolling has 
proved sufficient to accomplish its task. The confidence 
of the local population in the prevailing peaceful condi- 
tions has been reflected in the increased agricultural 
development taking place and extending right up to the 
armistice demarcation line. 

The fact that the Force has brought quiet to the 
region has not meant that its withdrawal can be undertaken, 
in the words of the Secretary-General : 

it is the chief characteristic of UNEF, whose functions 
have become largely routine, that its presence is a 
major factor in the maintenance of peace and quiet in 
the area while its absence would in the judgment of all 



ir5 Ibid. , p. 276. 

117 U.N. Doc. A/5172, p. 2. 






236 

concerned with it, be likely to result in a recur- 
rence of dangerous border disturbances and violence. 
It also continues to be true that any substantial 
reduction in strength below its present level would 
make it impossible for the Force to carry out ade- 
quately its existing responsibilities, ^8 

The comment about the importance of maintaining the 
Force in the area suggests not only the Force's accomplish- 
ments, but also what it did not accomplish. The Force has 
been able to do no more than maintain quiet. It has not 
been able to bring a resolution of the basic issues tor- 
menting the Middle East; it has not brought the Egyptians 
and the Israelis any closer to a political solution of the 
outstanding issues dividing them. Some have criticized the 
united Nations role in the Suez crisis arguing that the 
political issues should not have been avoided. Their 
reasoning goes something as follows. The United Nations was 
in a position of some power in the Middle East in early 1957 
V i S _ a _ V is the belligerents. The leverage which the United 
Nations then had should have been used to force negotiations. 
Political neutrality in this case prevented the United 
Nations from playing as effective and vital role as it might 

have. 

The arguments that the Force should have taken a 
more positive role are good in theory, but they begin to 
break apart under practical considerations. It can be held 



118 u\N. Doc. A/4486, p. 13. 






237 

that one of the reasons UNSF has been so successful is that 
it has taken a limited role which has enabled it to maintain 
the cooperation of all parties. A more positive role could 
easily have lost it this cooperation. What would be the 
implications of a loss of cooperation? Could the Force have 
occupied Egyptian territory in opposition to the Egyptian 
will? Could they have controlled effectively in the midst 
of a hostile populace? Would the necessary support have 
been forthcoming from members of the United Nations if the 
Force were involved in fighting? It seems doubtful that 
these questions could be answered affirmatively in view of 
the size of the Force, the unwillingness of the states 
contributing men to have their forces involved in fighting, 
and the lack of consensus on a solution to the Middle East 
problems. 

The Force has served, and served well, as a preserver 
of the quiet which is indispensable to the removal of the 
major obstacles to peace in the Middle East. But the Force, 
by its very nature, is unable to remove those obstacles 
itself. 

Conclusions 

Having examined the character and functioning of the 
United Nations Emergency Force, an effort must now be made 
to evaluate our findings. What can be concluded about the 
' Force-about its nature and its effectiveness? 






238 

There can be little question but that the United 
Hations Emergency Force does represent a significant 
pioneering effort in the evolution of methods of peace- 
keeping, UHlP's pioneering character coupled with, its 
success have served to make it both the inspiration and the 
model for succeeding forces. The experience with U1\TEF 
seemed to quicken the use not only of forces but of observer 
groups as well. Failure by the Force might well have stop- 
ped this "noble experiment" before it had been given the 
opportunity of being fully tested. 

The description of UKEF as a pioneering effort should 
be qualified. The Emergency Force was built on the founda- 
tions of the truce organizations. Their personnel and 
principles, even their failures, had relevance for the first 
peace-keeping Force. The failures of the Truce Supervision 
Organization in Palestine had long suggested the need for a 
stronger peace-keeping organization in the Middle East. The 
experience of the same organization eased many of the 
administrative problems of establishing a force. It should 
be noted, however, that even though the establishment of 
UHEF was encouraged and eased by the precedents and practices 
of the preceding observer groups, these alone could not bring 
the Force into being, A crisis was needed to jolt the 
members of the United Nations into undertaking a signifi- 
cantly more ambitious and original endeavor. 






239 

The character of UF3F, as veil as of those succeed- 
ing peace-keeping groups modeled upon it, was shaped by the 
original conception of the Force as international and para- 
military. The Secretary-General laid down the basic 
principles of the Force's composition and operation at the 
outset. The principles of composition reflect UNFF's 
international and neutral status- The Force was to be 
politically and regionally balanced, with a cross-section 
of the states in the United Nations participating. To help 
guarantee neutrality the permanent members of the Security 
Council and states with, a special interest in the question 
were disbarred from participation. In its functioning the 
Force was to operate as a para-military force, using arms 
in self-defense only and relying on its presence and its 
prestige to stabilize the situation. A condition of its 
operation was the prior consent of all parties directly 
involved. These principles worked well in the Suez situa- 
tion,, were frequently cited as ideal for a non-fighting 
force, and were invoked when new forces were established. 

The principles and practices of peace-keeping laid 
down by TJNEP were, however, the principles of limited action 
and limited commitment. The Secretary-General and the 
majority of the members of the United Rations chose to give 
the narrowest of possible interpretations to the powers and 
functions of the Force. It was only to preserve quiet, not 



24-0 

to Impose solutions. Moreover, many of" the members of the 
world organization shunned acceptance of much responsibility 
for either the policy guidance or the material support of 
the Force, The Secretary-General was given very broad 
discretion in establishing and directing the Force. The 
Advisory Committee was set up to assist the Secretary-General 
in his responsibilities and, it may be assumed from its 
power to convene the General Assembly, to control him. In 
practice, it served primarily as a means of mobilizing 
support for policies determined 'oj the Secretary-General. 
The problem of adequate policy direction and control of the 
Force Oj the parent political organ was not resolved by the 
experience of the Advisory Committee. The hesitancy of 
member states to accept responsibility for the guidance of 
the Force was matched by an even greater reluctance by many 
to assume the financial burdens the Force entailed. The 
principle of the collective responsibility of the members 
for the support of the Force has been the dominant principle 
of financing. Although the principle was hailed as a great 
advance for peace-keeping endeavors, it has not been firmly 
established in fact. It has been challenged by competing 
principles — the special responsibility of the permanent 
members of the Security Council and of the aggressors; the 
need to take into account the ability to pay in computing 
assessments — as well as by the practices of those states 









241 

which have failed for economic or political reasons to pay 
their assessment. The Force has not been equally dependent 
on all; it has relied heavily on a few staunch supporters. 
The success of UNEF can be credited to a harmonious 
balance of the Force's powers and responsibilities. Al- 
though the Force's powers were restricted and the commit- 

t 

ments of the members of the United Rations to it limited, 
UEEF's responsibilities were also narrowly defined. In 
addition, the Force operated in a highly favorable political 
milieu. It had the consent and cooperation of the parties 
involved and considerable moral support at United Rations 
headquarters for its activities. 

r 

With the benefit of hindsight and of the experience 
of the recent peace-keeping forces, it can be concluded 
that the principles of UNEF—which are the principles of a 
limited force — are not equally applicable to all peace- 
keeping operations. Consent, cooperation, and limited 
responsibilities seem almost essential concomitants of a 
UNEF-type operation. Without the latter conditions, the 
likelihood is either a failure of mission or- a redefinition 
of the Force. 






CHAPTER V 

AN EXPANSION OP PEACE-KEEPING: THE UNITED 
NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO-ITS ORIGINS 



Introduction. 



The United Nations Force in the Congo provides a 
test of the non-fighting force technique. The United 
Nations Force was able to draw upon the experience of 
earlier missions for guidance in its establishment and 
operation. Yet, it went beyond the earlier uses of the 
force, being by far the most ambitious. It was the 
largest force in terms of both men and equipment, and the 
most expensive. It had a multi-lingual base and over 
twice as many nationalities serving in it as had served 
with the United Nations Emergency Force. And it had a far 
more difficult and complicated task. Thus, a comparison 
of the United Nations Force with earlier non-fighting units 
sheds light on the conditions which determine the effective- 
ness of a non-fighting force. An examination of the diffi- 
culties confronted by the Force and the controversy aroused 
~~oj it may help determine whether the United Nations operation 
In the Congo (ONUC) marks the outer limits — or beyond — of 



"The United Nations operation in the Congo is re- 
ferred to as ONUC from its French title, Operation des 
Nations Unies au Congo. 

242 






24-3 

a peace force or whether it merely provides the groundwork 
for more ambitious ventures. 

By I960 the United Nations had accumulated con- 
siderable experience in the use of the military man as an 
international presence. With a record of success in the 
use of this technique, a backlog of experience, and units 
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and 
the United Nations Emergency Force actually in the field 
at the time, it was not unnatural for the United Nations 
to turn to a non-fighting force to restore peace and calm 
to the newly independent Republic of the Congo. 

Although the Secretary-General admitted that prob- 
lems , difficulties, and even risks were involved in sending 

p 
a force to the Congo, he clearly felt that the problems 

were surmountable, the game worth the stakes. It is 

probable that no one, Secretary-General included, foresaw 

the extent of those problems, difficulties, and risks. It 

is unlikely that the United Nations Force for the Congo 

would have been in the field little more than forty-eight 

hours after the receipt of the request for aid if the 

members of the Security Council had known that the mission 

would raise bitter controversy both in and out of the 

United Nations, that it would bring the Organization to 



2 
Security Council, Official Records , 15th Year, 

873rd meeting (July 13/14-, i960), p. 5. 



244 

the brink of financial collapse, and that it would cost the 
life of one Secretary-General. 

following the format used in the examination of the 
other United Nations military groups, we will reviexv the 
origins, characteristics, and functioning of the United 
Nations Force in the Conge We shall be particularly con- 
cerned with the question of how the use of the non-fighting 
force in the Congo both differed from and resembled previ- 
ous uses of a military unit. 

Conditions for Creation of the United Nations Force 

The crisis area: internal conditions in the Congo 

The United Nations Force for the Congo came into 
being to deal with a crisis situation which had developed 
in the Republic of the Congo immediately following the 
proclamation of Congolese independence on June 30, I960, 
Superficially, the situation bore resemblance to both the 
Suez and Lebanon situations. There was intervention by an 
outside power and there were elements of civil war. In 
fact, the Congo' case was more notable for its differences 
from than for its similarities to the earlier crises. Far 
more complex, far more volatile, it posed problems of a 
different order from those connected with earlier uses of 
military men in a peace-keeping capacity. 






24-5 

The immediate cause of difficulty was the confused 
and violent conditions created by the riotous and disobedi- 
ent acts of the Congolese soldiers. The soldiers' mutiny 
began on July 5 with disobedience to white officers and 
demands for pay raises and promotions. It quickly took an 
uglier turn, involving widespread rebellion and uncon- 
trolled attacks on Belgians. Disorder in the country was 
intensified by the breakdown of services caused by the 
flight of white persons from the Congo. 

A second dimension was added to the situation with 
the intervention of Belgian troops to' restore order on 
July 10. The intervention by the Belgians was unilateral. 
The Congolese had not requested Belgian aid in bringing 
the situation under control and vociferously protested 
Belgian action charging that it was an act of aggression 
and a violation of the treaty of friendship betx^een Belgium 
and the Republic of the Congo. 



5 

"ror a description of the situation in the Congo 

preceding United Nations intervention see U.N. Doc. S/4531, 
pp. 176-204. 
4. 
A part of these troops were stationed in the Congo 

at the bases of Kamina and Kitona at the time of the dis- 
orders and a part (approximately 1,200 paracommandos) were 
flown in from Belgium on July 9. 
5 
The Belgians did not attempt to justify the inter- 
vention on the basis of treaty rights. Rather they argued 
later in the Security Council that intervention rested on a 
higher obligation than law — the obligation of a nation to 
protect its nationals. They also suggested that the inter- 
vention could not constitute aggression since it was limited 
•in scope and time, being conceived as a temporary measure 



246 

In addition to external intervention and internal 
turmoil there was a third major element in the Congolese 
situation — potential civil war or disintegration of the 
Congo. The threat was raised by the secession of the 
province of Katanga from the Republic of the Congo on July 
11 5 one day after Belgian intervention. Although the 
Belgian Government had blocked efforts of Katanga to gain 
an autonomous position in the Congo prior to independence, 
its position was less clear after the disorders in the 
Congo. The Belgian Government refused to grant formal 
recognition to Katanga as an independent state, nonethe- 
less, in succeeding months the Belgian Government gave at 
least passive support to Katanga's position, while Belgian 
business interests and residents in Katanga sympathized 
with and sometimes actively supported the pretensions of 
the province to independence. (It might be noted that the 
Belgians had a particular interest in Katanga because of 
the large number of Belgian residents and Belgian invest- 
ments concentrated in the province.) 

Rioting -troops , moves to secession, and foreign 
intervention pose a considerable challenge to a world 
organization. In fact, the challenge was more difficult 
than these elements suggest. In a sense, these were merely 



for the humanitarian purpose of protecting Belgians. Se- 
curity Council, O fficial Records , 15th Year, 877th meeting 
(July 20/21, I960;, p. 30. 






24-7 

the manifestations of the deeper troubles in the Congo — 
troubles which were to provide the context of United Nations 
action. 

Most basic of the difficulties within the Congo was 
a complete lack of preparedness for independence. The 
Congolese had virtually no elite trained to take over rule 
of the country. They had practically no experience in self- 
government. Experience at the national level in governing 
the country or at the higher levels of administration was 
nil. 6 

If the Congo was ill-prepared for self-government, 
it was little better prepared for nationhood. There was 
little feeling of unity, little sense of a Congolese 
nationality. Tribal rivalries divided the country, fre- 
quently erupting in violence. The political parties which 
had sprung up so quickly in the late 1950 's (estimates of 



It was not until 1957 that the Congolese had been 
allowed any participation in governing the country. At 
that time they were given a role in the governing of the 
cities of Leopoldville, Jadotville, and Elizabethville. 
Reforms providing for greater Congolese participation in 
governing were prepared, but before they could go into 
effect the wave of history had made them obsolete. In the 
late 1950's political parties began to spring up demanding 
full independence. In February, I960, at a Round Table 
conference of Belgian and Congolese leaders independence 
was suddenly granted. See Richard Miller, Dag Hammarskjold 
and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 
1961), pp. 266-267. See also Staff Memorandum on the Re- 
public of the Congo , Printed for the use of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, 86th Congress, 2nd Sess., August 24-, 
I960, pp. 2-5. 



248 

the number range from 40 to 200) were not well-equipped to 
mold the country into a nation. Most of the so-called 
parties were simply loose organizations based on the 
personal following of a particular leader or leaders or on 

tribal affinity. Only three of the parties had any sort 

7 

of national basis. Nor was there any strong, dynamic 

leader to tie the country together. Patrice Lumumba came 
closest to filling this role, and he may have actually 
divided more than he united. 

The leadership in the Congo lacked the ability to 
smooth the transition from dependence to independence. The 
two top government positions, those of President and Prime 
Minister, were held by political rivals Patrice Lumumba and 
Joseph Kasa-Yubu. 

Thus, the situation in the Congo into which the 
United Nations presence was injected was complex and diffi- 
cult in the extreme. The complexity, confusion, disunity, 
and violence were to have their effects on the United 
Nations operation. 



'The three parties closest to being national parties 
were the Mouv ement National Co ngplais led by Lumumba; the 
Mouvement Na tional Congo! ais led by Kalenji; and the Parti 
National du progres, a nation-wide coalition of parties in 
fact. Staff Memorandum on the Republic of the Congo , op . 
cit. , pp. 41-42. 






249 

ie United Nations involvement 



The immediate cause for the United Nations inter- 
vention was the request of the Congolese Government for 
military assistance from the United Nations in the face of 
the triple problems of internal disorder, Belgian inter- 
vention, and secession by the richest province in the state. 

Congolese authorities dispatched a series of notes 
to the Secretary-General on July 11 and July 12, I960, re- 
questing military aid. The Congolese had some difficulty 
deciding to what ends assistance should be given. In the 
first note they requested help in restoring the discipline 
of the Congolese army. In two succeeding notes, however, 
they asked military aid for the purpose of bringing with- 
drawal of Belgian solders from Congolese territory and 

specifically excluded questions of internal order from the 

a 
jurisdiction of the United Nations troops. The inconstancy 

reflected in the early requests might have served as a 

warning of what was to come* 

The initiative in turning to the United Nations for 

assistance may not have been entirely Congolese. The 



The Congolese also had some difficulty deciding who 
should assist them. A request was directed on July II to 
the United States by Vice-Premier Gizenga. The United 
States was asked to cooperate with the Belgians and loyal 
Congolese troops In restoring order. Ibid . , p. 7 and The 
New York Times , July 13, 1961. 

~^U.N. Boc. SA382, pp. 11-12 and The New York Times , 
July 12, 1961, and July 13, 1961. 









250 

request apparently stemmed at least in part from discussions 
held between Congolese leaders and Dr. Ralph Bunche, the 
Secretary-General's representative in the Congo at the time 
the crisis erupt ed/ 

The communications to the Secretary-General fell upon 
receptive ground. Secretary-General Hammarskjold was con- 
vinced that the United Nations had a responsibility to help 
African states assume their place in the world community. 
This concern for Africa was concretely expressed in the case 
of the Congo even before the crisis erupted by the presence 
in the area of Dr. Bunche. Bunche had represented the 
Secretary-General at the independence ceremonies and re- 
mained to discuss the kinds of assistance needed by the new 
nation* 

After the disorders the general concern for Congo- 
lese development was coupled with fear that the chaotic 
internal situation would create a political vacuum tempting 
great power intervention, posing dangers for the Congo and 
the world. Injection of a peace-keeping force into the 
area was one means of forestalling these dangers. Yet the 
peace— keeping mission in the Congo differed in an essential 
respect from its predecessors. It was designed to deal not 
with an external threat to the Congo, not with an inter- 
national crisis involving two or more states, but with an. 



Joseph Lash, Dag Hammarskriold; Custodian of the 
Brus hfire P eace (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 
1961), p. 226. 






251 

internal Congolese problem. Despite the Belgian inter- 
vention and the potential great power involvement, the 
essential mission of the United Nations in the Congo was to 
restore order between the Congolese. 

The Establishment of the United Nations Force 

The establishment 

As we examine the actual creation of the United 
Nations Force in the Congo, two things stand out: the speed 
with which the Force was brought into being and the impor- 
tance of the Secretary-General and of the Afro-Asian states 
in the establishment of the Force. 

She Secretary-General responded almost immediately 
to the Congolese requests for help,, Under his powers under 
Article 99 of the Charter Hammarskjold called a Security 
Council meeting for the evening of July 13 5 1960 o J " In the 
hours preceding the meeting, the way was prepared for posi- 
tive United Nations action* A resolution calling for the 
withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorizing military aid 
to the Congolese Government was prepared by Tunisian 
representative Mongi Slim. The resolution was a product of 
Slim's consultations with, the Secretary-General, key 
Secretariat aides, and Afro-Asian members of the United 



Article 99 states that the "Secretary-General may 
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of inter- 
national peace and security. " 






252 

Nations. At the same time intensive efforts were made by 
the Secretary-General and his aides to ensure that suffi- 
cient support to pass the resolution would be forthcoming 

12 
in the Security Council. 

The resolution itself was intentionally imprecise to 

avoid arguments which might delay action by the United 

13 

Nations. ' The imprecision had disadvantages. Debate in 

the Security Council revealed considerable difference in 
opinion as to precisely what was being authorized and fore- 
shadowed future difficulties over the role of the Force. 

The preparations for quick Security Council action 
were, however, imminently successful. The Security Council 
passed the resolution providing the base for establishment 
of a United Nations Force at the July 13 meeting (the first 
formal meeting on the Congo question). The vote was 8 in 

12 

During the day of the 13th the Secretary-General was 
the focal point of intensive consultations on the question 
of United Nations action in the Congo. On the morning of 
the 13th the Secretary-General consulted with Tunisian dele- 
gate Slim and with African leaders. At noon an informal 
luncheon was held by the Secretary-General for members of 
the Security Council. During the afternoon there were more 
consultations, including one with the Soviet representative 
to persuade him' to act favorably on the resolution. At the 
same time Slim consulted actively with delegations as well 
as with Secretariat members. The African and Asian blocs 
caucused to resolve their positions on the issue. Lash, op . 
cit. s pp. 226-228. See also Colin Legum, Congo Disaster 
(JTarmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, l^Bl), pp. 127-129 
and The New York Times , July 14, 1961 and July 16, 1961. 

13 
^Security Council, Official Records , 15th Year, 

873rd meeting (July 13/14, I960), p. 39. 






253 

favor, none against, and 3 abstentions , The United Kingdom, 
France, and China abstained because of reservations regard- 
ing the provision calling for Belgian withdrawal, There 
was apparently no opposition to the injection of a United 
Nations presence into the region,, 

The speed with which the Force was authorized was 
matched by a comparable speed in bringing the Force into 
existence. Thirty-six hours after passage of the July 14 

resolution the first United Nations troops from Ghana and 

14. 

Tunisia were disembarking at Leopoldville. 

The dispatch with which the mission was set up can 
be attributed at least in part to two things. First, the 
Secretary-General and Secretariat members were able to draw 
on the accumulated experience of past efforts. Although 
they might know little about the Congo, they did know what 
must be done to establish a force. They knew what needs 
had to be met and they had some idea as to how they could 
be met. Moreover, personnel were available both at Head- 
quarters and in the field who. were experienced in estab- 
lishing and operating a peace-keeping mission, 3unche, who 



'Perhaps symbolic of the variety of difficulties that 
would plague the Force was the rivalry between Tunisian and 
Ghanaian troops to arrive in the Congo first. Ghana wished 
to have its men arrive first and when informed that United 
States transport planes would pick up Tunisians and deposit 
them first, the Ghanaians asked for Russian transportation. 
Russian transport was given and Tunisian and Ghanaian troops 
arrived almost simultaneously. 






25^ 

had beer, actively involved with all previous major non- 
fighting military groups, was in the Congo and in a position 
to serve as director of the operation and temporary comman- 
der of the Force, The man appointed commander, General Carl 
von Horn, had been Chief of the United Nations Truce Super- 
vision Organization since 1958, Within the Secretariat 
Headquarters persons like David Vaughan and Andrew Cordier, 
who had taken a decisive part in setting up UNEF, could be 
tapped,, 

In the second place, the Secretary-General had 
expedited the establishment of ONUC by laying the founda- 
tions for it prior to its creation. On the day of July 13 
the Secretary-General not only prepared the way for Security 
Council action, but he also laid the groundwork for the 
operation itself . Plans were made for staging the operation, 
for setting up communications, and for transporting troops 
to the Congo, and obtaining food supplies. Patterns of 
troop recruitment were decided on and certain African states 
were contacted about supplying men to the United Nations 
Force. Before the resolution establishing the Force was 
even passed, the Secretary-General had troop commitments 
from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia* 

In the early morning hours of July 14, following 
passage of the resolution, the plans were put to good use. 
Action moved in a number of directions at once. Requests 



255 

for troops were made to the states of Liberia and Ethiopia 
and, to balance the Force, to Ireland and Sweden. The 
problem of transporting the troops was handled by wnat had 
become the usual expedient of requesting assistance from 
the United States Air Force. Arrangements were made with 
Britain to use Kano, Nigeria, as a staging area. Orders 
went out for the equipment the Force would need. 

There were, of course, problems. Many stemmed from 

the speed itself, the ambitious dimensions of the operation, 

15 
and the lack of basic information about the Congo. ' The 

Congo was more remote than other locales to which United 
Nations forces had been sent. The great dispatch with 
which the Force was organized made the shortage of informa- 
tion especially difficult to remedy. But, all- things 
considered, it was rather remarkable to have 4,000 troops 
in the Congo and beginning to function by July 18. 

The legal foundations of the United Nations Force 

The legal bases of the peace-keeping groups preceding 
the Force in the Congo were rather vague. Such vagueness 
undoubtedly had a purpose: it left room for flexibility in 
interpretation and avoided troublesome and delaying legal 
arguments at the . time the group was set up. The United 



15 ' ' 

Edward Bowman and James Fanning, "The Logistics 

Problems of a UN Military Force," International Organiza- 
tion , Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 1963), p." 561.' 



255 

Nations Force in the Congo fits the pattern of the earlier 
operations: the legal foundations of the Force were not 
specified when it was established, 'The general impression 
conveyed , however, was that UNSF and ONUC were to be basi- 
cally similar,, It seemed to matter little initially that 
OFJC was authorized by the Security Council rather than the 
General Assembly and that its mandate differed somewhat 
from that of UNEF. 

If the united Nations action in the Congo had gone 
smoothly. It is likely that the United Nations Force would 
have functioned much as UNEF had done and that few legal 
questions would have "oeen raised about the Force . As 
controversy swirled around OFJC, however, a great many 
questions were raised about its legal base, its authority 
and powers, The answers given to those questions , though 
themselves a bit vague , seem to place ONUC on a different 
legal plane from that of UNEF. 

The question of the precise articles of the Charter 

under which ONUC was set up came to be one of considerable 

significance. , having a bearing not only on the scope of 

authority of the Force within the Congo , but also on the 

relationship of the Force to the host country and to 

1 c 

participating states. Since the only articles of the 



' * The sources which we must rely upon in determining 
the legal basis for the Force are the Security Council and 
General Assembly resolutions, reports and statements by the 
Secretary-General,, and statements of members of the Security 

Council « 






257 

Charter mentioned in any of one resolutions relating to the 
Force were Articles 25 and 4-9, which, merely called on the 
member states to comply with Security Council decisions, 
there i»ias room for debate,, 

Three main positions were taken with respect to the 
legal authority for the Security Council action. Some 
viewed it as action under Chapter VI and entirely dependent 
on the consent of the parties involved. Others — particularly 
the Communist members — -saw it as enforcement action under 
Articles 4-2 and 4-3 of the Charter. A third group regarded 
it as action taken under Articles 59 and 4-0 of the Charter, 
thereby standing between peaceful settlement and enforcement 
action in terms of United Nations power. Some provisional 
measures might be invoked under the latter interpretation. 
This was the prevailing view — it was also the view put 
forth in modified form by the Secretary-General. Eammarskjold 
held that the United Nations action was based on two pegs: 
the request of the Congolese Government for military assist- 
ance and an Implicit finding of a threat to peace and se- 

17 
curity under Articles 39 and 4-0 of the Charter. ' 'The 

threat to peace and security apparently stemmed from the 

possibility that a vacuum in the Congo would lead to the 

intervention of outside powers. 






] 7 

""'Security Council,; Offic ial Records , l>th Tea 

873rd meeting (July 13/14, I960"), p. 4- and 920th meeting 

(December 13/14, I960) , p. 19. 






258 

As the Congolese Government became more difficult 
to deal with and the situation in the Congo more chaotic, 
the Secretary-General mentioned less and less the request 
of the Congolese and emphasized more and more the right of 
the United Nations to act under Articles 39 and 40 of the 
Charter,, The Secretary-General said in this respect: 

The resolutions of the Security Council of July 14 
(S/4-387) and July 22 (S/4405) were not explicitly 
adopted under Chapter VII, hut they were passed on 
the basis of an initiative under Article 99. For 
that reason I have felt entitled to quote these 
articles under Chapter Til. ..the problem facing the 
Congo is one of war or peace and not only in the 
Congo. *-° 

At a later Security Council meeting the Secretary-General 
indicated that in his view the resolution might be con- 
sidered as implicitly taken under Article 40 based on an 

19 
implicit finding under Article 39* 

What was the significance of concluding that ONUC 

was based on Articles 39 and 40 and not solely on Chapter 

VI of the Charter? On the one hand, this apparently made 

the i'orce less dependent on the consent of the host state 

and of the participating states than would have been the 

case if the action had been based solely on Chapter VI. The 



Security Council,; O fficial Records , 13th Year, 
884th meeting (August 8, 196<T) , p . $ . 

19 Security Council, Official Records , 15th Year, 
920th meeting (December 13/14, I960"), p. 19. 












259 

dependence of the Force on Congolese consent seemed related, 
however, not only to legal factors but also to the gravity 
of the situation. At the outset of the mission ranch 
emphasis was placed on ONUC-Congolese consultation and co- 
operation," Under the pressure of events in the Congo less 
and less stress was placed on the consensual elements . It 
became clear that the Force was not, in fact, going to be 
bound by the requirement of consent of the Congolese Govern- 
ment to its actions, A number of moves were made without 
the approval of that Government and sometimes in outright 
defiance of its wishes, 21 The obligation of the Congolese 
Government to carry out the decisions of the Force was 



20 The resolution authorizing the Force referred to 
assistance given in consultation with the Congolese Govern- 
ment. In the first Security Council meeting on the Congo 
several representatives indicated that the consent of the^ 
Congolese Government was necessary to the determination of 
the duration and assignment of the Force, in his first 
report on the implementation of the July 14 resolution the 
Secretary-General stated that the Force was oo oe regarded 
as a temporary security force in the Congo with Lhe consent, 
of the Government for the time and purpose indicated. U.N. 
Doc. S/4-389, PP. 17-18. 

21 For example, the Secretary-General ignored demands 
from the Congolese that the Ghana units of the Force with- 
draw HI so Ignored were demands that Dayal be replaced as 
the Secretary-General's Special Representative, This might 
be compared with the strict adherence to the requirement > oi 
consent in connection with UHEF which was held to be action 
entirely under Chapter VI- In this connection see, Thomas 
Franck and John Carey, The Legal Asp ects of bhe united _ _ 
Nations Ro le in tne Congo (Dobbs ii'erry, I7T7: Oceana Publi- 
cations, Inc., l9oT3T"pp« 62-65. 



260 

emphasized rather more than the United Nations obligation 

22 
to consult the Congolese. 

Not only was the united Nations Force less dependent 
on the host government than UNBF had been, but it also took 
a stronger position vis-a-vis the participating states. 
Decisions by the Security Council on the Congo were regarded 
as more than recommendations. Member states were considered 
to have an obligation under Articles 25 and 49 to execute 
them,, In fact, the Force seems to have been in practically 
the same position as UNEF with respect to contributing 
states: it was dependent on their voluntary cooperation, 

On the other hand, invocation of Articles 39 and 40 
of the Charter in support of ONUC action did not mean that 
the Force was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter in 
the sense of being empowered to take enforcement action, 

Although Articles 39 and 40 are in Chapter VII, they were 

23 

not considered as enforcement provisions, J The Secretary- 
General, arguing against the charge that he had interpreted 



The obligation of the Congolese was based or. its 
responsibilities under Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter 
to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, This 
obligation was bolstered by the specific commitment to oe 
guided by good faith with respect to the jj-orce made by the 
Congo in a July, I960, agreement between the United Nations 
and the Congolese Government. See U.N. Doc, S/4589/Add. 5. 

2 ^See„ for example, the comments of Thomas Franck 
and Ernest Gross on this point in Franck and Carey, op_. 

C 1 G , ',' p ® OD) 



261 

the mandate of the Force too narrowly, specifically sepa- , 
rated Article 4-0 from the enforcement side of Chapter VII, 
saying: 

Has the Council. . .ever given the Secretary-General or 
the Force the means — I mean now the legal means — by 
which we could carry out the wider mandate you believe 
has been given to the Force? And if so... could the 
Council have given such means to the Force, through 
the Secretary-General, without acting against the 
clear injunctions of the Charter? May I remind you 
that it is even doubtful if the Council has ever 
acted under chapter VII. The very most that can be 
said is that the Council's actions may have been taken 
under Article 4-0 of the Charter. 2 ^ 

In the Secretary-General's view the United Nations 
Force could not be deemed to be acting under the enforcement 
articles unless a specific finding to that effect was made. 
And he suggests in the above statement that such a finding 
might well be ultra vires of the Charter. A majority of the 
Security Council members, as well as of the International 
Court of Justice, upheld this interpretation. The Inter- 
national Court of Justice stated explicitly that "the 
' operations known as TJNEF and ONUC were not enforcement 
actions within the compass of Chapter VII of the Charter,...' 

^Security Council, Official Rec ords, 15th Year, 
915th meeting (December 8/9, I960;, p. ~* 

^International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses ' 
of the United Nations ( Article 17 , paragraph 2 of the 
Cha rter ), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports, 
1962, p. 166. 






262 

Before the Congo operation was over, some of ONUC's 
moves did, in fact, look like enforcement action. This was 
particularly true of the military campaigns of December, 
1961 5 and December, 1962. In addition, the February 21 and' 
ITovember 15, 1961, resolutions strengthening the Force's 
mandate ^oj allowing a limited use of force for specified 
purposes seemed to be moving close to, if not into, the 
enforcement area without admitting to a shift in the legal 
foundations of the Force. 

The initial legal foundations of the Force were 
difficult to reconcile , on occasion, with the mandate and 
actions of the Force in its later stages. The difficulty' 
stemmed from the very nature of the OITUC mission. The 
Force's primary purpose was to restore order within the 
Congo by pacifying elements within that state. To bring 
peace and stability to the Congo as instructed , the Force 
found it necessary to become involved in internal questions 
in the Congo and to take the initiative in the use of force. 
Theoretically , the primary justification for such actions 
would be in pursuance of Chapter VII. Yet the very nature 
of the Force's mission — -to restore peace within the Congo — 
made it difficult to invoke Charter provisions referring to 
international peace and security. Conceivably the Secretary - 
General's findings of an implicit threat to the peace, 
arising from potential outside intervention, might have been 



263 

extended to justify not only action under Articles 39 and 
40 of Chapter VII out also under the enforcement , articles, 
41, 42, and 43. The fact that this was never done may 
suggest the weakness of such a legal base. 

Whether for political or legal reasons Chapter VII 
was never invoked as a justification for the positive action 
by ONUC in the Congo. The Secretary-General clung to the 
view that the Force was acting only under Articles 39 and 
■ 40. He stressed the defensive nature of all United Nations 
military engagements. For example, in explaining the 
December, 1961, fighting in Katanga, Secretary-General U 
Thant said: 

This military action was undertaken with the great- 
est reluctance, and only when it became obvious that 
there was no use in continued negotiations, which were 
marked by repeated instances of bad faith and failure 
to implement agreed measures on the part of the politi- 
cal leaders of Katanga. . . . 

The purpose of the present military operations is 
to regain and assure our freedom of movement, to re- 
store law and order, and to ensure that for the future 
the United Nations forces and officials in Katanga are 
not subjected to such attacks; and meanwhile to react 
vigorously in self-defense to every assault on our 
present positions, by all means available to us. 26 

Thus, the Force placed in a position where practical 
necessities and legal niceties were in conflict reconciled 
them by the expedient of ignoring the conflict. The Force 
took the necessary military initiatives without admitting 



' Z5 

"The Congo. . .a. move toward reconciliation," United 

Nations Review , Vol. 9, No. 1 (January, 1962), P. 7. 









264- 

to enforcement action. The Ponce's actual powers were 
brought Into line with Its responsibilities . The cost was 
action on occasion of at least questionable legality and 
the establishment of a potentially dangerous precedent of 
military initiatives and Internal Involvement outside 
Chapter VII. 

The mandate of the United Nations Force 

The basic mandate of the United Nations Force was 
laid down in the July 14, I960, Security Council resolution 
authorising establishment of the Force* The principles 
under which the Force was to function in carrying through 
its mandate were enunciated In the opening statement of the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Congo 
question. The initial mandate and operative principles were 
clarified and widened in the Security Council resolutions 
of February 21, 1961, and November 24-, 1961, and by in- 
terpretation. 

The role which the Force was to play in the Congo 
situation at the outset of the mission was set ~bj the 
Secretary-General's interpretation of the July 14 resolu- 
tion. The terms of that resolution were broad. The para- 
graph relevant to the role of the Force authorized "the 
Secretary-General to take the necessary steps , in consulta- 
tion with the Government of the Republic of the Congo., to 









265 

provide the Government with such military assistance, as 
may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congo- 
lese Government with the technical assistance of the 
United Nations, the national security forces may be able, 
in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their 
tasks," The looseness of the mandate conferred in the 
resolution was initially a reflection and subsequently a 
source of conflicting interpretations as to the proper role 
of the Force in the Congo. 

The opening debate in the Security Council regarding 
the Force's role in the Congo centered on the goals the 
Force was to pursue in the Congo: was it to be primarily 
concerned with quelling the violence in the Congo or with 
the eviction of the Belgians and the restoration of the 
authority of the Central Government over the whole of the 
Congo, 

On the one hand, the Secretary-General, supported by 
the Western nations on the Security Council, conceived of a 
role for the United Nations Force patterned on that played 
by UNSF„ Hammarskjold held that the Force should assist 
the Congolese troops in maintaining order within the Congo, 
thereby creating the conditions that would make possible 
the withdrawal of Belgian troops. He did not foresee di- 
rect action by the United Nations Force to bring Belgian 



^U.N. Doc. S/4387, p. 16. 



266 






withdrawal. It was under this interpretation of the 



mandate that the Force functioned in the early months of 
the Congo operation. 

On the other hand, there was a dissenting position. 
The Congolese leaders, backed up by Poland and the Soviet 
Union, held that the principal concern of the Force should 
be the elimination of the Belgian aggressors from the 

Congo. The Force should serve as an arm of the Congolese 

29 

Government. ' The two Afro-Asian members of the Security 

Council, Tunisia and Ceylon, appeared to be closer to the 
Congolese position than to that of the Secretary-General. 
(They indicated that they had not called for outright con- 
demnation of Belgium as an aggressor only because they 
wanted to ensure passage of the resolution authorizing 
assistance to the Congo. Y The dissenting position gained 
strength as the Force, operating within a narrow mandate, 
proved less and less capable of coping with the situation 
in the Congo. 

The principles under which the Force was to operate 
in carrying through its mission were also laid down by the 
Secretary-General in the early stages of the Force's life. 
The initial ONUC operating principles were based on the 

" 5'fi 

Security Council Official Records , 15th Year, 
873rd meeting (July 13/14, I960;, p. 5. . 

29 Ibid., pp. 19-21 and 3.1. 

5 °Ibid. , pp. 12 and 39. 






• 



267 

rules set out In the Secretary-General's 1958 report to the 

51 

General Assembly on UNEF and on the conclusions drawn 

from previous experience in the field. In the course of 
the Congo operation these principles, cited as "basic to the 
operation of a non-fighting force, became stretched and 
tarnished, as did the original mandate itself. 

The first of the central principles of the Force's 
operation was that it should act only in self-defense. To 
act only in self-defense meant that ONUC should not take 
the initiative in the use of armed force. It could, how- 
ever, respond with force to an armed attack, including an 

32 

attempt to make it withdraw from its positions. OFJC 

adhered fairly strictly to this principle in the first 
months of the operation, but the principle proved ill- 
suited to the Congo situation. Acceptance of it placed 
the Force in dangerous and awkward positions and may have 
contributed to the limited effectiveness of the mission in 
its early months. Although never formally renunciated, 
this principle was departed from on at least three impor- 
tant occasions in the Congo. 



^TJ.N. Doc. A/394-3. 

52 U.N. Doc. 3/4-389, PP. 19-20. 

"as critics pointed out, respect was not engendered 
for the Force by its standing idly by while measures of 
great violence occurred. See, for example, the statement 
of Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon, Security Council, Official 
Records, 15th Year, 917th meeting (December 10, 1^60), pp. 
6-7, 



268 
The second principle which the Secretary-General 
determined ONUC should follow was that of non-intervention 
in internal conflicts in the host country.^' This position 
was well-established in the Lebanon situation, in which the 
military observers maintained a neutral position between 
the government and opposition elements within the country. 
The United Nations Force was not to exercise authority in 
the Congo in cooperation or in competition with the host 
government or with the representatives of any other 
governments. Nor was the Force to be used to promote any 
specific political solution to pending problems. The 
Secretary-General suggested that deviation from this 
principle would tend to rip the operation itself apart, 
causing nations who disagreed to pull out their support. ^ 
The principle of non-intervention in internal questions is 
undoubtedly the safest and, in most cases, the wisest to 
pursue. If it could have been followed in the Congo, ONUC 
might have been spared some bitter attacks. But in the 
Congo the internal situation was so chaotic it became 
virtually impossible for the Force to remain aloof from 
domestic issues. Even with the best intentions and the 
most conscientious efforts to stand aloof, the Force in- 
fluenced the political balance within the Congo. 



5 \.N. Doc. SA389, P. 19. 

55 Ibid. s p. 19 and U.K. Doc. S/44-17, pp. 52-53. 






269 

A third principle of operation, which was embodied 
in the resolution itself, was that the Force should act in 
consultation with the Congolese Government. This too be- 
came the subject of controversy, with the Secretary-General 
and the Congolese leaders differing sharply on what was 
implied by the phrase "in consultation." Did "in consulta- 
tion" mean that ONUC was at the disposal of the Congolese 
Government to do with as it would, as the Congolese Govern- 
ment seemed to think? Did it mean that the consent of the 

Congolese Government was necessary to any important moves 

36 
by the Force?*^ Or did it merely mean that the Congolese 

Government should be informed before decisive moves were 
undertaken by the Force? 

The Secretary-General and the Congolese Government 
were at odds almost immediately over the proper use of the 
Force. In his first report on the implementation of the 
resolution the Secretary-General tried to clarify the re- 
lationship of the Force to the Congolese authorities by 
differentiating between consent and control. According to 
Hammarskjold OKTJC was in the Congo at the request of and 



^ This seemed to be the position taken by at least 
one delegation in the initial debate. The representative 
of Ecuador indicated that the Congolese Government should 
give their consent to the presence of United Nations forces, 
the length of time they would remain in the Congo, and other 
key questions. Security Council, Official Records, 15th 
Year, 873rd meeting (July 13/14, I960), pp. 32-33. 






270 

with the consent of the Congolese Government for the express 
purpose of assisting that Government in maintaining order 
and protecting life. Nonetheless, the Force was still 
under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested 
in the Secretary-General acting under the instructions of 
the Security Council. It was up to the Secretary-General 
to define the Force's mission. Moreover, despite the fact 
that the Force was theoretically an arm of the central 
government, it was still prohibited from being a party to 
any internal conflict.^ If the dilemmas posed by a force 
serving as an arm of government but enjoined from aiding 
that government in struggles against it were not immediately 
apparent, they soon became so. By the end of its tour of 
duty ONUC came very close to serving as an instrumentality 
of the central government. 

The principles of operation which had worked well 
in previous peace-keeping operations were less easily 
applied in the Congo. Before the mission could be success- 
fully completed, both mandate and principles had to be 
altered to fit the Congolese situation. 

The initial mandate of the Force along with the very 
restrictive conditions of its operation became more and 
more inappropriate to the situation. OFUC was unable to 
bring the withdrawal of all foreign troops (mercenary as 



"37 



U.N. Doc. S/4-389, P. 18. 






271 
well as official) or to quell all violence by the force of 
its presence alone. As the Congo crisis lengthened and 
deepened, the role of the Force in the Congo was steadily 
broadened, by both resolution and interpretation, until 
ONUC did have the authority and power to quell the violence 
and evict the foreign troops. 

The first serious efforts to strengthen the Force's 
position were made in December, I960, in the face of clear 
evidence of the inability of ONUC to cope with the violent 
situation in the Congo. The efforts ended in failure, re- 
vealing deep division within the United Nations over the 
Force. The only point upon which agreement could be reached 
in the Assembly was on reaffirmation of the previous resolu- 
tions on the question. And debate had revealed that there 
was little agreement as to the meaning of the prior 
resolutions. 

In early 1961 the first steps to breaking the stale- 
mate on the Congo were, taken with the passage of the Febru- 
ary 21 Security Council resolution. This resolution, which 
significantly strengthened the powers of the Force, marked 
a turning point in both the character and fortunes of the 
United Nations Force. It provided for the use of force by 
the United Nations troops to prevent civil war. In so do- 
ing the resolution initiated the transition of ONUC from a 
non-intervening, peaceful force to an intervening force, 

able and willing to take the initiative militarily when 
necessary. 






272 

A combination, of factors account for the positive 
action by the United Nations. First, the conditions in 
the Congo were growing steadily more chaotic, the Force 
weaker. Rumors of civil war were rife. Continued in- 
action seemed to spell ignominious failure for the mission. 
Second, the murder of Patrice Lumumba in early February 
sent a wave of shock over the United Nations and provided 
an immediate stimulus to moves already underway at the 

United Nations Headquarters to find a solution to the Congo 

39 

problem. ' Finally, under the impetus of these events the 

position of some of the delegations and of the Secretary- 
General apparently shifted to acceptance of a stronger 
mandate for the Force. 

Leadership in widening the Force's mandate was taken 
by Secretary-General Hammarskg'old and by the Afro-Asian 
members of the Security Council. On February 1, 1961, the 
Secretary-General requested a strengthening of the Force 
without indicating precisely how the strengthening should 
be accomplished. On February 15 Hammarskjold clarified the 



^ See The New York Times , January 1, 1961, January 17, 

1961, and January 23, 1961. 

39 

y ■'Lumumba had been captured by troops under President 

Kasa-Vubu and transf erred later to the control of President 
Tshombe of Katanga. It was generally assumed at United 
Nations headquarters that Lumumba had been murdered on the 
orders of his captor, President Tshombe. See in this con- 
nection the report of the Commission of Investigation, U.N. 
Doc. AA964. 

Of particular significance was the modification of 
United States policy with the change in government admini- 









273 

earlier request by suggesting several measures to this end 
for passage by the Council. In his view provisions should 
be made for a) an international investigation of the circum- 
stances around Lumumba's death; b) protection of the 
civilian population against attacks from armed units; c) 
reorganization and withdrawal from politics of the Congo- 
lese army; d) elimination of the Belgian element from the 
Congo; and e) use of all means short of force, including 

negotiating neutral zones and cease-fire arrangements, to 

41 
forestall clashes of armed units. In fact, the proposals 

involved little real departure from what the Force was al- 
ready authorized to do, yet their potential value as a 
reaffirmation of support for OKUC was substantial. 

The Afro-Asian members of the Security Council 
followed Hammarskjold' s lead. A resolution to strengthen 
the Force was drawn up by Liberia, the United Arab Republic, 
and Ceylon. Inspired by and modeled on the proposals made 
by the Secretary-General, the resolution went beyond the 
Secretary-General's suggestions in its most critical aspect. 
Provision was made for the use of force by OETUC for purposes 
other than self-defense! (The Secretary-General had 



strations. The Kennedy Administration moved toward a more 
activist policy on the Congo question. 

Security Council, Official Records , 16th Year, 
935th meeting (February 15, 1961), p. 9- 



274 
specifically excluded the use of force from his request 
for additional powers for omJC.) The heart of the resolu- 
tion was Part A, Section 1 which reads: 

Urges that the United Rations take immediately 
all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence 
fL°oIoL'T ln *£? G ° n ?°> incl ^ing arrangements 
f?Lc ^~ fireS? 3 e haltin S of all military opera- 
tions, the prevention of clashes and the use of 
lorce, if necessary, in the last resort. 4-2 

Support for the resolution seemed substantial. On 
February 21 it was passed by the Council by a vote of 9 to 
0, with two abstentions (France and the Soviet Union). 

Passage of the resolution had proved easy. There 
was, however, considerably less unanimity on the meaning and 
I implications of the resolution. While the resolution was 

widely interpreted as constituting a new mandate for ONUC, 
there was little agreement on the nature of the new man- 
date. Mbr was there any agreement or even real considera- 
tion as to whether the legal basis under which the Force 
was operating was thereby altered. 

In the statements made in the Security Council at 
the time the February 21 resolution was under consideration 
two main points of view with respect to' the use-of -force 
paragraph were apparent. 

One interpretation of the resolution viewed the new 
mandate as a very limited one, not too different from the 



t&z z : ■ 



-U.N. Doc. SA741, p. 147. 



275 
mandate of the Force already in effect. In general, the 
United States and the Western European states adhered to 
this line. 

The United States was apparently somewhat troubled 
by the implications of the resolution and strove to mini- 
mize their significance. The official attitude was that 
before force was resorted to, every effort should be made 
to accomplish the purposes of the paragraph by negotiation, 
conciliation, and other peaceful means. In addition, it 
was held that the "appropriate measures" to prevent civil 
war referred to were limited both by earlier Security 
Council resolutions (particularly those establishing the 
principle of consultation with the Government of the Congo 
and impartiality and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of the Congo) and by those provisions of the Charter 
restricting the use of force and prohibiting the Organization 
from intervening in the internal affairs of a state. J The 
United States position pointed up a potential conflict be- 
tween the non-interference provisions of the August, I960, 
resolution and "the use-of-force provision. 

The United States reservations with respect to the 
resolution were shared by the United Kingdom, among others. 
The British representative in the Security Council stressed 






ZP5 
^Security Council, Official Records , 16th Year, 

941st meeting (February 20, 1961), p. 17* 



276 

that force should he used only to prevent a clash "between 
hostile Congolese troops. There could he no question of 
empowering the United Nations to use force to impose a 

illL 

political settlement. 

In contrast to the Western uneasiness about the use- 
of -force provision, the Afro-Asian members seemed uncon- 
cerned about the hypothetical problems raised by the 
provision. They were less worried about the United Nations 
overstepping its mandate than about it getting the job done. 
This difference in attitude is important in view of the 
later shift in leadership of ONUC toward the Afro-Asians. 
The statement of Mr. Hasan of Pakistan illustrates this 
approach: 

The weakness of the current operation, as it has 
been conceived in this Council so far, is that it 
alternately faces and refuses to face, the fact 
that the United Nations, by the very instigation of 
this operation, has assumed a jurisdiction over the 
Congo which exceeds the provisions of the Charter 
if too legalistically interpreted. . .a consensus has 
already emerged that the situation in the Congo is 
incapable of correction through means which are con- 
ventionally within the Charter... we believed that the 
solution of the problem created by the present situa- 
tion can be, sought only in the administration of the 
country by United Nations assistance, to the end 
that, in the resulting conditions of peace and sta- 
bility, the Congolese people may be enabled to achieve 
their own political settlement, unhampered by outside 
interference, military or political—and both are 
important. 4-5 



44. 

Security Council, Official Records , 16th Year, 

9^2nd meeting (February 20, 1961), p. 6. 

Quoted in Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, 
Peace-Keeping by U.N. Forces; Prom Suez to the Congo (New 






277 

In summary, it can be observed that there was a dif- 
ference of opinion among Security Council members as to 
precisely what they were authorizing when they passed the 
February 21 resolution. While the Western powers held that 
the mandate was only slightly broadened, the Afro-Asians 
were convinced that a much clearer and stronger mandate 
had been set forth. 

The opinion of the Secretary-General, who had primary 
responsibility for implementing the resolution, was close 
to that of the Western delegates. On the question of the 
new powers of the Force the Secretary-General said that: 

I strongly welcome the first three-Power resolution 
adopted today by the Council as giving a stronger 
and more clear framework for United Nations action 
although, as so often before, it does not provide a 
wider legal basis or new means for implementation.^ 

The Force's mandate seemed to be further strengthened 
by a second February resolution, even though that resolution 
was defeated. The resolution, proposed by Ceylon, Liberia, 
and the United Arab Republic, noted and condemned the out- 
rages and atrocities in South Kasai, Leopoldville, and 
Katanga and authorized the United Nations to use force if 
necessary to prevent their recurrence. No objection was 



York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Center of International 

Studies, Princeton University, 1963), p. 75- The statement 

was made in the 94-1 st meeting of the Security Council, 

46 

Security Council, Official Records , 16th Year, 

942nd meeting (February 20, 1961 j), p. 40. 



278 

raised to the section. advocating the use of force to stop 
rioting and atrocities, but several Western states objected 
to singling out these three provinces for mention while 
omitting reference to Stanleyville. ' Consequently, they 
blocked passage of the resolution. Hammarskjold suggested 
that the reference to the use of force in this draft might 
be regarded as a new departure, giving new rights, pre- 
sumably with Article 42 of the Charter as a basis. 
Significantly, the Secretary-General indicated that since 
no difference of opinion had emerged over the operative 

paragraphs, he felt entitled to use them with full moral 

49 

value. Thus, the defeated resolution would seem to have 

opened the way to a potential broadening of the powers of 
. ONUC. 

The mandate of the Force was once more reaffirmed 
and strengthened in November, 1961. The November re- 
affirmation constituted, in effect, an acceptance by the 
Security Council of the broad interpretation of the powers 
granted to ONUC by the February 21 resolution. It marked 
a victory for the concept of a positive intervening force. 



The United States representative proposed amend- 
ments which would have substituted "in various parts of the 
Congo" for the reference to specific places. This amendment 
was defeated by the negative vote of the Soviet Union. 
Ibid . , p. 24. 

TO Ibid ., p. 43. 
^Ibid. , pp. 40-41. 









279 

From November 11 to November 2*4- the Security Council 
considered ONUC's role in the Congo. The consideration, in 
view of the Force's military ventures in September of that 
year and the subsequent confusion as to its direction, was 
over-due. Out of the consideration came support for a 
strong role for the Force. The resolution adopted at the 
November 24- Security Council meeting extended the power of 
the Force beyond that granted in the February 21 resolution. 

The most significant provisions of the November 
resolution are found in paragraphs 4, 5, 8, and 9. Para- 
graphs 4 and 5 recognize the problem of the mercenaries 
and strengthen the hand of ONUC in dealing with it. Para- 
graphs 8 and 9 confront the problem of secession itself, 
affirming United Nations support for the Central Government 
and a unified Congo. The relevant paragraphs follow: 

4. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take 
vigorous action, including the use of requisite 
measure of force, if necessary, for the immediate 
apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or 
deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary 
personnel and political advisers not under the 
United Nations Command, and mercenaries as laid down 
in paragraph A. 2 of the Security Council resolution 
of February 21st, 1961. 

5. Further requests the Secretary-General to take 
all necessary measures to prevent the entry or re- 
turn of such elements under whatever guise and also 
of arms, equipment or other material in support of 
such activities; 

8. Declares that all secessionist activities 
against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to 
the Loi fondamentale and Security Council decisions 
and specifically demands that such activities which 
are now taking place in Katanga shall cease forthwith; 









280 

9. Declares full and firm support for the Central 
Government of the Congo, and the determination to 
assist that Government in accordance with the de- 
cisions of the United Nations to maintain law and 
order and national integrity, to provide technical 
assistance and to implement those decisions ;... 50 

The resolution passed 9 to 0, with only the United 
Kingdom and France abstaining. Once again, however, the 
discussions preceding passage of the resolution revealed 
that the long-standing differences of opinion among Se- 
curity Council members on the role of the Force were still 
in existence. Now, however, the dominant approach was one 
which emphasized the importance of reaffirming and if neces- 
sary enlarging the powers of the Force to meet the problems 
confronting it. This approach was taken by most of the 

Afro-Asian states, the Communist bloc, the Congo itself, 

51 

and, with some reservations, the United States. The ideas 



5 °U.N. Doc. S/5002, p. 14-9. 

51 

' The United States representative supported the reso- 
lution and the need for forceful action to end secessionist 
activities in particular. This stand marked a change in 
United States policy from the preceding February when 
Ambassador Stevenson had stressed the limitations on the 
Force. The United States had shifted away from the position 
of its NATO allies toward that of the Afro-Asian bloc. How- 
ever, the United States stressed the importance of applying 
the terms of the resolution to all areas where secessionist 
activities were taking place. (Behind the United States 
stand was a concern that Orientale province might become a 
headquarters for communist activities in the Congo.) To 
cope with these grave situations the United States went be- 
yond support of forceful action to end the problem of 
mercenaries and proposed an amendment to the draft resolu- 
tion which would have authorized the Secretary-General to 
remove or prevent the use for military purposes of aircraft 






of the Afro-Asians, which had "been in the minority in 
December , i960, had become majority opinion by November, 
1961. 

The consensus of opinion seemed to be that the United 
Nations should aid in unifying the Congo and bringing an end 
to the secessionist activities. It was reasoned that such 
assistance would not constitute intervention in the internal 
affairs of the Congo since the secession was foreign- 
inspired and supported. The form which it was assumed that 
United Nations assistance might take was the eviction of 
mercenaries and political advisers and the stoppage of goods 
and equipment sent to the secessionist state. If the 

United Nations had to use force to achieve these ends, then 

52 
it would have to use force. 



and other weapons of war which have entered any region of 
the Congo contrary to the laws of the Congo and United 
Nations resolutions. The amendment which had far-reaching 
implications did not receive the seven votes necessary for 
passage. Security Council, Official Records , 16th Year, 
978th meeting (November 21, 1961), p. W~ t 

52 

Although the November 24 resolution provided specifi- 
cally for the use of force only in the elimination of the 
mercenaries, some of the delegates seemed to feel that force 
might be used to end the secession of Katanga if necessary. 
For example, Mr. Malalasekeva of Ceylon said, "The draft 
resolution does not authorize the Secretary-General to go to 
war but it does give him authority and initiative to apply 
a requisite measure of force." The representative of 
Ceylon had confidence that the Secretary-General could de- 
cide what was a requisite measure of force. Security 
Council, Official Records , 16th Tear, 975th meeting 
(November 16, 1961) , "p. W. In the same vein the representa- 
tive of the United Arab Republic noted that the resolution 
deprecated the secessionist activities illegally carried 
■ out by the Katanga administration and authorized the 



282 

The Afro-Asian states did not view the November 24- 
resolution as a new departure but merely as a clarification 
and reaffirmation of powers vested in the Secretary-General 
by the February 21 resolution. 5 * Under this interpretation 
the new resolution lay within the framework of the Febru- 
ary 21 resolution and merely recommended methods of imple- 
mentation of that resolution. 

Opposition to the course being taken by the Security 
Council was again voiced by the representatives of the 
Western European nations. Supporters of their position had 
steadily dwindled over the months however. France and the 
United Kingdom, as members of the Council, and Sweden and 
Belgium, non-members but interested parties, all spoke out 
against the tenor of the new resolution. The French dele- 
gate pointed out that France had adhered to three principles 
throughout the Congo affair: the sovereignty of the Congo; 
the unity of the Congo; and non-interference in Congolese 



Secretary-General to take vigorous action to end the seces- 
sion. Security Council, Of ficial Records , 16th Year, 974th 
meeting (November 15, 1961), p. 12. The representative of 
India, Krishna Menon, argued that force should be used if 
necessary to terminate the war against the United Nations 
because the prestige and authority of the Organization was 
dependent on its success. Security Council, Official Records , 
16th Year, 976th meeting (November 17, 1961), p. 25. 

■ 53 
^For example, the representative of the United Arab 

Republic contended that if the February 21 resolution had 

been fully implemented, it would have been unnecessary to 

deal again with the Congolese question. Security Council, 

Official Records, 16th Year, 974th meeting (November 15, 

1961), P. 12. 






283 

internal affairs. His stress was placed on the latter 
principle and on the dangers of intervening in any internal 

conflicts or using force to reintegrate Katanga into the 

54 
Congo. ' The delegate of the United Kingdom joined his 

French colleague in deploring the use of force and con- 
tending that lasting unity would he brought only hy peace- 
ful , c oiis ti tut ional means. In his view the ways of force 
were not the ways of the United Nations and the consequences 
so incalculable and so dangerous that it would he irrespon- 
sible of the United Nations to adopt such policies „ One 
of the incalculable consequences the United Kingdom feared 
was the creation of a dangerous precedent for the future; 
there would be no end to the responsibility the United 
Nations would be undertaking. It would be at the beck and 
call of any state with a dissident minority on its hands. 

Thus, the United Nations Force had commenced its 
mission under a mandate which, although vague, was inter- 
preted as confining Its responsibilities to creation of 
some sort of internal stability in the Congo through its 
presence so that the Belgians could withdraw. In achieving 
its ends ONUC was neither to use force (except in self- 
defense) nor to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
Congo. By November, 1951,. the Force's mandate, though still 



54 

iDxd. , pp. 15-16, 



5 C * 
976th meeting (November i77~T^6I), pp. 53P34. 



Security Council, Offici al Records , 16th Year, 






284 

vague, was interpreted in such a way as to permit it to 
take positive action for the removal of Belgian mercenaries 
and the reintegration of the Congo — and the positive action 
permissible included the use of force in something more 
than self-defense. OSUC had acquired the means to carry 
through a difficult mission, hut it had acquired them at ■ 
the cost of a strict interpretation of the Charter. The 
use of force in something other than self-defense without 

invocation of the enforcement provisions of the Charter 

56 
placed the action on questionable legal foundations. 

That this was, in fact, recognized by the United Nations is 

suggested by the failure of that body to cite the November 

resolution as justification for its military initiatives. 

The military actions continued instead to be labeled as 

defensive. 

Conclusions 

Let us step back a moment and evaluate what was done 
by the United Nations in the first days of the Congo crisis. 
A* turbulent situation, even one with international implica- 
tions s and a request for assistance do not automatically 
bring forth a positive response from the United Nations. 
What were the ingredients which brought such a response, and 
brought it rapidly, to the Congolese situation? 



■* See the comments in this connection by Burns and 
Heathcote, op. cit . , p. 127. 






285 

First, there were what might be termed the legal 
considerations. Legally, United Rations action seemed 
justified by the Congolese request coupled with the Belgian 
intervention and the potential great power intervention 
which gave an international dimension to the situation. 
Moreover, the United Nations mission appeared workable. 
Cooperation of the parties directly involved appeared to 
be guaranteed by the Congolese request and by the favorable 
reaction of Belgium to the possibility of United Nations 
action. 

Underlying these factors were more basic political 
considerations. The Secretary-General took a strong role 
of leadership in the situation, a leadership which would 
seem to be necessary to the establishment and guidance of 
such a Force. Too, the situation in the Security Council 
was favorable to action, largely perhaps because of the 
African and Asian support. The Afro-Asians, the middle- 
sized Western nations (sometimes termed the "fire brigade" 
states), and the United States seemed anxious to stabilize 
the situation in the Congo and to protect it from becoming 
a battlefield in the Cold War, If France, Britain, and 
the Soviet Union were less enthusiastic about United Nations 
intervention, none felt strongly enough to reject an action 
favored by the Afro-Asians in the face of the turbulence 
in the Congo. 






286 

Finally., practical factors contributed to the will- 
ingness and ability of the United Nations to bring a force 
for the Congo into being. The presence of Ralph Bunche in 
the Congo, able to serve as a link between headquarters 
and the Congolese Government and to get the operation under- 
way, was important. The willingness of the member states 
contacted to supply troops and transport immediately was 
important. The experience accumulated and the personnel 
trained in earlier ventures of this sort contributed to 
the ease of establishment and to the confidence with which 
the United Nations undertook the assignment. 

No one seems to have stopped to ask some serious 
questions about how similar the Congo situation was, in 
fact, to the earlier situations in which military men had 
been used or about the costs the mission might entail and 
the problems it might create for the world organization. 
Perhaps the very ease with which the Force was established 
blurred the difficulties which the situation in the Congo 
posed for a non-fighting force. 












CHAPTER VI 

THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO: THE OUTER 
LIMITS OF PEACE-KEEPING? 

Characteristics of the United Nations Force 

Leadership of O.NUC 

Strong leadership in bringing ONUC Into being and in 
directing it was exercised by Secretary-General Hammarskjold 
and, following his death in September, 1961, oj Secretary- 
General U Thant. These two men, more than any others, were 
responsible for the shape and role of the United Nations 
Force. It was they as well who bore the heavy burden of 
responsibility for the successes and failures of the 
operation. 

The leadership of Secretaries-General Hammarskjold 
and Thant differed in style and content. Hammarskjold was 
firmly committed to the principles of the non-fighting 
force which he had enunciated at the outset of the Congo 
mission. He never really departed from these principles. 
He was highly sensitive to the political and legal re- 
straints on the Force's action. He did not want ONUC in- 
volved in aggressive fighting or in the internal politics 
of the Congo. On the other hand, U Thant appeared less 

287 






288 

impressed with tiie need to adhere to the principles under 
which the Force commenced operations than with the impor- 
tance of bringing the mission to a successful termination. 
It was under U Thant' s leadership that the Force departed 
most drastically from the initial conception of the non- 
fighting force. Faced with a choice of indefinite stale- 
mate or some military initiative in the Congo by the Force, 
U Thant chose the latter alternative. He gave strong 
leadership to the Force in military initiatives taken in 
December, 1961, and December, 1962, which led to the 
eviction of the mercenaries and the re-establishment of 
control by the central government over the entire state. 

Both Hammarskjold and Thant shared the responsibili- 
ties of leadership of the Force with an informal group of 
close advisers from the Secretariat and with a Congo Ad- 
visory Committee. Both groups came into being at the 
initiative of Secretary-General Hammarskjold and seemed 
designed, first, to assist in decision-making and, second, 
to broaden the base of support for the decisions. 

The Secretariat advisers, known informally as the 
"Congo Club," served principally to aid the Secretary-General 
in decision-making. According to at least one observer, 
certain members of the group were considerably more 
important than others during Hammarskjold' s tenure of 






289 

office. 1 In the period between Hammarskjold' s death and U 
Thant's assumption of the reins of leadership, the "Congo 
Club" directed the Congo operation without apparent diffi- 
culty. 

Despite its name the Congo Advisory Committee appears 
to have "been designed less to provide guidance to the 
Secretary-General than to win support for the Force. The 
Committee, modeled after the UNEF Advisory Committee, was 
composed of representatives of states contributing troops 
to the Force. (Despite the fact that several of the states 
pulled their troops out of the Force in early 1961, tbey 
continued to bold membership on the Advisory Committee.) 
The Secretary-General announced creation of tbe Advisory 
Committee in late August, I960. At the time botb he and 
the Force were coming under increasingly heavy attack and 
pressure was mounting from the Congolese and Soviet repre- 
sentatives for an Afro-Asian Observer Group to oversee the 
Congo operation. The Advisory Committee served to widen 
the formal channels of communication and consultation 



1 Singled out for their influence were tbe American 
members of the group, Dr. Ralph Bunche, Dr. Heinz Vie sch- 
boff and Mr. Andrew Cordier. Otber members oi tne Oongo 
Club included 0..V. Narasimhan, Sir Alexander KacFarqubar, 
General Indarjit Rikhye , Frances Nwokedi, Robert Gardiner 
and Taieb Sahbani. Conor Cruise O'Brien, ToJShtan£a_and 
B ack; A UN Case History (London: Hutchinson, 1962), pp. 
50-51 . 



290 

between the Secretary-General and the members of the United 
Nations on the Congo question. Little evidence and few 
records are available as to the precise role and importance 
of the Advisory Committee. Nevertheless, in his reports 
in 1961 and 1962 to the Security Council, the Secretary- 
General stressed his consultations with the Advisory Com- 

2 

mittee prior to making an important decision. 

Secretary-General Eammarskjold attempted to secure 
additional assistance and support in his direction of the 
Congo mission,. As the criticism of the Congo operation 
mounted in late I960, the Secretary-General repeatedly re- 
quested the Security Council or the General Assembly to 
set up some sort of advisory group to help make, and take 
responsibility for, important decisions. (Apparently he 
felt a group created by the Assembly or the Council would 
have more power and prestige than an advisory committee 
designated by the Secretary-General. Neither body took 
action on the Secretary-General's requests. It must be con- 
cluded that the important decisions on ONUC were made by 



_ 

According. to Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Bowitz the 
Secretary-General chose to present all important decisions 
and questions of principle to the Committee and to keep it 
informed about current developments in the Congo. In 
Bowitz 's view the Committee grew to be a significant politi- 
cal body which played an important role in policy formulation. 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Bowitz, "The Central Political and 
Military Administration of the United Nations Forces, " Paper 
prepared for the Conference on the United Nations Security 
Forces, Oslo, Norway, February, 1964 (mimeographed), p. 8. 



. 291 

the administrators in the United Nations, with little day- 
to-day guidance or control from the political organs . The 
political organs were apparently chary of involvement be- 
cause of the controversial nature of the Force. 

Not ail important decisions were made at headquarters 
however. A number of highly significant moves had their 
origin in the field. An examination of the field leader- 
ship of the Force reveals that most of the hey figures in 
the initial phases of the operation had had experience with 
other peace-keeping missions. The United Nations was able 
to depend both in the field and at headquarters on personnel 
knowledgeable in the ways of peace-keeping. Of necessity 
this personnel was primarily Western or Indian in the begin- 
ning in contrast to the composition of the Force which was 
primarily African. African leaders experienced in this 
sort of endeavor simply were not available. 

Heading up the entire United Nations operation in 
the Congo in the early months was the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General. (After May 25, 1961, the top 
official in the' Congo was termed the Off icer-in-Charge. ) 
The first Special Representative was Dr. Ralph Bunche, who 
may have had more experience with peace-keeping operations 
than any other single individual in the United Nations. 
His efforts date back to the Palestine crisis in 1948. It 
is suggestive of the difficulties of the Congolese mission 






292 

that both Dr. Bun die and his experienced successor, Dr. 

z 

Rajeshwar Dayal, came under bitter attack by Congolese 

authorities and were ultimately forced to resign. 

The first military leaders were also experienced in 
peace-keeping operations. The Secretary-General selected 
Ma^or-General Carl von Horn as Supreme Commander of the 
Force. Von Horn had served since 1958 as the Chief of Staff 
of IMTSO. He was to be assisted by a small personal staff 
of officers drawn from under his command in Jerusalem. The 
Secretary-General selected as his military adviser on Congo 
problems General Indarjit Rikhye, who had formerly served 
as Chief of Staff of UNEF. 

The character of the Force's leadership began to 
shift in 1961 in such a way as to place more Africans and 
Asians in key positions. This shift was possible once the 
Force was well-established because experienced personnel 
were less necessary and because ONUG was developing its 
own cadre of trained leaders. It was desirable because of 
mounting attacks on the Force by Africans and Asians, some 
of whom charged' it with being Western-dominated. In the 
face of these charges it seemed expedient to bring more 
Africans into leadership positions. 

By 1962 not only had the leadership of the Force in 
the field shifted toward more Afro-Asian participation, but 



^Dayal served in 1958 as one of the three members of 
the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. 



293 

so also had leadership at United Nations Headquarters. 
U Thant of Burma was Secretary-General. Afro-Asians ap- 
parently played a more important role in the direction of 
the Congo operation. Their increased number and stature 
in the United Nations as a whole was reflected in miniature 
in the Congo. It is not without significance that the 
direction of the Force's role changed simultaneously toward 
greater activism — a shift long desired by a majority of 
Afro-Asian members. 

Support for QNUC 

Men for the United Nations Force . -The composition 
of the United Nations Force, like that of earlier peace- 
keeping missions, was largely determined by the Secretary- 
General. HammarskQ old followed the principles of regional 
solidarity, universality, and exclusion of permanent 
members of the Security Council in his selection of troops 
for the Force. 



'Two challenges to the Secretary-General's position 
on the composition of the Force were raised, unsuccessfully 
in the initial Security Council debate on the Force. Franc 
voiced the opinion that only troops from completely uncom- 
mitted states, states with no interest in the Congo should 
be used. This might be interpreted as a suggestion that 
African states should not supply troops for ONUC. However, 
France did not elaborate upon nor press this position to a 
vote. Security Council, Official Records , 16th Year, 
873rd meeting (July 13/14, 196Q), p. 2B. An almost dia- 
metrically opposed stand was taken by the Soviet Union. 
They brought to a vote a resolution which would have dis- 
carded the principle of universality by providing that only 






2°A 

The most notable difference between the composition 
of G1TUC and of earlier peace-keeping groups was tbe impor- 
tance given to tbe principle of regional solidarity. In 
tbe organization of TO7EF states from tbe Middle East bad 
been excluded from participation because of their special 
interest in tbe situation. However, in tbe formation of 
tbe Congo Force tbe earlier practice was not followed. 
Instead of exclusion of African states from participation, 
heavy reliance was placed on them for contributions to tbe 
Force. The importance of tbe principle of regional soli- 
darity was reflected in tbe initial composition of tbe 
Force. Approximately three-fourths of the troops during 
the first three months of the operation were African. 

The Secretary-General's reasoning in emphasizing 
the principle of regional solidarity was revealed in his 
first report to the Security Council on the implementation 
of tbe resolution. Hammarskjold contended that just as the 
ultimate solutions to the problems of the Congo must be 
found within tbe Congo itself, so also should international 
assistance be given to tbe Congo by its sister African 
states as an act of African solidarity. 5 The Secretary- 
General's use of Africans may have been a consequence both 



African states should give military assistance to one Congo. 
Defeated in the Security Council vote, the proposal won tbe 
support not only of the Soviet Union and Poland but also Oi 
Tunisia and Ceylon. Ibid . , p. 37. 
5 U.N. Doc. SA398, p. 20. 









295 

of his awareness of the sensitivity of these new nations 
and of his conviction that they could be helped best by 
helping themselves. 

Recruitment for OMJC was easy in the early stages of 
the operation. A number of African and Asian states res- 
ponded enthusiastically and promptly to the Secretary- 
General's request for troops. Contingents from such 
perennial supporters of peace-keeping as Canada, Norway, 
Sweden, and Ireland rounded out the representativeness of 
the Force and tempered the principle of regional solidarity 
and self-help with that of universality. 

The period of abundance of manpower soon ended, how- 
ever, and the maintenance of the Force at even minimal 
strength to accomplish its mission became a major problem. 
As the operation became more controversial and as its life 
extended over months, then years, enthusiasm waned. And 
so correspondingly did troop contributions to the Force. 

The plans of the Secretary-General to draw heavily 
on the African states for the Force were shattered early by 
the decision of 'a number of African states to withdraw theii 
troops from ONUC. All of the African states belonging to 
the Casablanca Group except Ghana withdrew their men in 
late I960 and early 1961 because of dissatisfaction with 
the policies the United Nations was pursuing in the Congo. 
(Ghana substantially reduced its contribution to the Force, 



& 



296 

but did not withdraw completely.) The Casablanca powers 
had constituted the backbone of the Force initially. 

The withdrawals altered the character of the Force. 
The moderate African states of Nigeria and Ethiopia re- 
placed Tunisia, Morocco, Ghana, and Guinea as the leading 
African contributors, while Asian troops, especially 
Indians, took up much of the slack left by the African 
withdrawals. The following table suggests the changes in 
the composition of the Force over the years. The Western 
states supplied about 15 per cent of the men for the Force 
throughout the mission. The African states, which had 
initially contributed almost 90 per cent of the manpower 
provided only a little over a third of the troops from the 
middle of 1961 forward. On the other hand, Asian states 
lifted their share from 15 to almost 50 per cent, helping 
to fill the void created by the African departures. 

The African withdrawals considerably weakened the 
Force until replacements could be found. This weakening 
occurred in the early months of 1961 at the very time the 
Force was given a somewhat broadened authority under the 
February 21, 1961, resolution. 



b 
The Casablanca powers included Algeria, Morocco, 

the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Mali, and Ghana. See 

Thomas Hovet, Jr., , "United Nations Diplomacy," Journal of 

International Affairs , Vol. 17, No. 1 (1962) for a table 

showing the membership of caucusing blocs and groups in 

the United Nations as of December, 1962, p." 56. 









O 
P 

h 

CO 

P, 
O 

o 
H 

Pm 

O 

W 

5 

o 

CO 



• 




<N 


m 


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; 




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■ 


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I 




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m 


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cu cu 






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CO H 50 " H 






fe rH 










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See Thoma 
963), 36. 
a, Brazil, 
frica: Con 
an, Tunisia 
k, Greece, 


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Cfl 

cfl 

XI 






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297 






298 

Not only political problems but the very length of 
the Force's life complicated the task of maintaining ONUC 
at strength. The states upon which the United Nations re- 
lied primarily for men had neither large armies nor great 
wealth. Financial or military circumstances at home made 
it necessary for several states to pull out their troops 
during the course of the operation. For example, Chinese 
attacks on Indian territory in 1962 and 1963. made India 
anxious to recall the hulk of its large contingent in the 
Force. Thus, the longer a mission exists, the more likely 
it is that difficulty will develop in keeping that mission 
at full strength. . 

Money: the financial basis of the Force . -One of the 
most perplexing and persistent problems connected with ONUC 
was that of adequate financing. The problem grew out of the 
high costs of the Force, the controversial nature of the • 
program, and the unwillingness of the member states, whether 
for monetary or political reasons, to contribute to the 
support of the operation. The Force was on shaky financial 
foundations from the outset. 

The costs were indeed high; they averaged $10 million 
a month for almost four years. Annual ONUC costs far ex- 
ceeded not only the costs of UNEF but also the regular 
expenses of the Organization itself. For example, in 1961 
the UNEF budget was $19 million; the regular budget of the 
United Nations $71,64-9,30.0; and the ONUC budget $120,000,000. 



299 

The unwillingness or inability of a large number of 
member states to contribute to the support of ONUC brought 
the operation and the United Nations itself close to 
financial disaster and threatened the viability of both. 
The same kind of financial problems had arisen with UNEF, 
but because total expenses were smaller and fewer nations 
in arrears, the problem did not assume such serious pro- 
portions. 

The o^estion of financing QUITO did not come before 
the General Assembly until the operation had been in ex- 
istence several months and had already incurred obligations 
in the range of $4-0 million as well as the wrath of a 
number of delegations. Perhaps the financial path of ONUC 
would have been easier if some of the key decisions on 
financing had been taken while the first blush of enthusi- 
asm for the operation was on. 

Expenditures for the first six months of the mission 
were made by the Secretary-General under the familiar 
authority of a resolution authorizing him to enter into 
commitments not. exceeding $2 million to meet unforeseen and 
extraordinary expenses for the maintenance of peace and 
security,^ (This resolution was almost identical to those 
under which the initial expenditures for the Palestine and 
Lebanon observation groups were made.) Since it was 



-7-. ■ 

General Assembly resolution 1W4 (XIV). 






300 

immediately obvious that $2 million would hardly suffice 
for the Congo operation, the Secretary-General requested 
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions to set an upper limit on expenditures of, first, 
$15 million and, later, $40 million. This was done. 

In a series of meetings in December, I960, the Fifth 
Committee of the General Assembly "began what was to be a 
long drawn-out struggle with the problems of financing OITUC. 
In the decisions taken by the Committee at this time, how- 
ever, the pattern for the financing of 01TOC was set. The 
methods used to finance OFUC paralleled the methods used 
for UNEF. Once more the special account was used for the 
Force. Again assessments were set on the basis of assess- 
ments for the regular budget with modifications for cause. 
The application of the UNEF precedents to OFUC is somewhat 
ironic in that the UNEF account was some $20 million in 
arrears at the time the Congo operation was established. 

Handling the OFUC expenses through a special account 
left doubt surrounding the same two issues that had plagued 
the achievement of a firm financial basis for UNEF: a) what 
was the nature of the expenses and consequently of the legal 
obligation of the members to contribute to the OFUC special 
■account, and b) on what basis should the expenses of the 
Force be apportioned among the member states. (It might be 
noted that the Secretary-General and a number of the 



301 

representatives of Western states recognized the deficiencies 
inherent in the special account and attempted, without suc- 
cess, to have 0HTJC finances handled as regular budget items.) 

The question of the nature of the expenses of the 
peace-keeping force centered on the issue of whether or not 
ONUC expenses should be considered as part of the expenses 
of the Organization under Article 1? of the Charter or as 
special expenses. The significance of this question was 
considerable. If the expenses of OMC were deemed to be 
expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 
17, all members of the Organization would appear to have a 
moral and a legal obligation to pay for ONUC. If they did 
not pay their assessments, it might be assumed that Article 
19 would come into play. (Article 19 provides that "a 
member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the 
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization 
shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of 
arrears equals or exceeds the amount of contributions due 
from it for the preceding two full years.") 

The importance of this question was reflected in its 
lengthy consideration: it was debated in the Fifth Committee 
in numerous meetings, studied by a Working Group of fifteen 
and an Expanded Group of twenty-one, voted on directly on 
several occasions, and, finally, presented to the Inter- 
national Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. 






302 

A review of the positions of the member states on 
the nature of the ONUC expenses reveals much about both the 
Force's financial support and its financial difficulties. 
The positions on this question taken by the delegations at 
the outset changed relatively little before the 1962 opinion 
of the International Court of Justice. (The opinion of the 
Court apparently influenced some member states to accept, 
at least in theory, the ONUC expenses as regular expenses 
of the Organization.) 

An analysis of the debate and votes reveals that the 
staunchest support for the view that OHTJC expenses were 
expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 
17 came from the Secretary-General, the United States, most 
of the Western European states (excepting France, Spain, 
Belgium, and Portugal), and such Commonwealth members as 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. On the other hand, the 
Communist states held unswervingly to the view that the 
expenses did not fall within the purview of Article 17. 
The Afro-Asian and Latin American nations were less steady 
in their course. There was division within the blocs and 
shifting of positions over time. 

Let us briefly examine the reasoning behind the 
major positions taken on the nature of the OFUC expenses. 
Those who contended that peace-keeping expenses were regu- 
lar expenses of the Organization marshalled both theoretical 



303 






and practical arguments in support of their position. The 
principle of collective responsibility to maintain inter- 
national peace and security was cited, and it was noted 
that the sovereign equality of members should extend to 
duties as well as to privileges. Middle-sized powers like 
Sweden and Canada seemed especially concerned that all 
nations accept their responsibilities in the Organization 
in order to prevent the United Nations being dominated by 
a few great powers. 

Practical considerations were also cited by this 
group* They sought a method of financing ONUC that would 
provide it with the funds needed. The delegate of Canada 
pointed out in this connection that in order to preserve 
the ONUC peace-keeping machinery, the mistakes made in 
financing UNEP had to be avoided at all costs. Noting that 
many states had not contributed to the UNEF special account 
because they did not feel obligated to contribute, he 

argued that to adopt a similar system for the Congo was to 

9 
court failure. 

The strongest opposition to acceptance of the costs 

of peace-keeping operations as regular expenses of the 



Organization came from the Communist states, supported by 



°U.N. Doc. A/4971, Annex II (November 15, 1961), pp. 
14 and 17. 

■^General Assembly, Official Records, 15th Session, 
Fifth Committee, 808th meeting (.December 5, I960), p. 270. 






304- 

France, Portugal, South Africa, and a few others. They 
held that the expenses of peace-keeping operations must be 
financed in accordance with special rules under Article 43, 
Chapter VII, of the Charter. The Soviet reasoning is sug- 
gested in an early statement prepared for the Working Group 
of fifteen. In the statement the Soviet Union cited 
Articles 11 and 24- to prove that all questions relating to 
the adoption of measures for the maintenance of inter- 
national peace and security fall exclusively within the 
competence of the Security Council. From this contention 
the Soviet Union reasoned as follows: 

The procedure for carrying out action for the 
maintenance of international peace and security and 
the material support of such action, including 
financing, are governed by Articles 4-3 and 4-8 of the 
United Nations Charter, from which it follows that 
the Security Council determines which of the Members 
of the United Nations is to take action to carry out 
its decisions and that the conditions for the pro- 
vision by a State of armed forces and other assistance 
are to be defined in appropriate agreements concluded 
between Members of the United Nations and the Security 
Council. Only the Security Council, through the con- 
clusion of the above-mentioned agreements with States 
Members of the United Nations, may decide the question 
of the payment of expenses involved in operations for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Consequently, the consideration of and the adoption 
of decisions on appropriations for such operations 
fall within the exclusive competence of the Security 
Council. The General Assembly may not take decisions 
regarding the procedure for payment of the afore- 
mentioned expenses. 

Expenses connected with operations for the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security, that is, in- 
curred under Article 4-3 of the United Nations Charter, 









305 

are not budgetary expenses of the United Nations and 
do not fail within the scope of Articles 17 and 19 
of the United Nations Charter. 10 

It might he noted that the Soviet reasoning was re- 
jected by the International Court of Justice in their 
opinion of July 20, 1962. 

Yet another position on the status of peace-keeping 
expenses was expounded by the representative of Mexico. 
The delegate of Mexico endeavored to prove through interpre- 
tation of the records of the San Francisco Conference and 
some involved reasoning that the expenses of ONUC could be 
considered neither as expenses of armed forces provided 
for under Article 4-3 nor as "expenses of the Organization" 
within the meaning of Article 17 (2) of the Charter. 
Consequently, a special procedure — fair, equitable, and 
with general approval — should be used for financing ONUC. 
The line of argument put forth in support of this position 
went as follows: 

First, at the San Francisco Conference, all "ex- 
penses of the Organization" within the meaning of 
Article 17 (2), without exception, were regarded as 
being subject to the penalty provided for in Article 

19. 

Secondly, expenses resulting from operations in- 
volving the use of armed forces. . .were deliberately 
and intentionally excluded by the San Francisco Con- 
ference from the application of the penalty provided 
for in Article 19. 

iS ___^ A ^ 971 ^ Armex -q (November 15, 1961) 
(mimeographed), pp. 2-3. 



306 

Thirdly, it follows that [such] expenses are not 
"expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of 
Article 17 (2). 11 

The Mexican representative supported his conclusion that the 
San Francisco Conference had intended to exclude expenses 
resulting from operations under Article 4-3 from the penalty 
provision by citing the official records of the Conference 
and by interpreting the terms of Articles 4-3 and 106. He 
then went on to argue that expenses of the Congo operation 
could not be classified as "expenses of the Organization," 
either, saying: 

...if the obligations — and these ., of course include, 
the expenses — connected with the use of armed forces 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 4-3 (the 
only Article of the Charter which lays down methods 
for the establishment and maintenance of such forces) 
were deliberately and intentionally excluded by the 
San Francisco Conference from the application of the 
penalty provided for in Article 19 and thus ipso 
facto from the "expenses of the Organization" within 
the meaning of Article 17 (2) of the Charter. . .then 
expenses arising out of military operations not 
explicitly provided for in the Charter, operations 
which can only be considered admissible by implica- 
tion, by analogy, and as a result of valid decisions 
by the competent body, must a fortiori be excluded 
from the application of that, penalty; it follows. that 
such expenses cannot be regarded as "expenses of the 
Organization" within the meaning of Article 17 (2).^2 

The reasoning of the Mexican representative seems 
fragile and tortured. Even assuming that expenses under 



-. 



1:L U.N. Doc. A/C. 5/868 (April 26, 1961) (mimeographed), 
p. 1. Statement made by the representative of Mexico at the 
84-5th meeting of the Fifth Committee on April 20, 1961. 

12 Ibid. , p. 4-, 



307 

Article 4$ are excluded from the penalty provision, there 
seems to be no inherent reason that peace-keeping expenses 
should be considered as subject to the same treatment as 
expenses under Article 4-3. (Nor does it seem to us that 
excluding expenses from the application of the penalty 
provision, automatically means that they are no longer 
"expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 

17.) 

The failure of either the Fifth Committee or of its 

Special Working Committee of fifteen set up to study the 
financing of peace-keeping operations, to reach any final 
agreement on the issues in question led the General Assembly 
to request the International Court of Justice for an advis- 
ory opinion on whether the expenses of UNEF and ONUC 
constituted expenses of the Organization within the meaning 
of Article 17 (2) of the Charter. On July 20, 1962, the 
Court issued its opinion. The Court concluded that the 
peace-keeping expenses were regular expenses of the Organi- 
zation. According to the Court: 

For the reasons stated, financial obligations 
which, in accordance with the clear and rexterated 
authority of both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, the Secretary-General incurred on 
behalf of the United Nations, constitute obligations 
of the Organization for which the General Assembly was 
entitled to make provision under the authority of 
Article 17. 15 



^International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses ox 

■ the United Nations ( Article 17 , parap;raph2 of the Qu arter; , 

Jdvisory Opinion of 20 July 1962:1. C.J. Reports, 1962, p. 
177. 



308 

Although the opinion of the Court was accepted by 
the Fifth Committee by a vote of 75 to 17, with 14 absten- 
tions, the decision of the Court did not resolve the 
financial crisis and immediately persuade those in arrears 
to contribute. As those who had objected to presenting 
the question to the International Court of Justice had con- 
tended, the question was not purely legal. 

Closely related to the issue of the nature of peace- 
keeping expenses was the second major issue of financing 
OiTUC — how the Force should be paid for. The methods pro- 
posed by member states for financing the operation can be 

classified into four main groups on the basis of where 

Ir- 
responsibility for support of the Force was to rest: 

(1) The expenses should be borne by all the member 
states and apportioned in accordance with the scale of 
assessments for the regular budget or by a special scale of 
assessment. In this group some held that the expenses 
should be included in the regular budget; others would 
enter them in a special account. Some would soften the 
impact of the assessments on those least able to pay by 
allowing voluntary contributions to be applied to the re- 
duction of the assessments. This position was held by 
those states which viewed* ONUC expenses as expenses of the 
Organization under Article 17. 



i4 U.N. Doc. A/4276, p. 3. 






309 

(2) The expenses should be met under special agree- 
ments concluded in accordance with Article 4-3 of the Charter 
between the Security Council and the countries providing 
troop.. 1 * 

(3) The expenses should be borne in larger part by 
those states with a special responsibility either for peace 
and security (i.e. the permanent members of the Security 
Council) or for the situation itself (i.e. the former 
Administering Power). The under-developed states favored 
shifting responsibility for OMJC to the permanent Security 
Council members and Belgium, while the Communist states 
argued that Belgium ought to bear the bulk of the costs. 

(4) The expenses should be financed entirely out of 
voluntary contributions. 

The resolutions passed by the General Assembly on 
the financing of OIUC reflect this variety of opinion on ., 
how the operation should be paid for. The basic pattern 
for financing was set in December, I960, when it was de- 
cided that assessments would be apportioned on the basis of 
the regular budget. 



15 
^The International Court of Justice rejected this 

position, reasoning that the Security Council had duly 
authorized the Secretary-General to implement the resolu- 
tions, that the Security Council can act through instruments 
of its own choice, and that there was no necessity for the 
Security Council itself to determine the arrangements to 
carry out its decision. International Court of Justice, 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations , pp. 176-77. 






310 

The provision for assessment was modified in two 
important ways. First, the original and all succeeding 
resolutions provided for the reduction of the assessments 
of those least able to pay. In the I960 budget it was 
provided that assessments should be reduced by up to 50 
per cent for states receiving assistance under the Expanded 
Programme of Technical Assistance, commencing with those 
assessed at the minimum percentage of .04-, Reduction was 

tied to receipt of voluntary contributions to cover the 

16 
amount of the reduction. In succeeding resolutions the 

reduction of the assessment of those least able to pay was 

larger (75 and then 80 per cent of the assessment), and it 

was not made dependent on being covered by voluntary 

contributions. 

Second, the theory of special responsibility for the 
costs of the Congo operation was at least recognized in the 
resolutions providing for the financing of the Force, All 
resolutions called on Belgium to make a substantial contri- 
bution to the support of the Force and all except the first 
resolution called on the permanent members of the Security 
Council for sizable additional contributions. 

The assessment method of financing was relied on 
until mid-1962. While theoretically adequate, the method 



16 U.N. Doc. A/4676, pp. 10-11. 



311 

did not work very well in practice "because of the failure 
of a large number of states to meet their assessments. 

A rather unique method, the United Nations bond 
program, was introduced to finance both UNEF and ONUC from 
mid-1962 to mid-1963. Under this approach the Secretary- 
General was authorized to sell $200 million in United 
Nations bonds to cover the costs of the peace-keeping 
missions. The bond program also ran into difficulties. 
The member states proved reluctant to purchase the full 
$200 million worth of bonds. More than a year after the 
program had been initiated less than three-fourths of the 
bond issue had been subscribed. 

In mid-1963 the United Nations turned to the assess- 
ment plus voluntary contributions method of financing. The 
life of the Force was extended from January to June, 1964, 

only after pledges of voluntary contributions had been re- 

17 
ceived to cover a portion of the costs of ONUC. 

where, in fact, did much of the burden for paying 

for ONUC rest during its lifetime? Certainly not with the 

former administering power Belgium nor with permanent 



— _ 

'The cost of maintaining a Force of 5,350 men in the 
Congo for six months was estimated at $18,200,000. The 
first $3 million was to be assessed on the base of the regu- 
lar assessments. For the remaining sum the 85 under- 
developed nations would be assessed at 55 per cent of the 
regular rate. The United States, Britain, Canada, and other 
Western powers agreed to make special donations of $1.3 
million. The Congo itself pledged to pay $3,200,000. The 
New York Times, October 1, 1963, and October 12, 1963. 



312 

Security Council members France, China, and the Soviet 
Union. None of these paid their regular assessments to 
ONUC, much less made voluntary contributions to it. On the 
basis of who paid, responsibility rested largely with the 
United States, whose contributions to ONUC averaged about 
48 per cent of the total costs, and with the middle-sized, 
"fire brigade", nations who paid their assessments for ONUC 

when due . 

The problem of financing ONUC was unresolved at the 
time of the mission's termination on June 30, 1964. The 
Congo operation had put the United Nations deeply in debt. 
Failure to find a way to cover the costs of the Force helped 
to bring the premature dismantlement of the mission. How 
premature the withdrawal was, was revealed in the violence 
that erupted following the departure of ONUC. 

Material: the logistic base of the Force. -The 
logistic challenge presented by ONUC was unparalleled in 
earlier operations. The size and duration of the mission 
and the nature and extent of the Congolese territory posed 
problems of organization and maintenance of the Force of 
far greater difficulty than any previously confronted. 



1Q \t the end of 1961, for example, only 19 nations had 
i*4-*w Sid their I960 and 1961 assessments. They were: 
t^&lllZ Snadaf Denmarh,^relLd, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, SwedeA, Ceylon, Burma Japan India, 
Thailand, Turkey, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Liberia, and the 
United States. 

19 General Rikhye pointed out that the geographical 



313 

Despite tills, supplying the Force proved less troublesome 
for those responsible than staffing and financing it. It 
may be suggested that in the area of logistics the politi- 
cal considerations loomed less large and the experience of 
earlier missions proved more directly relevant. 

The United Nations had precedents, experience, and 
some equipment to draw on in getting ONUC set up and in 
maintaining it. This is not to imply that there were no 
gaps in the United Nations peace-keeping preparedness. 
There were. .Both the intellectual and material bases 
could well have been strengthened. For example, a unit 
undertaking planning and intelligence activities on a con- 
tinuing basis would have been of great use. Substantially 
more operational equipment on hand would have been of help. 
Yet, there were at least the beginnings of logistic prepa- 
ration for peace-keeping. 

The logistic problems of 02TUC were many; the most 
serious can be divided into four broad groups. First, 
there were the problems connected with getting the Force 
into the field .quickly with adequate equipment to function. 
A second major concern was to provide a communications- 



problem was one of the greatest burdens to the Force. The 
area of the Congo was immense and the problem of distances 
was aggravated by the equatorial climate with its torrential 
rains and by the difficult terrain with impenetrable jungles 
and swamps and high mountains. General Assembly, Official 
Records , 16th Session, Fifth Committee, 825th meeting (March 
24, 1961), pp. 2-3. 



314 

transportation system within the Congo for ONUC. The third 
challenge related to the need to supply the Force with heavy 
combat equipment when it shifted to at least a semi-fighting 
role. Finally, there was the omnipresent problem of routine 
day -by-day support of the Force. 

The first assignment — that of transporting thousands 
of men and supporting equipment into the Congo — was sub- . 
stantial. The United Nations met the assignment with rela- 
tive effectiveness, calling on both experience and the 
assistance of member states in doing so. Speed was con- 
sidered to be of the essence. The United States, assisted 
by the United Kingdom and Ethiopia initially and Canada, 
Switzerland, and the Soviet Union later, provided air sup- 
port, flying the first troops into the Congo within forty- 
eight hours after passage of the authorizing resolution. 
The United States did not feel constrained in the Congo 
situation to limit its flights to staging areas outside 

the crisis area and so was more directly involved in the 

20 
Congo mission than it had been in the Suez operation. 

Moreover, the United States continued to provide essential 

transport services to OIHJO for the duration of the mission. 

In addition to providing air transport the United States 



See the comments of Brigadier General Tarleton H. 
Watkins, "Operation New Tape - The Congo Airlift," Air 
University Quarterly Review , Vol. 13, No. 1 (Summer, 1961), pp. 
18.-33, 



315 

placed one of its transport vessels at the service of the 
organization for nearly three years. 

More difficult than providing the means to get the 
troops on the spot quickly was that of ensuring that they 
were adequately equipped and supplied on arrival. And as 
in the case of TINEF, this simply was not done at the outset. 
Although troops were requested to bring supplies and equip- 
ment for use in the first stages of the mission, the amount 
and kind of equipment brought by the contingents varied 
widely. This variation as well as the lack of immediate 
preparedness was a source of weakness in the Force at the 
outset. Luckily, the weakness was not disastrous, as it 
could have been if the Force had met organized opposition 
on its arrival in the Congo. The initial improvisation 

with all its dangers could probably have been avoided only 

21 
with the sacrifice of speed in getting on the scene. 

If transport to the Congo was not a major problem, 

transport and communication within that state were. The 

sources of difficulty rested in the size of the Congo, 

equivalent to the eastern third of the United States; the 

meagerness of pre-existing transportation and communication 

facilities; and the shortage of proper communications 

equipment in the early stages of the operation. Although 

inadequate communications facilities hampered the functioning 



__. 

Bowitz, 03). cit . , p. 4. 



_J> 



316 

of the Force throughout its stay in the Congo, the situation 
was particularly difficult in the early days of the opera- 
tion. The following comments "by the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General are suggestive of the prohlems: 



Communications of all kinds have hitherto been at a 
minimum. When a brigade of three battalions is 
responsible for an area the size of France which is 
beset by problems ranging from famine to tribal war, 
the lack of communications aggravates the already ex- 
hausting task of the troops. At present radio com- 
munications have been established by the Force signals 
between ONUO headquarters and the majority of the 
territorial commands. There are, however, still some 
territorial commands which depend for their link with 
headquarters on borrowed or public facilities. The 
situation within the territorial commands is not 
completely satisfactory, many of the units being with- 
out radio units between their headquarters and sub- 
units. .. .With the voluntary departure of European 
personnel incident to independence there was virtually 
no trained staff to supervise the operation of tele- 
phone and radio transmission installations and these 
facilities are in operation today only because of the 
presence of a large U.N. -International Telecommunica- 
tion Union Team. 22 

The importance of adequate communications and trans- 
port to ONUC is suggested by the fact that over one-third 
of the annual operating budget of the Force (or around $36 
million in 1961) was devoted to this item. Most of the 
transport within the Congo had to be by air. Initially, the 
United Nations borrowed some planes from member states and 
chartered others for use. Later commercial transport flights 



^ 2 U.N. Doc. S/4-531, p.. 186. Quoted in- Edward Bowman 
and James Fanning, "The Logistics Problems of a UN Military 
Force," International Organization , Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring, 
1963), p7~36^. 






* 



517 

were used as well* Some serious weaknesses emerged in the 
intra-Congo transport system. On the one hand, OHUC had 
difficulty finding flight and technical ground crews able 
to run and maintain its planes properly. (The same comment 
could be made with respect to ground transport.) On the 
other hand, the costly commercial flights, over which the 
United Nations apparently exerted insufficient control, 
were considered neither safe nor reliable. J At critical 
periods in the Force's history the United Nations intra- 
Congo transport system was bolstered by United States trans- 
port flights. Although some question might be raised as to 
the propriety of this degree of participation by a permanent 
member of the Security Council, little question could be 
raised as to the value of the assistance. 

A third logistic problem of significance developed 
when the Force shifted from its non-fighting to its fighting 
role. In its first major encounter with Katanga forces in 
September, 1961," the Force suffered severely from a shortage, 
if not complete absence, of heavy weapons and military 
planes. The acquisition of such equipment could have posed 

^Ibid. , v. 363. See also Lincoln Bloomfield, "Head- 
quarters-Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and 
End of ONUC," International Organization , Vol. 17, No. 2 
(Spring, 1963), ?. 3B5» See also Major-General mdarjit 
Rikhye, "Preparation and Training of United Nations Peace- 
Keeping Forces," Paper prepared for Conference on the 
United Nations Security Forces, Oslo, Norway, February, 
1964, pp. 12-14. 



318 

great difficulty. The United Nations had neither the 
available funds nor the transport necessary to quickly 
introduce such equipment into the area. In fact, the 
dilemma was resolved, if not fully at least adequately, by 
the loan and contribution of equipment by those states most 
interested in seeing the mission succeed. Substantial 
quantities of military goods were put into the hands of 

United Nations troops before both the December, 1961, and 

24 / 

the December, 1962, engagements. (The United States, in 

particular, played a central role in supplying equipment to 
the Force.) This aid was probably a critical element in 
the successful (if temporary) pacification of the Congo. 
There were many problems connected with just the 
routine support of OFQC. Feeding, equipping, and housing 
the Force became less than routine in the face of the 
difficulties posed by the characteristics — physical and 
political — of the Congo and by the size and national di- 
versity of the Force itself. Providing the Force with 
accommodations was a challenge. In many cases suitable 
facilities were not available and extensive alterations or 
construction work were necessary. ^ Feeding the Force was 
complicated: food either had to be brought in from outside, 



Bowitz, op. cit . , p. 7. 

^General Assembly, Official Records , 15th Session 
Fifth Committee, 825th meeting (March 24, 1961), p. 4. 



519 

thereby entailing long supply lines, or purchased locally 
at high prices; there was heavy spoilage due to the absence 
of refrigeration and storage facilities; and, in addition, 
the different dietary requirements of over twenty national 
contingents had to be taken into account. Despite all this, 
the initial cost of rations per man at $1.60, though high, 
was substantially lower than UNEF's initial per man cost of 
$2. JO. 26 The United Nations Force faced logistics problems 
similar to those confronted by earlier peace-keeping groups, 
but it faced them on a bigger scale. That the United 
Nations met these problems as effectively as it did may 
well be attributed to the accumulated peace-keeping experi- 
ence behind it. 

The legal status of the United Nations Force 

To function effectively a peace-keeping force must 
enjoy certain basic rights and privileges within the host 
state. By i960 not only was there recognition of the 
importance of guaranteeing the legal status of a force, but 
there was also ,a guideline as to precisely what rights and 
privileges should be accorded a force. 

The legal status of the United Nations Force in the 
Congo was set forth in two documents: the Agreement of July 
29, I960, and the Agreement of November 27, 1961. The 



.__ — . 

ibid. , p. 4. 






320 

first of these, initialed shortly after the Force's arrival, 
defined in broad terms the relationship of OFUC and the 
Government of the Republic of the Congo. The document was 
brief. The Government of the Congo promised to ensure the 
freedom of movement of the Force and to accord the requisite 
privileges and immunities to personnel associated with the 
Force — these rights were similar to those granted both UNEF 
and UNOGIL by their respective host states. In addition, 
the Congolese Government stated that in exercising its 
sovereign rights with respect to the presence and function- 
ing of the Force, it would "be guided, in good faith, by 
the fact that it has requested military assistance from the 

United Nations and by its acceptance of the. resolutions of 

27 
the Security Council of 14- and 22 July I960." ' In its 

turn, the United Nations promised that the activities of 
the Force would be guided by the task assigned to the Force 
in the resolutions and indicated its willingness to maintain 
the Force in the Congo until its task was fully completed. 

It was intended that the July 29 Agreement should be 
almost immediately supplemented with an additional agree- 
ment, spelling out the status of the Force in detail. In 
fact, the collapse of the Central Government in September, 
I960, delayed the negotiations of that second agreement over 



27 U.N. Doc. SA389/Add. 5, pp. 27-28. 



321 

a year. Until November 27, 1961, the legal position of 
the Force rested on the simple terms of the July 29 Agree- 
ment. Once negotiated, however, the November 27 Agreement 
was retroactive to the date of arrival of the first ele- 
ments of the Force. 

The terms of the November 27 Agreement parallel 

29 
closely the terms of the UNSF status of force agreement. 

Virtually the same rights and privileges (in practically 
the same terminology) were guaranteed to members of the two 
Forces. Once again the Force was granted, among other 
things, freedom of movement within the Congo, exemption 
from local taxation, exemption from passport and visa regu- 
lations, immunity from every form of legal process, freedom 
of communications, and the right to display the United 
Nations flag and insignia. It might be noted that a po- 
tentially troublesome provision in the UNSF agreement giving 
the respective national governments exclusive jurisdiction 
over their nationals in criminal cases was repeated as well 
in the United Nations-Congo agreement. In the Congo situa- 
tion the defects of the provision became apparent with the 
failure of several governments to prosecute nationals 



__ 

During early September, I960, a draft agreement had 
been submitted on the status of the United Nations in the 
Congo. However, negotiations on the agreement were halted 
by the constitutional crisis. U.N. Doc. 5A531, p. 181. 

29 U.N. Doc. A/3526 and U.N. Doc. AA986. 



, 322 

accused of major crimes within the host state. ^ Thus, in 
this respect at least it would seem wise to alter the format 
of the agreement. Somewhat more authority over the actions 
of members of the Force might well he granted to the Force 
Command. 

The principal difference between the ONTJC and TJNEF 
status of force agreements rested not in the provisions 
respecting the rights of the Force directly, but in those 
sections relating to the status of the host government. 
The agreement between the United Nations and the Congo 
placed more emphasis on the rights of the host government 
than did the earlier agreement. For example, the agreement 
with the Congo specified that the Congolese Government 
should be kept informed as to the arrival and departure 
of all military units, that full responsibility for imple- 
menting domestic legislation should remain with the Congo- 
lese authorities, and that due attention should be paid 
pertinent information transmitted to the Secretary-General 
by the Congolese Government concerning the United Nations 
Force and officials. Although the rights accorded the 
Government of the Congo were not significantly greater than 
those exercised by the Government of Egypt, there was more 
emphasis on spelling out these rights in the later agreement. 
It can be assumed that this was a consequence of the months 



5 °Rikhye, op_. cit . , p. 10. 



323 

of chaos within the Congo and of the sensibility of the 
Congolese Government regarding its independence. In view 
of the turbulent Congolese situation, the OMJC mission 
would have probably been facilitated if the rights on both 
sides — Force and Government — had been spelled out in detail 
early in the operation instead of sixteen months after its 
initiation. 

ONUC in Action 

The measure of the United Nations Force lies in what 
it accomplished in the Congo. To determine the answer to 
this question, we must examine the Force in action. 

In our opinion the relationship of ONTJC's power, 
measured in both tangible and intangible terms, to the 
responsibilities confronting it, provides the key to under- 
standing and evaluating the Force's operations in the field. 
In analyzing the Force's operations over more than three 
years, five factors seem to be critical in the power- 
responsibility equation. They are: 

1) the mandate of the Force, as set forth in the 
relevant Security Council and General Assembly 
resolutions and interpretive statements; 

2) the interpretations of the mandate of the Force 
made by those in charge of the Force both in the 
field and at Headquarters; 



324 

3) the means of action available to the Force to 
carry through its mandate; 

4) the internal situation in the Congo; 

5) the situation at Headquarters in New York vis-a-vis 
the entire Congo operation, with particular rele- 
vance to the degree of support engendered for the 
operation. 

In terms of this relationship the history of the 
Force in the Congo falls more or less naturally into four 
phases. The first two periods, which comprise the time 
from the establishment of the Force to the passage of the 
February 21, 1961, resolution strengthening the mandate of 
the Force, are characterized by a great gap between power 
and responsibility. During what we term the third phase of 
the Force's operations, running from February 21, 1961, to 
August, 1961, the gap was closed slightly by a widened 
mandate given to the Force. In the last period, from 
September, 1961, forward, the gap between power and responsi- 
bility first widened and then, following the death of 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold, was closed or almost closed. 
It is the thesis of this section of the study of ONUC that 
power and responsibility were seriously out of balance for 
the United Nations Force in all except the last phase of 
its operations. The responsibilities, either assigned or 
assumed in the field out of the necessities of the situation, , 






325 

were too great for the power which the United Nations Force 
had at hand to meet those responsibilities. Figure 3 
suggests graphically the relationship of power and 
responsibility. 

The role of ONUC 

Before examining precisely what the Force did in 
the Congo, let us see why the gap between power and res- 
ponsibility existed in the early phases of the operation. 

In the first place responsibilities were very great 
and were not laid out in clear and precise terms. The 
responsibilities which the Force undertook when it went 
into the Congo were fourfold: to ensure the speedy evacu- 
ation of all Belgians; to assist in maintaining law and 
order by deployment of United Nations units in various parts 
of the country; to help maintain essential services and 

bring back normal activities; and to regroup the army in 

51 
camps to start its training and reorganization. 

These were broad goals which needed translation into 
specific programs and policies before constituting an ade- 
quate guide for action to men in the field. Yet, in the 
early months of the Congo operation such a translation was 



These objectives were enunciated in the first report 
of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
Hageshwar Dayal. U.N. Doc. SA531, p. 177. 



326 



Responsibility- 



Power 




UN Support 

weapons 

prestige 




"V 



_L 



July 
1960 



Sept. 
1960 



Feb. 
1961 



Sept. 
1961 



Dec. 
1961 



Dec. 
1962 






Figure 3 

The relationship of the Force's power to 
its responsibilities over time 









327 

apparently not forthcoming. The initial explanation of the 
role of the Force, which was handed to each soldier on his 
arrival in the Congo, was couched in general terms: protec- 
tion was to be given to all people, white and black; orders 
would come from the United Nations; the Force had a "great 
opportunity now to help the Congo and its people.""' Nor 
were more explicit orders issued in the early days to 
supplement the introductory memo. 

The responsibility for translating the terms of the 
resolution into instructions to the troops rested primarily 
with the unit commanders, not so much by design as by de- 
fault on the part of superior officials. As a consequence 
the operation was characterized by flexibility, diversity, 
and dissent. 

In the second place, the means which the Force had 
at its disposal in the first months to accomplish the 
United Nations objectives were limited by the principles 
under which the Force was operating. Most restrictive of 
these principles were the prescriptions against intervening 
in the internal, affairs of the Congo and against using arms 



jra 

y This initial message was signed by Dr. Ralph Bunche 

and Major-General von Horn. U.S. House of Representatives, 

"Staff Memorandum on the Republic of the Congo," 86th Cong., 

2nd Sess. , p. 15. 

-^See the statement of Major-General Henry T. Alex- 
ander, British Commander of the Ghana contingent. U.N. Doc. 
S/W5, p. 101. 



328 

except in self-defense*. These principles, which, the 
Secretary-General had set forth in his July 13, I960, 
statement to the Security Council and which had "been rein- 
forced in later statements and in the August 9» I960, 
resolution, were s"cressea m the direcuives oo tne rroops 
in the field. 

The main weapon which is available to a non-fighting, 
non-interventionist force to accomplish its ends is its 
prestige; its principal means, its presence on the scene* 
Since the observation groups and TINE]? had functioned suc- 
cessfully without the use of arms and with reliance on 
simply being in the crisis area, it -was assumed that the 
same means would prove effective in the Congo. 

There are certain conditions, however, that must be 
met if a force is to accomplish its objectives by means of 
its presence alone , First, some cooperation and mutual 
trust between the United Nations and the host state and the 
states directly involved in the situation is required. 
(This need was implicitly recognized in the July 1?, i960, 
Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of 
the Congo.) The Congolese Government was uncooperative 
and at times openly hostile to the United Nations Force, 
berating it, criticizing it, launching bitter attacks on 
its actions and its aims in the Congo. To make matters 



^ f U,U, Doc. SA389, Add. 5, pp. 27-28. 









329 

more difficult,, Belgian cooperation with, the United Nations 
force appears to have been more formal than real. 

Secondly, reliance by a military unit on its presence 
alone to accomplish its ends presupposes that the presence 
is embodied with, an aura of prestige and authority. The 
united Nations Force did not call forth the sort of respect 
in the Congo that UNEF had in the Middle East. 55 

Finally, if a force is to avoid internal inter- 
ference, a relatively stable internal situation would seem 
important. The United Nations Force was placed in an almost 
impossible situation with respect to intervention. Pro- 
hibited from intervening by the Charter generally and by 
the August 9, I960, resolution specifically, the Force found 
it difficult not to intervene. The mandate of ONUC, to 
help the national security forces restore order, juxtaposed 
domestic and foreign issues from the beginning. When the 
constitutional government disintegrated into competing 
factions in early September, I960, the actions undertaken 

by the United Nations became "a bone of contention with one 

56 

group or another. Even to do nothing was to affect the 

political balance and arouse the ire of some groups. 



-^Sounding a note of bitterness after several weeks 
experience as the head of the United Nations presence in the 
Congo, Dr. Ralph Bunche summarized the situation saying that 
the Force had been dropped in the midst of a country and of 
a people totally unprepared by experience and psychology to 
understand it and to appreciate its functions and its real 
worth. U.N. Doc. S/4-4-51, p. 113. 



36 



U.N. Doc. SA531, P. 180. 






330 

Thus 5 it must "be concluded that, on the one hand, the 
United Nations Force in the Congo had very broad responsi- 
bilities — broader than those assigned to any earlier peace 
troops or observation units. On the other hand, the 
prestige and good will on which the non-fighting force must 
depend were in short supply. The Force was not able to 
meet its responsibilities until the change in atmosphere 
and leadership at United Nations Headquarters added to the 
means available to it. The February 21, 1961, and November 
2<+, 1961, resolutions opened the way for the use of force 
by the United Nations troops when necessary to restore order. 
This authority had to be utilized before the United Nations 
could accomplish its mission. 

The organization of the Force 

The organization of the United Nations Force in the 
Congo was based on the principle of civilian supremacy and 
on clear lines of command from the top down. Figure 4- 
indicates the organizational arrangements. 

As is apparent from Figure 4, the first in command 
in the Congo was a civilian, the Secretary-General's 
Special Representative. The Commander of the Force had 
operational authority over the troops, but he did not hold 
the final power of decision as to the circumstances in 
which the troops might act and the nature of the action 
• that they might take. The troops were organized so that 



New York 



331 






Security Council 



.Secretary-General, 



Civilian Adviser for 
U. N. Operations in 
the Congo 



The Congo 



Military Adviser for 

U. N. Operations in the 

Congo 



The Secretary-General ' s 
Special Representative*. 



Chief of U. N. 
Civilian Opera- v 
tions . 

Consultative Group \ 

Civilian Affairs 
Officers 



\ 



\ 



\ 



\ 



\ 



N/ 



Supreme Commander of the 
/United Nations Force 



/ 



/ 



General Staff 



/ 



/ 



/ 



/ 



Commanders of Contingents 



Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) 



Supply 



Purchasing Finance 



Transport 



Personnel 



Security 



Billeting 



«Off icer-in-Charge since May 25, 1961. 
Source: U. N. Doc. S/4417, Table 1, p. 66. 



Figure 4 
Organization chart of United Nations operation in the Congo 









332 

national contingents remained relatively autonomous and 
served as a unit. In case of conflict between the goals of 
the United Nations and of an individual nation, the loyalty 
of the troops was committed, at least theoretically, to the 
United Nations. 

If a mission is of short duration, relatively non- 
controversial, and engaged only in observation, its pattern 
of organization will probably not be of primary significance 
As the Force became more and more active, moving beyond 
observation, and correspondingly more controversial, the 
organization of ONUC assumed considerable importance. 

The lines of control from Headquarters to the field 
and from the field headquarters to the individual contin- 
gents appear clear-cut in the organization chart. In fact, 
organizational arrangements proved wanting when tested 
under fire. Effective direction and control from the top 
broke down in the most critical phases of the operation. 
In three important military operations in which ONUC took 
some Initiative, communications with United Nations Head- 
quarters in New York broke down and fundamentally important 
political -military decisions were made In the field. The 
first break came in September, I960, when the Force took a 
part in the Easa-Vubu-Lumumba struggle for leadership by 
closing the airports and radio stations. The last break, 
coming in December, 1962, when contacts between field units 






333 

and headquarters in the Congo and Headquarters in New York 
were cut, illustrated that the problems of effective control 
had not been solved near the end of the mission. 

Problems of organizational arrangements and control 
were not confined to the relations between New York and 
Leopoldville. There were difficulties aplenty within the 
Congo. On the one hand, the division of top leadership in 
the Congo between a civilian representative of the Secretary- 
General and a military commander apparently caused some 
friction. The thinking of the top men and communication 
between them was not always in harmony. On the other hand, 
the relative autonomy of the national units coupled with 
the great distances in the Congo and the primitive communi- 
cations system made it difficult for those in control in 

the Congo to keep all the units under them moving in the 

37 
same direction at the same time. 

In short, the nature of a peace-keeping force, com- 
posed of national units giving up little of their national 
consciousness, coupled with the nature of the Force's 
assignment in the remote and primitive Congo made problems 
of direction and control particularly severe at every level 



^ 'There is some evidence that occasionally national 
units, differing from the U.N. Commander on the goals or 
means of the operation, either went beyond or did not ful- 
fill the orders issued. ]?or example, see Conor Cruise 
O'Brien's question about Swedish participation in the 
August, 1961, effort to end Katanga's secession. O'Brien, 
op . cit . , pp. 253-255- 



33^ 

of the operation, There Is little evidence that a solution 
to the dilemma had been found "by the time the mission 
terminated. In all likelihood a real solution, one that 
would hold up in emergency situations, would require sub- 
stantial movement to a more integrated force — a truly 
international rather than multi-national force. A clearer 
enunciation of the goals of the operation and of the methods 
to be used to achieve these aims could substantially con- 
tribute to the coordination and control of the mission by 
purpose. 

The functioning of the United Nations Force 

Let us now turn to the question of what the Force 
actually did in the Congo to achieve the objectives of the 
United Nations. 

Phase I . -The first stage of the Force's activities 
in the Congo ran from July, I960, to early September, I960. 
In this period the Force moved in very quickly to restore 
order and to enable the Belgians to withdraw. The ONUC 
mandate was narrow: it could not use force to accomplish 
Its ends. However, OMJC had substantial support at United 
Nations Headquarters behind it and a fair amount of co- 
operation from Congolese authorities. It seemed initially 
that responsibilities and powers might not be too far apart. 



335 

As in earlier peace-keeping missions the immediate 
aim was to make the presence of ONUC felt by getting it on 
the scene and seen, Almost immediately on arrival in 

Leopoldviile the various national contingents of the Force 

38 
were deployed to key locations within the Congo . 

The first moves of the Force beyond simply circula- 
ting in the countryside to make its presence felt were 
directed at establishing control of important installations 
within the Congo in order to guarantee the viability of the 
Force as an operating unit as well as to help restore 
essential services and normal activities in the country. 
It was particularly important that control of communications 
facilities be assured. Thus, United Nations units took 
over Ndjili and Ndolo airports and the port city of Matadi. 

They were also deployed to vital installations throughout 

39 
the country. 

Once established on the scene, the Force turned its 

attention to fulfilling the responsibilities laid out for 

it. First among these was encouraging the withdrawal of 

Belgian military units. Except in the province of Katanga 

_ 



* The Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
suggested in his first report that merely having the United 
Nations troops on the scene had a favorable influence on the 
situation. U.N. Doc. S/4-531, P* 194. 

^For example, United Nations troops were deployed to 
the oower station, the reactor, and the textile mill in 
Leopoldviile. U.N. Doc, S/4-389, Add. 4, pp. 26-27. 






336 

this was relatively easy for the firm establishment of a 
United Nations presence in an area brought the subsequent 
withdrawal of the Belgian units. 

Katanga created special problems for the Force. The 
difficulty in Katanga x^as that the Belgians would not with- 
draw until ONUC entered, and President Tshombe of Katanga 
refused the United Nations entry., In the face of Tshombe 's 
"determination to resist by every means" a United Nations 
presence, the Secretary-General postponed entry of the 
troops and requested further instructions from the Security 
Council., There was no effort on the Secretary-General's 
part to change the character of the Force to enable it to 
enter Katanga forcefully, a move he considered neither 
desirable nor feasible. Rather the aim was to win Tshombe 's 
consent to the United Nations presence by reassuring him 
that the Force would not be used to influence internal 
political settlements. The move was successful. On August 
12 the first United Nations troops entered Katanga without 
incident. Two Swedish companies, dramatically led by the 
Secretary-General, broke the path. 

By mid-September all official Belgian troops were 
out of the Congo. The withdrawal of Belgian troops did 
not end the problem of foreign intervention however, Re- 
placing the official troops were former Belgian officers, 
non-commissioned officers, and paid mercenaries. They 



■x 



37 



posed a far more difficult problem for the United Nations — 
a problem not to be solved until the beginning of 1963. 

As challenging as bringing Belgian withdrawal and 
considerably more difficult was the Force's responsibility 
to restore law and order to the chaotic Conge An obvious 
place to begin was with the disorderly and turbulent troops 
of the Congolese National Army (AIC), Since ONUC could not 
use force except in the direct emergencies in self-defense, 
the main hope of controlling the Congolese troops seemed to 
rest in disarming and retraining them. Yet, a limited 
program of disarmament undertaken at the outset of the 
mission was soon halted upon the complaint of Congolese 
authorities. United Nations officials rejected both the 
use of force and the disarmament of Congolese troops in the 
face of the disapproval of the Government as completely 
incompatible with the nature of the United Nations mission. 
The United Nations Force was a peace force, not a fighting 
force. Unanswered was the question of a peace force's 
ability to cope with the situation in the Congo. If the 
ONUC had been allowed to disarm and retrain the Congolese 
troops at the outset of the mission, the gap between the 
Force's responsibility to ensure order and its ability to 
accomplish this end might have been eased. 



. Although the ONUC had no warrant to disarm the 
Congolese troops forcibly, on a number of occasions the 
troops gave up their arms voluntarily on the arrival of 
United Nations contingents. 'Thus, in .buluabourg 3?000 






338 

Despite the difficulties under which the Force 
operated, there were some early signs of improvement in 
internal Congolese conditions, There was hope at the end 
of August, for example j that the United Nations Force might 
be withdrawn from the Congo in the near future. 

Ph ase II , -Qui eh resolution of the military problems 
of the Congo was not to be, however. From September, I960, 
through January, 1961, the situation in the Congo grew ever 
more chaotic and the position of OFtJC steadily deteriorated. 
All that the Force could do during this period was to try 
to maintain minimal conditions of order and help to pre- 
serve the fiction of a viable central government in the 

Congo, 

The Congo situation was turned topsy turvy and made 
doubly difficult in September by a power struggle for con- 
trol of the Congolese Government between President Kasa-Yubu 
and Prime Minister Lumumba, 



members of the ANC laid down their arms as the Tunisians 
took over. This limited program of disarmament came to an 
abrupt halt when the Congolese Government complained that 
the United Nations was disarming the Congolese so as to 
leave them defenseless before the Belgians, The decision 
to halt the disarmament program was severely criticized as 
damaging the ability of the Force to fulfill its mission. 
One of the military men in the Congo who spoke against the 
order was Major-General Alexander. Alexander felt the UN 
Force would be in a hopeless position unless the Congolese 
troops -were disarmed and the Force given some initiative 
in the use of arms. U.N, Doc. S/W*-5» PP. 101-02. 






339 

In a situation obviously containing explosive po- 
tential the United Nations moved in to try to safeguard its 
own position and to stabilize conditions., To do this the 
United Nations Force took two highly significant and contro- 
versial emergency measures. It closed the airport to all 
traffic except that of the United Nations and it shut down 
the radio station* These actions were taken on the basis 
of decisions made on the spot by Assistant Secretary- 
General Andrew Cordier rather than on the orders of Head- 
quarters in New York. While the United Nations disavowed 
all intentions of intervening in an internal political 
dispute , the effect of the United Nations action was to 
favor the Kasa-Vubu position, for it was Lumumba who might 
have benefited from use both of airfields and radio. 

The direct and indirect effects of the constitutional 
crisis had a very great impact on the power of the force to 
carry through its mission In succeeding months. Although 
neither the official mandate of the Force nor the powers 
granted it under the operative resolutions were changed, 
the actual power base of the Force shrunk considerably. 
The shrinkage was the consequence of two factors primarily. 

First, the internal situation of the Congo after 
the September government crisis was difficult in the extreme, 
The Force was to cooperate with the Government of the Congo 
in restoring order, but after September it was not entirely 






340 

clear where the constitutional authority in the Congo rested. 
It was clear that no authority in Leopoldville exercised 
either cle facto or de ,jure control over the country as a 
whole. Provinces were in secession, Congolese troops were 
out of control. The United Nations Force, directed to co- 
operate with the Government out not to affect the political 
situation, found that almost any action which it took or 
which it did not take had an impact on the internal situation. 

Secondly, not only did the situation within the Congo 
become much less favorable to the successful operation of 
the Force after September, but the support for ONUC at 
United Nations Headquarters also drained away with increasing 
rapidity. As early as August signs of disaffection with the 
Force had appeared among certain of the African and the 
Communist delegates. These signs of discontent became overt 
and noisy in September. The African states of the Casa- 
blanca Croup and the Communist states had been sympathetic 
to Prime Minister Lumumba. The actions of the United Nations 
which seemed to favor the Kasa-Vubu faction during the 
governmental crisis alienated much support at Headquarters 

for the Force. 

Faced with a lack of support at United Nations Head- 
quarters and an -unimaginably confused and complex internal 
situation, the Force was in a situation in which its 
responsibilities seemed far in excess of its powers. In 






3^-1 

these circumstances the Force followed a policy of limited 
action. It confined its role to one of trying to maintain 
as much order as possible in the Congo without resorting to 
forceful means to attain its object and to protecting those 

individuals and groups who might seek united Nations 

. , 41 

assistance. 

The Force tried to discourage aggressive acts by the 
Congolese troops by showing its colors. There was increased 
patrolling, marches to show the United Nations flag and 
emphasize the United Rations presence, and some, not very 
successful, joint patrols with the Congolese. Where civil 
war was occurring the United Nations troops attempted to 
stop it — without disarming the parties or using arms them- 
selves. Rather they acted as a liaison to try to reduce 
tensions between the disputing parties . 

Useful as these activities may have been, the efforts 
of the Force, with its limited means and restricted mandate, 
were pitifully small in the context of the violent, steadily 
worsening conditions in the Congo. 

Events at the United Nations Headquarters in New York 
and in the Congo seemed to be building to a climax at the 
end of i960. The low point in the life of the United 
Nations Force came in January, 1961, when the Force seemed 



~TTT 



"Perhaps as telling a comment as any on the whole 
confused Congo situation was that in October every govern- 
ment leader, actual and proclaimed, was under United Nations 
protection. This included the Chief of the Armed Forces. 






342 

closest to withdrawal and ignominious failure. The gap 
between the responsibilities of the United Nations opera- 
tion and its ability to meet those responsibilities had 
never loomed so large. 

'The mandate of the Force was inappropriate to the 
situation. The prestige of the Force was low and it was 

further depressed by the apparent inability of the Force to 

42 
cope with the situations confronting it. 

The position of OMC was growing weaker not only in 

terms of such intangibles as world support and prestige 

but also in terms of such tangible factors as numbers of 

men available to the Force. The bitter controversy over 

the Force and its role was reflected in the decision of 

four of the important Afro-Asian contributors to withdraw 

their troops from OUUC in protest against the policies being 

43 
pursued by it. 

™ 

The transfer of Lumumba by the Leopoldville Govern- 
ment from Thysville Prison to Katanga Province into the hands 
of his most bitter enemy, Moise Tshombe, illustrates the 
dilemma confronting the Force. The Force was bitterly criti- 
cized by supporters of Lumumba for failing to stop the trans- 
fer and for standing by and talcing no action when they ob- 
served Lumumba and his two companions being treated with 
considerable brutality at Elizabethville Airport. Yet under 
the Force's mandate, as the Secretary-General pointed out, 
it "had neither the power nor the right to liberate by force." 
The New York Times , February 16, 1961, p. 13. 

^During the month of January, 1961, the United Arab 
Republic, Mali, Morocco, and Indonesia announced that their 
troop contingents would be withdrawn by February 1, 1961. 
Approximately 2,500 men were involved. 






34-3 

To add further to the difficulties of 01UC the co- 
operation between the Central Congolese Government and the 
United Rations which 'would seem well-nigh essential to a 
force in OHUC's exposed position was very weak, A dearth 
of communication and cooperation could "be attributed in part 
to the personal hostility which developed between the 

Secretary-General's Special Representative in the Congo, 

44 
Rajeshwar Dayal, and the Central Government authorities . 

The time seemed to be approaching when a choice would 

have to be made between strengthening the. Force or letting 

it die. 

Phase 111 . -The choice was made in February, 1961, in 
favor of a stronger force. The passage of the February 21 
resolution by the Security Council inaugurated a new phase 
in the history of ONUC. The position of the Force improved 
markedly from February to August, 1961. The improvement can 



From January to March, 1961, when Dayal was recalled 
to United Nations Headquarters for "consultations" a series 
of notes were dispatched to the Secretary-General asking for 
Dayal' s recall and proclaiming the impossibility of any sort 
of cooperation between Dayal and Congolese Government offi- 
cials. The Secretary-General refused to accede to the 
requests for Dayal ' s recall, explaining that Dayal was nob 
a diplomatic representative but a. senior official of the 
Secretariat and therefore not subject to a declaration of 
persona non grata . The Secretary-General indicated that 
Dayal "s assignment was established under the special authority 
of the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 100 of 
the Charter and that he could not accept instructions with 
respect to that aopointment under Article 101. U.N. Doc. 
S/4629, P. 37. 






34-4- 

be attributed to several things: the strengthened mandate 
provided by the February 21 resolution; the increased sup- 
port given to the Force in its activities; the improved 
relationships between the Force and the Central Government 
of the Congo. All helped to close the gap between the power 
and responsibilities of the Force — the gap which had become 
so wide by the end of I960. 

The February 21 resolution clarified and strengthened 
the charge to the Force to prevent civil war, to bring about 
the withdrawal of Belgian and other foreign military and 
para-military personnel and political advisers, and to assis 

in the re-establishment of a constitutional government and 

4-5 
in the reorganization and control of Congolese army unxts. 

If the Force were to regard the February resolution as 
embodying instructions to it from the Security Council, it 
would have to conclude that there had been no drastic 
alteration in its objectives but that it had been given 
some discretion to use new means to achieve its ends. The 
use-of -force provision, that provision which empowered ONUC 
to use force to prevent civil war, seemed to widen to some 
indeterminate amount the power of the United Nations Force. 

The Secretary-General interpreted narrowly the so- 
called, new mandate. Thus, actual instances of OFCJC talcing 
the initiative in using force to halt civil strife were few 



-rc 



U.N. Doc. S/4-74-1, pp. 14-7-14-8. 



34-5 

in number. Yet, the power was potentially available and 
this alone strengthened the United Nations hand. The United 
Nations Command did make considerable verbal use of its 
power. Stern warnings that force could be used by GNUC to 

halt military operations were issued by the Special Repre- 

4-6 
sentative in an effort to end the civil war situation, 

Force actually was used \)j OWUG to block aggressive actions 
by Katangese troops in Northern Katanga in April. 

Not only was the mandate of the Force strengthened 
but the position of the Force itself was materially improved, 
In the middle of February ONUC was in the process of being 
dangerously reduced in size by troop withdrawals. This 
trend was reversed after the passage of the February 21 
resolution. India almost immediately offered troops, com- 
batant as well as non-combatant. The nearly 5 5 000 men 
India sent to the Congo took up much of the slack left by 
the troop withdrawals and improved the over-all calibre of 
the Force, 



7j r 

Thus 5 almost immediately after the resolution was 
passed the United Nations headquarters in Leopoldvilie 
threatened to use force to stop military moves by leaders 
in Katanga and Kasai provinces. The threat was effective 
enough to stop the advance of at least one column of troops. 
The New York Times , February 26, 1961, p. 1. 

^The New York Times, April 9, 1961, p. 8. 



V 



3^6 

Finally, the situation of the Force in the Congo was 
made more tenable by an improvement in relations between 
the United Nations and the Central Government. In January 
and February tension between United Rations Headquarters in 
Leopoldville and Congolese officials was high; relations 
were marked by personal antipathies and frictions. The 
United Nations Command apparently seldom consulted the 
Congolese Government on its moves, while the Congolese 
Government, in its turn, cooperated little with ONUC. By 
April there had been a significant change in United Nations- 
Congolese relations. Mr. Dayal, the controversial repre- 
sentative of the Secretary-General, had been replaced by a 
more amenable representative, Mr. Mekki Abbas. More 



It is true that before the position of the United 
Nations vis-a-vis the Congolese leaders grew better, it 
first grew worse. The Congolese officials of all factions 
met the announcement of the February 21 resolution with 
fear and bitterness at the outset. The United Nations 
officials had apparently done little to explain the reso- 
lution to the Congolese or to reassure them as to the 
safety and sanctity of their independence. The Congolese 
feared that the aim of the resolution was to disarm their 
soldiers and to convert the Congo into some sort of 
trusteeship. Thus, a series of incidents involving physi- 
cal and verbal attacks on the ONUC took place in the period 
Immediately following passage of the resolution. The mosi, 
serious of these — the Banana-Mat adi incident in which the 
Congolese troops forced the United Nations Ghanaian units 
to withdraw from the area — was a blessing in disguise. It 
led to the first serious consultation between the United 
Nations and the Congolese Government following passage of 
the February 21 resolution. These consultations were the 
opening wedge for the negotiation of a general agreement 
between the United Nations and the Government of the Congo. 






3^7 

important, the United Nations, under the impact of several 
serious incidents between the (MUG and the Congolese troops, 
had negotiated a general agreement with the Congolese 
Government which laid the basis for future cooperation as 
equals. In this general agreement the Government of the 
Congo accepted the February 21 resolution, while the United 
Nations reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty of the 
Republic of the Congo in the implementation of the resolution. 

The United Nations concentrated on accomplishing two 
objectives in the February to August, 1961, period: halting 
the fighting which threatened to plunge the Congo into civil 
war, and restoring constitutional government to the Congo. 

Civil war situations existed in a number of loca- 
tions in the Congo in early 1961. The United Nations 
engaged in patient and persistent activities to prevent the 
development of military operations and the outbreak of 
hostilities. Using a combination of threats, persuasion, 
and negotiation the Force moved quickly into situations of 
potential violence and acted to restore the situation to as 
much normalcy as possible. They encouraged meetings by 
opposing sides, the establishment of neutral zones, the 
withdraxtfai of invading forces, and disarmament. 

The one sector in the Congo where United Nations 
diplomacy had the least effect was Katanga. It might be 



13. 



"united Nations Review, Vol. 8, No. 6 (June, 1961), p. 



3^8 

noted that the Katanga gendarmerie was more effective, and 
better disciplined, equipped, and led than any other unit 
in the Congo. The authorities in Katanga were estimated to 

have at their disposal 5,000 Congolese soldiers and some 

. . . ... 50 

4-00 non-Congolese officers and non-commissioned oiiicers. 

in April this gendarmerie was embarked on an offensive 

military operation in North Katanga, Efforts by the United 

Nations to bring a halt to the fighting had little success. 

Officers in the field refused even to meet with United 

Nations officials while Tshombe's promises were broken as 

fast as they were made. With the failure of both persuasion 

and threats to bring a halt to the aggressive moves by 

Katanga 5 the use-of-force provision in the February 21 

resolution was applied for the first time, and applied with 

success,, 

By the end of April "a mixture of UNF presence, in- 
formal staffwork, and military diplomacy" and, on rare 
occasion, force had ended any immediate threat of civil war 

• t - „ 51 
xn -one Congo. 



5°u,N. Doc. S/4-691, P. 102. The New York Times points 
out that Tshombe's army differed from others in that it was 
the only oart of the ore -independence force which made the 
transition from pre-independence to independence in more^ or 
less orderly fashion. The difference is attributed to the 
fact that the Belgian officers gave the force continuity ~ 
elsewhere all foreign officers were lost and those men who 
had only been sergeants before had difficulty acting effec- 
tively as generals. The New York Times , April 3, 1961, p. o 

51 Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping 
by U.N, Forces: Fro m Suez to the Cong o (New Yorii: Frederics 
ilHPraeger for "the~Center of International Studies, Prince- 
ton University, 1963), P. 86. 



3^9 

Civil war might be quelled and temporary calm re- 
stored in the Congo by ONUC efforts, but to establish any 
sort of permanent order and terminate successfully the 
United Nations mission a government able to exercise de 
facto and de jur e control over all the Congo seemed essential. 
Thus, a second principal drive by the United Nations officials 
during the spring and summer of 1961 was directed at bringing 
about the restoration of constitutional government. 

The United Nations officials both prodded and assisted 
the Leopoldville authorities to convene a national parliament 

in which all factions in the Congo would be represented and 

52 
at which a legal government might be established. Repre- 
sentatives of the United Nations encouraged the various 
Congolese factions to meet and assisted in the planning and 
preparations for the legislative assembly. The ONUC assumed 

all responsibility for the elaborate security arrangements 

53 

for the parliamentary meeting. ' 



yt ~Two important conferences should be noted that stand 
out in "he movement to establish a national government in 
the Congo,, The Tannarive Conference in March was dominated 
by Tshombe and put forth plans for a confederal Congolese 
state. The Coquilhatville Conference prepared the way for 
the convocation of parliament. At this Conference a new 
constitution was drawn up under which the Congo was to be a 
federation with a strong central government. Neither Tshombe 
nor Gizenga participated in this conference. 

-^Security arrangements were extensive. Throughout 
early July the ONUC transported deputies from their home 
areas to Lovanium University, near Leopoldville, where the 
meeting was to be held. At the University itself a 1,600 
man combat, military police, and administrative group from 









350 

The United Nations efforts proved successful. The 
parliament met from July 22 to August 2. On August 1 they 
selected Cyrille Adoula to be Prime Minister by a vote of 
200 out of 221 possible" votes. Adoula was a moderate, 
connected with no particular tribal or political faction. 
His selection was viewed as a victory for the United Nations 
and a good omen for the Congo.. 

With the establishment of a legally recognized 
central government for the Congo, what should be the United 
Nations role? The position of ONUC seemed much strengthened 
and the situation- within the Congo much improved. The 
United Nations had an official Congolese government with 
which to deal; situations likely to lead to civil war had 
been stilled, at least for the moment; and the Force itself 
was both materially and morally stronger, having regained 
some of its lost numbers and lost prestige. There was talk 
in August, 1961, as there had been talk in August, I960, 
of ending the military phase of the Congo operation in the 
near future. 



ONUC sealed off the central section of the University from 
the outside. Members of the Parliament were to meet in the 
auditorium of the University and to sleep in dormitories on 
the campus. They were not to leave during the session of 
Parliament, while access to the area was granted only to 
accredited persons. Inside ^5 United Nations Security 
Guards had been detailed to help the secretariat of the 
Congolese Parliament. United Nations Review , Vol. 8, No. 
8 (August, 1961), p. 5. 






351 

The Congo problem could hardly be considered solved, 
however, until the issue of Katanga was resolved. And 
Katanga was to mean for the United Nations Force that it 
was not entering its last days but rather a new and decis- 
ive phase of its history — a phase in which its whole 
character was to be modified. 

Phase IV . -The fourth phase in the Force's history 
ran from late August, 1961, to June, 1964. During this 
period the character and role of the United Nations Force 
in the Congo was fundamentally altered. The United Nations 
recognized the gap in the power-responsibility equation 
and moved — spasmodically and with some hesitancy it is 
true — to close the gap. By the end of 1962 the United 
Nations had brought power and responsibility into relative 
balance by changing the principles under which the Force 
was functioning and altering the nature of the Force itself. 
The non-fighting force found it necessary to fight to carry 
its mission to a successful conclusion. 

The inauguration of the Adoula Government, hailed as 
a move toward stability for the Congo, raised the issue of 
the proper role for the United Nations Force. The Adoula 
Government took as one of its initial objectives the ending 
of the Katanga secession and the restoration of Congolese 
unity. In line with this objective Adoula asked United 
Nations assistance in putting an end to the aggressive 



352 

activities of the Katanga gendarmerie and in securing the 
evacuation of the foreign officers and mercenaries in the 
Katanga armed forces. This general request was strengthened 
by a plea for help in implementing Ordinance 70. Ordinance 
70, enacted by the President on August 24- , ordered the 
immediate expulsion from the territory of the Republic of 
the Congo of all non-Congolese officers and mercenaries 
serving in the Katanga forces who had not entered into a 
contractual agreement with the Central Government. 

To be consistent with the directives for ONUC laid 
down in the preceding year by Hammarskjold and reaffirmed 
by the August 9, I960, Security Council resolution, the 
United Nations should have rejected such requests as inter- 
ference in the internal disputes in the Congo. Yet, there 
seemed little hope of ending the Congo crisis and the United 
Nations involvement until the secession of Katanga was 
halted. Consistency and caution apparently gave way before 
the realities of internal strife and disorder in the Congo. 
The United Nations policy shifted in August away from 
neutrality in the Central Government -Katanga dispute toward 
support for the Central Government. ' This support received 

^The modification in United Nations policy is re- 
flected in a number of statements made in August by the 
Secretary-General and by his representatives in the Congo. 
On the day following Adoula's plea for the unity of the 
Congo, the Off icer-in-Charge, Sture Linner, suggested that 
the United Nations would not intervene to stop the Central 



355 

concrete and controversial expression in the August- 
September military encounters "between ONUC and the Katanga 
gendarmerie . The experience suggested the dangers of in- 
creasing involvement without increasing capabilities cor- 
respondingly. 

On August 28 in pursuance of the February 21 resolu- 

55 
tion and Ordinance 70, the United Nations Force in 

Katanga took positive steps to assist the Adoula Government 

in eliminating the foreign mercenaries. In the early 

morning hours ONUC began operation "Rumpunch," which was 

designed to apprehend all foreign officers. 

The United Nations moves, executed with swiftness 

and surprise, succeeded admirably. Key installations were 

occupied. Evacuation measures were undertaken. Virtually 

no opposition was met. 



Government if they used forceful means to achieve that unity. 
On August 26, Conor Cruise O'Brien, the United Nations 
Representative in Katanga indicated that the United Nations 
was ready to help Adoula end Katanga's independence by 
military force if necessary. (United Nations sources in New 
York disassociated themselves from O'Brien's statement, 
expressing some doubt that it had ever been made.) Burns 
and Heathcote, op_. cit . , pp. 96-99. 

-^United Nations officials considered that Ordinance 
70 calling for the expulsion of all non-Congolese officers 
and mercenaries along with the request to the United Nations 
for assistance in executing the Ordinance gave the United 
Nations legal rights within the Congo corresponding to the 
terms of the February 21, 1961, resolution. U.N. Doc. 
S/WO, pp. 99-100. 



• 



354 

Temporary precautionary measures (for example, the 
.house arrest of the Minister of Interior of Katanga and the 
occupation of the radio station) were lifted on the same 
day instituted, with Tshombe's promise to cooperate fully 
with the United Nations, to dismiss all foreign officers, 
and to announce on the radio his acquiescence to the United 
Nations action. The Belgian Consul volunteered to take 
responsibility for ensuring the surrender, repatriation, 
and travel . of all persons required to be evacuated. On the 
assumption that the troops would be evacuated, the United 
Nations halted its apprehension of foreign military person- 
nel. For a time there was great enthusiasm over the blood- 
less success of "Rumpunch. " It was considered by some to 
mark the end of Katanga's secession. 

The success of "Rumpunch" proved of short duration. 
Neither the immediate objective of eliminating the mercen- 
aries or the more basic aim of ending Katanga's secession 
was achieved.. 

In the days following the August 28 maneuver tensions 
rose in Katanga. Threatening acts by the political police, 



^ By September 9, the deadline set for the evacuation 
of foreign military personnel, only 273 foreign officers and 
mercenaries had been repatriated with an additional 65 await- 
ing repatriation. Perhaps more serious was evidence that a 
number of foreign of ficers .were returning and reinfiltrating 
the gendarmerie . Ibid . , p. 102. 









355 
inflammatory propaganda on Radio Katanga, and widespread 
rumors caused panic among the Baluba population. (Some 
55,000 refugees came to the ONUC for protection. )^ The 
ONUC itself was directly threatened both by demonstrations 
against it and by terroristic conspiracies and activities. ^ 8 
Negotiations between United Nations officials and Tshombe 
to bring a reduction of tensions and assurance of evacuation 
of foreign mercenaries were without success. 

On the morning of September 15 a small eight-day war 
between Katanga and the United Nations broke out — a skir- 
mish which culminated in virtual defeat for the United 
Nations and death for Secretary-General Hammarskjold. The 
September fighting is extremely important because the non- 
fighting force was at this point transformed into a fighting 
force seeking political objectives. 

Although the origins of the fighting were clouded in 
mystery, the outcome was clearly unfavorable to the United 
Nations. The United Nations Force in Katanga was ill- 
prepared for major military engagements, being limited in 
size and having, little heavy equipment and no air arm. 



57 Ibid. , p. 102. 

The United Nations Headquarters in Katanga had in- 
formation that terroristic groups planned to introduce 
plastic bombs into its headquarters, that guerrilla groups 
were being organized among the gendarmerie, presumably to 
attack the Force, and that plans had been made for an 
attack on the United Nations garage and vehicles. Ibid . , 
pp. 101-02. 






356 

Almost from the time that the fighting started, 
efforts were underway by the United Nations to obtain a 
cease-fire. It was on a journey to meet Tshombe to negoti- 
ate such an agreement that the Secretary-General met death 

in a plane crash. Despite Hammarskjold' s death negotiations 

50, 
continued and a cease-fire was agreed to on September 21. y 

The September military engagement — its origins and 
its failure — raised bitter questions as to the precise 
intentions of the United Nations in the fighting and the 
locus of decision-making and responsibility for the action. 

Official United Nations sources contend that ONUC 
was acting only in self-defense in Katanga, responding to 
attacks on it by the Katanga gendarmerie . According to 
these sources, fighting broke out more or less spontane- 
ously after fire occurred in the United Nations garage and 
while the United Nations was attempting simply to evacuate 

foreign personnel under the authority of the February 21 

60 
resolution and Ordinance 70. Other versions suggest that 



^ y The cease-fire agreement provided for a cease-fire; 
a joint commission of four members to supervise the appli- 
cation of the agreement, to seek ways to place the relations 
of the United Nations and Katanga on a basis of mutual 
understanding and harmony, and to fix the respective posi- 
tions of the troops; and for an exchange of prisoners. It 
also prohibited the movement of troops to reinforce a 
garrison or position. U.N. Doc. S/*W0/Add. 7, pp. 119-120. 

60 

The official account of the origins of the fighting 

read as follows: "In the early hours of .13 September, the 

United Nations Force therefore took security precautions 

similar to those applied on 28 August and deemed necessary 

■ to prevent inflammatory broadcasts or other threats to the 



357 
the Force was acting not merely in self-defense but was 
taking an initiative to try to achieve a political settle- 
ment. According to Conor Cruise O'Brien, the United Nations 
Representative in Katanga, the September 13 action, the so- 
called "Operation Morthar," was carefully planned with the 
objective of ending the secession of Katanga once and for 
all and by force if necessary. 61 Under his interpretation 
it was basically enforcement action by the United Nations. 
A central question about the decision-making which 
remains unanswered is whether the military action was 
ordered from United Nations Headquarters with the full know- 
ledge and approval of the Secretary-General or whether it 
was decided upon by those in the field with limited, if any, 
prior consultations with the Secretary-General. Either 
interpretation raises some serious questions about the 
international military operation. 



maintenance of law and order, while the United Nations re- 
sumed carrying out its task of apprehending and evacuating 
foreign military and para-military personnel. At this 
point an alert was set since arson was discovered at the 
ONUC garage. As the United Nations troops were proceeding 
towards the garage premises, fire was opened on them from 
tne^ ouilding where a number of foreign officers are known 
oo be staying. [In the first version of the report "the 
building" read 'Belgian Consulate.'] United Nations troops 
were subsequently also resisted and fired at as they were 
deploying towards key points or while they were guarding 
installations in the city. United Nations troops returned 
the fire." See U.N. Doc. S/4-94-0, p. 103. 

Conor Cruise O'Brien describes the plans for Opera- 
tion Morthar in some detail in his account of his experience 
in United Nations service in Katanga. See O'Brien, oo. cit.. 
•pp. 247-53. ' -* ' 



358 

If it is assumed that United Nations Headquarters 
was informed and in accord with the plans for Morthar, it 
can be argued that once decided upon, the plans should have 
"been carried through forthrightly and decisively if at all 
possible. This in turn raises questions about why the 
United Nations was not better prepared to undertake a 
strong role if that role was fully authorized beforehand. 
Finally, if the action was, in fact, taken in pursuance of 
the February 21 resolution providing for the use of force 
to prevent civil war, why not recognize this as the legal 
and moral justification for the action rather than disguise 
it as self-defense? The official United Nations report of 
events provides support for the former Justification when 
it makes reference to conditions in Katanga prior to the 
September 13 fighting as "likely to lead to tribal and 
civil war,," 

Even more serious questions respecting control and 
communications in the Congo operation are raised if it is 
assumed that this significant and potentially explosive 
action was taken in the field by officials of ONUC without 
the authorization of the Secretary-General. * In fact, the 



._ 

°ni.N. Doc. SA94-0, p. 101. 

63 

^There seems a good bit of circumstantial evidence 

to suggest that, in fact, the Secretary-General was not 
fully aware of what was being planned, of the full scope 
and intent of Morthar. Throughout the Congo affair 
Hammarskj old's approach had been restrained. He had laid 
' great stress on the danger both to the mission and to the 






359 
September fighting raises several questions about control 
from the top in an international military organization. 
Both in their initiation of hostilities in Katanga and in 
their desire to carry the action to a successful conclusion, 
the men in the field appeared to be considerably more 
aggressive than those at Headquarters. How can control be 
imposed on military men in the field who feel that a solu- 
tion to a problem is essential and are in a position to 
bring about that solution? The difficulty arises out of 
the fact that the military men tend to be unconcerned with 
the political ramifications of their action and the prece- 
dents they may be setting. This problem of control may be 
particularly acute when differences of opinion as to the 
proper scope of action for the Force exist at United Nations 
Headquarters. These differences may percolate down to the 



world organization of taking the initiative in the use of 
force and in the imposition of political solutions. There 
is little evidence to suggest that Hammarskjold considered 
that the February 21 resolution provided a mandate for the 
use of force to end Katanga's secession. Hammarskjold' s 
full approval would seem to represent a reversal of his 
previous policies. Other evidence of his separation from 
Morthar is found in his subordinates' desire to have the 
fighting occur when the Secretary-General was not present 
and in his reaction to the fighting in Elizabethville. 
Hammarskjold 1 s emphasis was on ending the fighting as 
quickly as possible, not on achieving victory. In his note 
to Tshombe regarding a cease-fire Hammarskjold said, "...the 
United Nations desires without reservation to avoid hostili- 
ties and the shedding of blood." U.N. Doc. 8/4-94-O/Add. 4, 
p. 12. For a discussion of his subordinates' actions see 
Burns and Heathcote, op_. cit . , pp. 103-106. 









360 

Force in the field. It is perhaps significant that a key 
figure in the September operation, M. Khiary, was a 
Tunisian and that the Afro-Asian approach favored a more 
positive role by ONUC to end the secession of Katanga. 

The United Nations Force was in an unenviable posi- 
tion from the time that the September cease-fire agreement 
was signed until the end of November. The Force, whose 
position had been considerably strengthened and its ability 
to carry through its mission improved in the spring and 
summer of 1961? once again lost ground. The gap between 
the responsibilities confronting the Force and its ability 
to handle those responsibilities was widening. 

A number of factors contributed to the deteriorating 
position of ONUC. Perhaps the most significant was the 
lack of a clear sense of identity. The role of the Force 
in the Congo was in confusion. The United Nations Force 
had tried for months to succeed in the Congo as a non- 
intervening force — to bring order and tranquillity by its 
presence alone. It proved unable to resolve the Congo 
crisis by this means. In February its mandate was strength- 
ened to allow it to use force in the last resort to prevent 
civil war. In September the Force applied the new mandate 
and tried at being an intervening force. ONUC took the 
initiative to end Katanga's secession and bring unity to 
the Congo — and this effort failed too. It failed because 






361 

the United Nations leadership shrank from the use of very 
much initiative or very much force. The Secretary-General 
might stretch his principles with respect to international 
military forces to allow the use of a little force, but he 
was less ready to see ONUC involved in a bloody battle to 
impose a solution to the Congo question. 

It appeared that the United Nations Force could not 
fulfill its mandate and still maintain its position as a 
non-intervening force, yet there was reluctance to alter 
the rules of the game. The need was for a clear decision 
on what the goals and means of the Force were to be. Yet, 
the death of the Secretary-General left ONUC at least 
temporarily without the strong leadership necessary to make 
such a basic organization-shaping decision. 

The Force was weakened not only by confusion over 
its role but also by a decline once again in its material 
strength and prestige. The September fray, whether or not 
it was, in fact, a military defeat for ONUC, was so in- 
terpreted, and this interpretation undercut the prestige 
of the Force. Moreover, a reduction in troop strength was 
cutting into the capabilities of the Force. Withdrawal of 
contingents from Ghana, Tunisia, and Liberia reduced the 
troop strength from 19,825 in July, 1961, to 15,500 in 
October with the expectation that further withdrawals would 
cut the Force to around 14-, 4-00 by December. 






362 

The prestige and position of the Force were hurt 
not only by the military defeat per se but also by the 
cease-fire agreement. The agreement was bitterly opposed 
in principle by the Afro-Asians and by the Congolese 
Government. The Afro-Asians viewed it as surrender to 
Tshombe, while the Congolese authorities considered it 
tantamount to recognition of the legitimacy of the Katanga 
regime. In addition, the terms of the agreement were con- 
sidered to favor Katanga. The United Nations was accused 
of making the agreement primarily to obtain the release of 

the 190 ONUC prisoners captured during the September 

, 64- 
engagement . 

Not only did the position of ONUC seem to be slip- 
ping back toward what it had been in early 1961, but all 
the old problems were cropping up again. 

Within Katanga the problem of mercenaries continued 
serious. Tshombe refused to take action to eliminate 
foreign military personnel, arguing that Katanga had paid 
them all off on August 28 and that they were no longer a 
responsibility of Katanga. The United Nations pointed out 
that not only were they still present, but that a new 
difficulty had arisen: 



Burns and Heathcote, o p , cit . , p. 117. 









563 

Instead of flaunting themselves in. uniform they now 
serve in civilian garb and are correspondingly diffi- 
cult to identify and apprehend. There is also good 
reason to believe that they have taken cover in 
various forms of civilian employ, real or otherwise. 
It has also been established that a considerable 
number of para-military personnel ivho carried arms 
during the recent hostilities were European residents 
of the Congo otherwise regularly employed. Finally, 
some persons previously evacuated by ONUC under the 
terms of paragraph A- 2 are reliably reported to have 
returned to Katanga or to be active in the neighboring 
areas. 65 

The possibility of civil war once more reared its 
head. War between the Central Government and both Katanga 
and a Stanleyville group threatened. In late October and 
early November fighting did break out between the forces 
of the Central Government and of Katanga in the Kasai- 
Katanga border area. In addition to factional fighting and 
threats of secession, the undisciplined and undependable 
troops of the Congo were acting up again — rioting, terrori- 
zing, raping. 

The period of self -evaluation and uncertainty as to 
direction ended for ONUC in November, 1961, with the se- 
lection of U Thant as Acting Secretary-General and the 
passage of the November 24 Security Council resolution de- 
signed to clarify the mandate of the Force. The resolution 
reaffirmed the power granted in the February 21 resolution 
and extended that power slightly. It constituted a victory 



"63 



U.N. Doc. SA9WAdd. 12, p. 15. 



364 

for the concept of the positive, intervening force. The 
move to close the gap between power and responsibilities 
of the Force by giving the Force an added increment of 
power begun hesitantly in August had been made. 

The leadership of U Thant, the new Acting Secretary- 
General, may have been of more direct and immediate signifi- 
cance than the November resolution in broadening the scope 
and increasing the flexibility of the United Nations Force. 
Both in his initial statements on the Congo to the Security 
Council and in his actions U Thant revealed himself to be 
more concerned with results in the Congo than with principles, 
The new Secretary-General did not share Hammarsk j old ! s pre- 
occupation with preserving the impartiality of the Force and 
ensuring against military initiatives by it. An indication 
of the approach he would take to the problems of the Congo 
was given in his statement to the Security Council at the 
conclusion of its November discussion on the Congo. He 
said in part: 

The subject of the activities of mercenaries in 
' Katanga is one on which we are all entitled to have 
strong views, for it is intolerable that efforts to 
achieve reconciliation in the Congo should be per- 
sistently obstructed and thwarted by professional 
adventurers who fight and kill for money. I intend, 
therefore, to discharge the responsibilities entrusted 
to me in paragraphs 4- and 5 of the resolution with 
determination and vigor. It will be my purpose to 
employ toward that end, and to the best advantage, as 
much as possible of the total resources available to 
the United Nations Operation in the Congo. 






365 

All of the United Nations responsibilities flow- 
ing from past resolutions on the Congo continue with 
new emphasis, since those resolutions have all been 
reaffirmed in the action just taken. Assistance must 
be given to the Central Government in the maintenance 
of law and order. Everything possible must be done to 
avert civil war, even by the employment of force, 
should this prove necessary as a last resort. This, 
I believe, necessarily implies a sympathetic attitude 
on the part of ONUC toward the efforts of the Govern- 
ment to suppress all armed activities against the 
Central Government and secessionist activities. 
Supporting the territorial integrity of the country, 
the United Nations position, it seems to me, is 
automatically against all armed activities against 
the Central Government and against secessionist 
forces. 66 

Thus, a new Security Council resolution and a new 
Acting Secretary-General opened the way to new initiatives 
by ONUC to end the secession of Katanga and resolve the 
crisis of the Congo. Neither the resolution nor the Secre- 
tary-General said that force would be used for the specific 
purpose of ending Katanga's secession. However, if para- 
graph 4- of the resolution, referring to the use of force, 
were taken in conjunction with paragraph 8, demanding an 
end to Katanga's secession, it might be reasoned that ONUC 
had power not only to eliminate the mercenaries but also 
to end the secession by forceful means. 

It was only shortly after the passage of the November 
24- resolution that the second major military encounter 
between the forces of Katanga and of the United Nations 



_ 

Security Council, Official Records , 16th Year, 
982nd meeting (November 24, 1961), p. 20. 



366 

occurred. Heavy fighting took place from December 5 "to 
December 18, 1961. The December action differed signifi- 
cantly from the September engagement in the amount of 
support it engendered and in its execution. Its results 
were still inconclusive in the long run. 

The United Nations was better prepared to fight in 
December than it had been in the preceding September. With 
better preparation and a new attitude at United Nations 
Headquarters, ONUC was able to wage a more aggressive and 
successful campaign than had been the case earlier. Most 
significant in terms of better preparation was the provi- 
sion of an air arm to the Force in Katanga. In the 
September fighting Katanga controlled the air with two 
Pouga jets and caused considerable havoc by bombing and 
strafing. In the period between September and December 
steps were taken to overcome this deficiency in the equip- 
ping of ONUC by providing fifteen jets from India and 
Sweden. In December the United Nations gained control of 
the air, thereby preventing Katangese attacks on their 
positions and making possible reinforcements. In addition 
to more and better equipment, there were substantially more 
United Nations troops in Katanga (4,000 as compared to 
1,200) or potentially available. 6 ' 



. ^Control of the air and the contribution by the 
United States of four troop transports gave the United 
Nations flexibility in moving troops into areas of greatest 

need. 



7, 



67 






Just as important as men and equipment was the change 
in attitude at United Nations Headquarters and among some 
member states toward the Force. The change is well- 
illustrated by the Secretary-General's order on December 6 

to United Nations Forces to take any air or ground action 

68 
necessary. The strong support given by the United States 

to the Force — support taking moral and material forms — was 

also important. This support was particularly significant 

when demands for a cease-fire were made by France, the 

United Kingdom, and others. As its NATO allies called for 

a cease-fire, the United States supported the United Nations 

decision to continue fighting until its objectives were 

69 

achieved. 

Without going into the details of battle, it can be 
noted that the United Nations fought effectively. It 
quickly gained control of the air and slowly seized key 
installations in Elizabethville. By the time of the cease- 
fire GBUC had control of virtually all important installa- 
tions and probably could have imposed a military solution 
if it had continued to fight. 



ZT5S 

The New York Times , December 6, 1961. 

"The United States Secretary of State endorsed 
publicly U Thant's move to restore the United Nations free- 
dom of movement and to effect the United Nations mandate 
to reintegrate the Congo. The New York Times , December 9, 
1961.. 



368 

On December 18 the fighting ended with a hold-fire 
which was put into effect after President Tshombe expressed 
a desire to negotiate with Prime Minister Adoula on the 
Congo problem. Talks were held between Tshombe and Adoula 
at Kitona. Out of the Kitona meeting came an eight-point 
pact which seemed, in effect, to mark the end of Katanga's 
secession. Tshombe promised, among other things, to accept 
the application of the Loi f ondamentale , to recognize the 
indissoluble unity of the Congo with Kasa-Vubu as head of 

state, and to recognize the authority of the Central Govern- 

70 

ment over all parts of the Congo. 

If we assume that the function of the peace force is 
to create conditions by its presence for peaceful settlement 
of disputes s it might be contended that this in a rather 
ambitious form was what the Force was doing in December. 
The United Nations Porce did not actually impose a solution, 
rather it placed Tshombe in a position in which he had 
little choice but to give up his resistance and accept, at 
least temporarily, the terms of the Central Government. 



'Other provisions of the Kitona Agreement included 
participation of Katangese representatives in the government 
commission to be convened to study the draft for the future 
constitution; Katangese representation in the Parliament; 
placement of the gendarmerie under the authority of the 
President of the Republic. In addition, Tshombe promised 
to ensure respect for the resolutions of the General Assembly 
and the Security Council. U.N. Doc. S/4940, Annexes I and 
II, pp. 9-H. 



569 

In the last analysis, however, the results of the 
December, 1961, military initiative were limited. Tshombe, 
notable for his ability to make agreements and then wriggle 
out of them when the immediate pressures which had caused 
him to agree were lifted, hedged on the Kitona Agreements. 
Months after the Agreement was signed, the provisions were 
little nearer being executed than they had been on the day 
the agreement was signed. The hopes that the December 
engagement and the Kitona pact had raised were proved 
illusory. 

The United Nations leadership demonstrated notable 
patience with Tshombe during months of desultory negotia- 
tions between Tshombe and both the United Nations repre- 
sentatives and the Adoula Government. Two of the principal 
issues under discussion between United Nations and Katangese 
officials were the questions of freedom of movement for the 
ONUC throughout Katanga and the expulsion of the foreign 
mercenaries and political advisers. Behind these issues 

was the issue with which the Central Government was most 

71 

concerned, the unification of the Congo. ' During the long 

negotiations the United Nations did not resort to force to 
resolve the deadlock although the threat of force to expel 
the mercenaries was made. The Secretary-General explained 
United Nations restraint by stressing that the United Nations 



71 



U.N. Doc. S/5240, p. 2. 






570 

was making every possible effort to solve the outstanding 
issues by peaceful reconciliation. 

By the late fall of 1962 United Nations authorities, 
strongly backed if not prodded by the United States dele- 
gation 5 decided it was imperative that a solution be found 
to the problem of Katanga's secession specifically and of 
the Congo generally. It was assumed that once the problem 
of Katanga was dealt with, it would be possible to cope 
effectively with the political, economic, and financial 
problems of the Congo as a whole. 

A variety of elements contributed to the growth of 
feeling that a solution must be found. First, the longer 
that Katanga was able to defy successfully the Central 
Government, the more likely its independence was to become 
permanent. Yet, the corollary of an independent Katanga 
seemed to be a weak, unstable, financially insecure Congo. 
Failure to bring Katanga into the Congo would doom the 
United Nations operation in the Congo to failure. Moreover, 
Prime Minister Adoula's failure to deliver on his initial 
promise to end Katanga's secession was causing disaffection 

with that moderate government and raising the spectre of a 

72 

shift to more extreme elements. 

Second, the ability of the United Nations to resolve 
the crisis in Katanga seemed on the verge of decline. The 



' This possibility was particularly disturbing to the 
United States which had visions of a Communist-oriented or 






371 
financial situation of the United Nations was grave. By 
October, 1962 , the Organization was deeply in debt, and it 
was questionable whether it could indefinitely bear a $10 
million a month commitment to the Congo operation. In 
addition, the United Nations faced the imminent loss of the 
backbone of the Force. India, confronted with aggressive 
Chinese moves, expressed a desire to withdraw the approxi- 
mately 5,500 troops it had in the Congo. Thus, if the 
United Nations were to be in a position to back up its 
demands on Katanga with force, it would be necessary to 
act before the Indians and the money were gone. 

Desirable as it might be to end Katanga's secession, 
the problem of how this might be accomplished remained. 
Negotiations had not proven fruitful ; the alternative 
seemed to be to force Tshombe to negotiate a settlement or 
to impose a solution. In either case some sort of coercion 
would have to be applied to Katanga to bring them to heel. 
Pressure seemed to be an essential adjunct to talking. 

In November, 1962, the Secretary-General marked the 
shift in tactics in dealing with Tshombe with the announce- 
ment of a proposed program of economic sanctions. However, 
the European states in a position to best implement such a 
plan responded unenthusiastically, making the outlook for 
effective sanctions dim. 



influenced government being installed in Leopoldville if 
"Adoula was ousted. The New York Times , April 29, 1962, and 
July 29 v 1962. 



372 

The United Rations paralleled the plan of economic 
sanctions with a program designed to strengthen its military 
position in the Congo. A detailed plan of military opera- 
tions , designed to achieve freedom of movement for ONUC 

throughout Katanga and to ensure the elimination of the 

73 

mercenaries, was drawn up in late October. J The military 

plan of operations was hacked up by reinforcements of 
material and manpower. This build-up was intensified in 
mid-December. By then it was clear, first, that Tshombe 
would not voluntarily accede to U Thant's Plan of National 
Reconciliation or negotiate seriously with the Central 
Government, and second, that the plan to use economic 
pressure to force such agreement would fail for lack of 
cooperation by certain members of the United Nations. 



^Dr. Ralph Bunche describes the plan in the following 
words:. "A plan of operations to achieve freedom of movement 
for ONUC throughout Katanga in the event of a continued 
denial of this freedom by Katangese authorities, which would 
also ensure the elimination of mercenaries and assist 
national unity was devised in the course of consultations 
involving Mr. Gardiner, the Force Commander, General Prem 
Ghana, and myself during my visit to Leopoldville in October 
of last year. That plan was subsequently approved by you 
for ultimate execution, if all non-military efforts finally 

failed. 

The first phase of that plan had unexpectedly been 
activated on 28 December." U.N. Doc. S/5053, Add. 14-, 
Annex 34, p. 5^« 

^The United Nations strengthened the Force in several 
respects. At least 1,000 troops from Indonesia and Norway 
joined the Force in December. Anti-aircraft defenses were 
exoanded and some 20 jet fighters, obtained from Sweden, 
Italy, and the Philippines, were added to the United Nations 
air force. The United States provided the transportation to 









373 

Tiie military build-up did not prove superfluous. 
Fighting broke out on the 28th of December between Katangese 
gendarmerie and the United Nations Force. As had been the 
case in the two prior military engagements, the actual 
hostilities were preceded by growing tension and increasing . 
numbers of incidents. Strong pressures by the United Nations 
on Katanga and rumors that forceful action was imminent 
resulted almost inevitably in violent and bitter attacks 
by Tshombe on ONUC and subsequent physical attacks on the 
Force by members of the gendarmerie and the populace at 
large. 

The December, 1962- January, 1963, military action by 
the United Nations proved far more effective than the 
United Nations military efforts in September and December, 
1961. The United Nations Force moved forward with determi- 
nation and Katangese resistance seemed to melt away before 
the onslaught. The United Nations air arm quickly obtained 
supremacy of the air, destroying Katanga's air force on the 
ground. By December 31, the United Nations Force in 
Elizabethviile,- composed of Indian, Irish, and Ethiopian 
troops, had taken control of that city and the area around 
it. At the same time Swedish and Ghanaian ONUC troops had 
taken over Kamina with some light resistance but no 
casualties. 



,move men and supplies into and within the Congo and itself 
contributed substantial amounts of equipment to the opera- 
tion. Burns and Heathcote, op_. cit . , p. 203. 






374 

From January I to January 4 United Nations troops 
moved rapidly along the Slizabethville-Jadotville road and, 
in what was deemed a brilliant military engagement, took 
control of Jadotville. The Jadotville victory, however, 
presents a strange, two-sided picture of a brilliant mili- 
tary manuever on one hand and of tangled and unsatisfactory 

controls and communication between the field unit and 

75 

headquarters on the other. ' Successful as it was, Jadot- 
ville raised some serious questions about the United Nations 
operation for it was undertaken in the face of orders from 
United Nations Headquarters to halt. Moreover, Headquarters 
lost contact completely with its troops for a number of 
hours. Since this particular engagement is of significance 
in illuminating the relationship between the field units 
and headquarters both in Leopoldville and New York, it 
seems worthwhile to briefly review the sequence of events. 
With the Blizabethville success the United Nations 
Command had apparently decided to halt the military initia- 
tive in order to give Tshombe an opportunity to come to 
terms and perhaps to try to preserve ONUC's reputation as 
a peace force. In line with this approach a cable was sent 
to the Force on December 30 specifying that any further 

military action, other than that required in self-defense, 

76 
would be taken only with headquarters clearance. 



75 U.N. Doc. S/5053, Add. 14, Annex 33, pp. 32-53. 
76 U.N. Doc. S/5053, Add. 14, Annex 34, p. 57. 









375 

Yet in halting the military initiative the United 
Nations Command apparently had reservations. Although they 
did not want to seem aggressive, they did want to achieve 
their objectives. Accordingly , it was decided that the 
December 30 cable requiring clearance was too restrictive 
and would unduly handicap the Force. On December 31 a 
second cable was sent which advised the military to exploit 
the road-block success, to extend the Elizabethville 
perimeter, and to keep the gendarmerie, on the run. United 
Nations Headquarters judged that the potential conflict of 
the second cable with the first and with statements by the 
Secretary-General about halting the fighting would not 
develop because of the automatic limits to the Force's 

advance imposed by the fact that reinforcements in troops, 

77 

air support, material, and bridging had not arrived. 

The calculations of those composing the cables went 
awry, however, when the automatic limits failed to function. 
As an ONUC company moved out on December 31 in a probing and 
patrol action, it encountered little opposition. It pressed 
forward, crossing the Lufira river and establishing a bridge- 
head on the opposite bank. After crossing the river, the 
unit received a cable calling for a halt in advance before 
the river was crossed. This confronted the field commander 
with a dilemma. It would be risky militarily and potentially 

" Ibid ., p. 57. 









576 

dangerous either to withdraw across the river or to remain 
in an exposed "bridgehead since night was coming on. (One 
might also assume that it would he risky to move forward 
as well though the official reports make no note of this 
risk.) The decision was made by the field commander to 
move ahead despite contrary orders from Headquarters. 
United Nations Headquarters lost contact with the company 
of troops as they marched forward to take Jadotville with 
little difficulty. 

Despite the success of the venture, the advance of 
United Nations troops to Jadotville while the Secretary- 
General was reaffirming the peaceful intentions and limited 
aims of the United Nations was embarrassing. The loss of 
contact with and control over the men in the field was 
dismaying and disturbing. 

The "disconcerting picture on communication to and 
from the field"^ 8 and control from Headquarters was appar- 
ently not the result of insubordination on the part of those 
in the field, but of an unfortunate combination of circum- 
stances; confusing orders from United Nations Headquarters 
(reflecting the inherent confusion experienced by a peace 
force fighting) ; poor communications between the field 
and headquarters; and a rapidly changing and unanticipated 
military situation. 



'°IJD_id. ? p. 56. 






377 

In the days following the Jadotville victory the 
United Nations troops moved rapidly, taking control of 
major centers in Katanga with ease. On January 15, 1963, 
in letters to Prime Minister Adoula and Secretary-General 
Thant, Tshoin.be announced: 

I am ready to proclaim immediately before the world 
that Katanga's secession is ended, to grant the 
United Nations troops liberty of movement throughout 
Katanga, and to return to Elizabethville to direct 
the means of applying the U Thant plan. 79 

On January 21 United Nations troops entered Kolwezi, 
Tshombe's last major stronghold, peacefully. After twenty- 
four days of military operations, the United Nations was in 
virtual control of all Katanga. 

So ended the secession of Katanga and the fighting 
by the United Nations peace-keeping force. All that was 
left to the Force was to carry out the original mission 
of retraining Congolese soldiers and helping to maintain 
law and order. That these were not easy tasks is suggested 
by the fact that the Force still remained in the Congo a 
year and a half after the last round of fighting in Katanga. 

The Secretary-General announced in mid-1963 that 
ONUC would be withdrawn by the end of 1963 when the money 
appropriated for the operation would be gone. Pressure 
from the Afro-Asian states, the United States, and the Congo 



'"Burns and Heathcote, op_. cit . , p. 218. 






378 

itself for an extension of the life of the Force led the 
Secretary-General to give the question to the General 
Assembly for a decision. After special financing arrange- 
ments were worked out, the Assembly approved a resolution 
to maintain a Force of approximately 6,000 men in the Congo 
until June 30, 1964. The resolution included a proviso 
that the life of the Force should not be extended beyond 
the June 30 cut-off date. The purpose of the provision 
was to force the Congolese to assume responsibility for 
their affairs and to prevent the United Nations from being 
committed indefinitely in the Congo. 

With the Force's departure the Congo sank: once again 
into chaos and civil war. The job of retraining the Congo- 
lese so that they could maintain order when the United 
Nations troops departed was apparently not successfully 
accomplished. 

Conclusions 

We have now reviewed the complicated and sometimes 
confusing history of the United Nations Force in the Congo. 
The Congo posed immense challenges for the United Nations. 
The United Nations victory in the Congo, if it could be 
termed a victory, was reached at heavy costs. The Congo 
experience in many ways raised as many questions as it 






80 These special arrangements included donations of 
|1.3 million by the United States and other Western nations. 









379 

answered about the desirable and attainable mission and 
character for a peace force. Nonetheless, some tentative 
conclusions with respect to peace-keeping forces can be 
drawn from the Congo venture. 

We may begin by asking — was the United Nations Force 
in the Congo a success? To some extent the answer depends 
on one's definition of success. The United Nations had not 
created a stable nation in the Congo by the time the Force 
withdrew in 1964- . it had carried out the major responsi- 
bilities assigned to it: the Belgian and foreign mercenaries 
were out of the Congo; some semblance of law and order had 
been established; a central government with jurisdiction 
over the entire state had been set up; the reorganization 
and retraining of the Congolese army had been undertaken, 
though certainly not completed. The United Nations had 
done about as much as it could do, legally and practically, 
in the time given it. The rest was up to the Congolese 
themselves. The Congolese failure in maintaining a viable 
state can hardly be attributed to a failure of the United 

Nations. 

In order to succeed in the Congo , the United Nations 
Force had to modify drastically its initial character. The 
Force in the Congo was modeled on the Emergency Force in 
Suez. The Secretary-General followed the precedents which 
had been developed by the experience with UNEF in setting 



380 

up ONTJC. Among the principles which governed the Force 
in Its operations were the following: the Force should 
take no military initiative; the Force should not intervene 
in the internal affairs of the Congo; the Force was in the 
Congo at the request and with the consent of the Congolese 
Government. In many ways the Force in its initial con- 
ception was not very different from an over-grown, well- 
armed observation group. To carry through the mission 
assigned to it "by the Security Council, the Force would rely 
primarily on its presence in the crisis area, a presence 
made strong "by its prestige and its support among the United 
Nations members. 

Yet this conception of a peace-keeping force proved 
singularly inappropriate to the Congo situation. The Force 
did not command the same respect or moral authority in the 
Congo that it had in Suez. Moreover, the internal situation 
was far more chaotic in the Congo and engendered divisions 
within the ranks of the United Nations itself. Once the 
Central Government of the Congo collapsed, the responsibili- 
ties of the United Nations Force exceeded its capabilities. 

The February, 1961, Security Council resolution 
opened the way to a basic modification in the character of 
the Force, transforming it at least potentially from a non- 
intervening to an intervening force, able to take positive, 
forceful action when necessary. From February forward the 






381 

Force strengthened its position in the Congo, narrowing the 
gap "between its responsibilities and capabilities. Yet, it 
was not until the Force actually used its military power 
offensively in December, 1961, and December, 1962-January, 
1963, that it found it possible to complete successfully 
its assignment in the Congo. By January, 1963 , the non- 
fighting, non-intervening force had become a fighting force, 
imposing a political solution on the Congo. It makes little 
difference that the fighting occurred on only three major 
occasions and involved less than two months of conflict in 
all. The important thing was that the fighting occurred 
at crucial times in the Congo mission and was essential to 
the final resolution of the issue. 

The reasons for changing the mandate of the Force 
are clear. The United Nations was caught in a hind. The 
Force could not be pulled out of the Congo before it had 
completed its mission without damaging the prestige of the 
world organization seriously; it could not stay in the Congo 
indefinitely in a position of stalemate; and it could not 
carry through its mission under its original mandate. So, 
the mandate was changed. Yet, the precedent of an inter- 
vening, militarily active peace-keeping force is a potentially 
dangerous one. Apparently these dangers have been recognized 
by United Nations Headquarters, for there has been reluctance 
to admit to any change in the 'basic character of the Force 






382 

in the Congo, Statements by the Secretary-General have 

de-emphasized the importance of the fighting undertaken by 

81 

the Force and stressed the fact that it was a peace force. 

We would contend that, in fact, the Force had undergone a 
fundamental transformation in its approach and its capa- 
bilities between July, I960, and January, 1963. 

It was necessary not only to change the mandate of 
the Force to achieve success in the Congo operation, but 
also to pour large numbers of men and substantial sums of 
money into the Congo, The United Nations may well have 
been over-committed in the Congo — the commitments required 
for success were very great. A peace-keeping force that 
fires in self-defense only can be expensive and controversial, 
but not nearly so controversial nor difficult to maintain as 
a peace-keeping force that takes military initiatives. 

Keeping sufficient numbers of men in the field for 
the four-year period was a major challenge. Fifteen to 
twenty thousand men is a large number for an international 
organization to acquire from the member states for a long 
duration. This, is particularly true when the major powers 
are not among the acceptable contributors. The difficulties 
were compounded, first, by political differences over the 
role of the United Nations Force which caused some states 



51 U.N. Doc. S/5240, pp. 102-103. 






383 

to withdraw their men; and, second, by the dangers and hard- 
ships to which the Force was exposed which led both to 
withdrawal of troops and reluctance to contribute. In 
addition, certain states, such as India, resented the fact 
that their men were endangered because they fought under 
restrictions as a peace-keeping force and attempted to have 
these limiting rules modified or eliminated. 

To fight successfully not only men but material are 
necessary. A fighting force needs substantially more and 
different equipment from a non-fighting force; jet planes, 
heavier weapons, more ammunition, more troop transport may 
be required. In September, 1961, the United Nations Force 
was not adequately equipped for the fighting in which it 
engaged. Despite U Thant's contention that ONUC had only 
defensive weapons throughout its mission, many new items 
such as jets were placed at the disposal of the Force prior 
to the December, 1961, and December, 1962, fighting. For 
reasons of cost and politics the United Nations relied 
primarily on the contributions of member states for this 
equipment. 

The need for large numbers of men and equally large 
amounts of equipment in the Congo contributed to the serious 
financial crisis which grew out of this peace-keeping venture, 
The costs of the operation were difficult for the United 
Nations to bear in view of the unwillingness of a number of 



384 

member states, either for political or economic reasons, 
to contribute their share. In fact, the Congo operation 
could hardly have continued without the substantial contri- 
butions made to the mission by the United States. Yet, 
the generosity of a few states is a frail financial support 
for peace-keeping missions. Thus, new and more satisfactory 
methods of financing peace-keeping forces must be sought. 

A danger of commitments as extensive as those in- 
volved in the Congo operation is that undue influence may 
be wielded by those with the men and money to keep the 
operation afloat. Threats to cut off. contributions or pull 
out troops may give certain states a disproportionate voice 
in United Nations decisions. (On the other hand, this may, 
on occasion, be a healthy counter to the one state^one 
vote situation.) For example, a question may be raised as 
to whether the United Nations found its policies tied too 
closely to the policies of the United States because of the 
large American contributions to the United Nations mission 
in the Congo. From November, 1961, forward the United 
States apparently played an active role in shaping United 
Nations policy. 

Once the mandate of the United Nations Force was 
changed and its role expanded not only did the problems of 
men and money become more difficult, but new problems arose. 
A fighting peace-keeping force has problems which are 
■peculiar to it. Two of the most difficult in the case of 



385 
the United Rations Force in the Congo were, first, main- 
taining political controls over the military operations in 
the field without unduly hampering the military, and, 
second, acquiring and maintaining an effective fighting 
force, with emphasis on the fighting. 

The question of political control was never effec- 
tively resolved in the Congo operation. The problem 
existed at two levels. On the one hand, the General Assembly 
and the Security Council were reluctant to take policy 
leadership , leaving a great deal of discretion to the 
Secretariat. Hammarsk j old , especially after the September, 
I960, crisis, made a practice of going to the Security 
Council for new instructions — instructions which they were 
hesitant to give. U Thant as Secretary-General consulted 
less with the Security Council. In fact, the Council did 
not meet on the Congo question after November, 1961. Thus, 
there was no consideration by the Council of the implica- 
tions and desirability of either the December, 1961, or 
the December, 1962, fighting. It can be assumed that the 
fact of not meeting implied tacit support for the policies 
of the Secretary-General. Nonetheless, clearer policy 
guidance would seem desirable. 

The role of the Advisory Committee in giving policy 
guidance to the Secretary-General needs further investiga- 
tion. It would seem possible for this body, composed of 






386 
representatives of nations contributing men to the United 
Nations Force, to exercise rather close political super- 
vision over the actions of the Secretary-General. In fact, 
indications are that the Advisory Committee — though use- 
ful — did not play a decisive role in decision-making. 82 

On the other hand, the problem of control and communi 
cations existed also with respect to the relations between 
United Nations personnel in the field and those at Head- 
quarters. In virtually every military engagement in which 
the United Nations Force was involved, difficulties emerged 
in maintaining control from the center. There seem to be 
at least four factors contributing to the problem of 
control: 1) the difficulty of keeping tight control over 
military forces faced with a crisis and the need for 
emergency decisions which do not leave time for consulta- 
tions with Headquarters; 2) the highly sensitive nature of 
United Nations involvement and the importance of political 
considerations to every move the United Nations makes; 3) 
the vagueness of. the United Nations mandate in crises be- 
cause of the difficulty of reconciling the peace force 

op 

On the other hand, there is evidence that the 
Advisory Committee was of value as a kind of sounding board. 
Secretary-General U Thant held that the Congo experience 
demonstrated the great utility of the advisory committee 
arrangement in the conduct of a highly complex and politi- 
cally sensitive activity. In his view the Advisory Com- 
mittee had been indispensable in the Congo operation, 
providing a means to test proposed lines of action, exchange 
.viewpoints, and obtain sound guidance. Ibid . , p. 104. 



387 

concept with military action; and 4) the poor communica- 
tions "between the field and Headquarters. 

Dr. Bunche, following an investigation of the Janu- 
ary, 1963 ? Jadotville incident, put forward several 
recommendations designed to tighten the lines of communica- 
tion and control between Headquarters and the field. * In 
order to clear up misunderstandings on reporting he 
recommended that precise directives, defining the require- 
ments for prior clearance before action is taken, be drawn 
up and that methods of informing and reporting be revamped. 
In order to improve communications from the field he sug- 
gested that a. mature and responsible reporting officer be 
assigned to any unit likely to see fighting. To improve 
communications between the civilian and military personnel 
he suggested that a high level liaison officer be assigned 
responsibility for relations between the chief civilian 
official and the military commander. 

However, the problem of control from the center may 
not be amenable to full resolution. As Bunche himself 
suggests, once a combat situation develops the efforts to 
regulate the details of the military moves by political 
levers may put lives in jeopardy. Once a military action 
is afoot, control by headquarters in response to political 
considerations may do violence to sound military judgment 
and tactics at a serious cost to the Force. 



0> u.U. Doc. S/5053/Add 14, Annex 34, pp. 58-59. 



388 

A rather different sort of problem that confronts 
the fighting peace-keeping force is the calibre of its 
soldiers. A fighting peace force requires rather different 
capabilities and contributions by the men participating 
than does a non-fighting force, The fighting effectiveness 
of the United Nations Force in the Congo was apparently 
hampered by the lack of a clear mandate defining for the 
men the purpose of their fighting; the shortage of well- 
trained fighting men in the Force; and the frictions 
between the different national units composing the Force. 

All of this suggests that a fighting peace-keeping 
force presents problems of a different and more difficult 
order than those posed by a non-fighting force. The moral 
here would seem to be that the United Nations ought to 
consider long and hard the implications of its military 
involvement in a crisis situation before undertaking any 
such involvement. 












CHAPTER 711, 

THE NON-FIGHTING FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT 

Recent Uses of the Non-Fighting Force 

The objective of the foregoing examination in depth 
of the establishment and operation of four non-fighting 
military organizations has been to determine the nature 
and potential of this instrument of United Nations peace- 
keeping. The pattern has proved a popular one: a new 
presence has been established in each of the last three 
years. In 1962 a force of a little over 1,500 men eased 
the transition of governmental authority from the Nether- 
lands to Indonesia in West New Guinea; in 1963 an observer 
group was set up to oversee an arrangement for the dis- 
engagement of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia 
from the civil war situation in Yemen; and in 1964 a peace- 
keeping force was sent to Cyprus in its time of troubles. 
These too must bear on our final evaluation of the non- 
fighting force as an instrument of peaceful settlement. 

In Vest New Guinea a United Nations Security Force 
gave a mantle of legality to the transfer of sovereignty 
from the Dutch to the Indonesians in late 1962 and early 

389 






390 

1963. The agreement under which the transfer was made and 
the Force functioned was negotiated by former United States 
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. The United Nations Force in 
Vest New Guinea, in response to the local situation and to 
the heavy burden in money and men imposed on the world 
organisation at this time by the United Nations Forces in 
the Middle East and the Congo, was a deviant from the usual 
pattern of peace-keeping forces. Although the headquarters 
staff was multi-national, the Force itself was not. Some 
1,500 Pakistanis were deputized to serve as the United 
Nations presence. The costs were not borne by the United 
Nations, but by the two parties directly involved in the 
questions at issue, that is, the Netherlands and Indonesia. 
The Force's duties presented less challenge and fewer prob- 
lems than those of most peace-keeping forces. A political 
settlement had been reached in this case prior to the 
establishment of the Force, and the principal responsibili- 
ties of the Force were to help implement that settlement. 
Its primary assignment was to maintain civil order in an 
orderly society, while its maximum duration was set at 
eight months. 



See Paul van der Vieu for a rather critical view of 
the United Nations role in West Irian. While admitting that 
the United Nations helped achieve a smooth transfer of 
authority, the author wonders if it was not achieved at the 
cost of neglect by the United Nations of its responsibility 
to guarantee rights to the native people and future self- 
determination. See Paul van der Vieu, "The United Nations 



, 391 
In June, 1963, an observer group of approximately 
200 men was established to serve in Yemen. In the Yemeni 
situation a local conflict had developed regional overtones 
with even more serious repercussions possible. In the fall 
of 1962 civil war had broken out in Yemen when rebels over- 
threw the Iman and set up a republican government. The 
republicans met resistance from royalist, tribesmen and' 
fighting continued _ in the mountainous terrain. Complica- 
ting the situation, the United Arab Republic sent troops to 
Yemen to bolster the republican forces, while Saudi Arabia 
channeled aid to royalist forces. 

In the spring of 1963 the United States and the 
United Nations cooperated to prevent a regional conflict 
from developing. The peripatetic Mr. Bunker again negoti- 
ated an agreement, this one providing for the disengagement 
of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. Under the 
terms of the agreement the Government of the United Arab 
Republic agreed to withdraw its troops, some 30,000 in 

number; and Saudi Arabia agreed to halt the aid being 

o 

furnished the royalists. 

An observer group of 200 men was set up to oversee 
the compliance with the agreement. The group was composed 



in Vest Irian: A Critique," Internation al Organization, Vol 
18, No. 1 (Winter, 1964), pp. 56-73. [ 

2 U.U. Doc. S/5298, pp. 33-34. 






392 

of a 117-man Yugoslav reconnaissance unit transferred from 
UHEP, a 50-man Canadian air arm, and six multi-national 
observers to watch, the border withdrawals. The functions 
were narrowly defined: the observers were to observe only . 
They were neither to investigate nor to issue orders or 
directives. 

The expenses of the observer group, averaging 
$200,000 a month, were to be borne by the two parties in- 
volved, the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. The 
period for which support for the group was promised initially 
was two months. In September and again in November, 1963, 
the life of the group was extended for additional two-month 
periods with the promise of continuing financial support. 
At the end of 1963 the character and size of the group were 
changed. There was recognition that little progress had 
been made in improving the situation and that the observers, 
few in number and restricted in mandate, could do little to 
accelerate the rate of progress. Therefore, the observer 
group was reduced sharply in size and the military commander 
who had served as the chief of the mission was replaced by a 

5 U.2T. Doc. S/5321, p. 47. 

to 
In his initial report (U.N. Doc. S/5298) the Secretary- 
General suggested the group be financed under General Assembly 
resolution 1862 (XVII) providing for use of the peace and se- 
curity contingency fund available to the Secretary-General. 
Subsequently, the plan for U. A. R. -Saudi Arabian financing was 
agreed upon. See U.N. Doc. S/5325? p. 50. 



593 

non-military man, Pier Spineili, head of the United Nations 
European office. The non-fighting military presence was 
in the process of being converted to a diplomatic presence. 
In September, 1964, the mission was withdrawn completely in 
the face of continued frustration in resolving the crisis and 
in the wake of the refusal of the Saudi Arabian government 
to extend further its support of the United Nations mission. 
The most recent resort to the United Nations military 
presence has been the most ambitious of the three. In 
March, 1964, a United Nations Force was established for de- 
ployment on Cyprus. Under the terms of the initial resolu- 
tion the Force was "to use its best efforts to prevent a 
recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to 
the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return 
to normal conditions." The decision to use a United Nations 
Force in that troubled island came only after efforts to 
install a NATO Force linked loosely to the United Nations 
failed,, The authorization for the Force came after lengthy, 
hard negotiations on the terms under which the Force would 
serve and on its character. After all the negotiations were 
over, the Force bore a strong resemblance to those used in 
the Middle East and in the Congo. 



^U.N. Doc. S/5501, p. 2. (Mimeograph) 

6 

1 U.N. Doc. S/5575. The resolution was passed at the 

1102nd meeting of the Security Council on March 4, 1964. 



59^ 
The Cyprus Force was composed of over 6,000 men drawn 
from seven neutral and Commonwealth nations. Its composition 
differed somewhat from that of previous forces in that 
British troops were included while no contingents from the 
Afro-Asian countries were present. Financing too was a 
departure from the usual: expenses were met by those states 
contributing the troops and by voluntary contributions. The 
Force operated under the restriction against the use of arms 
except in self-defense that has become standard for United 
Nations forces. • Its mandate was to help restore peace and 
calm to Cyprus, while a political solution was sought. ^ 

The Non-Fighting Force: Its Institutionalized Side 

Let us now evaluate the significance of the foregoing 
case studies, including in our observations the more recent 
experience of the United Nations with the military presence 
in a non-fighting capacity where such experience is relevant 
and illuminating. 

The questions which were raised in the introductory 
chapter and around which the case studies were structured 
must now be answered. In this chapter attention will be di- 
rected at determining the nature of the force as an 
instrument of peaceful settlement — an instrument which has 
emerged out of custom, usage, and deliberate design. In the 



7 U.N. Doc. S/5653. 



395 

following chapter the conditions for the successful estab- 
lishment and use of this instrument will be analyzed. In 
both chapters an attempt will be made to develop some 
tentative hypotheses about the nature of the force and its 
functioning. 

We are concerned with the use — past, present, and 
future — of the non-fighting force. Thus far, the non- 
fighting military presence, in the form either of the 
observer group or the peace-keeping force, has been injected 
into at least ten situations of actual or potential 
violence. Central to our analysis of the character of the 
non-fighting military presence is the determination of the 
degree to which the non-fighting force is or is becoming an 
institutionalized instrument, relatively available for use 
in crises, and the degree to which it is an ad hoc device, 
created anew for each situation into which it is interposed. 
Before beginning our analysis we must note what precisely we 
mean by institutionalization. Institutionalization in this 
study refers to the establishment of an organized pattern of 
behavior, a pattern of action which has some structure and 
some stability. (It does not necessarily infer a highly 
organized, deeply-entrenched pattern of action.) Institu- 
tionalization would stand then in contrast to the method of 
improvisation in which everything begins anew with each 
force. 






396 
To the extent that the force remains non-institu- 
tionalized generalization becomes difficult and of limited 
reliability. Has the United Rations, as some aver, been 
unable "to make any real progress in institutionalizing the 
United Nations' modest capabilities based on present 

Q 

powers?" It is. a contention of this study that this is 
too strong a conclusion, and that there has been a partial 
institutionalization of the non-fighting military presence. 
The United Nations no longer faces the situation it did 
with the first peace-keeping groups "when everything had 
to be improvised, when there was no precedent for making 
units, avail able, no administrative and financial procedure, 
and no organization to which the Secretary-General could 
turn in the task given him by the Assembly of putting a 
United Nations force into a dangerous and delicate 

Q 

situation. nJ 

The military presence used by the United Nations today 
is not entirely or even primarily an ad hoc creation tailored 
anew for each particular crisis. The United Nations has 
drawn on the past in creating its military forces. As evi- 
dence of the institutionalization of the technique of the 



Lincoln Bloomfield, International Mili tary Forces: 
j-ne Q.uesoion _of ^Peacekeeping in an Arme d and Disarming w*or] d 
(New York: Little, Brown and Company r 1964), p. 73." — 



9 



Lester B. Pearson, "Force for U.N. " Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 35 s No. 3 (April, 1957) , p. 402. 






397 
non-fighting force, the difficulties and decision-making 
connected with, establishment of an early group like the Truce 
Supervision Organization in Palestine might be compared with 
the more recent experience of the United Nations in calling 
a military presence into being. The United Nations Emergency- 
Force in the Middle East drew on the experience of the ob- 
servers in Palestine and Kashmir; the United Nations Obser- 
vation Group in Lebanon built on UNEE; the United Nations 
Force in the Congo built on the precedents of both UNEE and 
UNOGIL, The United Nations Force in Cyprus has followed 
the pattern laid down by the earlier groups , 

Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the non-fighting 
force technique has been only partly institutionalized. A 
somewhat different mix of men, material, money, and principles 
has been developed for each major use of the non-fighting 
group. An examination of the degree and scope of institu- 
tionalization of the various aspects of the force suggests 
an inverse relationship between degree of institutionaliza- 
tion and the political importance and sensitivity of the 
questions involved. 

There has grown up in connection with the non-fighting 
force a philosophy, a methodology, and a bureaucracy. A 
group of principles have been established firmly as guides to 
the force's creation and operation. Techniques of bringing 
the force quickly into being as well as efficient operating 



398 

practices have been developed. Finally, a nucleus of 
personnel experienced in peace-keeping work has emerged. A 
closer examination of the developed side of the non-fighting 
force may cast some light on the reasons for the institu- 
tionalization of certain aspects of the force hut not of 
others. 

Institutionalization of a philosophy of action 

The fundamental principle around which the observer 
groups and the peace-keeping forces have been organized is 
that they shall not fight. This principle, from which 
there has been no departure in theory, is central to the 
very nature of these groups. Translated into practical 
terms , the non-fighting principle has meant that the ob- 
server groups have gone unarmed, while in most cases the 
peace-keeping forces have been equipped with no more than 
light arms and instructed to fire only in self-defense. The 
non-fighting nature of these groups is now well-established, 
but initially this was not the case. The question of arming 
some or all the truce observers was raised in connection with 
the Palestine Truce Supervision Organization and ansxtfered 
negatively. The establishment of UKTEF brought to the fore 
the issue of the use which the troops might make of their 
arms. A restricted interpretation of the Force's powers was 
given. Men of UEEF were to shoot only in self-defense. (To 



399 
shoot in self-defense meant that they might respond to 
direct attacks or attempts to force them from positions 
which they had a right and a responsibility to hold.) 

The non-fighting principle was strained and stretched 
in the Congo. The Congo experiment seemed to take the Force 
one step beyond a non-fighting status. In September and 
December, 1961, and December, 1962, OMJC did take military 
initiatives to bring a resolution of the crises which 
plagued the Congo. The use of military force opened the 
way for a broader definition of the role of a peace-keeping 
force. However, the United Nations demonstrated little 
desire to use the Congo experience as a wedge to more 
ambitious action. The United Nations approach is illustra- 
ted by the Secretary-General's vehement denials that United 
Nations troops in the Congo ever took a military initia- 
tive — in his view they were acting in self-defense at all 
times. 

Thus, in principle the non-fighting pattern has never 
been breached. The strength of this pattern was reaffirmed 
when it was used as the basis for defining the powers of the 
observers in Yemen and the troops in Cyprus. Yet the 
strength of the principle and its applicability to all 
situations are not always equal. For example, the newest 
force, operating in Cyprus under the non-fighting principle, 
has faced great problems. In Cyprus Greek and Turkish 



400 

Cypriotes have not been amenable to the orders of the Force. 
•They have engaged in the practice of shooting at each other 
and, on occasion, at members of the United Nations Force. 
The dilemma that the United Nations faced in the Congo is 
being repeated in Cyprus. It may be difficult if not im- 
possible for the Force to carry out its mandate in Cyprus 
while shooting in self-defense only. Yet to depart from 
the non-fighting principle presents its own special prob- 
lems . The Secretary-General expressed early in the Cyprus 
mission the opinion that it "would be incongruous, even a 

little insane" to shoot Cypriotes in order to maintain the 

10 

peace. 

In many ways what the United Nations peace-keeping 
force most represents is an over-size observer group. The 
use of the Force in the Congo marked a move toward the true 
military force. However, the United Nations has shown no 
desire to widen or even to repeat that move. The members 
of the United Nations do not really want to field an army 
which fights. Such armies bring with them a whole host of 
problems. The troops need to be better trained, equipped, 
and supplied when they engage in combat. Moreover, a 
fighting force tends to be highly controversial. And here 
is the crux of the United Nations failure to broaden the 
Force: the consensus among the members necessary to field a 



XU U.N. Doc. S/5671, P. 3. 






4-01 

military force, or at least the consensus on disputes not 
involving Chapter VII, that is, aggression, is generally 
missing. 

An explanation of the United Nations preference for 
the non-fighting force does not answer the question of 
whether the United Nations can stick to this sort of force 
without drastically limiting the kind of situation it will 
enter* The Congo and Cyprus experiences suggest the need 
either for modification of the force's mandate or for less 
difficult assignments for the force in future. 

A second principle which is well established with 
respect to the non-fighting force is that it acts with the 
consent of all parties concerned. The principle of consent 
has "both a practical and a legal side. On the one hand, 
consent is the corollary of the non-fighting nature of the 
force. A small force, unarmed or lightly armed, can hardly 
impose its will on a nation, on dissident elements within a 
nation, or on two nations in conflict. For example, it 
cannot force the withdrawal of invading armies; it can only 
oversee the voluntary withdrawal of those troops. On the 
other hand, since the use of the non-fighting force has not 
been considered as enforcement action under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, a principal legal justification for the force's 
presence within a nation is the consent of that nation. 









402 

It might be noted that consent seems to be somewhat 
more important if the force is set up by the General Assembly 
rather than by the Security Council. For example, the 
principle of consent was not emphasized in connection with 
the Palestine Truce Supervision Organization. In fact, 
threats to invoke enforcement action under Chapter VII were 
made to encourage the parties to the truce to fulfill its 
terms. Nor was the United Nations Force in the Congo, whose 
legal basis was never very clearly specified, as dependent 
on the consent of all as the General Assembly-created UNEF. 

The legal status of a force within the host country 
is determined by agreement between the host and the United 
Nations, Prior to 1955 relatively little heed was paid to 
the question of the status of the observers — perhaps be- 
cause most of the early observer groups were small in size 
and not highly controversial. However, with the stationing 
of UNEf on Egyptian territory a status-of -force agreement was 
negotiated between Egypt and the United Nations. This agree- 
ment has served as the model for succeeding agreements. The 
status-of -force agreement is usually negotiated in the early 
days of the operation. The Congo provided an exception to 
this rule: collapse of the Central Government and chaotic 
internal conditions delayed the detailed agreement over 
sixteen months. The status-of -force agreements have been 
noteworthy for allowing the force freedom of movement and 



403 

action as well as wide privileges within the host state. It 
should be remarked, however, that negotiation of these 
principles has not always guaranteed their implementation in 
practice. In particular, the provision ensuring the United 
Nations troops freedom of movement has caused difficulty on 
occasion: not. all parties have always been willing to sup- 
port the active role for the force implied by full freedom 
of movement. 

The principle of consent is firmly installed with 
respect to the non-fighting force. It applies not only to 
the entry of the force into national territory and its 
status therein, but also to the composition, leadership, and 
functions of the force itself. While a minimum foundation 
of consent is essential to the force's existence, it can be 
argued that the principle of consent has been pushed to the 
point of undercutting the force's effectiveness. Details of 
organization and operation can be subject to too much 
negotiation. Perhaps this is one of the inevitable costs of 
the multi-national force. 

A third great, principle which has guided the non- 
fighting unit is that of political neutrality. The function 
of the United Nations presence is to create an atmosphere of 
calm in which basic political solutions to the questions at 
issue can be sought. To fail to remain politically neutral 
would weaken the military unit's ability to maintain peace 
'without resort to force. 






404- 

Unfortunately, political neutrality is another well- 
established principle of the non-fighting force which is ' 
more applicable to some situations than to others. In 
particular, difficult philosophic and practical questions 
develop x^hen the force is injected into civil war situ- 
ations — and most of the recent missions of the United 
Nations contingents have involved elements of civil war. 
For examples can 'the force remain neutral between the 
central government and rebel factions? The central govern- 
ment is the legal government of the state. It has consented 
to the entry of the United Nations force and agreed to co- 
operate with that force. The problems involved are suggested 
by the United Nations experience in Lebanon and in the Congo. 
In Lebanon the observers entered at the request of the 
central government. To operate effectively the observers 
found it necessary, however, to negotiate and develop good 
relations with rebels who held much of the border territory. 
The United Nations representatives found little evidence of 
the infiltration of arms and men from without that the 
Lebanese Government had charged was occurring. Although 
the Force tried to remain neutral, it was criticized for 
its findings by both the Lebanese Government and some 
members of the United Nations. The difficulties were re- 
solved before becoming too sticky by the internal reconcili- 
ation of the Lebanese factions. What would have happened, 






405 

however, if the civil war had grown worse with the Lebanese 
Government on one side, supported by the United States and 
its allies, and the rebels on the other, supported by the 
United Arab Bepublic, the Soviet Union, and their allies? 
In all likelihood, the observers would be caught in the 
middle, subject to at least verbal attack by one or both 
sides. 

In the Congo situation the United Nations Force 
experienced all the difficulties which may be connected 
with a position of neutrality in a civil war situation. 
The United Nations firmly proclaimed the neutrality of the 
Force with respect to any political disputes within the 
Congo. It stood aloof initially from the conflicts between 
the central government and the secessionist provinces and 
rival governments. But in the chaotic Congo every action 
the Force took or refused to take was interpreted as favor- 
ing some faction. The Force found itself involved in 
political controversy no matter what it did. In addition, 
it discovered that there was little hope of resolving the 
Congo's problems and withdrawing the United Nations units 
until a viable central government was established. Without 
admitting officially that it was backing away from the 
principle of political neutrality, the Force did, in fact, 
throw its aid to the central government finally. 



o 






406 

Despite its experience in the Congo, the United 
Nations has not discarded or reinterpreted the principle of 
political neutrality. The principle was proclaimed in 

connection with United Nations activities in Yemen and 

11 
Cyprus. "^ While it is rather doubtful that the principle - 

can be made completely viable in civil war situations, 
there are few preferable alternatives to it. For ex- 
ample, in their study of United Nations peace-keeping 
forces Burns and Heathcote set forth two possible alterna- 
tives to the political neutrality approach, yet their 

12 

alternatives have their own disadvantages." On the one 

hand, they suggest that the United Nations might determine 
the political ends of the force at the time that the force 
was created. This could lead to the negation of the 
principle of political neutrality in disputes followed by 
the force, at least in theory, heretofore. How would this 
work? If applied to the Cyprus situation, it might be de- 
termined at the outset that the force would support the 
establishment of firm control over the island by President 
Makarios. Yet there are theoretical and practical diffi- 
culties with this course of action. First, it would seem 



1X U.N. Doc. S/5298, p. 34; U.N. Doc. S/5593/Add. 3; 
and U.N. Doc. S/5788. 

Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping 
by U.N. Forces: Prom Suez to the Congo (New York: Frederick 
a'. Praeger for the Center of International Studies, 
.Princeton University, 1963), pp. 166-167. 






4-07 

to involve the United Nations in a domestic conflict, 
thereby violating the United Nations Charter. Second, it 
would probably be a divisive course of action for the United 
Nations, for it is unlikely that all members of the world 
organization would agree on the faction to be supported. 
The second Burns and Heathcote proposal raises fewer obvious 
problems. It is suggested that in situations of internal 
chaos the United Nations force be given full responsibility 
to restore order and police the situation, while remaining 
neutral,, Yet in most cases restoring order would tend to 
redound to the advantage of the central government. In 
effect , the force would be taking sides. Some of the same 
problems as those connected with the obvious intervention 
of the force on behalf of one party could be expected to 
emerge. 

The principles of non-fighting, consent, and politi- 
cal neutrality are well-established as the philosophy of 
operation of the United Nations peace-keeping groups. Al- 
though these principles do not apply equally well in all 
situations, they do represent a consensus among United 
Nations members as to the ideal. Deviations from the 
principles may be possible and on occasion essential, yet 
there seems to be no favor among United Nations members for 
an alteration of the basic principles and therefore of the 
basic nature of the peace-keeping group. 



4-08 

Institutionalization of a philosophy of force composition . 

Out of the years of experience with peace-keeping 
groups a core of principles has been developed as to the 
proper composition of the non-fighting military presence. 
The initial groups had to feel their way through uncharted 
areas. Decisions on the character of the force were made on 
the spot on the basis of expediency. Availability of 
military men and the closing out of Russian participation 
seemed to be the primary rules of the participation formulas 
set up for the early observer units. 

The move to a multilateralization of the peace- 
keeping group came first in the Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation overseeing the armistice agreements in Palestine. 
In 1953 the composition of this Organization was broadened 
from its Belgian-French-United States base with a number of 
additional countries being called upon for observers. 

The development of a formula for participation in 
peace-keeping groups was furthered with the establishment 
of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956. A pattern 
xtfas provided around which succeeding groups have been 
fashioned. First, the principle of wide participation was 
affirmed. (It has been followed in every succeeding peace- 
keeping unit with the exception of the United Nations 
Security Force used in West New Guinea. The use of Pakistani 
troops entirely for that Force was apparently an adaptation 









409 

to circumstances. At the time the United Nations was heavily 
committed, if not over-committed, in men and money for 
peace-keeping. ) 

Second, with UNEF the precedent was set that the 
permanent members of the Security Council should not con- 
tribute men to a peace-keeping group. This principle 
reflects a major function of the group — to isolate dis- 
putes from the conflicts of the major powers. There was a 
departure from this principle in the formation of the 
United Nations Force in Cyprus. Again, the departure was 
a result of special circumstances. The fact that the 
United Kingdom had several thousand troops on Cyprus, 
equipped, trained, and acquainted with the terrain and the 
problems, combined with the reluctance of member states to 
contribute men to the Force made it desirable if not 
essential to include British troops in the Force. The sub- 
sequent treatment of the British members of the United 
Nations Force by the Cypriotes and the suspicion engendered 
by their presence suggests the wisdom of the original 
principle. 

Finally, under the UNEF pattern those states with 
any special interests, actual or potential, in an area were 
also exempt from participation in the peace-keeping force. 
Thus, no Middle Eastern states participated in UNEF. In the 
Congo this principle was modified in favor of that of 






410 

regional solidarity; it was deemed important for the African 
states to assume a responsibility for African problems. The 
Congo experience indicates that the principle of selection 
of troops from non-involved nations has much to recommend it. 

The United Nations has been forced to throw most of 
its peace-keeping groups together hurriedly. Few conform 
to all the principles developed by peace-keeping experience, 
let alone to an ideal model. What would seem to be an ideal 
toward which the United Nations might work and is, in fact, 
working is a balanced force composed of units earmarked and 
trained for service with the United Nations by the middle- 
sized neutral Asian, African, and Western nations. 

In 1959 the Secretary-General queried a number of 
the middle-sized and smaller nations on the possibility of 
setting aside troops for United Nations peace-keeping duties. 
The nations were evasive and little was done for years. 
However, by early 1965 some concrete steps had been taken 
■toward a semi-institutionalized force-in-being with the ear- 
marking of units for United Nations use by Canada, Iran, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the Scandinavian states. In 
some of these states the stand-by unit receives special 
training for United Nations duty. In Canada, for example, 
a normal Regular Infantry Battalion of 650 men is nominated 
as United Nations Stand-by Battalion and receives training 



411 

1 -z 

in airportability and peace-keeping tasks. y The Secretary- 
General's Military Adviser has suggested informally to 
countries with stand-by forces that these units receive 
special instruction in the following areas: a) the history 
of United Nations peace-keeping operations; b) methods to 
aid civilian authorities to maintain law and order; c) 
methods to assist civilian authorities to keep public 
services in operation; and, d) fire control, that is, 

holding one's gunfire even when exposed to danger and 

14 

provocations. 

The stand-by units are still far removed from a full- 
fledged permanent force. On the one hand, it has been 
impossible to regularize the offers of stand-by units. The 
Secretary-General has no authority to discuss or take 
account of such offers officially. Thus , the Secretary- 
General "s involvement with the stand-by units has, of neces- 
sity, been outside the scope of his official duties. On the 
other hand, the stand-by forces do not respond automatically 
to a United Nations call for men; the seconding governments 



^Colonel W.A. Milroy, "The Organization and Role of 
the Canadian Army to Support Peacekeeping Operations," 
Transcript of the Presentation of Colonel Milroy to the 
Meeting of Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects 
of U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations, Ottawa, Canada, November, 
1964, p. 3. 

Conversation with Major-General I.J. Rikhye, Military 
Adviser to the Secretary-General, Black Mountain, North 
Carolina, July, 1965. 






412 

retain the right to determine whether their forces will he 
used for any particular mission. ^ Nonetheless, if the 
precedent of earmarking units for United Nations service is 
widely followed "by other nations, the United Nations would 
seem to he on the way to a more secure "base for its peace- 
keeping activities. 

Institutionalization of a methodolog y 

Institutionalization comes not alone at the level of 
principle. A methodology of peace-keeping has been developed 
out of experience over the years: a methodology which eases 
"both the establishment and operation of the peace-keeping 
group. 

The United Nations Secretariat faced a myriad of 
problems with the establishment of the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization, the first large observer group, 
and the United Nations Emergency Force, the first truly 
international force. Almost every decision, no matter how 
prosaic , was precedent-setting. Basic questions on trans- 
port, equipment, insurance, allowances had to be resolved. 
Although each new venture in the peace-keeping field brings 
new questions aplenty, main guidelines on the routine ques- 
tions have been set. Let us give just a few examples. 



15 
^Per Haekkerup, "Scandinavia's Peace-Keeping Forces 

for U.N. ," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 42, No. 4 (July, 1964), 

677-678, 






413 

Transport of men quickly to the scene of operations 
from their home countries could be a real problem in view 
of the United Nations lack of any extensive transport 
facilities. In fact, the willingness of the United States 
Air Force to provide transport when needed has made this 
problem quite manageable. The Air Force efforts are sup- 
plemented with charter flights and with transport donated 
by states contributing contingents to the force. During 
the establishment of UNEF the prohibition against great 
power involvement was interpreted to prohibit United States 
flights of men and equipment into Egypt itself. Charter 
flights carried the men from the staging areas into Egypt. 
In subsequent situations the prohibition on great power 
participation was not interpreted so as to block United 
States flights into the host country. In fact, in the 
latter stages of the Congo operation American planes were 
flying men and equipment around within the Congo — which 
would seem to be stretching the ground rules a bit. Al- 
though the United States willingness to contribute exten- 
sively to the United Nations transport needs has led to the 
practical institutionalization of its services, it is not 
entirely healthy for the United Nations to be so dependent 
on one member state, however reliable, for a critical peace- 
keeping service. 






4-14 

The difficulties of feeding and equipping the force 
in its early stages have apparently been reduced from those 
encountered with the Suez and Congo forces. (That the prob- 
lems have not been eliminated, however, is suggested by 

complaints over the low stock of rations made in connection 

16 

with the Yemen mission. ) Perhaps the most important 

factor in the improvement has been the increased emphasis 
on making arrangements for the support of the troops prior 
to their entry into the troubled area — in the early 
missions attention was concentrated on getting the men 
quickly in the field, support and supply notwithstanding. 
In addition, the acquisition by the United Nations of a 
small supply of equipment for the use and stock of peace- 
keeping forces-in-being has eased the early weeks of new 
missions. For example, in Lebanon the initial equipment 
needed was borrowed from UNEF stores. The effort now under- 
way to standardize the equipment in use and bring it more 
and more under United Nations, rather than contingent 
ownership, should further contribute to the rapid establish- 
ment of an effective force. 



16 

In the Secretary-General's report of September 4-, 

1963, on the functioning of the United Nations Yemen Obser- 
vation Mission the Secretary-General answered "irresponsible 
and reckless accounts of conditions relating to the Mission." 
He indicated that there was not and never had been "any 
serious shortage of rations, though ration stocks reached a 
low level at one point due to a temporary uncertainty as to 
the best means of transportation." U.N. Doc. S/5412. 






415 

As the United Nations has accumulated experience in 
peace-keeping, certain principles and practices of field 
operation have also "been established. On the one hand, the 
need to give the commander of the force full field responsi- 
bility for operations and logistics has been accepted. On 
the other hand, there has been a recognition of the impor- 
tance of clear directives and precise operational in- 
structions from the United Nations Headquarters to the force 
commander. The United Nations has moved far beyond its 
early practice of wiring the commander the relevant Security 

Council resolution and letting the resolution alone stand as 

17 
the instructions from United Nations headquarters. ' 

Despite progress much remains to be done to perfect 
the handling of logistic and operational problems by the 
United Nations. An important, if still small, step in the 
direction of improvement was made with the establishment on 
a permanent basis in January, 1963, of the office of Military 
Adviser to the Secretary-General. The Military Adviser is 
now provided with two aides to assist him in his advisory 
and planning activities. The need at United Nations Head- 
quarters for a planning and intelligence staff able to 
prepare the way for new military missions has long been 



_. __ 

'Conversation with Ma j or-General I.J. Rikhye, Mili- 
tary Adviser to the Secretary-General, Black Mountain, 
North Carolina, July, 1965. 









4-16 

recognized. Although the unit in being is far less ambiti- 
ous than those usually proposed, it represents the begin- 
nings of preparedness. 

Outside the formal structure of the United Nations 
those member states most concerned with United Nations 
peace-keeping have undertaken some joint consultations with 
a view to furthering the readiness of the United Nations to 
meet new challenges. In 1964- two conferences were held on 
United Nations peace-keeping: the Oslo Conference in Febru- 
ary at itfhich fifteen nations were represented and the Ottawa 
Meeting of Military Experts in November at which twenty- 
three nations were represented. The Ottawa Conference, 
which was restricted to delegates from nations which had 
provided troops for peace-keeping efforts, was devoted to a 
consideration of the technical aspects of peace-keeping 

■j o 

operations. The presence of the Military Adviser of the 
Secretary-General at both meetings in an advisory capacity 
made possible some dialogue between the United Nations 
Secretariat and the member states on past and potential 
technical problems of peace-keeping operations. ° Such 



1 p 

The states which were represented at the Ottawa Con- 
ference were: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, 
Ghana, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, 
Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Tunisia, and the 
United Arab Sepublic. The Secretary-General's Military Ad- 
viser was in attendance as an Observer. 

19 
'The future of conferences such as that held in 

Ottawa is somewhat clouded due to the strong protests made 






4-1? 

conferences and informal consultations among member states 
can help to compensate for deficiencies in pi arming at 

United Nations headquarters. 

Institutionalization of a Force bureaucracy 

As important to the perfection of the peace-keeping 
device as the development of principles and practices of 
peace-keeping has been the growth of a United Nations 
bureaucracy experienced in this sort of activity. A corps 
of military and civilian leaders skilled in establishing 
and guiding the non-fighting force is growing up. On the 
one hand, there is a group of Secretariat officials who have 
been assigned responsibilities with a number of the peace- 
keeping missions. For example, Ealph Bunche has played a 
prominent role in the establishment and/or operation of 
every major United Nations peace-keeping activity since 
Palestine. Although Secretariat officials may not be know- 
ledgeable as to the conditions in an area to which a peace- 
keeping group is assigned, their knowledge of the ins and 



by the Soviet Union to the Conference and to the presence 
of the Secretary-General's military adviser in particular. 
The Soviet Union held that the Conference envisaged the 
"creation of a military apparatus on a collective basis by 
a number of states members of military blocs with the aim 
of conducting military operations in the interests of this 
group of states under the cover of the United Nations flag. 
See Paul Martin, "Peace Keeping: Some Prospects and Perspec- 
tives," Text of a Speech to the McGill Conference on World 
Affairs, November 21, 1964, Statements and Speeches , Infor- 
mation Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 
'Canada. 









418 

outs of such missions should enable them to move forward 
with considerably more assurance than was the case a decade 
ago. 

On the other hand, the military men experienced in 
this sort of undertaking serve as a nucleus- on-hand to which 
the United Nations can turn in establishing a new mission. 
The original field commanders of each of the observation 
groups and the peace forces since UNEF have had prior 
United Nations peace-keeping experience. To illustrate, 
UNEF was organized by Major-General E.L.M. Burns, who was 
serving at the time as Chief of UNTSO, and by a small group 
of observers Burns brought with him from the Truce Organiza- 
tion. The organization of the Observation Group in Lebanon 
was handled by a group of observers on loan from UNTSO. The 
first commander of the United Nations Force in the Congo was 
Major-General Carl von Horn, who came from service as Chief 
of the Truce Supervision Organization. He too was assisted 
in his initial duties by some truce observers as well as by 
some units from UNEF. Von Horn served also as the first 
chief of the Yemen Observation Mission, a mission which was 
composed almost entirely of units transferred from UNEF. 
The first chief of the United Nations Force in Cyprus was 
Lieutenant-General P.S. Gyani, who had just completed four 
years service as Commander of UNEF. 






4-19 
Not only is a corps of leaders being developed to 
guide United Nations peace-keeping missions, "but the number 
of experienced men for the rank-and-file positions is also 
growing. Although the tour of duty for most of the United 
Nations soldiers is short, re-enlistments occur. The 
simultaneous operation of several peace-keeping operations 
in recent years has made possible the transfer of experienced 
soldiers and observers from a well-established mission to 
one in the process of establishment, thereby easing the first 
stages of such an endeavor. Such transferred troops can get 
on the scene quickly with some idea of what should be done 
once there. In the Congo crisis Swedish contingents were 
transferred from UNEF for temporary duty with ONUC during 
its first days. In the Yemen mission over one-half of the 
initial observers came directly from service with UNEF. In 
the case of Cyprus it was reported that the Irish contingent 
would be composed largely of volunteers with service in the 
Congo. In addition, as noted earlier, some states are ear- 
marking and training military units specifically for United 
Nations duty, while in 1965 Sweden inaugurated a staff course 
open to all Scandinavian officers to be sent on United 
Nations observer duty. An expanded staff program is planned 
for the summer of 1966. All of this is still far from a 
standing force of trained units, but it does represent an 
improvement over the completely inexperienced force, used of 
necessity in the earliest missions. 



420 

The significance of institutionalization 

The United Nations is developing skills in peace- 
keeping: principles, practices, and personnel upon which it 
can rely for each new venture are being built. What is the 
extent and significance of this institutionalization? First, 
the institutionalization is not complete; what are perhaps 
the most critical areas for the successful creation and 
operation of a force are still in a state of limbo. Arrange- 
ments for financing and political controls are not fixed. 
Second, the growth in institutionalization which has occurred 
does not necessarily bring a corresponding increase in either 
willingness to establish peace-keeping missions or in their 
success. The United Nations has undertaken its most recent 
assignments only with reluctance, while no force has re- 
ceived the unvarnished praise of the first, UNEF. 

It may be hypothesized that incomplete institutionali- 
zation and qualified success grow out of the same cause: a 
basic lack of political consensus. The states that compose 
the United Nations are unwilling to support in advance and 
unreservedly United Nations efforts to keep the peace. Each 
situation must be examined on its merits. The United Nations 
endeavor must be matched against the national interest of the 
state. In each of the past peace-keeping missions there has 
been a continuum of opinion among members ranging from 
passive opposition to limited acceptance to active support. 









421 

On the one hand, there has been little open opposition to 
the initial establishment of any of the peace-keeping 
operations. There have been no negative votes in the Se- 
curity Council, though there have been abstentions, on the 
establishment of the military presence. On the other hand, 
neither has there been a willingness on the part of all the 
states to support the peace-keeping missions whole-heartedly 
with men, money, and material. Moral support is come by 
more easily. 

The i'Ton-gighting Force; Its Non-Institutionalized Side 

The areas in which the least institutionalization of 
peace-keeping has occurred are precisely those which are 
closest to the heart of the operation. Thus, the financial 
basis of the peace-keeping mission and the proper locus of 
decision-making and control of the force pose issues still 
unresolved. 

The financial questions relating to peace-keeping are 
unresolved because the United Nations is a league of 
sovereign states. Members opposed or luke-warm to a peace- 
keeping operation do not favor commitment of the nation's 
resources, even a very small part of those resources, to 
further that peace-keeping venture. 

As the United Nations has undertaken new and more 
ambitious peace-keeping assignments, it has actually retro- 









4-22 

gressed in terms of the establishment of a secure financial 
base for such activities. The early observer groups' ex- 
penses were included in the regular budget. Even though the 
Soviet Union complained about the composition of the Truce 
Supervision Organization and, on occasion, about its 
functioning, that nation continued to pay its entire assess- 
ment for the regular budget, including the portion which 
would go for the support of the observers. Since 1963, the 
Soviet Union has deducted from its regular contribution, 
the proportion of its assessment which would go for support 
of peace-keeping activities it does not approve. 

With UNEF came the concept of the special account for 
peace-keeping expenses along with that of the collective 
responsibility of all members for these expenses. The two 
concepts proved somewhat incompatible in practice. The 
application of the forward-looking collective responsibility 
principle was undermined, at least to a degree, by the 
operation of the special account. It is true that the 
members were assessed for the special account on the basis 
of the scale for the regular budget and that the Secretary- 
General and a number of the national representatives con- 
tended that the special account carried the same obligation 
to pay as did the regular account. Despite this the 
special account gave legal and moral support to those who 
argued that there was no obligation to contribute. (In view 
of the difficulties connected with the special account, it 






423 

is rather surprising that the Secretary-General suggested 
its use for both the Observation Group in Lebanon and the 
Force in the Congo. The expenses of the observers were 
included in the regular budget, but a special account was 
established for ONUC.) 

The failure of a number of states to pay their 
assessments for UNE1? and ONUC threw the United Nations into 
financial crisis. Ultimately, an Advisory Opinion was asked 
of the International Court of Justice with respect to the 
obligation of the member states to pay for peace-keeping 
operations set up in special accounts. The Court, upholding 
the view put forward consistently by the Secretary-General, 
ruled that these expenses did not differ basically from 
those included in the regular budget and were expenses of 
the organization within the meaning of Article 17 (2) of the 
Charter. 

A court decision could not resolve the basic political 
problem posed by the members 1 failure to come forth with 
financial support however. The only sanction available to 
the United Nations against those who refuse to pay is depri- 
vation of their vote in the General Assembly. Members of 
the United Nations have been reluctant to impose this 
sanction, for the consequences of lifting the right to vote 
of such states as Prance and the Soviet. Union cannot be 
foreseen. The cure might well be more disastrous for the 






424 

world organization than the disease. Thus, when the 
Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly convened in the 
winter of 1964 the long-anticipated show-down over finances 
was sidestepped ("by the expedient of avoiding virtually all 
roll-call votes) in favor of continued efforts to find a 
solution to the financial crisis acceptable to all,. 

The essentially political nature of the financial 
question is reflected as well in the United Nations retreat 
from the concept of collective responsibility. Despite the 
Court's opinion that all members are responsible for a 
peace-keeping action voted by the Assembly or the Security 
Council, other and extraordinary methods of financing have 
been sought in the subsequent peace-keeping missions. In 
the West New Guinea and Yemen cases the parties directly 
involved were required to cover the costs of the United 
Nations action. In the Cyprus situation the Secretary- 
General returned to the precedents of the Korean War. Those 
states contributing men to the United Nations Force were 
asked to bear the costs of the operation. Voluntary contri- 
butions to make" up any deficits were also invited. This 
approach, too, has had discouraging results. 

In its early peace-keeping activities the United 
Nations established the observer group or force, got it 
operating in the area of crisis, then worried about how to 
pay for it. In the face of severe financial problems, this 






4-25 

method lias been discarded. In the three most recent peace- 
keeping operations the Secretary-General has attempted to 
make an assured financial base a condition for the estab- 
lishment of the mission. What this has meant in effect is 
that the interested parties, interested because they are 
directly involved as in West Hew Guinea or Yemen or inter- 
ested because they want to see peace and stability promoted 
by the United Nations as in Cyprus, have been given the 
responsibility of paying for the peace-keeping. let this 
hardly seems a definitive answer. It is true that those 
states 'which really want to see an operation succeed can 
help ensure that success by covering its costs. However, 
an undue reliance and, in the case of ambitious endeavors, 
perhaps an unacceptable burden is placed on a few states. 
The important principle of collective responsibility is 
undermined in the process. 

One other financial alternative which has been pro- 
posed n oj students of the United Nations should be noted. 

What of independent sources of revenue for the United 

20 
Nations? If the United Nations had an independent income, 

could it not undertake these missions with impunity, worrying 

little about whether individual nations were willing to 

contribute to the support of peace-keeping? Theoretically 

See, for example, John G. Stoessinger, Financing the 
United Nation s S ystem (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, t!J64-)s pp. 265-292. 



426 

yes, but one must probe more deeply. Would the sovereign 
states be willing to give the United Nations an independent 
or semi-independent existence by giving it an independent 
income? Would they be willing to release the controls held 
on the world organization's activities through their 
financial support or non-support of those activities? It 
seems unlikely that the members of the United Nations would 
give the organization this much discretion. More probably 
they would wish either to keep their fingers on the purse 
strings or to confine the independently-financed activities 
to innocuous and non-controversial welfare-type measures. 

The exercise of effective political control over a 
force poses a second unresolved problem. The Security 
Council and the General Assembly have been either unable or 
unwilling to lay down more than the broadest guidelines for 
the activities of the peace-keeping group. In every case 
great discretion has been given to the Secretary-General (or 
in the case of the early observation groups to the Mediator 
or the Conciliation Committee) in both the establishment and 
supervision of the force. Again this seems to stem from a 
lack of political consensus among the members. The lowest 
common denominator of agreement is the establishment of a 
force. Beyond that there is division. 

The consequence of the Council's and Assembly's abdi- 
cation of responsibility for managing their peace-keeping 



427 

arms is that the precise shape and nature of the endeavor 
is determined in large part by decisions made by the 
Secretary-General, The peace-keeping group in being is in 
good part a reflection of the Secretary-General's conception 
of what it should be. Thus, under Hammarskj old there was 
great emphasis on the principles of the operation, caution 
in any expansion of the activities of the force, and avoid- 
ance if at all possible of military engagement. Both 
Trygve Lie and U Thant seem less concerned about principle 
than about operating success. Their groups would apparently 
have a potentially broader mandate than Hammarskj old deemed 
acceptable. As Secretary-General, Lie stood at the fore- 
front of United Nations opinion, recommending both a standing 
United Nations guard and an armed force to enforce the 
decisions of the world organization with respect to Palestine. 
U Thant has been more reluctant to commit the United Nations 
to new peace-keeping activities than was his predecessor, 
but once committed he appears more willing to breach the 
principles of non-fighting and neutrality if this is neces- 
sary to the success of the mission. 

The responsibilities for peace-keeping assumed by the 
Secretary-General have strengthened that office. But those 
same responsibilities have destructive potential. If the 
mission errs, if the force becomes controversial, blame 
falls on the Secretary-General. 






428 

Some effort has been made to spread at least slightly 
the burden of peace-keeping responsibility borne by the 
Secretary-General. The principal institutional device used 
for this purpose is the Advisory Committee. The Advisory 
Committee technique was inaugurated with the United Nations 
Emergency Force. The General Assembly called for a commit- 
tee of representatives of seven states, reflecting a cross- 
section of United Nations membership, to assist the 
Secretary-General . The Advisory Committee seems to have 
played a limited role in actual decision-making. Its value 
rested rather in backing up the Secretary-General's de- 
cisions , conveying the impression that controversial 
decisions were the product of the organization as a whole 
and not merely of its executive head. Thus, the UNEF 
Advisory Committee came into most prominence in connection 
with a dispute over the United Nations role at the time of 
the Israeli departure from the Gaza Strip. 

Advisory Committees were created as adjuncts to the 
Observation Group in Lebanon and the Force in the Congo. 
The origins and' operation of the committees in these two 
situations lends credence to the conclusion that their main 
purpose is to provide moral support for the decisions made 
by the Secretary-General. Thus, the Advisory Committee for 
the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was created 
oj the Secretary-General in mid- July, over a month after 
the mission was inaugurated but at a time that it was coming 









429 

under criticism. There is little evidence that the Commit- 
tee did anything once established. Again, in August, I960, 
when the United Nations Force in the Congo began to come 
under pressure, the Secretary-General created an Advisory 
Committee. This time it was composed of representatives of 
the nations contributing troops to the Force. 

In the Congo crisis the Secretary-General pleaded 
with both the General Assembly and the Security Council to 
set up a subsidiary body to aid him in decision-making and 
to assume some of the responsibility for the highly contro- 
versial decisions which had to be made. The pleas were 
ignored, perhaps because there was little consensus on the 
proper composition or role of such a group. As the OHTTC 
mission became more and more controversial, the Secretary- 
General emphasized his consultations with the Advisory 
Committee in arriving at decisions. Although the Advisory 
Committee's precise operation and role is again clouded in 
ambiguity, evidence suggests that it did not play a very 
significant role as an advisory or decision-making body. 
Its main use was as a sounding board and prop for the 
Secretary-General . 

The failure to establish any control agent over the 
Secretary-General with respect to the Force in Cyprus 
emphasizes the problem of devising adequate controls and 
aids to the Secretary-General. At the time that the dis- 
cussions of the establishment of a peace-keeping force for 



430 

Cyprus were under way, it was reported that the Secretary- 
General s s plans envisioned a four-man committee as the 
directorate of the Force. The committee would he composed 

of the Secretary-General and three representatives from the 

21 
Security Council. The proposal was lost in the shuffle. 

The only direct control placed on the Secretary-General in 
connection with his role in bringing the United Nations 
Force in Cyprus into being was the requirement that he re- 
port periodically to the Security Council. 

It must not be assumed, however, that the Secretary- 
General has been without guidance as to the attitude of the 
member states with respect to any of the peace-keeping 
forces. The Secretary-General has engaged in intensive 
private consultations with the major powers in the United 
Nations in connection with all the peace-keeping groups. 
Though little stressed publicly, such private discussions 
are a significant supplement to Advisory Committee consulta- 
tions. 

Although the various Secretaries-General have demon- 
strated great skill in organizing and directing peace- 
keeping operations, the heavy reliance on the Secretary- 
General seems a perilous foundation, perilous both for the 
position of the Secretary-General and for the stability of 



Ch ristian Science Monitor , February 20, 1964, and 

February - ?! , 1964 . 






4-31 

the peace-keeping operation. It would seem desirable if not 
essential that some more effective form of political control 
and guidance be instituted between the Secretary-General 
and the Security Council and/or General Assembly. 

Finally, neither the legal basis nor the exact extent 
of the powers of the force have been spelled out. In view 
of the lack of agreement on how the force should be financed, 
controlled, and operated, the ambiguity of the force's legal 
foundations is not surprising. To tie the force too closely 
to particular articles of the Charter would be to define its 
character and nature more precisely than warranted by the 
consensus on the force. A vague legal foundation corres- 
ponds with a lack of unanimity on the exact nature of the 
force. 

Conclusions 

A survey of those aspects of the non-fighting military 
presence which are at least semi-institutionalized and those 
aspects which remain non-institutionalized leads us to two 
questions: first, why is there a difference in extent of 
institutionalization and, second, what is the significance 
of this difference? 

A consideration of the difference in character be- 
tween the institutionalized and non-institutionalized 
elements of the non-fighting force suggests that political 






4-32 

factors determine the degree of institutionalization. It 
is the technical-administrative side of the force which 
has been institutionalized; the really basic questions about 
the character and support of the force remain unanswered. 
The consensus among the members necessary to fix the basic 
outlines of the force firmly is simply not in existence. 
Although almost all the members of the United Nations have 
accepted the usefulness of this new instrument, there is 
still no agreement on exactly what kind of instrument it 
should be. The members of the United Nations may be willing 
to give the Secretary-General the authority to run a force, 
but they are not willing to commit themselves deeply to its 
existence. The member states are not yet willing to release 
unconditionally men and money to whatever end the United 
Nations membership might determine important to peace and 
security. Nor are they willing to assume responsibility 
for more than the most general guidance of the force. 

The second question which must be considered with 
respect to the force is the significance of the institu- 
tionalization which has occurred to the successful function- 
ing of the force. As details of composition and logistics 
are worked into a routine pattern and as personnel experi- 
enced in peace-keeping is built up, a new force becomes 
easier to establish and more efficient once established. 
It can' be put into the field more quickly with less confusion 






^33 

and it becomes more skilled in its operations. Yet the 
real questions about bow a non-fighting force operates and 
the real criteria of its success are again political. It 
can be assumed that the institutionalization of the admini- 
strative and technical aspects of the force can improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness to a degree — but only to a 
degree. In the following chapter we will explore the 
question of the determinants of the effective operation of 
the non-fighting force further. 



> 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE PERFORMANCE AND THE POTENTIAL OP THE NON-FIGHTING FORCE 

i 

The non-fighting military presence has been called 

into more and more frequent use. It is at least partially- 
institutionalized with proposals for further institutionali- 
zation common. Discussions of establishing some sort of 
permanent international force are made with increasing 
frequency. In view of the important role in international 
politics of the non-fighting force, it is incumbent on us 
to develop some sort of framework for evaluating the 
performance — past and potential — of this newest 
instrument of peace-keeping. 

On the basis of the experience the United Nations 
has had thus far with peace-keeping groups, it is possible 
to outline in rough and tentative fashion the conditions 
under which the peace-keeping group is likely to be brought 
into being and to be used effectively. Since no permanent 
force has been created yet, establishment and effective 
operation pose separate, though related, problems and must 
be examined individually. A peace-keeping group might be 
brought into being quickly and then fail to operate 
effectively because of the particular conjunction of circum- 
stances. Or it is possible, if less easily demonstrated, 

454 



435 

that a force might have operated effectively to dampen down 
a crisis if it had been possible to create the force 
initially. 

It may be. concluded that there are four clusters 
of factors which are significant in determining whether a 
non-fighting military presence will be established. 

A first and minimum requirement for the establishment 
of a force is that there be at least passive acquiescence to 
such establishment by all the major powers or, alterna- 
tively, fairly wide support among the members of the Organi- 
zation. The acquiescence of the permanent members of the 
Security Council is, of course, necessary if the force is 
to be created by the Council where the veto is omnipresent. 
If the agreement necessary for Security Council action is 
missing, the General Assembly can act under the "Uniting 
for Peace" resolution. Although there has been much popular 
comment linking this resolution to the peace-keeping forces, 
every group except the United Nations Emergency Force and 
the Security Force for West New Guinea, which was rather 
special in character, has been created by the Security 
■ Council. It would appear that in the area of peace-keeping 
the Security Council has not been superceded by the General 
Assembly. Nonetheless, one may assume that the "Uniting for 
Peace" resolution acts as a prod to the Security Council. 
Since the General Assembly can move into areas where the 



436 

Council is blocked by veto, there may be little to gain by 
a veto (assuming support for action in the Assembly) except 
disparagement of the Security Council — an end not desired 
by the Soviet Union, its supporters, and many of the major 
powers. (The role of the communist states,. as reflected in 
the votes establishing the forces, is interesting. Although 
they have voted in the General Assembly against establish- 
ing, financing, or strengthening such groups, they have not 
voted in the negative in the Security Council where such a 
vote would doom the proposed operation.) It may be that 
the peace-keeping forces have helped not only to expand the 
powers of the Secretary-General, but to revitalize the 
Security Council as well. 

A second requirement for the creation of the force is 
the consent of the parties directly involved in the dispute 
at issue. The very nature of the non-fighting force pre- 
cludes a force not based on consent. The force is to enter 
a situation of actual or potential conflict and help restore 
peace by its presence alone. This necessarily calls for 
the consent of the parties involved to the force's entry. 
whether such consent will be forthcoming would seem to de- 
pend in large part on whether the nations involved judge 
that the force would serve, or at a minimum would not injure, 
their national interests. If those involved do not view the 
force as useful to them, it is likely that some pressure will 



4-37 

be required to win the necessary consent* Illustrative of 
the latter situation would be the Israeli consent to the 
United Nations entry to the Gaza area. 

A third factor affecting the likelihood of use of 
a United Nations force in a crisis is the nature of the 
parties involved in the question at issue. The force Is 
most likely to be used in disputes or conflicts involving 
the newly independent nations of the world* In every one 
of its uses since World War II, in fact, at least one of 
the parties has been a newly independent nation. The 
instability of these states and the host of problems 
associated with their entry into the society of nations 
makes them likely subjects for United Nations intervention. 
Not only are the new nations more crisis -prone than some of 
the older states, they are also more ready to turn to the 
United Nations for assistance in coping with the problems. 
With the increasing number of new nations in the United 
Nations, there has also been a growing use of the non- 
fighting force. Thus, a principal function of the non- 
fighting force has been to dampen down crises in the new 
nations and to insulate them from East-West conflict. 

If the peace-keeping group is likely to be used in 
the new nations to stabilize volatile situations, it Is not 
likely to be used in either intra-bloc disputes or East- 
West engagements. In view of the competition and frictions 






4-38 

"between the major powers, neither wants to drag its family 
disputes into the world organization. It is deemed 
preferable to resolve such issues within the bloc if 
possible, rather than getting them entangled in the world 
organization. The case of Cyprus demonstrates that this is 
not always possible. (It is significant that the United 
Kingdom and the United States attempted to keep the issue 
out of the halls of the United Nations. The early proposals 
were for a force composed of troops from the NATO powers, 
tied loosely to the United Nations, rather than for a United 
Nations force. Only the intransigence of the Cypriote 
Government forced the issue into the United Nations.) Nor 
is the non-fighting force deemed a suitable instrument for 
the resolution of East-Vest differences. The dangers to 
the United Nations of getting caught in the cross-fire be- 
tween East and West are well-recognized. Proposals to 
establish units for duty in such conflicts have come to 
naught. Thus, the United States suggestion in 1964 that a 
United Nations force be sent to Laos was received with 
coolness and little action. 

. Finally, the degree of institutionalization of the 
force and the extent and nature of United Nations experience 
with peace-keeping forces bears on the ease of establish- 
ment. Successful and extensive experience in peace-keeping 
contributes to both the psychological and the material 



4-39 

readiness to create new groups. Thus, the success of the 
United Nations Emergency Force and the institutionalization 
of certain aspects of the force made the instrument more 
available than it had been in earlier years. Efforts to 
call a United Nations force into being in Palestine in 194-8, 
for example, and to strengthen the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization in succeeding years with sizable 
contingents had failed — there were no precedents for a 
force and the crises were not grave enough to warrant 
establishment of a new precedent. 

The very availability of the technique of the peace- 
keeping force raises certain difficulties however. Once the 
precedents are set, there is the danger that new forces may 
be created for emergencies without adequate consideration of 
all the implications of the action and of all the factors 
necessary for the successful completion of a mission. The 
Congo case might well be cited as one in which a force was 
created with limited consideration of the consequences. It 
may be healthy for the United Nations to consider carefully, 
as it has since the Congo difficulties, precisely what is 
involved before a peace-keeping mission is initiated. This 
comment suggests that extensive institutionalization of the 
force before the conditions for its successful operation 
are established may be a disadvantage on occasion, leading 
the United Nations into situations beyond its capabilities. 






440 

If mere establishment of a peace -keeping force does 
not guarantee its successful operation, what are the basic 
conditions for its success in the field? The powers of the 
force must be roughly in balance with its responsibilities 
for it to operate effectively. Although this seems an 
obvious prior condition, one of the major elements in the 
failures of past peace-keeping efforts has been an imbalance 
of responsibilities as compared to powers. 

The responsibilities of the peace-keeping group are 
(with variations cued to the particular circumstances) to 
help maintain a condition of non-fighting, while political 
solutions are sought to the basic issues in dispute. The 
peace-keeping group may observe, patrol, investigate, and, 
rarely, use arms to maintain tenuous stability in an area 
of crisis. 

Under relatively ideal conditions the non-fighting 
force works very well indeed. An ideal situation might be 
defined as one in which a) the functions of the force are 
clear-cut and well-defined; b) the parties involved co- 
operate fully with the United Nations, group, view the United 
Nations presence as in their national interest, and can 
control their population; and c) the United Nations mission 
has strong support from members of the world organization. 
Such an ideal situation was approximated in Suez. None of 
the parties directly involved opposed the United Nations 



441 

intervention, so basic cooperation was ensured. The lines 
of conflict were clearly drawn. The mandate of the force 
was, at least in its restricted form, clear-cut. 

Unfortunately, the conditions of operation of the 
United Nations non-fighting force are frequently far from 
ideal. Responsibilities become heavier as conditions be- 
come less ideal. Situations involving civil or communal 
strife are particularly likely to pose difficult problems 
for the United Nations. To operate effectively the United 
Nations force needs to have the consent and cooperation of 
all parties. To win such cooperation the group must be 
neutral between all factions. Yet it is not easy for the 
force to appear neutral in a civil war situation. Coopera- 
tion with the legitimate government is often necessary to 
the mission; yet such cooperation is likely to be interpre- 
ted as favoritism. In fact, even the most rigorous efforts 
to be neutral may fail to establish the force's impartiality. 
Laying aside any question of United Nations neutrality, 
those involved in civil conflict may simply be unwilling or 
unable to ensure that all their adherents cooperate fully 
and in good faith with the peace-keeping mission. It is 
unfortunate in view of the difficulties that a civil war 
situation poses for the United Nations that the most 
probable future uses of the force will be in just this sort 
of situation. Every use of the peace-keeping device since 






44-2 

1958 has had civil war elements. Communal strife, racial 
strife , tribal strife — all are likely in the new nations; 
it is also likely that the United Nations will be involved 
in some of these situations. 

The duration of a crisis and the likelihood of a 
solution will also affect the nature of a non-fighting 
force's mission. The force is by definition a temporary 
expedient designed to maintain the status quo while a politi- 
cal solution is sought to the underlying problems at issue. 
If the final solutions prove illusive and the force's 
temporary stay is prolonged as a consequence to semi- 
permanency, the problems of the force tend to be compounded. 
Hot only is it difficult over a long period of time to 
maintain cooperative relationships in the field, but support 
for the force at United Nations headquarters may ebb as well. 
The force itself may be associated with the failure to re- 
solve the issues to the detriment of its prestige. To the 
extent that the position of the force is undermined, its 
ability to bring a successful resolution of the issues will 
be weakened. At the same time the United Nations may find 
its resources tied down to a crisis without end; its flexi- 
bility to meet new challenges reduced. 

When the United Nations becomes involved in a less 
than ideal situation, the gap between responsibility and 
power widens. If the United Nations peace-keeping missions 






4-4-3 
are to operate effectively, if difficult operations are not 
to drag the United Nations itself down in their failures, 
such gaps must be closed. The mission must be contracted 
or the authority available to the operation expanded. 

The powers which the non-fighting force has to carry 
through its functions are relatively few in number. It is 
to maintain peace through its presence primarily. Backing 
up that presence and giving it significance is the moral 
authority of the world organization. 

The moral support behind the non-fighting force be- 
comes increasingly important as a mission becomes more 
controversial or difficult. Past experience indicates that 
the successful functioning of a force does not require total 
support for it by all the members of the international 
organization. The support required will vary, in fact, with 
the situation. It would seem fair to conclude, however, 
that a successful peace-keeping presence will require at a 
minimum a foundation of dedicated commitment from a nucleus 
of states. Among those strongly committed should be some 
major power or powers. The committed supply not only moral 
backing for the force, but also a dependable base of men, 
money, and material. 

Past peace-keeping efforts have had such a nucleus 
of strong support. An analysis of votes relating to the 
peace-keeping groups and of financial and manpower contri- 






W4 

butions reveals that the core of support has rested with, a 
group of middle-sized states — Canada, Denmark, India, 
Norway, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden, among others — 
and with the United States. The latter power has provided 
the great power assistance needed. On the one hand, 
transport and supplies have been provided in the early 
stages of the operation. On the other hand, power and in- 
fluence have been exercised by the United States on behalf 
of the force and its endeavors. Such backing is, on 
occasion, indispensable for a non-fighting force, for it 
has limited means of its own to enforce decisions of the 
international organization. However, the importance of the 
United States support raises the question, directly, of the 
chances of success of a peace-keeping effort which the 
United States did not regard as being in its national 
interest and, indirectly, of the dangers of reliance for 
support on too few powers. (It might be noted that some of 
the most enthusiastic support for the peace-keeping force 
has come from the United States. Not only has the United 
States been at the head of the list of supporters of estab- 
lished forces, it has also been among the first to propose 
new forces. Thus, the United States advocated a force for 
the Palestine situation in 194-8, for the Lebanese crisis in 
1958, and for Laos in 1964.) United States support or no, 
it xv r ould seem essential for a force to have support which 



445 

matches, in terms of depth of commitment and breadth of 
powers committed, the scale and difficulty of the mission 
undertaken. 

As a peace-keeping group assumes heavier responsi- 
bilities, the group may need not only greater moral backing, 
but also a stronger material base, better trained and 
organized men ? and possibly a wider mandate. For example, 
the force which is thrust into a highly volatile situation 
in which all the elements are not easily controlled may 
well need to be empowered to shoot if necessary to quell 
riotous action. Such a broadening of mandate and expansion 
of powers was found necessary in the Congo. 

Our review of the conditions which determine the 
success of a peace-keeping group in the field has emphasized 
the importance of ensuring that the powers of the force are 
adequate to its assignment. The difficulty of the assign- 
ment is primarily a product of the situation into which a 
peace-keeping group is thrust. The power and capability of 
a group are a product of both political factors — support 
from the member states for the group and its mission — and 
such practical factors as mandate, equipment, and training. 
As the Congo experience forcefully demonstrated, it is not 
always possible to foresee accurately the full dimensions 
of a peace-keeping group's task at the outset of a mission. 
The greater the responsibilities assigned the group, the 



446 
more difficult the situation into which it is injected, the 
more generous will its powers have to be for success. If 
the powers of a peace-keeping group are commensurate with 
its responsibilities, it can be assumed that it will be 
able to carry through its mission of maintaining a state of 
non-fighting. 

We do not wish to imply, however, that the power- 
responsibility equation is the only consideration affecting 
the desirability of establishing and continuing a peace- 
keeping group. The long-range effects of the United Rations 
mission, successful though it may be in maintaining a 
condition of non-fighting, must be taken into account in 
judging the ultimate value of a peace-keeping unit. 

what, on the one hand, are the costs of achieving 
a balance of power and responsibilities? Conceivably, a 
peace-keeping group could be too expensive — the costs of 
achieving a favorable balance could be so great as to en- 
danger the political and financial stability of the world 
organization. What, on the other hand, are the political 
consequences of United Nations action? It is possible that 
a peace-keeping unit while maintaining a non-fighting condi- 
tion in an area might actually militate against a permanent 
political solution to a crisis. The very presence of the 
United Nations troops, preventing overt violence, might 
remove from the parties involved any pressure to negotiate. 












44-7 

An acceptable stalemate with the United Nations guaranteeing 
against a recurrence of hostilities might on occasion seem 
preferable to a compromise of principles . This comment is 
not meant to impugn the value of establishing a state of 
non-fighting, but merely to suggest that if the non-fighting 
force technique is to be effectively used, it must not be- 
come a substitute for a solution to basic issues. It is, 
after all, theoretically only the first stage in a United 
Nations effort to resolve a crisis. 

Our delineation of the factors that affect establish- 
ment and effective use of a non-fighting force in a 
particular crisis leaves open the question of the future of 
this peace-keeping technique. Can we expect extensive and 
successful use of the force? Is it likely that the powers 
and responsibilities of future peace-keeping groups will be 
in balance? If in balance, will it be at the level of low 
power and few responsibilities or at that of extended 
responsibilities and powers? Although a definitive answer 
to these questions is hardly possible, some possibilities 
for the future can be suggested. 

We begin ~by accepting the need for the non-fighting 
force technique in the world. Evidence of that need is wide- 
spread. There has been an increasing tendency to call on the 
United Rations military presence to cope with situations of 
tension and violence. Even the attempts which have occurred 






448 

since the Congo mission to retrench and re-think the United 
Nations military role have been only partially successful. 
Crises in Yemen and Cyprus thrust themselves on the United 
Nations and demanded international attention. At the same 
time there have been a rising number of proposals at all 
levels — governmental, scholarly, and popular — for the 
creation of some sort of permanent or semi-permanent peace 
force, capable of rapid dispatch to areas of crisis. For 
example, the United States came forward with the suggestion 
of a United Nations peace force in connection with its 1961 
proposal for "General and Complete Disarmament" and on 
occasion has seemed to advocate the establishment of a small 
police force preliminary to the completion of disarmament 
arrangements. In the summer of 1964 the Soviet Union, whose 
attitude to peace-keeping forces has tended to be cool, 
called for a permanent force. Both the practice and the 
proposals reveal a common belief that "international anarchy 
carries increasingly intolerable risks due to the dangers of 
self-help in a thermonuclear world." 

Assuming' then the value of the non-fighting force 
technique, there are in our view three possible lines of 
development that the use of peace-keeping groups may take in 



1 
Stanley Hoffmann, "Erewhon or Lilliput? — A Critical 
View of the Problem," in Lincoln Bloomfield, International 
Military Forces (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964-;, p. 

196. 



449 
coming years. For want of any more formal title we will 
simply call these three possibilities the limited approach, 
the ambitious approach, and the flexible approach. 

The limited approach to future use of the non-fighting 
force technique is one which would emphasize caution: caution 
in further development of the technique and caution in its 
use in new crises. Little effort would be made to institu- 
tionalize the non-fighting force. Forces would be created 
ad hoc for specific problems. Situations which promised to 
be controversial or highly challenging would be avoided. 
Use of the group would be confined to relatively ideal 
situations such as that found in Suez. Since the responsi- 
bilities of the group would be limited in an ideal situation, 
its powers would not have to be great. There are, however, 
difficulties with this approach. First, it may simply be 
an impossible course to pursue. It is difficult to guarantee 
in advance that a situation will be ideal for a group. Few 
situations are ideal. Fven those which seem ideal at the 
outset of a crisis often grow more difficult with the passage 
of time. Second, the sterility implicit in this approach 
raises questions as to its desirability. The peace-keeping 
group would seemingly be condemned to handling innocuous 
situations, while the most important to stabilize — the 
serious and the difficult — would be out of bounds. 












450 
The ambitious approach is at the other end of the 
spectrum of possibilities in peace-keeping. It envisages 
a situation similar to that desired by advocates of a 
permanent United Nations peace-keeping force. A peace- 
keeping force would be on hand, backed by moral and material 
support, for injection into all serious crises. There would 
be wide use, in theory, of such a group. The powers avail- 
able to it would be extensive and use of force when necessary 
would not be precluded. 

The limitations on the ambitious approach are both 
practical and political and stem from the very nature of 
the international community today. There is, in fact, no 
real hope of the imminent creation of a permanent standing 
force. Past difficulties in ensuring financial support, 
men, and equipment for ad hoc forces indicate that members 
of the international organization are not yet ready to assume 
permanent commitments for the support of a force. Nations 
measure United Nations action against their national 
interests. Those judged to be against their interest win 
little or no support. To undertake advance commitments for 
a standing force would be tantamount to releasing some of 
the controls over the force. Even those states which have 
most staunchly supported the non-fighting force and have 
earmarked troops for United Nations service have retained a 
veto on the use of their men. Because the international 






451 
community is a community in only a limited sense, the 
actions which can be taken in the name of that community 
are also limited. The developments which must occur before 
the United Nations can follow the ambitious approach to 
peace-keeping have been suggested by Secretary-General 
U Thant: 

The very existence of such a force would imply, if the 
force is to be used effectively, a very considerable 
surrender of sovereignty by nations, which in its turn 
would require the acceptance by public opinion of new 
and radical political principles. Very considerable 
progress in disarmament would also be a necessary pre- 
requisite. The direction of such a force, its basis 
in international law, its composition, the rules for 
its use and the evolution of an accepted body of 
international law upon the basis on which it would 
operate are all delicate processes which cannot and 
should not be hurried, although they should be the 
object of the most serious attention by governments 
and by institutions and individuals, for, clearly, 
some such development must be the ultimate aim. An- 
other necessary condition would be a far wider 
acceptance than now exists of the impartiality and 
objectivity of international servants both civilian 
and military, for without this recognition the force 
would lack an essential element of moral authority and 
status.^ 

The third line of development is one which stresses 
flexibility in both the development and use of the non- 
fighting force. The flexible approach is the one which we 
expect to be followed in the immediate future. If the world 
is not yet ready for a permanent force, neither is it willing 



2 

U Thant, "Strengthening of the United Nations," UN 
Monthly Chronicle , Vol. 1, No. 1 (May, 1964), p. 82. ~~ 






4-52 
to accept the dangers of unfettered, self-help. Under the 
flexible approach a continued evolution and institutionali- 
zation of the peace-keeping technique can be anticipated. 
The growth will be slow and new principles and practices 
will be tested as they are assimilated. Use of the peace- 
keeping group in crises can be expected to be selective. 
Although its invocation will not be confined to the ideal 
type situation, there will be an effort to determine whether 
the powers, measured particularly in terms of political 
support and material preparedness, are adequate to cope with 
the actual and potential problems in a volatile situation. 
This line of development lacks the certainty that comes with 
the permanent institutionalized force, but it has the ad- 
vantage of flexibility. Highly unfavorable situations can 
be avoided. The force can be shaped so as to increase 
support for it in the field and at United Nations Head- 
quarters. Advances in peace-keeping can correspond to the 
temper of the times. In short, the chances for success in 
peace-keeping ventures can be maximized. 

The future United Nations military groups have no 
easy road ahead; success is in no way guaranteed. The path 
of wisdom would seem to be to act, but to act judiciously. 
For the United Nations to assume responsibility beyond its 
capabilities in a crisis and to fail could be disastrous, 
but for the United Nations to do nothing is to wither on the 






453 
vine to insignificance. In the words of U Thant: 

...if the United Nations is to justify the hopes 
of its founders and of the peoples of the world 
it must develop into an active and effective agency 
for peace and international conciliation by ° 
responding to the challenges which face it. May we 
have the courage, the faith, and the wisdom to make 
it so. 3 



5 

OJ Thant, "A United Nations Stand-By Peace Force," 
Address at Cambridge, Massachusetts, June 13, 1963. U I 
Press Release SG/1520, June 12, 1963, p. 10. 



APPENDIXES 



455 




















TABLE A 


-1 














■ 


RECORD OF CRITICAL VOTES 
UNI SO Votes 


IN HIE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE 


ESTABLISHMENT AND 


SUPPORT OF 


PEACE- KEEPING 


GROUPS 








Estab- 
lish- 


Estab- 






Swedish 
Re- 
solu- 
tion 
to end 
UN0GIL f 


u. s. 

Re- 








JNUC Votes 




UNYOM Votes 


I/NFICYP Votrfi 
Authorit> 


Security Council 
Membprs a 


ing 
UNTSO- 
Firat 
Truce b 


ing 
UNTSO- 
Second 
Truce c 


Re- 
affirm- 
ing 
Truceb 


Estab- 
1 Idl- 
ing 
UNOGXL* 


solu- 
tion 
to 

broaden 
UN0CIL& 


Japanese 

Com- 
promise' 1 


To 
Estab- 
blish 

ONUC 1 


To 
Condemn 
Belgian 
Aggre6- 


To 
Strengthen 


To 
Strengthen 


To 
Establish 


to 
Secretary- 
General 
for 
Arrange- 


To 


Chinn 

France 

United Kingdom 


Yes 
Yea 
Yes 


Yes 
Yes 
Yes 


Yes 
Yes 


Yes 

Yes 
Yes 


No 
No 


Yes 
Yes 


Yes 
Yes 


Abs, 
Abs. 


No 
No 


Yes 


Yes 

Abe. 
Abs. 


UNYOK™ 
Yes 


ments 11 
Yes 


IHFICY? 

VC8 


Union of Soviet Socio] 












Yes 


Abs. 




Yes 




Abs. 


Yes 


1st Republics 


Abs. 




Yes 
Yes 


Abs. 
Yes. 












Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


United States 


Yet 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


No 
Yes 


Yes 
Yes 


Yes 
No 


Abs. 
Yes. 


Yes 
Yes 


Abs. 


Abs. 


Yes 


Argentina 


Yes 


Abs. 


















Yes 


Yes 


Belgium 


Yes 


Yes 








" 


" 


- 


- 


. 










Bolivia 


. 


. 








~ 


■ 


Yes 


No 








" 


- 


Brazil 










" 


- 


- 


_ 










- 


■ 


Canada 

Ceylon 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


- 


- 


- 


- 


Yes 


Yes 
Yes 


Yes 
Yes 


Chile 


. 








™ 


- 


- 


Yes 


No 




Yes 

Yes 




■ 


- 


Colombia 
Czechoslovakia 


Yes 


Yea 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


Yes 


Yes 


~ 


- 


Yes 


- 


. I 


_ ■ 


Ecuador 


. 








■ 


- 


. 


_ 


. 






■ 


- 


- 


Ghana 


- 


. 


, 




™ 


- 


- 


Yes 


Abs. 


Yes 






Abs. 


Yes 
































Italy 










No 


Yes 


Yes 


. 


. 






Yes 


. 


- 


Ivory Coast 


.. 








" 


- 


- 


Yes 


No 








. - 


- 












" 


- 


~ 


m 










- 


- 


Liberia 










No 


Yes 


Yes 


. 








" 


Yes 


Yes 


Morocco 


_ 


. 






" 


- 


- 


- 


- 


Yes 




" 


" 


- 


Norway 


m 


■ m 








" 


- 


- 


_ 










■ 












■ 


- 


- 


„ 












Yes 


Philippines 










No 


Yes 


Yes 


- 


_ , 






Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Poland 










~ 


m 


■ 


• 










* 


- 










" 


- 


- 


- 


Yes 








Yes 


- 


• 


Syria 


Yes 


Ho 






Yes 


Abs. 


Yes 






_ 




■ 


- 


- 


Tunisia 














" 


■ 


- 










" 


Turkey 


. 








" 


" 


- 


Yes 


Abs. 


_ 






" 


- 


Ukrainian Soviet 












" 


" 


- 


- 


Yes 






" 


■ 


Socialist 




























" 


Republic 


Abs. 


Abs. 


























United Arab 












" 


• 


- 


. 












Republic 


„ 
























** 


- 


Venezuela 

In Favor 
Against 


9 




7 
1 


11 



10 



2 
9 


9 

1 (Ve- 


10 
1 (Veto) 


8 



2 

7 


Yes 

9 


Yes 

9 



2 


Yes 
10 


— 


11 


Abstain 


2 


3 





1 





to) 
1 





3 


2 . 


2 


1 


3 






A dash (-) indicates 


that a 


state wa 






l 
























Security Council resolution of May 29, 1948 U N Doe ft/ftft1 a; - 

^Security Council, official lUscords, Third W.MOW L.u£ I^.VS^flt^^ * ™ Ut " N S " pe ~ l " the <*™° - ■»• «U„. Provision.. 

'Security Council resolution of July 15, 1948, u. N. Doc. s/902. 
Security Council resolution of October 19, 1948 U N Doc c/inii n, » , . 

^Security Council, offlcls! Records, Third 'year .'|g Jj'JStaT Zt^ll^^.V"' " ""'^ U °* "" »«**- «"««. *m a cease-fire, 

Security Council resolution of June 11, 1958, U. N. Doc. s/4022. 

f U. H. Doc. S/4054. (This draft resolution was voted on at the 834th Security Council satins on July 18 !,58 ) 

«0. N. 0«. S/4050/Rev. 1. (mis draft resolution „ae voted on at the 834th Security Council „eeti^ on j„ ly „ 1958 , 

V. >. Doc. S/4055, Rev. 1. (This draft resolution „. voted on at the 837th Security Council .eetlns on July „, 1958 , 

Security Council resolution of July 13/14, 1960, u. N. Doc. s/4387. 
JU. N. Doc. S/4386. (These agents were voted on at the 873rd Security Council Meetly on July 13/14, 1960 ) 

Security Council r&solutlon of February 21, 1961, u. t|. Doc. s/4741. 

Security Council resolution of November 24, 1961, U. N. Doc. s/5002. 
"Security Council resolution of June 11, 1963, U. N. Doc. S/5331. 
"Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964, U. N. Doc. S/5575, Paragraph 4. 

Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964, u. H. Doc, S/5575. 






4-56 



SELECTED CRITICAL VOTES IS TIIE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SUPPORT OF PEACE-KEEPING GROUPS 



Member States 8 



Vote Authorizing 
Mediator** 



Vote 
Authorizing 

Plan 
for Force c 



Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burma 
Burundi 

Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 

Central African Republic 
Ceylon 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 

Congo (Brazzaville) 
Congo (Leopoldvllle) 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Cyprus 

Czechoslovakia 
Dahomey 
Denmark 

Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 

Federation of Malaya 
Finland 
France 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Laos 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Libya 

Luxembourg 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Nepal 

The Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 



Yes 

Aba. 

Yes 
Yes 

Y«l 



Abs. 

rai 

Aba. 



Yea 
Yes 
Abs. 



Aba. 
Yea 



Abs. 
Yes 



Yes 
Yea 



Yea 

Abs. 



Abs. 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Aba. 

Yes 

Abe. 
Aba. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yea 
AbB. 
Yes 



Abs. 
Yes 

Y,;-. 

Yes 

Yes 
Yea 



Yes 
Yes 



Yea 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Abs. 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 

Yes 



Yes 
Abs. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Aba. 
Yes 



Vote 
Approving 
Force" 



Yes 
Abs. 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Abs. 
Yes 



Aba. 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 



Vote on 

Financing 

Force 

q957) e 



Yes 
No 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Abs. 
Yes 



Abs. 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 
Yea 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 



Yes 


Abs 


Yes ' 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Abs. 




Yea 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Abs. 


Abs. 


Yes 


Abs. 


. 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 




Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 



Yes 
Yes 



Approving 
ONUC £ 



Yes 
Abs. 

Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 
Yes 



Abs. 
Yes 



Yes 
Yd 

Yes 



Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
YeB 
Yes 
Abs. 
Yes 
Yes 



Abs. 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 



Vote on 

Financing 

1960S 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Abs. 
Yes 
Yes 



No 
Aba. 
Abs. 
Yes 

Abs. 

Abs 

Abs. 

Abs. 

Abs. 

Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 

Abs. 

Yes 

No 



Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Aba. 

Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 

Abs. 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Abs. 

Abs. 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 



Vote on 
Financing 



Yes 

No 

Yes 



No 
Abs. 



Yes 
Aba. 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Abs. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Aba. 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 



Yes 


_ 


, 


Yes 


No 


Yea 


Yes 


Yes 


Yea 


Yes 


. 


_ 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


- 


Abs. 


. 


- 


- 


Yes 


Yes 


Abs. 


YeB 


- 


- 


No 


Yes 


Abs. 


Yea 


Yes 


- 


Yea 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yea 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


- 


. 


- 


Yes 


- 


- 


Yea 


Yea 


Yes 


Yes 


Yea 



Vote 
Co Accept 



Opinio 






Abs. 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 

Yea 

Yet 

No 

Yes 

Yes 



Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Abs. 
Yes 
(a) 

Yea 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 



No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 
No 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 



4-57 



TABLE A-2 - Continued 



Member States* 


UNTSO 

Vote Authorizing 
Mediator* 


Vote 
'"ithorlzing 

Flan 
for Force 


UNEF 

Vote 

Approving 

Force" 


Vote on 

Financing 

Force 

(1957) e 


Vote 
Approving 


ONUC 

Vote on 
Financing 


Vote on 
Financing 


Vote 
to Accept 
I. C. J, 


Pakistan 

Panama 

Paraguay 

Peru 

Philippines 

Poland 

Portugal 

Romania 

Rwanda 


Yes 
Yes 

Abs. 
Yes 
Ho 


Yes 
Yes 

Yen 

Yes 
Yes 

Abo. 
Abs. 
Abs. 


Yes 
Yes 
Yea 
Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 
Yes 
Abs. 


Yes 

Yea 

Yea 

Yes 

Yes 

Mo 

Yes 

No 


Yes 

Yea 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Abs. 
Yes 
Abs. 


Yes 
Yea 

Yes 

Abs. 
No 
No 
No 


Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 
No 
Abs. 
No 


Yes 
Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

Yes 

No 

No 

No 


Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 


Abs. 


Yes 


Yea 


Yes 


Yes 


No 


m 


Yes 
No 


Sierra Leone 










" 


Yea 


- 


Yes 


Somalia 








• 


" 


- 


Yes 


Yes 


South Africa 

Spain 

Sudan 


Yes 


Abs. 
Yes 


Abs. 
Yes ' 


Abs. 
Yes 


Abs. 
Yes 


Yea 

Abs. 
Abs. 


Abo. 
Yes 


Yes 
No 

Abs. 


Sweden 
Syria 


Yes 
Abs. 


Yes 

Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 
' Yes 


Yes 
Yes 


Abs. 
Yes 


Abs. 
Yes 


Tanganyika 












■ 


■ 


No 


Thailand (Slam) 
Togo 


Abs. 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 
Yes 


Trinidad and Tobago 


. 








" 


Abs. 


Yes 


Yes 


Tunisia 










" 


- 


- 


Yes 


Turkey 


Yes 






Abs. 




Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 












Yes 


Yes 


Republic 
Union of Soviet Socialist 


Bo 


Aba. 


Abs. 


No 


Abs. 


No 


No 


No 


Republics 


Ho 




Abs. 


No 
Abs. 
Abs. 
Yes 










United Arab RepublicJ 


Abs. 






No 


No 


No 


United Kingdom 


Yes 


Abs. 








*JS. 


Abo. 


United States 
Upper Volts 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 


Yes 

Yes 


Yen. 
Yes 


Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Yemen 
Yugoslavia 


Yea 

Abe. 
Abs. 
No 


Yes 
Yes 

Yes 
Yes 


Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 


Yes 

Yes 
Yas 
Yes 


Yes 
Yes 
Yes 

Yes 


Yes 

Abs. 

No 
Abs. 


Abs. 
Yes 
Yes 
Abs. 
Yes 


Yes 

Yes 

Abs. 


In Pavor 
Against 


31 

7 


57 


64 



12 


57 
8 
9 


70 


45 ' 


57 


76 


Abstained 


16 


19 


11 


15 
25 


11 
12 


17 
8 



«A dssh (-) indicate, that a state ... not a member of the United Nation, at the time the vote was taken or was not present for the ■ 

b Genersl Assembly resolution 186 (S-II) adopted on May 15, 1948. 

General Assembly resolution 998 (ES-I) adopted on November 4, 1956, at the 563rd plenary meeting. 

"General Assembly resolution 1001 (ES-I) adopted on November 7, 1956, at the 567th plenary meeting. 

e U. N. Doc A/3560 (February 25, 1957). 

^General Assembly resolution 1474 (ES-IV) adopted on September 20, i960, at the 863rd plenary meeting. 

«U. N. Doc. A/4676 (December 19. 1960). 

h D. N. Doc. A/5066 (December 19, 1961). ' 

lG.ner.1 Aaaembly resolution 1854 (XVII), Part A, adopted on December 19, 1962, st the 1199th plenary meeting. 

•Wes recorded for Egypt prior to 1950 are Included in United Arab Republic tabulation. 



4-58 






TABLE B-l 
THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UNTSO a 





Men Contributed 




Men 


Contributed 




First Truce, June, 


1948 


Second True 


e, Sept. 


, 1948 


Contributing 










Other 




States 


Officers 




Officers 




Ranks 


Total 


Belgium 


31 




50 




50 


100 


France 


31 




125 




125 


250 


United States 


31 




125 




125 


250 


Sweden 


5 




10 




- 


10 


UN Headquarters 














International 














Contingent 


50 




7 






7_ 




"*** 











Total 


148 




317 




300 


617 



includes only observers and military personnel. It does not include 
auxiliary personnel. 

Source: L. Larry Leonard, "The United Nations and Palestine," 

International Conciliation No. 454 (October, 1949) and The 
New York Times , July 17, 1948. 



4-59 



TABLE B-2 
THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UNOGIL 



Contributing Country 

Burma 

Canada 

Chile 

Denmark 

Finland 

India 

Ireland 

Italy 

Nepal 

Netherlands 

New Zealand 

Norway 3 

Peru 

Sweden 3 

Total 



No. of Men Contributed 
July, 1958 

5 

11 

3 
15 



5 

5 

15 

5 

9 

1 

11 

5 

10 

108 



a Sweden also sent 12 pilots and aircrew members and Norway 8 pilots and 

aircrew members. 



Source: The New York Times , July 17, 1958. 



460 






TABLE B-3 
THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF UNEF OVER THE YEARS 



Contributing 
States 


1957 a 


Officers and Men 
1958 b 


Contributed 
1960 c 


1962 d 


Brazil 


545 


635 


632 


630 


Canada 


1,172 


975 


932 


945 


Colombia 


522 


492 


- 


- 


Denmark 


424 


459 


565 


562 


Finland 


255 


- 


- 


- 


India 


957 


1,167 


1,246 


1,249 


Indonesia 


582 


- 


- 


- 


Norway 


498 


538 


601 


613 


Sweden 


349 


505 


656 


424 


Yugoslavia 


673 


674 


709 


710 


Total 


5,977 


5,445 


5,341 


5,133 



Source: «U. N. Doc. A/3694; b U. N. Doc. A/3899; C U. N. Doc. A/4486; and 
d U. N. Doc. A/5172. 






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463 



TABLE B-5 






THE NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE 

IN CYPRUS (UNFICYP) 





Officers and Men Contributed 


Contributing 


April 30, 1964 a June 8, 1964 b 


States 


Military Police Total Military Police Total 



Australia 




Austria 


10 


Canada 


1087 


Denmark 




Finland 


1000 


Ireland 


636 


New Zealand 




Sweden 


889 


United 




Kingdom 


2719 



Total 



6341 



28 



28 







40 


40 


38 


55 


33 


88 


1087 


1122 




1122 




676 


40 


716 


1000 


1000 




1000 


636 


639 




639 






20 


20 


889 


954 


40 


994 


2719 


1792 




1792 



6369 



6328 



Source: a U. N. Doc. S/5679; b U. N. Doc. S/5764. 



173 



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BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The primary materials used in the research for this 
study were the official records, of the United Nations. Of 
particular relevance were the reports, prepared sometimes 
"by the of ficer-in-charge in the field and sometimes by the 
Secretary-General, on the organization and functioning of 
the individual peace-keeping groups. The records of the 
debate in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and 
the Fifth Committee of the Assembly shed considerable light 
on the positions of the various delegations on the United 
Nations peace-keeping endeavors. 

The records of two conferences held in 1964- on United 
Nations peace-keeping forces — the Oslo Conference on 
United Nations Security Forces and the Ottawa Meeting of 
Military Experts to Consider the Technical Aspects of United 
Nations Peace-Keeping Operations — were most useful. The 
papers prepared for the conferences covered a number of 
aspects of peace-keeping. An interview with Major-General 
I.J. Rikhye provided invaluable information and insights. 

Use was made of newspapers, and particularly of The 
New York Times , to supplement and, in some cases, to clarify 
the material gleaned from the United Nations records. 
Periodicals and journals also provided helpful interpretative 

4-65 






466 

material on one or more of the forces. International 
Organization might "be cited as a particularly rich source 
on this subject. 

Of value in gaining insight in depth into particular 
phases of the peace-keeping groups are the biographies, 
autobiographies, and diaries by or about participants which 
have been published. Unfortunately, these accounts are 
still relatively few in number. They can be most en- 
lightening. Among the more useful in this study were Count 
Folke Bernadotte's To Jerusalem , treating his experience as 
Mediator in Palestine, and Lieutenant-General E.L.M, Burns' 
Between Arab and Israeli , dealing with his service as Chair- 
man of the Truce Supervision Organization and Commander of 
the United Nations Emergency Force. A provocative if some- 
what emotional account of his experience with the United 
Nations operation in the Congo is given by Conor Cruise 
O'Brien in To Katanga and Back . O'Brien served as the 
Secretary-General's Special Representative in Katanga for a 
time. Of less direct relevance but of some value were the 
various biographies and autobiographies of Secretaries- 
General Lie and Hammarskjold. 

Finally, a number of secondary materials — books, 
monographs, and articles — were consulted. At the time this 
particular study Was undertaken, only a few scattered articles 
had been written on the non-fighting military presence. 






4-67 

Indicative of the growing awareness of the importance of 
this peace-keeping technique are the flock of materials 
which have been published in the last two years on the 
subject. Among the more useful of the secondary studies 
on the peace-keeping groups are the following: Larry 
Leonard's Int ernat i onal Conciliation study, "The United 
Nations and Palestine./' which concentrates on the establish- 
ment and operation of the Palestine Truce Supervision 
Organization; Gabriella Eosner ? s The United Nations Emergency 
Force , a thorough and detailed study of the emergence and 
operation of this particular force; William Erye's study 
. United Nations Peace Eorce , which deals with the United 
Nations Emergency Eorce and with the potentialities of a 
peace force; Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote's Peace- 
Keeping by U.N. Forces , a study which, despite the title, 
concentrates on the United Nations Eorce in the Congo; and 
Lincoln Bloomfield's International Military Forces , which 
includes a symposium on international forces. 



468 



United Nations Documents 

General Assembly, Official Records , Second and Third Sessions, 
plenary meetings (194-7-194-8). 

General Assembly, Of ficial Records , Second Special Session, 
plenary meetings (194-8) .' 

General Assembly, Official Records , First Emergency Special 
Session, plenary meetings (1^56). 



General Assembly, Official Records , Eleventh and Twelfth 
Sessions, plenary meetings (1956-1957). 



General Assembly, Official Records , Third Emergency Special 
Session, plenary meetings (1958). 

General Assembly, Official Records , Fourteenth to Eighteenth 
Sessions, plenary meetings (1960-1964- ) . 

General Assembly, Official Records , Fourth Emergency Special 
Session, plenary meetings (i960). 

General Assembly, Official Records , Third Special Session, 
plenary meetings (I960). 

General Assembly, Official Records , Fourth Special Session, 
plenary meetings (1965). 

General Assembly, Official Records , Third Session and 

Eleventh through Eighteenth Sessions, Fifth Committee 
(194-8 and 1956-1964-). 

General Assembly, Official Records , Second Session (194-7), 

A/364- , Sept. 3, 194-7, "United Nations.. Special Committee 
on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly." Supple- 
ment No. 11. 

General Assembly, Official Records , Second Special Session 
(194-8), A/532, April, 19^a-, "Palestine Commission: 
Report to the General Assembly." Supplement No. 1. 

General Assembly, Off icial Records , Third Session (194-8), 
A/574, June, I9T8, "Report of the United Nations 
Special Committee on the Balkans." Supplement No. 8. 

.A/64-4, 194-8, "Supplementary report 'of the United Nations 
Special Committee on the •Balkans. " Supplement No. 8A. 



469 

General Assembly, Official Records , Third Session (1948), 

A/648, "Progress report of the United Nations Mediator 
on Palestine." Supplement No. 11. 

General Assembly, Official Records , Third Session (1948), 

Annexes to the Summary Records of the plenary meetings. 

A/656, Sept. 28, 1948, "Report of the Secretary-General." 

A/678, Oct. 14, 1948, "Advances from the Working Capital 

Pund." 

A/692, Oct. 25, 1948, "Third interim report of the 
United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans." 

A/701, Nov. 3, 1948, "Seventh report of 1948 of Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions." 

A/728 and A/728/Corr. 1 and 2, Nov. 18, 1948, "Report 
of the Pirst Committee." 

A/736, Nov. 25, 1948, "Financial implications of the 
draft resolution proposed by the Pirst Committee." 

A/786, Dec. 9, 1948, "Financial implications of the • 
draft resolution proposed by the Pirst Committee." 

General Assembly, Official Records , Third Session (1948), 
Annexes to Fifth Committee, A/C.5/247/Rev. 1, Nov. 
15, 1948, "Report by the Secretary-General." 

A/C. 5/284, Dec. 7, 1948, "Financial implications of 
■ the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee 
on the progress report of the United Nations Mediator 
on Palestine (A/776): report by the Secretary-General." 

General Assembly, Official Records , Fourth Session (1949), 
A/930, "Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Work of the Organization 1 July 1948-30 June 1949." 
Supplement No. 1. 

A/935, August, 1949, "Report of the United Nations 
Special Committee on the Balkans." Supplement No. 8. 

A/945, "Report of the Security Council to the General 
Assembly." Supplement No. 2. 

A/959, Oct. 10, 1949, "United Nations Field Service: 
Report of the Special Committee on a United Nations 
Guard." Supplement No. 13 . 



4?o 

General Assembly, Official Records , Fifth Session (1950), 
A/1256, "Financial Report and Accounts for the year 
ended 31 December 194-9." Supplement No. 6. 

General Assembly, Off icial Records , First Emergency Special 
Session (1950s Annexes 

A/3267, Nov. 3, 1956, "Report of the Secretary-General 
submitted in pursuance of resolution 997 (ES-I), par* 
5, adopted by the General Assembly on 2 November 1956." 

A/3268, Nov. 3, 1956, "Letter dated 3 November 1956 
from the Alternate Permanent Representative of Prance, 
addressed to the Secretary-General." 

A/3270, Nov. 3, 1956, "Communication dated 3 November 
1956 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt, 
addressed to the President of the General Assembly and 
to the Secretary-General." 

A/3279, Nov. 4, 1956, "Aide-memoire dated 3 November 
1956 from the Permanent Representative of Israel, 
addressed to the Secretary-General." 

A/5284, Nov. 4, 1956, "Second report of the Secretary- 
General submitted in pursuance of resolution 997 
(ES-I), par. 5, adopted by the General Assembly on 
2 November 1956." 

A/3287, Nov. 4-, 1956, "Report of the Secretary-General 
on communications with the Governments of Prance, 
Egypt, Israel and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland concerning implementation of 
General Assembly resolution 997 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I) 
dated 2 and 4- November 1956." 

A/3289, Nov. 4-, 1956, "Pirst report of the Secretary- 
General on the plan for an emergency international 
United Nations Porce requested in resolution 998 
(ES-I) adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 
1956." 

A/3296, Nov. 5, 1956, "Third report of the Secretary- 
General submitted in pursuance of resolution 997 (ES-I) 
par. 5, adopted by the General Assembly on 2 November 
1956." 



4-71 

A/3302 and Add. 1 to 16, Nov. 6, 1956, "Second and final 
report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an 
emergency international United Nations Force requested 
in resolution 998 (ES-I), adopted "by the General 
Assembly on 4- November 1956." 

A/3310, Nov. 7, 1956, "Aide-memoire dated 5 November 
1956 from the Secretary-General, addressed to the 
Governments of France and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland." 

A/3317, Nov. 8, 1956, "Confirmation of the appointment 
of Major-General E.L.M. Burns as Chief of the United 
Nations Command for the emergency international force." 

General Assembly, Official Records , Eleventh Session (1956-7), 
Annexes 

A/3375, Nov. 20, 1956, "Report of the Secretary-General 
on basic points for the presence and functioning in 
Egypt of the United Nations Emergency Force." 

A/3383 and Rev. 1, Nov. 21, 1956, "Report of the 
Secretary-General on administrative and financial 
arrangements for the United Nations Emergency Force." 

A/3384- and Add. 1 and 2, Nov. 21, 1956, "Report of the 
Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly 
resolutions 997 (ES-I) and 1002 (ES-I)." 

A/34-02, Nov. 30, 1956, "Twenty- second report of the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions: administrative and financial arrangements 
for the United Nations Emergency Force." 

A/34-56, Dec. 14-, 1956, "Thirty-fifth report of the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions: possible claims in respect of death or 
disability attributable to service in the United Nations 
Emergency Force." 



A/3500 and Add. 1, Jan. 15, 1957, "Report by the 
Secretary-General on compliance with General Assembly 
resolutions calling for withdrawal of troops and other 



measures. " 



A/3511, Jan. 24-, 1957, "Note by the Secretary-General 
transmitting an aide-memoire on the Israel position on 
the Sharm el-Sheikh area" and the Gaza Strip." 



472 

A/3512, Jan. 24, 1957, "Report of the Secretary-General 
in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1123 (XI)." 

A/3526, Feb. 9, 1957 , "Report of the Secretary-General 
on arrangements concerning the status of the United 
Nations Emergency Force in Egypt." 

A/3527, Feb. 11, 1957, "Report of the Secretary-General 
in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 1124 (XI) 
and 1125 (XI)." 

A/3552, Feb. 21, 1957, "Regulations for the United 
Nations Emergency Force" (ST/SGB/UNEF/1) . 

A/3560 and Add. 1, Feb. 25, 1957, "Report of the Fifth 
Committee. " 

A/3563, Feb. 26, 1957, "Note by the Secretary-General." 

A/3568, March 8, 1957, "Second report of the Secretary- 
General in pursuance of General Assembly resolutions 
1124- (XI) and 1125 (XI). 

General Assembly, Official Records , Twelfth Session (1957), 

Annexes 

A/3694 and Add. 1, "Report of the Secretary-General." 

A/3761, Dec. 3, 1957, "Twenty-sixth report of the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions." 

A/3790, Dec. 12, 1957, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

General Assembly, Official Records , Thirteenth Session 
(1958), A/38237~ w Budget Estimates for the Period 1 
January to 31 December, 1958." Supplement No. 5A. 

General Assembly, Official Records , Thirteenth Session 
(1958) , Annexes 

A/3839, July 3, 1958, "Second report of the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 
Budget estimates for the period 1 January to 31 
December 1958." 

A/3899, Aug. 27, 1958, "Report of the Secretary-General." 

A/3943, Oct. 9, 1958, "Summary study of the experience 
derived from the establishment and operation of the 
Force: report of the Secretary-General." 



A/3989 , Nov. 11, 1958, "Report of the Special Politi- 
cal Committee." 

A/4-002, Nov. 19, 1958, "Twenty-fifth report of the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions. Budget estimates for the period 1 January 
to 31 December 1958." 

A/4072, Dec. 11, 1958, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

A/0. 5/763, Nov. 14, 1958, "Report of the Secretary- 
General. United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon 
and Expenditures Arising from General Assembly reso- 
lution 1237 (ES-III)." 

General Assembly, Official Records , Fourteenth Session 
(1959), Annexes 

A/4160, July 23, 1959, "Cost estimates for the 
maintenance of the Force: report of the Secretary- 
General . " 

A/4171, July 31, 1959, "Budget estimates for the 
maintenance of the Force: report of the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions." 

A/4176 and Add. 1 and 2, Sept. 10, 1959, "Manner of 
financing the Force: report of the Secretary-General 
on consultations with Governments of Member States." 

A/4210 and Add. 1, Sept. 10, 1959, "Progress report 
of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Emergency Force." 

A/4335, Dec. 4, 1959, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

A/C. 5/800, Nov. 12, 1959, "Supplementary estimates for 
1959. Revised estimates for I960: report of the 
Secretary-General . " 

General Assembly, Official Records , Fifteenth Session (I960), 
Annexes 

A/4396, July 8, I960, "United Nations Emergency Force: 
Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force: report 
of the Secretary-General." 

A/4486 and Add. 1 and 2, Sept. 13, I960, "United Nations 
Emergency Force. Progress Report of the Secretary- 
General . " 



474 

A/4580, Nov. 18, I960, "Supplementary estimates for 
the Financial Year I960. United Nations activities 
in the Congo for the period 14 July to 31 December 
I960." 

A/4587 and Add. 1, Nov. 22, I960, "Report to the 
Secretary-General from his Acting Special Representa- 
tive in the Congo." 

A/4592, Nov. 24, I960, "Report by the Advisory 
Committee on the Congo." 

A/4676, Dec. 19, I960, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

A/4705, March 1, 1961, "Report of the Secretary-General." 

A/4711 and Add. 1 and 2, March 20, 1961, "Report of 
the United Nations Conciliation Commission for the 
Congo. " 

A/4713, March 21, 1961, "Report of the Advisory Com- 
mittee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions." 

A/4740, April 20, 1961, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

A/C. 5/836, Oct. 24, I960, "Report of the Secretary- 
General. " 

A/C. 5/860, March 27, 1961, "Statement read by the 
representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics at the 825th meeting of the Fifth Committee." 

A/C. 5/862, April 14, 1961, "Statement by the repre- 
sentative of Mexico at the 837th meeting of the Fifth 
Committee. " 

A/C. 5/863, April 14, 1961, "Statement by the repre- 
sentative of India at the 838th meeting of the Fifth 
Committee." 

A/C. 5/864, April 17, 1961, "Statement by the Secretary- 
General at the 839th meeting of the Fifth Committee." 

A/C. 5/868, April 26, 1961, "Statement by the repre- 
sentative of Mexico at the 845th meeting of the Fifth 
Committee. " 

General Assembly, Official Records , Sixteenth Session (1961- 
62), A/4800, "Annual Report of the Secretary-General on 
the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1960-15 June 
1961." Supplement No. 1. 



475 

General Assembly, Official Records , Sixteenth Session (1961- 
62) , Annexes 

A/4857, Aug. 30, .1961, "United Nations Emergency Force. 
Report of the Secretary-General." 

A/4931, Oct. 20, 1961, "Report of the Secretary- 
General. " 

A/4943, Oct. 26, 1961, "Interim report of the Fifth 
Committee. " 

A/4971, Nov. 15, 1961, "Report of the Working Group 
of Fifteen." 

A/5019, Dec. 8, 1961, "Report of the Advisory Commit- 
tee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions." 

A/5066, Dec. 19, 1961, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

A/0,5/904, Dec. 7, 1961, "Report of the Secretary- 
General . " 

General Assembly, Official Records , Seventeenth Session 
(1962), Annexes 

A/5172, Aug. 22, 1962, "United Nations Emergency 
Force. Report of the Secretary-General." 

A/5187, Sept. 13, 1962, "United Nations Emergency 
Force. Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force: 
report of the Secretary-General." 

A/5274, Nov. 2, 1962, "United Nations Emergency Force. 
Fourteenth Report of the Advisory Committee on Admini- 
strative and Budgetary Questions." 

A/5352, Dec. 13, 1962, "United Nations Operation in 
the Congo.. Cost estimates and financing: report of the 
Secretary-General . " 

A/5395, Dec. 19, 1962, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

General Assembly, Official Records , Fourth Special Session 
(1963), Annexes 

A/5407, March 29, 1963, "Financing of United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Operations: report of the Working Group 
on the Examination of the Administrative and Budgetary 
Procedures of the United Nations." 



4-76 

A/54-16, May 8, 1965, "United Nations Operation in the 
Congo. Cost estimates for 1965: report of the Secretary- 
General . " 

A/54-58, June 26, 1965, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

A/C. 5/974-, May 14-, 1965 , "United Nations Financial 
Position and Prospects: report of the Secretary- 
General , " 

A/AC. 115/27, Feb. 1, 1965, "Criteria f or . the sharing 
of the costs of peace-keeping operations. Statement 
by the Secretariat." 

General Assembly, Official Records , Eighteenth Session 
(1965), Annexes 

A/54-90 and Add. 1-4-, Sept. 17, 1965, "Report of the 
Secretary-General on his consultations concerning the 
desirability and feasibility of establishing a peace 

fund." 

A/54-94- , Sept. 12, 1965, "United Nations Emergency 
Force. Report of the Secretary-General." 

A/54-95, Sept. 16, 1965, "United Nations Emergency Force. 
Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force: report 
of the Secretary-General . " 

A/5567, Oct. 14-, 1965, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

A/564-2, Dec. 5, 1965, "Report of the Advisory Committee 
on Administrative and Budgetary Questions." 

A/5680, Dec. 16, 1965, "Report of the Fifth Committee." 

General Assembly, Official Records , A/ AC. 121/4- , May 51, 

1965, "Report of the Secretary-General and the Presi- 
dent of the General-Assembly. Special Committee on 
Peace-Keeping Operations." 

International Court of Justice. Certain Expenses of the 

United Nations ( Article 17 , paragraph"^ of the Charter ), 
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1^62: I.C.J. Reports, 1962" . 

Security Council, Official Records , Third Year (194-8), 

Fourth Year (194-9), Thirteenth Year (1958), Fifteenth 
Year through Eighteenth Year (1960-1964-) . 



477 



Security Council, Official Records , Third Year (1948) 
Supplements for 1948 



A/AC. 21/lJ, Feb. 9, 1948, "Relations between the United 
Nations Palestine Commission and the Security Council." 

S/714, April 1, 1948, "Resolutions adopted at the 277th 
meeting of the Security Council concerning the 
Palestinian question." 

S/723, April 16, 1948, "Resolution adopted at the 283rd 
meeting of the Security Council concerning a truce in 
Palestine. " 

S/732, April 30, 1948, "Cablegram from the Chairman of 
the Palestine Truce Commission to the President of the 
Security Council." 

S/762, May 21, 1948, "Cablegram received on 21 May 
1948 from the Chairman of the Security Council Truce 
Commission for Palestine addressed to the President of 
the Security Council." 

S/773, May 22, 1948, "Resolution adopted at the 302nd 
meeting concerning the Palestine question." 

S/801, May 29, 1948, "Resolution adopted at the 310th 
meeting concerning the Palestine question." 

S/823, June 4, 1948, "Cablegram dated 4 June 1948 from 
the United Nations Mediator in Palestine to the 
Secretary-General. " 

S/829, June 7, 1948, "Cablegram from the United Nations 
Mediator in Palestine to the Secretary-General." 

S/83^, June 10, 1948, "Letter dated 10 June 1948 from 
the acting representative of the Provisional Government 
of Israel addressed to the Secretary-General transmit- 
ting the reply of the Provisional Government of Israel 
to the cease-fire and truce proposals of the United 
Nations Mediator." 

S/838, June 9, 1948, "Replies received from the 
Governments of Yemen, Iraq and Transjordan in response 
to the cease-fire and truce proposals of the United 
Nations Mediator." 

3/839 5 June 15, 1948, "Cablegram dated 15 June 1948 
from the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary- 
General." 



478 

S/856 and Add. 1 and 2, June 25, 1948 , "Cablegram dated 
25 June 194-8 from the United Nations Mediator to the 
Secretary-General concerning the incident of Negba in 
the Negeb . " 

S/860, June 50 , 1948, "Cablegram dated 30 June 1948 
from the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary- 
General concerning suggestions for the peaceful adjust- 
ment of the future situation in Palestine." 

S/861, June 30, 1948, "Cablegram dated 30 June 1948 
from the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary- 
General concerning the LST Altalena incident." 

S/863, June 28, 1948, "Text of suggestions presented 
by the United Nations Mediator on Palestine to the two 
parties on June 28, 1948." 

S/865, July 5 5 1948, "Cablegram dated 5 July 1948 from 
the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary-General 
concerning the prolongation of the truce in Palestine." 

S/888, July 12, 1948, "Report of the United Nations 
Mediator on Palestine to the Security Council." 

S/902, July 15, 1948, "Resolution adopted at the 338th 
meeting of the Security Council concerning the Palestine 
question." 

S/907, July 16, 1948, "Cablegram dated 16 July 1948 
from the United Nations Mediator to the Arab States and 
to the Provisional Government of Israel concerning the 
Security Council resolution of '15 July; and their 
replies thereto." 

S/915, July 11, 1948, "Cablegrams dated 11, 12, 15 and 

17 July 1948 from the Chairman of the Palestine Truce 
Commission to the President of the Security Council 
concerning Jerusalem." 

S/920, July 13, 1948, "Cablegrams dated 13, 15, 16 and 

18 July 1948 to the President of the Security Council 
from the President of the Palestine Truce Commission . 
concerning Jerusalem." 

S/928, July 28, 1948, "Cablegrams from the United 
Nations Mediator dated 22 and 27 July 1948 to the 
Secretary-General containing instructions given to 
Observers and Plans of Organization of Truce Super- 
vision. " 






479 



S/955, August 7, 1948, "Cablegram dated 7 August 1948 
from the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary- 
General , " 

S/961, August 12, 19^8, "Cablegram dated 12 August 194-8 
from the United Nations Mediator to the Secretary- 
General concerning the observance of the truce in 
Jerusalem. " 

S/966 5 August 12 s 1948,, "Cablegram dated 12 August 
1948 from the Foreign Minister of the Provisional 
Government of Israel to the President of the Security 
Council concerning the destruction of the Latrun pumping 
station. " 

SA018, Sept. 27 s 1948, "Report cabled 27 September 
1948 by the Acting United Nations Mediator to the 
Security Council regarding the assassination of Count 
Bernadotte. " 

S/1022, Sept. 30, 1948, "Cablegram dated 30 September 
1948 from the Acting United Nations Mediator to the 
Secretary-General concerning truce supervision. " 

S/1023, Sept. 30, 1948, "Cablegram dated 30 September 
1948 from the Chairman of the Truce Commission to the 
President of the Security Council." 

S/1025, October 5, 1948, "Report dated 16 September 
1948 by the United Nations Mediator on the observation 
of the truce in Palestine during the period from 11 
June to 9 July 1948." 

S/1042, Oct. 18, 1948, "Report dated 18 October 1948 
from the Acting United Nations Mediator to the Secretary- 
General concerning the Negeb situation. " 

S/1045, Oct. 19 s 1948, "Resolution adopted at the 
367th meeting concerning the Palestine question." 

S/1058, Oct* 26, 1948, "Note dated 26 October 1948 
addressed by Truce Supervision headquarters on behalf 
of the Acting United Nations Mediator to the Government 
of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Egypt con- 
cerning the cease-fire in the Negeb." 

S/1071, Nov. 6, 1948, "Report dated 6 November 1948 
from the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine 
to the Secretary-General concerning the observance of 
the truce in the Lebanese sector." 



480 



S/1080, Nov. 16, 1948, "Resolution adopted by the 
Security Council at the. 381st meeting concerning the 
Palestine question." 

S/1152, Dec 25, 194-8, "Cablegram dated 25 December 
1948 from the United Nations Acting Mediator on 
Palestine to the President of the Security Council 
transmitting a report concerning fighting in the Negeb." 

S/1153 and Corr. 1, Dec. 27 , 1948, "Cablegram dated 27 
December 1948 from the United Nations Acting Mediator 
on Palestine to the President of the Security Council 
transmitting an additional report regarding the 
fighting in the Negeb." 

Security Council, Official Records , Pourth Year (1949), 
Supplements for 1949 

S/1269, March 1, 1949, "Cablegram dated 1 March 1949 
from the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine 
to the Secretary-General concerning evacuation of 
Egyptian troops from Al Paluja." 

S/1285, March 11, 1949, "Cablegram dated 11 March 1949 
from the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine 
to the President of the Security Council concerning 
alleged military operations by Israeli forces in the 
Southern Negeb." 

S/1286, March 13, 1949, "Cablegram dated 13 March 1949 
from the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine 
to the President of the Security Council concerning 
alleged military operations by Israeli forces in the 
Southern Negeb." 

S/1295 and Corr. 1, March 22, 1949, "Cablegram dated 
22 March 1949 from the United Nations Acting Mediator 
on Palestine to the Secretary-General transmitting a 
supplementary report on the situation in the Southern 

Negeb." 

S/1357, July 21, 1949, "Letter dated 21 July 1949 from 
the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine to the 
Secretary-General transmitting a report on the present 
status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in 
Palestine. " 



4-81 



Security Council, Official Records , Fourth Year, S/l^-JO/Rev. 
1, March. 22, 1^50^ "United Nations Commission for India 
and Pakistan: third interim report." Special Supple- 
ment No. 7. 

Security Council, Official Records , Thirteenth Year (1958), 
Supplements for T95H7 - 

SA023, June 11, 1958, "Resolution adopted "by the 
Security Council at its 825th meeting on 11 June 1958, 
concerning the complaint of Lebanon." 

S/4029, June 16, 1958, "First report by the Secretary- 
General on the implementation of the resolution adopted 
by the Security Council on 11 June 1958." 

SA038, June 28, 1958, "Second report hy the Secretary- 
General on the implementation of the resolution adopted 
by the Security Council on 11 June 1958." 

S/WO and Add. 1, July 1, 1958, "First report of the 
United Nations Observation Group in Lehanon. " 

SAW, Jul 7 8 » 1958, "Letter dated 8 July 1958 from 
the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General 
transmitting the official comments of the Government 
of Lebanon on the first report of the United Nations 
Observation Group in Lebanon." 

SA050/Rev. 1, July 17, 1958, "United States of 
America: revised draft resolution." 

SA051, July 15, 1958, "Interim report of the United 
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. " 

SA052, July 17, 1958, "Second interim report of the 

United Nations Observation Group in Lehanon." 

SA055/Rev. 1, July 21, 1958, "Japan: revised draft 
resolution. " 

SA069, July 25, 1958, "Second report of the United 
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon." 

SA085, August 12, 1958, "Third report of the United 
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon." 

■SAlOO, Sept. 25, 1958, "Fourth report of the United 
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon." 



482 



S/4114, Nov. 14, 1958, "Fifth report of the United 
Nations Observation Group in Lebanon. " 

Security Council, Official Records , Fifteenth Year (I960), 
Supplements for l9~6"0T~ 

S/4382, July 13, I960, "Telegrams dated 12 and 13 July 
I960 from the President and the Prime Minister of the 
Republic of the Congo to the Secretary-General." 

S/4387, July 14, i960, "Resolution adopted by the 
Security Council on 14 July I960 (873rd meeting) con- 
cerning the situation in the Republic of the Congo." 

S/4389 and Add. 1-6, July 18, I960, "First report of 
the Secretary-General on the implementation of 
Security Council resolution S/4387 of 14 July I960." 

S/4398, July 19, I960, "Letter dated 19 July I960 from 
the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Puepubiics to the Secretary-General." 

S/4400, July 20, I960, "Letter dated 20 July I960 from 
the representative of the United States of America to 
the Secretary-General. A report of United States 
activities in support of July 14 resolution." 

S/4405, July 22, I960, "Resolution adopted by the 
Security Council on 22 July I960 (879th meeting) con- 
cerning the situation in the Republic of the Congo." 

S/4415, August 1, I960, "Letter dated 1 August I960 
from the representative of Ghana to the Secretary- 
General . " 

S/4417, and Add. 1-9, August 6, I960, "Second report 
of the Secretary-General on the implementation of 
Security Council resolutions S/4387 of 14 July I960 and 
S/4405 of 22 July i960." 

S/4419, August 6, I960, "Letter dated 6 August I960 
from the representative of Belgium to the President of 
the Security Council . " 

S/4420, August 6, I960, " Note verb ale dated 6 August 
I960 from the representative of Ghana to the Security 
Council. " 



4-83 



S/4-4-21, August 7, I960, "Telegram dated 7 August I960 
from the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo 
to the President of the Security Council.' 1 

S/44-26, August 9 ? I960, "Resolution adopted by the 
Security Council on 9 August I960 (886th meeting) con- 
cerning the situation in the Republic of the Congo." 

S/44.4.5, August 19, I960, "Exchange of messages between 
the Secretary-General and the President of Ghana." 

S/4-448, August 20 5 I960, "Telegram dated 20 August 
I960 from the Prime Minister of the Republic of the 
Congo to the President of the Security Council and the 
Secretary-General , " 

S/4-4-51, Aug. 21, I960, "Observations by the Special 
Reoresentative of the Secretary-General in the Congo 
on the report by Major-General Alexander (S/44-4-5, 
Annex II) . " 

S/4-4-75 and Add. 1-3, August 30 2 I960, "Third report of 
the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security 
Council resolutions S/4-387 of 14 July I960, S/4405 of 
22 July I960 and S/44-26 of 9 August i960." 

3/4-4-82 and Add. 1-4, September 7, I960, "Pourth report 
of the Secretary-General on the implementation of 
Security Council resolutions S/4-387 of 14 July I960, 
S/44-05 of 22 July i960 and S/4-426 of 9 August I960." 

S/4497, Sept. 10, I960, "Letter dated 9 September I960 
from the Pirst Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the 
Secretary-General . " 

S/4.505 and Add. 1 and 2, Sept. 11, I960, "Message dated 
II September I960 from the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General in the Congo to the Secretary- 
General . " 

S/4-531, Sept. 21, I960, "Pirst progress report to the 
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in 
the Congo, Mr. Rageshwar Dayal." 

S/4-557, Nov. 2, I960, "Second progress report to the 
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in the 
Congo and exchange of messages between the Secretary- 
General and the representative of Belgium, and between 
the Secretary-General and the President of the pro- 
vincial government of Katanga. " 



4-84 



S/4-571, and Add. 1, Dec. 5, I960, "Note by the Secre- 
tary-General transmitting a report from his Special 
Representative in the Congo regarding certain actions 
taken against Mr. Patrice Lumumba." 

SA573, Dec. 6, I960, "Statement dated 6 December I960 
by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics concerning the situation in the Republic of 
the Congo." 

SA585, Dec. 7 5 I960, "Note by the Secretary-General 
transmitting a note verb ale dated 7 December I960 from 
the Permanent Mission of Belgium to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General." 

SA590, Dec. 9, I960, "Note by the Secretary-General 
transmitting a report from his Special Representative 
in the Congo on the current situation in Stanleyville." 

8/4601, Dec. 21, I960, "Note by the Secretary-General 
transmitting a report from his Special Representative 
in the Congo concerning incidents at Bukavu." 

Security Council, Official Records , Sixteenth Tear (1961), 
Supplements for 1961. 

SA606 and Add. 1, Jan. 1, 1961, "Notes by the 
Secretary-General transmitting documents concerning 
the landing of the Armee nationale congolaise at 
Usumbura (Ruanda-UrunaTJ. " 

S/4-622, Jan. 12, 1961, "Letter dated 11 January 1961 
from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics to the Security Council." 

S/4-626, Jan. 13, 1961, "Letter dated 12 January 1961 
from the President of the Republic of Ghana to the 
Secretary-General, transmitting a Declaration con- 
cerning the situation in the Congo, adopted by the 
Conference of Independent African States." 

S/4-630, Jan. 16, 1961, "Exchange of communications be- 
tween the President of the Republic of the Congo 
(Leopoldville) and the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General in the Congo." 

SA637 and Add. 1, Jan. 23, 1961, "Note by the Secretary- 
General transmitting communications concerning Mr. 
Patrice Lumumba and other related subjects." 



485 



S/4640, Jan. 26 , 1961,' "Report by the Secretary- 
General on the intended withdrawals of certain con- 
tingents from the United Nations Force in the Congo." 

S/4643, Jan. 29, 1961, "Exchange of communications 
between the President of the Republic of the Congo 
(Leopoldville) and the Secretary-General." 

S/4668 and Add. 1, Feb, 1, 1961, "Telegram from the 
Secretary-General to H.M. the King of Morocco and ex- 
change of communications between the Secretary-General 
and the Representative of Morocco." 

S/4688 and Add. 1 and 2, Feb. 12, 1961, "Report to the 
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in 
the Congo on the subject of Mr. Patrice Lumumba." 

S/4691 and Add, 1 and 2, Feb. 12, 1961, "Report to the 
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in 
the Congo concerning recent developments in North 
Katanga. " 

3/^-725 and Add. 1, Feb, 18, 1961, "Communications from 
the President of the Republic of Ghana to the Secretary- 
General . " 

SA727 and Add. 1-3, Feb. 18, 1961, "Report to the 
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in 
the Congo concerning the arrest and deportation of 
political personalities." 

S/4?41, Feb. 21, 1961, "Resolution adopted by the 
Security Council on 21 February 1961 (942nd meeting) 
concerning the situation in the Republic of the Congo 
(Leopoldville) . " 

S/4743, Feb, 22, 1961, "(Telegram dated 22 February 
1961 from the President of the Republic of the Congo 
(Leopoldville) to the President of the Security Council." 

S/4745 and Add, 1, Feb. 22, 1961, "Report to the 
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in 
the Congo on the situation in Oriental and Kivu 
Provinces. " 

S/4750 and Add. 1-7, Feb. 25, 1961, "Report to the 
Secretary-General from his Special Representative in 
the Congo on the situation in the three main sectors 
of the Congo." 



486 

S/4-752 and Add, 1-4, Feb. 27, 1961, "Report of the 
Secretary-General on certain steps taken in regard 
to the implementation' of Security Council resolution 
S/4741 of 21 February 1961." 

S/4753 s Feb, 27, 1961, "Report dated 27 February 1961 
to the Secretary-General from his Special Representa- 
tive in the Congo on incidents in Leopoldville 
involving United Nations personnel." 

SA757 and Add. 1, March 2, 1961, "Report dated 2 
March 1961 to the Secretary-General from his Sp_ecial 
Representative in the Congo on the subject of United 
Nations protected areas." 

SA758 and Add. 1, March 3, 1961, "Report by the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council concerning 
recent events in the province of Leopoldville." 

S/4-761, March 8, 1961, "Report dated 8 March 1961 to 
the Secretary-General from his Special Representative 
in the Congo on the incidents at Moanda, Banana, and 

Matadi." 

SA768 and Add. 1 and 2, March 14, 1961, "Exchange of 
communications between the representative of Belgium 
and the Secretary-General and report addressed to the 
Secretary-General by his Special Representative in the 
Congo." 

SA771 and Add. 1-3, March 20, 1961, "Report of the 
Secretary-General on the implementation of part A, 
operative oaragraph 4, of Security Council resolution 
S/4741 of 21 February 1961." 

S/4775, March 30, 1961, "Exchange of correspondence be- 
tween the Secretary-General and the President of the 
Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) concerning 

Matadi." 

S/479O, April 14, 1961, "Report to the Secretary- 
General from his Acting Special Representative in the 
Congo concerning the interrogation of 30 mercenaries 
apprehended in Kabalo on 7 April 1961." 

S/4791, April 15, 1961, "Report to the Secretary- 
General from his Acting Special Representative in the 
Congo on the Civil War Situation in Katanga and on 
United Nations Action in implementation of the Security 
Council resolution of 21 February 1961." 



487 

S/4807 and Add. 1, May 17, 1961, "Second report of the 
Secretary-General on certain steps taken in regard to 
the implementation of Security Council resolution 
S/4741 of 21 February 1961." 

S/4841 and Add. 1-3, June 20, 1961, "Report of the 
Secretary-General on the implementation of part B, 
paragraph 1, of Security Council resolution S/4741 
of 21 February 1961." 

S/4-917, August 4, 1961, "Report on action taken by the 
United Nations to assist in the implementation of the 
agreement of 19 June 1961 between the Leopoldville and 
Stanleyville authorities." 

S/4-923, August 13, 1961, "Exchange of letters between 
the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo 
(Leopoldville) and the Secretary-General." 

SA939, Sept. 13, 1961, " Note verbal e dated 13 Sep- 
tember 1961 from the representative of Belgium to the 
Secretary-General . " 

S/4940 and Add. 1-19, Sept. 14, 1961, "Report of the 
Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in 
the Congo to the Secretary-General, relating to imple- 
mentation of part A, operative paragraph 2, of Security 
Council resolution S/4741 of 21 February 1961." 

S/4976, Nov. 11, 1961, "Report of the Commission of 
Investigation established under the terms of General 
Assembly Resolution 1601 (XV)." 

S/4989/Rev. 2, Nov. 24, 1961, "United- States of America 
amendments to document S/4985/Rev. 1." 

S/5002, Nov. 24, 1961, "Resolution adopted by the 
Security Council at its 982nd meeting on 24 November 
1961 concerning the situation in the Republic of the 
Congo." 

S/5004, Nov. 27, 1961, "Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Republic of the Congo relating to the 
legal status, facilities, privileges and immunities of 
the United Nations Organization in the Congo." 

S/5038, Dec. 21, 1961, "Report of the Secretary-General 
concerning the negotiations at Kitona between the Prime 
Minister of the Congo (Leopoldville) and the President 
of the provincial government of Katanga." 



488 

Security Council, O ffici al Records , Seventeenth Year (1962), 
Supplements for 1562 

S/5053 and Add. 1-12, Jan. 9, 1962, "Report of the 
Qfficer-in-Charge of the United Nations Operation in 
the Congo to the Secretary-General relating to the 
implementation of Security Council resolution S/4741 
of 21 February 1961 and S/5002 of 24 November 1961." 

S/5053/Add. 13, Nov. 26, 1962, "Report to the Secretary- 
General from the Officer-in-Charge of the United Nations 
Operation in the Congo on developments relating to the 
application of the Security Council resolutions of 21 
February and 24 November 1961 and submission and imple- 
mentation of the Plan of National Reconciliation." 

S/5078, Feb, 16, 1962, "Exchange of communications be- 
tween the representative of Belgium and the Secretary- 
General . " 

Security Council, Offi c ial Records , Eighteenth Year (1963), 
Supplements for 1~96"3 

S/5053/Add. 14 and 15, Jan. 11, 1963, "Report to the 
Secretary-General from the Officer-in-Charge of the 
United Nations Operation in the Congo on developments 
relating to the application of the Security Council 
resolutions of 21 February and 24 November 1961." 

S/5240 and Add. 1 and 2, Feb. 2, 1963, "Report of the 
Secretary-General concerning the implementation of 
Security Council resolutions S/4387 of 14 July I960, 
S/4741 of 21 February 1961, and S/5002 of 24 November 
1961." 

S/3298, April 29, 1963, "Report of the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council concerning developments relating 
to Yemen." 

S/5321, May 27, 1963, "Report by the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council further to his report of 29 
April 1963 on certain developments relating to Yemen." 

S/5323, June 3, 1963, "Report of the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council on the financial implications 
of the United Nations Observation Mission in Yemen." 

S/5325, June 7, 1963, "Report of the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council on latest developments concern- 
ing the proposed Yemen Observation Mission." 



489 

S/5331, June 11, 1963 , "Resolution adopted by the 
Security Council at its 1039th meeting concerning the 
situation in Yemen." 

S/5412, Sept. 4, 1963, "Report by the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council on the Functioning to Date of 
the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission and the 
Implementation of the Terms of Disengagement." 

S/5428, Sept. 17, 1963, "Report by the Secretary-General 
on the Question of Military Disengagement in the Congo. 
Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council 
on certain activities of former members of the Katanga 
gendarmerie. " 

S/5447 and Add. 1 and 2, Oct. 28, 1963, "Report by the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the 
functioning of the Yemen Observation Mission and the 
implementation of the terms of disengagement." 

Security Council, Official Records , Eighteenth Session 
(1964), Supplements for l96"4~~ 

S/5501, Jan. 2, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council on the functioning of the 
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission and the 
implementation of the terms of disengagement, covering 
the period from 29 October 1963 to 2 January 1964." 

S/5569, Feb. 29, 1964, "Report of . the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council concerning the situation in 
Cyprus . " 

S/5572 and Add. 1, March 3, 1964, '"Report by the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the 
functioning of the United Nations Yemen Observation 
Mission and implementation of the terms of disengage- 
ment, covering the period from 3 January to 3 March 
1964." 

3/5575, March -4, 1964, "Resolution adopted by the 
Security Council at its 1102nd meeting on 4 March 
1964." 

S/5579, March 6, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
on the organization and operation of the United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus." 

S/5593, March 12, 1964, Add. 1-3, "Report by the 
Secretary-General on the organization and operation 
of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Porce in Cyprus." 



490 



S/5625, March 26, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
on the organization and operation of the United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus." 

S/5634, March 31 ? 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
on the organization and operation of the United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Porce in Cyprus." 

S/5653, April 11, 1964, "Note by the Secretary-General. 
Aide-memoire concerning some questions relating to the 
functions and operation of the United Nations Peace- 
Keeping Porce in Cyprus." 

S/5671, April 29 , 1964 , "Report by the Secretary- 
General to the Security Council on the operations of 
the United Nations Peace-Keeping Porce in Cyprus 



IB." 



S/5679, May 2, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
on the organization and operations of the United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Porce in Cyprus." 

S/5681, May 4, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council on the functioning of the 
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission and the imple- 
mentation of the terms of disengagement covering the 
period from 3 March to 3 May 1964." 

S/5691? May 11, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council on the operation of the United 
Nations Peace-Keeping Porce in Cyprus." 

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to the Security Council on the United Nations operation 
in Cyprus, for the period 26 April to 8 June 1964." 

S/5784, June 29, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
on the withdrawal of the United Nations Porce in the 
Congo and on other aspects of the United Nations opera- 
tion there. " 

S/5794, July 2, 1964, "Report by the Secretary-General 
to the Security Council on the functioning of the 
United Nations Yemen Observation Mission and the imple- 
mentation of the terms of disengagement covering the 
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S/5950 and Add. 1 and 2, Sept. 10, 1964, "Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation 
in Cyprus . " 



4-91 



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 

Joan Sacknita Carver was born on January 22, 1931, 
at Spokane, Washington. In June, W9, she was graduated 
from Lewis and Clark High School, Spokane. In 194-9 she was 
awarded a Seven College Conference National Scholarship to 
Barnard College. In June, 1955, Mrs. Carver received the 
degree of Bachelor of Arts, magna cum laude, from Barnard 

College. 

From 1953 until 1955 Mrs. Carver was employed as the 
personal secretary to, the Iranian Ambassador to the United 
Hations. From September, 1955, until September, 1956, she 
was a research assistant with the Institute for Research in 
the Social Sciences and a graduate student in the Department 
of Political Science of the University of North Carolina. 
In August, 1957, she received the degree of Master of Arts 
from the University of North Carolina. 

Firs. Carver taught history at the Lake Shore Junior 
High School in Jacksonville, Florida in 1957-1958. In the 
following year she served as office manager at Bartram 
School in Jacksonville, In 1958 Mrs. Carver was appointed 
a lecturer in government and social science at Jacksonville 
University. From 1959 until I960 and from 1963 until the 



502 



503 

present time she has held the position of instructor in 

government at Jacksonville University. 

In September, I960, Mrs. Carver began work toward the 

degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Florida. 

From I960 until 1963 she was a student in the Department of 

Political Science and a graduate fellow. 

Mrs. Carver is married to Jay Randall Carver, Jr., 
and is the mother of one son. She is a member of Pi Sigma 
Alpha, Phi Beta Kappa, the American Political Science 
Association, the Southern Political Science Association, 
and the American Association of University Professors. 









This dissertation was prepared under the direction 
of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee 
and has been approved by ail members of that committee. It 
was submitted to the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences 
and to the Graduate Council, and was approved as partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. 



December 18, 1%5 




4^ IpM fU^^^s 



Dean, ColIege/6fj Arts and Sciences 



Dean, Graduate Scnool 
Supervisory Committee: 




Chairman 



^^Vtm**^ 







^jj^ c y^H